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Foreword.
In the foreword to the weekly letters of
1908, published early in 1909, it was suggested
that we could not expect the perpendicular
advance of 1908 to be duplicated in 1909 and
that ,esults would be largely dependent on
discrimination in the selection of securitief:
and the periods of buying and selling. Looking backward, we find that between January
.1, 1908, and January 1, 1909, Railroad Stocks
advanced on the average about 29 points
(from 71.75 to 100.57) and Industrials about
26 points (from 49.69 to 75.22) while in the
year 1909 Rails advanced only about 11 points
(from 100.57 to 111.36) and Industrials about
10 points (from 75.22 to 85.47).
The year 1910 will in my opinion call for
more careful discrimination than did 1909. I
had no hesitation in openly predicting a bear
market in 1907, and a bull market in 1908-9,
but indications are not so clear now. Business conditions are excellent and the future
promises well, but the stock market is at a
high level and there are some clouds on the
horizon. I am willing to go on record as
predicting a very mixed stock market for the
'-year with profitable ventures more than ordinarily dependent on the intelligent choice
of securities .
.JNote--The original intention was to publish
0 the charts accompanying the weekly letters in
a separate volume, but it was found practicable
and expedient to insert them in their proper
place under the same cover with the letters.
The references to Volume II may, therefore,
be disregarded.
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It is not probable that the major movements of
the stock m a rket will be so easily read in the year
1909 as was the case in 1908. There are some
things which will aid the careful student in his investigations and deductions, notably the new methods
of railroad acco unting and the sounder condition of
banking institutions and corporations, but we can
no longer argue that prices of securities generally
are far below values. The advance, or more properly, the recovery, of. 1908 could be predicted with
great positiveness. The trend of the market was
upward through out the year, and while it is probable
that we will find a continuation of this tendency in
1909 it is quite certain that the percentage of advance
will not be so great in the next year and that reactions will be more frequent and more severe than
was the case in 1908.
This does not mean that stock market opportunities will be curtailed in 1909. On the other hand,
they will be greater than for several years if the
principal movements can be forecasted with a reasonable degree of accuracy. That is to say, if instead
of the perpendicular upturn of the past year, we
have several severe recessions followed by further
advances, much greater profits can be accumulated.
Everything depends on the ability to foresee such
changes.
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Admitting the comparative difficulties which lie
in the path of prophecy now, I am personally confident that we need make no serious blunders. One
of the great points to be given attention will be the
technical situation. I do not refer to the shifting
of day-to-day operations, but to the more important
periods when stocks have temporarily passed from
strong to weak hands. At such times the more
powerful bull operators find it expedient to assist
the bears until the weak public participators are
eliminated and a short interest is created.
Recognizing the necessity of extreme caution
and ample information during the coming year, several improvements will be made in this service. Instead of attempting to analyze everything in my own
offices, arrangements have been made with excellent
specialists in every branch of the speculative and
investment business. Hereafter an inquiry on bonds
will be referred to the bond expert of one of our
best houses, an inquiry on curb stocks to an authority in that line, and so following. The technical
situation and purely speculative advice I will attend
to personally. It goes without saying that any information on any subject will be closely examined
in this office before being generally promulgated.
The above statements are not intended as selfadvertising. There is naturally some personal pride
in the successful issue of the letters of 1908, and I
would like to have it understood that no efforts
will be spared to improve the' service from year to
year. The scope of the service was greater last
year than in the preceding year, and the same improvement will be found in the coming year.
In order to show the movements of stock prices
in the second year following panics, a chart has
been prepared. (See Vol. II., Book of Charts.) By
comparing it with charts previously offered showing movements in years next following panics the
uncertainty referred to will be graphically shown.
I have also add ed notations as to specific influences
in the different periods.
The charts represent the course of the average
prices of 20 active stocks, all railroads, except that
in 1875 and 1879 Pacific Mail and Western Union
were included.
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Market Movement of Stock Prices in Second Year Following Panics.
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For 1875 the stocks were:
Central of New Jersey
Hannibal & St. Joseph
Chicago & Alton
Illinois Central
Chic. & Northwestern
Lake Shore
Chi., Mil. & St. Paul
Michigan Central
Chi., Burl. & Quincy
N. Y. Central
C., C., C. & lnd.
Pacific of Missouri
Chicago & Rock Island Pacific Mail
Delaware & Hudson
Pitts., Ft. Wayne & Chi.
Del., Lack. & Western
Union Pacific
Erie
Western Union
In 1879 the same stocks were used, except that
Louisville & Nashville was substituted for Pacific of
Missouri.
For 1886, 1895 and 1898 the following stocks
were used:
Atchison
Michigan Central
Canadian Pacific
Missouri Pacific
Chi., Mil. & St. Paul
Manhattan
Chi. & Northwestern
N. Y. Central
C., C., C. & St. Louis
Norfolk & Western
Delaware & Hudson
Northern Pacific
Del., Lack. & West.
Reading
Illir.ois Central
Southern Pacific
Lake Shore
Union Pacific
Louisville & Nashville
Wabash, pfd.
For 1895, the same· list was used, except that Bait.
& Ohio, Chesapeake & Ohio, Erie and Pennsylvania were substituted for Del., Lack. & Western,
Lake Shore, Michigan Central and Northern
Pacific.
For .thirty years past, stocks have swung on a
higher level, in the second year after a panic, than
they did in the year next after the panic.
Prices have, frequently, in the second year after a
panic, been subjected to great perturbations, and
twice, viz.: in 1875 and 1895, the rise preceded a
fall to a lower level within a year or two afterward , owing to conditions.
1875: A year of extreme depression in business,
and sharp rate wars between railroads. Several
railroads earned merely enough to pay their fixed
charges. The decline in May and June was largely
due to Erie · going into the hands of receivers, and
fear that other important lines might follow. Gold
was being exported and the balance of trade was
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against us. The October break was caused largely
by the sensational decline of Pacific of Missouri
from 47 ¾ in October to 7½ in November. The
road had b een leased at fixed dividends to Atlantic
& Pacific and this break utt erly upset confidence
and demoralized the prices of stoc ks. While there
was some recovery into 1876, business conditions
were extremely un satisfactory and led to the great
decline of 1876 and the panic of 1877. The banks
were in good shape, interest rates were moderate
and th e crops excell ent, although grain brought low
prices. It was the poor railroad earn in gs which
made serious trouble.
1879: A year of good conditions, record crops,
with hi g h prices fo r grain, an enormous balance
of trad e in our favor, greater h armo ny in the
railroad world, good earn in gs on accou nt of the
big crop s of 1878, and a numb er of important rail ro;id consolidations, several of them engin ee r ed by
Jay Gould. Unt il la t e in th e year, bank reserves were
ample and interest rates moderate. In Octobe r and
November there was a deficit in bank reserves and fo r
six weeks call a nd time loans were both high, call
money being up to 7 per cent. with ¼ to ½ commission added. The period of rai lroad forec los ures
was at an end for th e time being, and 1879 witnessed a ru sh to buy, especial ly low-priced railroad
shares and bo nd s, w hich was un preceden ted. A
vigorous ri se went o n until November, when an
overbought cond iti on of the market and hi gh money
caused a sha rp r eacti o n. The rise was resumed
sh ortly, h owever, and ran on fo r n early two years.
1886:
Stocks were comparatively low the
first part of the year, und er th e deoressing influ ence
of se riou s st rikes, th e ana rchi st o utra g..:: in Chicago,
a turn in foreign trade against us, a nd free exports
of gold. Go ld expo rts stopped in Jun e, at which
time th ere was $40.000,000 less of money in circulation in the United States than the year before. The
market turned in May, goo d crops h elping.
Co rn
was small this yea r, but other crops excellent.
Prices for grains were mo stly higher. The ba nks
had ample reserves until the las t half of th e year.
The market was .buoyant a nd higher after May,
and prices rose steadily until December, when a
flurry in interest rates caused a sharp break. The
6

decline culminated on December 15, when sales at
the New York Stock Exchange amounted to 1,096,000
shares, the heaviest day's trading on record up to
that time. The market soon recovered, and the
trend was upward thereafter for several years.
1895: A year of gloom, preceding the smash of
1896. Prices of stocks were higher than in 1894,
but the market was irregular, owing to the serious
handicaps' on business imposed by the Wilson
revenue tariff bill, the great Pullman strike, the
march of Coxey's army and general unrest in the
ranks of labor. The crops were in most cases enormous, but, on this occasion prices for grain were
materially lower. The banks were full of money
and interest rates absurdly low. The plethora of
money led to the retirement of various forms of
circulation, and on July 1 there were $59,000,000 Jess
money in circulation than the year before. Gold
was freely exported, and the raid on the Treasury
gold reserves, early in the year, is a matter of wellknown history.
During the year business revived
somewhat and stocks rose into October. After a
natural reaction into November, stocks might possibly have recovered sharply, but on December 17
President Cleveland's message on Venezuelan affairs,
with its possibility of war with Great Britain, sent
the speculative structure tumbling, and, owing to
other troubles, prices did not average as high again
for two years afterward.
1898: This was a year of business revival, promoted by the Dingley tariff law of July 24, 1897.
Surplus deposits in the banks were enormous, interest rates were low, foreign trade ran tremendously in our favor, and gold imports in the fiscal
year broke all records. Cotton, wheat and oats were
record crops, and while some other -crops were
less than usual, yet on the whole, prices were at
least satisfactory or higher. There was a very large
increase of money in circulation, on July 1 the
increase being $197,000,000' over the year before.
A temporary l ardening of interest rates led to a
considerable reaction in stocks in the Spring, and
thereafter stocks entered upon the Jong bull market,
which did not culminate until 1902.
1905: The country had entered upon a new era
of prosperity in 1904. The Northern Securities mud7

die was out of the way. Business and railroad
earnings were good, and there was hardly a cloud
in the sky. There was a strong reaction in the
Spring, on account of an overbought condition of
the market, and then stocks rose handsomely. In
the chart no account is taken of several of the giltedged high-class investment stocks, like D., L. & W.,
Ch. & Northwestern, Lake Shore and Great Northern preferred, which rose to fabulous 'prices. In
October and on into the following year the loaning
power of the banks almost reached the vanishing
point, and the country was hurrying on toward the
impasse, reached in 1906, where panic at an early
date confronted the country. The rise was halted
in the last three months of the year by !)rohibitive
rates for call and time money.

The General Situation.
The general situation was so fully discussed in
the special letter of December 29 that further comment is unnecessary. It is sufficient to say that
while the improvement in business is healthy and
reasonable it has been ove.restimated by many
writers and individuals. A mushroom growth in
business following a severe panic would not be at
all reassuring, it would merely represent a dangerously rapid convalescence which wou ld certainly be
folJowed by a relapse. Our greatest danger, so far
as stock prices are concerned lies in anticipating and
discounting that which does not exist.

The Technical Situation,
The technical situation is not entirely satisfactory.
The short interest has been reduced during the
holidays, A bear is the biggest coward on earth and
is always afraid to go home with many open commitments. · The very foxy people who want to anticipate the "January bulge" (which has already been
anticipated in many quarters) are long of stocks.
The weakness of the technical situation is of a temporary character, however, and may cure itself very
quickly. We should be able to get a pretty good
line on it next week.

Conclusion.
No doubt many of my clients will wonder, after reading the above )etter, whether I am a bull or a bear.
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I will state, without any qualifications, that I am bullish,
tut that I do not feel so confident in taking a positive
position as was the case in 1908. There are certain
groups and individual securities which offer the most
promise \\ ith the greatest factor of safety. These it
will be my endeavor to examin~ carefully and recommend from time to time.
Earnings should be carefully scrutinized from now
on. This thing of increases in net as against decreases
in gross has about run its course. ln fact. many of the
economies which have served t0 produce such showings cannot endure when business becomes normal and
the shoe may be on the other foot so far as comparisons
are concerned. We should also keep in mind the slump
in net earnings in November and December, 1908, and
remember that comparisons are with extremely low
figures and that improvement is thus magnified. For
example, the net earnings of Atchison and Southern
Railway for November, 1908, aroused considerable enthusiasm. This showing was, in truth, most gratifying,
but if the hackneyed methods of comparing figures with
the corresponding month of last year are supplanted by
more intelligent comparisons, we may not find things
quite so rosy. Atchison's net for November, 1908, was
$3,219,000 as compared with $1,980,000 in November,
1907, and as compared with $3,164,000 in November,
1906. Gratifying as the present exhibit is, a glance
shows the fallacy of comparisons with 1907.
Another thing which will require careful consideration is money conditions. We have had a long period
of very easy money, due to a large extent to dull business and idle funds. Money will not be easy forever.
Shortly the Trust Companies must ir,crea~e reserves
from 10% to 15%. This will cut down the floating
supply somewhat and if our hopes of improvement in
business are realized money will be more fully employed
in mercantile lines and consequently will demand a
higher figure when loaned on stock exchange collateral.
Money is a good deal like a laborer-it must work if it
is to earn, and it works cheaply when there is little
demand for its services, but when money is in demand
its wages are advanced.
•
The Italian earthquake will not probably have an
immediate market effect. It is impossible to offer a competent opinion as to the bearing of this great disaster
upon our securities until we know more about the extent of property loss and the extent to which life and
9

fire insurance corporat1ons are involved. If the latter
class of corporations have lost heavily they will be
compelled to market some securities and this may cause
temporary depression. It is not probable, however, from
the meagre data now at hand that property destruction,
measured in dollars, is so great as in lhe case of the
San Francisco earthquake, and we know how quickly
that loss was absorbed, or, at least, ignored marketwise.
Continue to advise purchases of industrial stocks on
all reactions. Would give preference ta the industrial
group. American Locomotive, American Car & :::;'oundry
and Railway Steel S'pring are very inviting. Amalgamated Cower is all right on the scaling principle. In
the steel stocks United States Steel common is safest
and most attractive. They will suffer far less than the
smaller corporations in the event of tariff revision.
The securities of the minor stec.l companies should be
avoided for the present. Distillers makes a good showing and should do better before long.

1('

January 9, 1909.
Analogy, when properly employed, is often of
great value. On the theory that history repeats
itself we may gain valuable suggestions. The great
flaw in this form of forecasting lies in a too literal
appl" cation of precedent without consulting possible
differences in conditons, specific and general.
In the Consolidated Gas matter we find an excellent precedent by harking back to th e affairs
of the People's Gas Company of Chicago.
The
ca ses present a fairly good parallel and wherever a
lack of conformity appears it has been considered.
We are also approaching another legal decision
for which we have a parallel; i. e., the present suit
against the Union a nd South ern Pacific corporations, and th e enfo rc ed segregation of the Northern
P acifi c and Great Northern in 1904. This matter
will be fully discussed in the weekly Jetter of
January 16.
It will be und er stood th at this letter and the
next weekly letter are not offered as specific r eco mmendatio ns in favor of Consolidated Gas or Union
Pacific, but as a most impressive test o f the value
of precedent. We will have occasion to employ
such reasoning frequ ently in the next year.
The sensational decline, amounting to $36 or
more per share, this week in the stock of the Consolidated Ga s Co. of New York presumably repres ents the fina ncial community's present judgm ent
of the extent t which the decision of The United
States Supreme Court in favor of the 80-cent gas
law affects th e value of the company's property.
Ordinarily a decline of such pro po rti ons in the price
of any well-kn ow n iss ue is q ui ckly followed by
heavy• purchases of an "investment" character,
which not only furnish a market fo r stock pressed
for sale, but, through the removal of the shares
purchased from the doma in of speculation , lays the
-foundation for a h ealthy and o rd erly recovery in
the price of the stock. Little or noth ing of the
sort has as yet manifested itself in the trading in
Consolidated Gas and the r easo n is di scoverable
in the comments one hears. in ba nking and broke rage offices o r r-eads in the financial ptess. The
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impression is widespread that, assuming the permanency of 80-cent gas in New York City, there
is no means of knowing, nor any data for forecasting, the company's future. This impression, it
need hardly be added, the company has done nothing to dispel.
It is my belief that the recent history of the
People's Gas Light and Coke Co., of Chicago, is
full of significance in regard to Consolidated Gas.
The former company nearly three years ago passed
through the same trying experience that has now
befallen the latter-the same, at least, in general
aspects, with differences in degree and in elements
of resistance to be noted.
,
In February, 1906, the Chicago company, after a
long series of legislative, aldermanic and popular
attacks even more severe than the New York company has passed through, agreed with the city upon
an 85-cent rate, conditioned upon the dismissal of
all the many actions pending against the company
and its constituents and to remain in force for
five years from February 1, 1906. Anticipating such
a settlement, the directors in December, 1905, reduced the dividend rate from 6 per cent. to 5 per
cent. Surprisingly enough, however this reduced
rate stood for just one year. In January, 1906, the
board restored the 6 per cent. rate, "belit>ving the
earnings justified it and impressed with the conviction that the minimum rate to which the stockholders are entitled is 6 per cent. per annum."
(Annual report for 1906.)
So far from being a disaster to the company, the
reduction from $1 to $.85 in the price of Chicago
gas enforced only the undeniably moderate reduction from 6 per cent. to 5 per cent. in the dividend ·
rate for a single year. To dig a little under the
surface, Jet us examine the gross and net earnings, percentages of change in each, and earnings
on stock, over a series of years, as follows:
Gross
Per cent.
Earnings.
Increase.
Year.
$13,146,367
12.5%
1907
11,680,044
*4.9
1906
12,284,363
2.1
1905
12,014,U84
1.3
1904
12

11,854,800
11,058,413
9,663,746
9,090,337

7.2
14.2
6.3
12.2
Per cent.
Per cent. Earned
Increase. on Stock.
5.7%
7.6%
*14.2
6.9
0.5
9.5
4.8
9.5
5.2
8.8
5.6
8.0
4.9
7.3
8.4
7.7
rated on $28,668,800
on $32,969,100 stock

1903
1902
1901
1900

Net
Year.
Earnings.
1907
$5,172,742
1906
4,892,741
1905
5,705,579
1904
5,678,264
1903
5,414,438
1902
5,145,202
1901
4,871,305
1900
4,642,550
For 1900, earnings are pro
stock; for all subsequent years
outstanding.
Here we find that, whereas the price of gas was,
roughly speaking, 15 per cent. below the _previously
prevailing price during eleven months of 1906, gross
earnings fell off less than 5 per cent. in that year.
To that extent did the normal increase in consumption, plus the economic increase due to the lower
price, offset the decreased compensation per unit of
sale. The great increase in 1907, of course, was
due largely to the acquisition under lease of the
Ogden Gas Co. The Ogden Co. appears to have
produced at the rate of about 900,000,000 cubic feet
annually, which, at 85 cents and allowing for miscellaneous earnings, would account for, say, $800,000 of the increase. In that case, the People's Co.
itself must have had an increase of more than 5
per cent. in gross earnings. Considering the previous record, this is a sati factory rate of increase.
Net earnings, naturally, were much harder hit by
the price reduction than gross and in 1907 were
still far from a restoration to the high level of 1905;
in fact, they were only about equal to the net earnings of 1902. But note that in 1904 and 1905, with
earnings of 9.5% on the stock, but beset on all
sides with anti-monopoly litigation and public demand for lower rates, the company deemed it prudent to pay but 6 per cent. dividends, or no more

* Decrease.
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than the directors now con sider it safe to pay with
only (in 1907) 7.6 per cent. earned. Furthermore,
the Ogden Co. absorption, which citizens tried desperately though unsuccessfully to prevent by injunction, evoked no protest whatever, o nce the company had conceded the principle of price regulation
by ordinance and a lower rate.
That the investing public is pretty well satisfied
with the Chicago company's exchange of large profits and the hazards of political legislation and competition for a narrow but secure margin of profit on
a steadily expanding vo lu me of business is fairly
clear from the rec o rd of fluctuations in the price
of the stock. The subjoined table of high and low
prices should, of course, be read in the light of the
great breakdown in security prices in 1907, and the
fact that many standard in vestment shares are yet
much below the quotations of two or three years
ago.

High and Low Prices, People's Gas Stock, by Years.
Year
· High
Low
Dividends
1908
106½
80
6%
1907
98~
70 ½
6%
1906
103
88
5%
1905
115 ½
97¼
6%
1904
112½
92¾
6o/o
1903
108¼
87¾
6%
1902
109½
98¼
6%
1901
120 ½
98¼
6%
1900
111 ½
81¾
6%
In order to graphically show the market movements of the stock of the People's Gas Co., a chart
has been prepared. (See V ol. II., Book of Charts.)
Now, for the Consolidated Gas Co., it must be admitted that all ava ilable data upon its current earnings are in the greatest confusion, chiefly because
of the litigation over 80-cent gas and the company's
determination not to give out r eally intelligible r eports durin g its pendency. But the report of the
Public Service Commission credits the company with
earning a surplus over intere st charges during the
calendar year 1907 of $7,464,822, eq ual to more than
9-per cent. on the $80,000,000 capital stock then outstanding. To be ure, this is figured on the basis of
14

Market Movement and Gross and Net Earnings of
People's Gas for the Years 1900 to 1908, inclusive.
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$1 gas, but on the other hand it does not include
the surplus earnings of other companies to which
the Consolidated, by reason of its stock holdings is
entitled, but which have been used for construction
instead of being withdrawn. In an exhibit before
the Stevens Committee of the Legislature the Consolidated Company stated that during the years
1900-1,04, inclusive, such reinvested surpluses equitably accruing to the parent company had averaged approximately $2,000,000 a year. They are
probably more than that now. In the meager reports the Consolidated formerly made to its stockholders it gave the surplus after dividends in 1901
as -$1,500,000, in 1902 as $2,100,000, in 1903 as $2,500,000 ·and in 1904 as $2,600,000. Thes, figures refer
to the Consolidated Company's income actually received, in years during which 8 per cent. or more
was paid on the company's stock The ordinary
expansion of the business, which constitutes a practically complete monopoly of ·both gas and electric
lighting in Manhattan and the Bronx, is indicated
in these figures; on $1 gas the surplus must by this
time have grown to much greater proportions than
the $2,600,000 admitted by the co:npany for 1904.
Now, on 23,000,000,000 cubic feet of gas a reduction
of 20 cents per thousand would mean a loss in surplus earnings of $4,600,000. But, bearing in mind
the previous surplus over dividends and the constant increase in the city's population, how long
would it take the natural growth of surplus earnings to wipe out the effect of the law's intervention?
Certainly the record of the Chicago company
strongly suggests that, in the two and a half years
that have intervened since the passage of the 80cent law in New York, the Consolidated Co.'s business may already have outgrown the effect of the
law, or that, if it has rtot, one or two years longer
will restore the company's ability to pay large dividends.
Some points of difference between the Chicago and
New York situations must be noted. The People's
Co, suffered a reduction of only 15 per cent. in the
gas rate, as against 20 per cent. for the Consolidated. Part of the former company's business is in
natural gas, already sold at SO cents and unaffected
by the ordinance. In Chicago, the reduction was
15

quickly followed by the absorption of a competitor
selling gas at 90 cents. Generally speaking, property is less valuable and taxes lower in Chicago
than in New York.
All these points favored a recovery in the Chicago company's earnings. But the New York company has its immense revenues from electric lighting, chiefly from consumers who either already enjoy a quantity rate that precludes their shifting to
gas, or, using electric light in residences, are indifferent to a few dollars more or less per month in
their lighting bills. Furthermore, the far greater
congestion of population in New York should permit an economy of distribution costs at least great
enough to offset Chicago's other advantages of production. What this matter of congestion means to
the gas companies may be indicated by the following approximate figures:
Cubic
Feet per
Miles
Cubic
of Mains
Feet Sold
Mile of Mains
15,000,000,000
6,050,000
People's Gas 2,312
23,000,000,000
12,800,000
Consol. Gas 1,792
No one at all familiar with New York need be
told that there is ample room, through the filling up
of northern Manhattan and the Bronx, and the
company's lighting interests in Westchester, for the
service of the Consolidated Co. to expand for an indefinite number of years ·to come.
It might be added that the Brooklyn Union Gas
Co., which accepted under legal protest the SO-cent
rate and in July, 1906, di scontinued its dividends
altogether, resumed payments in March, 1908, with
a 2½ per cent. declaration, following it in October
with a dividend of 3 per cent. In 1905 the company paid 8½ per cent. and before that 8 to 10 per
cent.
In my opinion it will be found that in 1907 and
1908 the Consolidated Gas Co. of New York earned,
on the basis 6f 80 cents for gas, considerably more
than the 4 per cent. paid, and that the normal increase of its service to consumers, coupled with
comparative freedom from the menace of adverse
legislation, will rapidly compensate the stockholders
for the actual damagt inflicted by the Act which the
Supreme Court has lately upheld.
16

T he General Situation.
The view has been constantly expressed in these
advices that those who believed in an immediate and
unprecedented advance in general business would
be disappointed. The financia l press, with a laudable but mistaken impression that confidence could
be restored by extravagant predictions, has done
more harm than good. Finding the roseate views
unfulfilled, many credulous people become discouraged.
The fact is that advancement is entirely
dependent upon actual performances and that
elation is a synonym for inflation. We are getting
along all right. There has seldom been a steadier
or healthier recovery from panic conditions, and
this growth will continue, but it must be the growth
of a tree or a plant, not a fungus growth. I cannot, in the limits of this letter, offer statistics in
detail covering the improvement in certain lines.
It is furthermore not nece sary to do this, as our
bank clearings, exports, etc., are matters of general knowledge.
It may be stated, however, that
progress is satisfactory without being abnormal;
that further progress will certainly be noted as we
go along and that stock. prices will anticipate such
improvements.

The T echnical Situation.
The technical situation shifts so quickly that it
is impossible to express any fixed opinion as to
the probable effect of the location of shares, at least
so far as the day-to-day trading is concerned. The
broader technique is strong. There has been some
selling by good people, but such liquidation has
been confined to profit-taking, and stocks are, generally speaking, still in strong hands.
Conclusion.
While we may witness a traders' market for a
time, it is my opinion that the trend is stilt upward
and will remain so until a reaction is brought about
by over-bought market conditions. The news of
the week has been superficially bearish. Such items
as gold exports, threats of a new Standard Oil suit, ·
the opening of the Union Pacific suit, etc., have
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been prominently displayed, whi le the more important fundamentals, such ·as the favorab le comparisons of railroad earnings and bank clearings
with the boom year 1906 are almost ignored.
Continue to recommend purchases of low-priced
stocks. Prefer the industrials, such as Amalgamated Copper, American Car & Foundry, Railway
Steel Spring. and Steel Common. In the rails,
Erie, Colorado Southern and the Goulds look attractive. Distillers is also wtll taken. The action in Smelters and Colorado Fuel is too manipulative for safety.
I hear some extremely good talk respecting To1edo, St. Louis & Western common. Think the
·stock should be bought.
A chart showing market movements of stocks for
the month of December appears in Vol. II., Book
of Charts.

18

January 16, 1909.
The stock market having experienced a substantial backset, in consonance with reiterated opinion
expressed in these letters, it becomes once more
attractive to the conservative investment and speculative elements. It transpires that profit-taking during the last weeks of the long rise in prices was
on a very much larger scale than generally estimated. Consequently the amount available for reinvestment is of greater volume tha:1 enters into
most calculations.
There is no whipped out and discouraged bull party
to amount to anything after this reaction of 5
to 12 points in the general list. The bulls are, if
anything, more confident of the future than they
were on the grand march of last summer and autumn. The only point of doubt or hesitation is
as to the best time to get aboard. On the question
of final outcome there is practically no variance
of opinion excepting among professionals, who are
chronically found in opposition to the public. The
professionals were a badly discomfitted lot last year
and if they refuse to accept the teachings of experience they will run a fair chance of getting another
drubbing.
The public and a comparatively smali number of
sagacious and daring "big rich" men made about all
the money on the phenomenal campaign of 1908.
The "talent" was stubborn throughout and suffered
merciless punishment. It seems to want more of
the same kind of medicine. But that is aside from
the main issue.
The pause in general business · promises to be of
short duration. The uncertainty over tariff revision
which most people offer in explanation of the winter
dulness, is in reality less of an uncertainty than
agitators would have the world believe. There is
as yet a lack of exact knowl edge as to precise
extent of the impending reduction, but on that
point the protected interests wil! have a line long
before Congress realizes that it has given a hint.
Everybody knows already which way the wind is
hlowing. What is not yet determinable is its velocity or lack of velocity.
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It is noticeable, however, that the men who are
least disturbed are those who are intrusted with
the management of the important industrials which
seem to be nearest the danger centers. With eyes
turned reverently upward and hands crossed in placid
resignation they say to anxious inquirers: "We are
in the hands of our friends . We can only trust they
will not be unjust in their treatment of the manufacturing interests which give employment to millions of workingmen whose wage scale is dependant
on the degree of protection accorded American
productions."
Gospel is not truer than the statement that tariff
revision is in the hands of its friends, and it may
be assumed as one of the certainties that no interest
will be hurt-that is, none of sufficient size and lung
power to get out and yell ''bloody murder" if really
threatened. For that and other reasons I am disposed to attach small real market importance to
this question of tariff agitation. As a temporary
sentimental influence its presence cannot be ignored
any more than measles and other troublesome and
annoying but not dangerous ailments incident to
childhood and pimples to adolescence. At the risk
of colliding with a recognizable body of opinion to
the contrary I refuse to give the tariff standing as a
serious factor in point of market influence.
At worst the special session of Congress is likely
to be a short one. It will find its work blocked
out for it by the Ways and Means Committee of
the present House, which has been on the job for
weeks and is driving ahead night and day in order
that the period of agony may be curtailed as ·much
as possible.
Instead of running the discus sion
into late summer as many anticipate the promise is for
a finish in May or June.
•
Meanwhile stocks on the shelves are undergoing steady
and important reduction. A population of 85,000,000
people are drawing on supplies at a rate which will
presently put them down to the limits of safety. It
therefore becomes apparent that when the pressure
is released and the wheels begin to turn in good
earnest there will be employment for everybody.
The bare shelves and storehouses will have to be
filled from the ground up. Times will be all the
better for the prolongation of the season of
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repression. The power is generating every hour in
the 24 and the stored up energy will increase the speed
of recovery. There will be a clear track and fine going.
J do not feel that in the foregoing I am entering the
field of prophesy, but merely formulating a deduction
from plainly dist inguishable promises.
It will be strange, indeed, if the stock market does
not discount the promise of returned prosperity in the
same hearty fashion it did the partial recovery from the
period of extreme depression following the panic of
1907. The great 1908 rise in prices might be described
as the first stage of a splendid upward movement. It
was justified in large measure by improved business and
J,ealthy growth o-f sentim ent. Enthusiasts who undertook to carry speculation too far were fortunately checked
in time to prevent calamity to the market. It seems
almost as though a wise providence had shaped -events
,,nd conditions. Made to order, the programme coul-d
not well have been improved upon or better suited to
the views of those whose anxiety is for the avoidance
of disastrous interruptions to a norm a l upward movement of values and fully restored activity in all lines.
Commenting on the situation as it looked to him, an
active and successful trader of consequence and typical
of a large and influential class said: "I sold out my
stocks fully a month ago and took my profits on a line
whose accumulation began soon after the panic. Like
everybody else on the bull side I gained in confidence
and courage as prices rose. I cashed in at a higher
range of quotations than I had dared hope for and
when I did so it was with the intention of keeping out
t:ntil after Congress acts on the tariff. I now find myself
waYering in that determination. The voluminous stocks
un!oa·ded around the top have not carried prices down
nearly as fast or as far as I had expected and they
seem really to have found -a home, or at least a comfortable resting place. As I read the market there has
been going on a replacement of sold out lines on a
large aggregate scale-not for account of the rich men
or bull leaders possibly, but for the medium class and
the little people. The absorption of stocks in this way
has not yet cleaned up the floating commission house
supply by any means, but it has reduced that supply
noticeably. I begin to believe that another rise in the
stock market is ahead of us and that the start off is
likely to be ahead of schedule tim•e. I shoul·d hate
mightily to be left behind when the train leaves."
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The party whose op1mons are thus quoted commenced the replacement of his stocks, putting in a
series of scale orders. He may have taken counsel
of his impatience and nervousness over inaction, but
there are many like him and their presence in the
-market is felt whenever the short selling contingent
makes a demonstration and tries to break through
the bulwarks.
The element of cheap money is a continuing influence that must not for a single moment be overlooked or forgotten.
Money is piling up at a
rapid rate in the New York and other eastern centers. I would rather see it in better use than resting in bank vaults, but here it is and it will not be
permitted to rust. If it can not find remunerative
employment in channels of trade and commerce it
will take what it can get where it can get it, pending
business revival. Wall Street is about the only place
where it can be kept busy just now, and there it is
drifting. In comparison with prevailing rates of
interest on call and time, there is a big margin of
profit in the purchase of many of the dividend payers. It stands to reason that advantage will be
freely taken of this situation and that large amounts
will find a way to the stock market.
The demand from solid investors, insurance companies and estates is keeping down supplies of firstclass bonds to the lowest ebb and thus paving the
way for new flotations that will probably be a
feature of the situation later in the year. Railroads are on ly awaiting the day when their equipment is in full use or nearly so, to go into the market for fresh capital. Meanwhile their rolling stock
and rails are wearing out and there is certain to
be plenty for the equipment companies and steel
mills to do. Wear and tear is a relentless proposition. There is no more esc:ape from it than from
death or taxes. Re-creation is a law of railroads
as it is of nature.
Financial writers try to make much of the rise
of ¼ in the Bank of England rate, but they ha ve
not disturbed the serenity of our bankers so that
anybody could notice. If the move has a dark and
portentious significance, the fact can not be made
clear to the lay understanding. It would appear
that the Bank of England's gold reserve has been
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unpleasantly drawn upon largely on account of
the gold hoarding instincts of the Bank of France,
and Thursday's action was a signal to quit. The
experts are puzzling their heads and their readers with speculations as to what purpose the Bank
of France has in dragging in gold, even going so
far as to divert shipments headed for London, a
blow below the belt which has been duly resented.
The development will have to take on a more definitely disturbing color before the New York securities market will get excited over it.
The extraordinary gold production is ever making for
higher prices and expanding speculation. Clients may
weary of frequent references to this feature in these
advices, but I feel it to be one of those things whose
potential impo·rtance amply excuses iteration. Every
twenty-four hours witnesses an infusion of not less than
1,000,000 gold dollars into the world's store of money,
l.hat means an enl,argement of cash and credit to a yearly
"ggregate of approximately $1,250,000,000. The stimulating effect of that increase :n the "life blood of commerce" must be powerfully felt sooner or later. That
the operation of the injection is insidious does not make
;.ny difference in results. The energy is there just the
same and it works while you sleep. It is making advance provision for financing the next industrial and
business boom.
Developments in the railroad field have recently been
of marked significance. Wisconsin Central has at last
found the lodgment it has been looking for under the
protecting wings of Canadian Pacific. An<l thus another
little road loses its identity in one of the big systems,
even as Colorado Southern did a few brief days ago.
Confirmatory evidence is offered that Toledo, St. Louis
& Wes tern is soon to divest itself of its treasury control
of Alton, Union Pacific getting that desirable connection
after many days. The terms of the reported deal are not
yet public property. It is safe to say, however, that if ,
the trade has been completed it will be to the ri ch advantage of Mr. Hawley's company. The name of Mr.
Hawley has become one to conjure with. He has certainly shown unusual talent in building up railroad properties and making them vialuable either to hold or sell.
Bituminous coal carrying roads have been acting well.
They are earning good money and as a rule their operating expenses are -in satisfactory control. Chesapeake &
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Ohio and Norfolk & Wes tern have been especially in
clemand at advancing quotations. These two lines have
a field which promises to be indefinitely profitable regardkss of the construction of new lines into West Virginia
by Messrs. Rogers, Ryan, Ream and others.
Heedless of the costly experience in Consolidated Gas
a credulous element is speculating on grape-vine ·advices
from Washington as to what the Supreme Court is
going to do in the case involving the validity of the
commodity clause of the Hepburn bill. Of course nobody can tell in advance what position the Supreme
Court will take in this matter. And in point of fact
whatever the decision may be it should be favo rable
to the price of the stocks of the railroads directly concerned. If the Court upholds th e law and forces a
c!ivorcement of Reading, Pennsylvania, Erie, Delaware
& Hudson and others of the AntJ:iracite group fr om their
coal lands the disposition of the properties would reveal
equities of very great value. A decision for the roads
would insure them a respite from attack in that quarter, though possibly not for long. The trend of mastering sentiment is for driving railroads out of lines
of business in competition with private shippers and
confining them to the arena of "common carriers." It
might be money in the pockets of the railroa·ds and
their stockholders to yield to popular sentiment and gracefully r etire from mining, regardless of what the
Supreme Court holds in the case before it. A growing
feeling in favor of that course is manifesting itself in
railroad man agement s. What a melon-cutting there
would be if such a course should be adopted.

The General Situation.
Small change fo discemable in general business conditions. Almost no improvement in manufacturing and
mercantile lines is noted and none was looked for by
those who form judgment on actualities and do not
attempt to bend facts to fit theori es and hopes. N aturally we would all like to see the mills and factories running double time and every car on every railroad in
action, but this halcyon era is not to .be for this winter's
unfolding. The further rest which the country is taking
will work to its ultimate good. It is resulting in a
grand clean up of old stocks of e-verythingentering into
human consumpticn and will enable the nation to take
a fresh start with a clean sheet. The rest is also putting
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the money market in a shape to make corporate financing t.asier when the season opens for wholesale raising
of new capital and borrowing. The stock market will
be quick to reflect real improvement in business.
It is keenly awake to favorable developments and
courageously indifferent to temporary dulness.

The Technical Situation.
There still remains a considerable short interest
in some of the specialties, notably Smelters, Erie,
Union Pacific, Reading and New York Central,
but of original selling for speculative account there
has been little during the last few days. The menace of unlimited cheap money and the discovery
that a steady absorption of stocks is going on act
as deterrents to bearish ambition. The market
has been acting as though liquidation had about run
its cour.se. It would take a severe shock to dislodge
any considerable quantities of long stock.
As compared with rails, the small decline in industrials for this week, shown by the barometrical
figures, is worthy of special m ention. The decline
in the corresponding industrial figure recorded last
week was entirely due to the forty-point break in
Consolidated Gas.
Conclusion.
It is observed that on market drives sellers h ave been
encountering effective r esistance before going farwhereas rallies are easy and only in exceptional cases
meet with important offerings. The market ·moves in
a narrow groove, however, and has been left mostly to
the tender mercies of the room traders. The pursuit
of fr.actions has become a tiresome amusement for the
talent, but traders seem fairly content ta let matters
take their course for the time being, realizing that the
inocuousness cannot last long.
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January 23, 1909.

In these letters I have recently favored the purchase
of industrial stocks as compared with rails. This advice, so far as the common stocks oi industrials are
concerned,is intended more for the speculator than the
investor. Many of the preferred industrial stocks I
consider as excellent and attractive investments. Such
securities as Steel preferred or American Locomotive
preferred are so strongly entrenched that their present
low prices are rather the result of an unwiarranted
prejudice against industrials than because of any inherent weakness, or danger to dividends.
The future of industrial shares appears to me to be
very bright. Some of them may be affected by tariff
revision. They have faced that menacing factor for
years and it is quite certain that possible reduction of
revenues through reduced duties has already been contemplated in the price of such stocks as stand in danger. Steel common has, in my opinion already discounted a reduction of 50% in duties. T•hat is to say,
if we were quite satisfied that no reduction would occur, the stock would be selling at much higher prices.
This is true of all other affected shares. Thousands of
investors and ~eculators will not buy Industrial stocks
until that tariff bugaboo is killed, and this lessens the
immediate demand, but industrial stocks held their own
. very nicely, and the absorptio'n :s of a very high characte·r . It is quite probable, and according to all prece-·
dent, that the operators who are "waiting till the tariff
is settled" before buying good securities in this group
will find when that momentous question is laid on the
shelf that the stocks they have been waiting to buy
have already advanced to prices which are no longer
attractive. If a man waits for all the evil possibilities
which may arise to be eliminated before he makes his
purchases he will never buy a share of stock. I have
never known of a period when the situation was entirely free of bear factors and, by the same token, the
clearer the financial sky appears the more certain we are
to witness a storm.
Far more important than a reasonable tariff revision,
is the influence of our steadily advancing commodity
prices. The cause of this grad:.ial advance in the cost
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of materials and commodities of all kinds has been frequently discussed in these letters. It · will suffice to say
that the increased production of gold still continues
and that there is no reason to anticipate a cessation of
the upward trend in everything that is bought and sold.
This is greatly in favor of irn::Ustrial stocks as compared with railroad securities. It is working in their
favor now and has been working in their favor for
years.
For over a year I have repeatedly referred to the
similarity between the panic of 1903 and that o-f 1907.
They were brought about by the same fundamentals and
cured by the same fundamentals. It is folly to attt>mpt to forecast movements by merely following
charted history, but like causes bring about like effects.
So far the movements of 1903-1904 and those of 19071908 constitute a remarkable parallel. Looking into
the future we may experimentally compare 1905 and
1909.

Let us examine the comparative movements of rails
and industria ls in 1905 for the sake of precedent. The
year 1905 opened with average prices of rails at 118.50,
and industrials 70.39. The mar)<et was strong, advancing, with ordinary reactions until the middle of
April. On April 15, rails had reached 126, an advance
of about 8 points, and industrials 83, an advance of
about 13 points.
The decline from April 15 culminated May 23 with
rails at 115 and industrials at 72.
At the end of the year 1905 rails were 133.17 and industrials 95.84.
Thus in the year 1905, which we are tentatively calling a parallel with 1909, industrials made a gain of
about 25 points, while rails made a gain of about 15
points. The difference is magnified by reducing the
relative gains to percentages, which is the true method
of examining the subject. Rails advanced from the beginning to the end af the year r905 about rj%, and
industrials about 35%.
It will at once occur to the studen: to inquire how
rails and industrials compare in the recoyery of 1908-09.
That is to say, has not the movement of 1905 already
been covered by a greater advance in industrials than in
rails? On January 1, 1908, rails stood about 95. At
this writing they are about 120, an advance of 25
points, or about 26%. Industrials on January I, rgo8,
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were about 67. They are now 84, an advance of 17
points, or 20%. But there is something else to consider. Industrials suffered more in the panic of 1907
than ·did rails, and while the percentage of recovery is
more or less uniform, we find that rails have come
much nearer to a full recovery, that is to say, the at~
taining of former high records than have the industrials.
Going back to the year 1902, which was the year
when industrial stocks first attracted general public at~ention as a group, we find that the average price of
industrials (middle price between highest and lowest )
for the year 1902 was about 63, and rails about 120.
As industrials are now about 84, and rails no higher
than in 1902, it is not hard to see what great advan•
tages have accrued to the investor or speculator in industrial stocks during the last seven years. There is
also the question of dividends, which have been greater
on industrials than on rails.
There is no reason why this readjustment should not
c-ontinue. Aside from the great economic reasons already mentioned, we find the highest grade of finan- ·
ciers taking an interest in our great industrial combinations. The stocks are becoming Sf:!asoned and prejudice against this class of securities is fading.
NOTE :-The average prices given in the comparisons in
this Jetter are those compiled by the Wall Street Journal.
My own figures do not go back to 1902, and for the sake
of uniformity I have employed the same averages throughout.

T. G.

The General Situation.
The general business situation is gra-dually improving,
or more correctly speaking, it is getting ready for the
improvement, which everybody believes is ahead. The
winter is now well advanced, and in every line of business men are making preparations for a renewal of activity. The cheapness of money, which for the moment spells trade apathy, is encouraging to those who
will have to look for new capital. It gives assurance
!hat the money will be available when wanted and in
this respect relieves anxiety. In building from the
ground up, merchants, manufacturers and those engaged in lines of productive enterprise are not ,anxious
to pay more for funds than they are obliged to. Consequently those who can do so will be early in the field
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to make arrangements, and already they are feeling
their way.
Corporations are giving indications th at they will become active candidates for capital as soon as the business outlook warrants them in planning outlays for increased facilities. It seems to be the prevailing opinion
in banking and corporate quarters that the period of
cheap money will not be prolonged far into the latter
half of th e year. At the same time the notion is discouraged that the country will leap instantaneously into
high-pressure activities. The record of the times since
the beginning of 1908 shows that improvement does not
come that way, and that if action is too rapid there is
:ilmost certain to be a reaction. The winter wheat out- ,
look has undergone some improvement during the last
week, and over very considerable area~ snowfall gives
the ground the protection and moisture demanded. Advices from the Mississippi Va lley are especially encouraging. The James J. Hill interview is eloquent testimony to this effect.
Mr. Hill's ordinary attitude is pessimistic, and when
he takes a position on the bright side the public sits up
and takes notice. It is quite likely that the Middle
West wi;I take the lea-d in the matter of reviving business activity. It is in the Mississippi Valley that the
native wealth is found in hrgest volume. It is there
that the first impulse in revived buying power may be
looked for. In fact, they have never known what hard
times were in that part of the country. The depression
in busines~ throughout that grea• area has been larg,ely
the reflection of dullness elsewhere-a mere matter of
sentiment.
The advance of about le. a pound in the price of
cotton has checked the buying interest abroad, and in
the opinion of specialists in tha~ trade, something of a
reaction in the market for futures is anticipated. There
has been considerable profit-taking o·n cotton contracts
within the last few days. Call monh has been 1¾%
several days this week and special loans have been
made as low as 1¼. A good many commission hous es
in Wall Street, which loaded t:p with money in November, expecting a big speculative business in stocks
during the first quarter of the :•ear, have been reloaning their extra cash in competition with the banks.
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'I'he Technical Situation.
While there is no evidence of a large short interest
in the general list, commitments for the bear account
being quickly retired at the first evidence of strength, it
is nevertheless true that the technical situation is not
weak. Marginal holdings are better fortified than at
any time in years, and it is only when margins are
thin or the market is full of close stop orders that the
professional bear element attempts "drives" at securities. While it would be possible for these destructionists to drive prices down a few points by mere weight
of heavy sales, they know full well that an attack on a
market where heavy margins are the rule, would only
result in hanging themselves up with a line of short
stocks.
There are al!io many scale orders in the market
which act as a supporting factor on declines.
The technical situation may be safely designated as
strong.
Conclusion.
The bearishly inclined point to the fact that the stock
market has advanced since the low points of 1907 more
rapidly than have business conditions. This is true, but
we should not lose sight of the fact that the low points
in business affairs represent something actual and tangible, while the low points on securities are invariably
fictitious in panic times. When Union Pacific sold at
!00 in 1907 the only reason why such a price was established was because some unfortunate individuals
had to sell at any price obtainable, and few people had
any money with which to make purchases. Both low
and high records in bear or bull periods are fictitious,
particularly in bear periods. The bears also point to
the advances in specific stocks such as Erie, Colorado
Southern and United States Steel, and call the improvement unwarronted. They do not explain why practically all the improvement is maintained. Soda-water
advances are ,always followed by severe declines.
Stocks have halted, it is true, and so have business
conditions. Both have made a normal recovery and now
rest on a plateau. As soon as the far-sighted operators
or investors of the country make up their minds that
business will soon resume and continue its improvement,
the -stock market will once more proceed on its up-
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ward trend. lt will not wait until business actually improves. In the latter part of 1905 the equipment corporations were crowded with business, and railroads
were distressed for cars. Let me quote from the Fi11ancial Chronicle of that year:
"With trade once more active an<l prosperous, the
managers of the roads discovered that, owing to the
enforced privations of the previous eighteen months,
they were now unable to cope with the enormous
volume of business which they were called upon to
move. In every direction they found themselves
seriously cramped-track facilities insufficient, motive power inadequate and the car supply woefully
short. Had things followed a normal course during the two preceding years-that is, had rolling
stock and track been enlarged in the ordinary way
-the situation would not of course have been so
bad. As it was, the railroads overwhelmed manufacturers and supply houses with their orders. And
the situation in that regard became intensified rather
than relieved as the year progressed. No sooner
was one lot of equipment received then it was necessary to give orders for a new lot. Towards the
close of 1905 freight congestion on nearly all the
leading lines of railroads was reported."
In regard to stock prices, the same authority says:
"In the stock market the activity and tremendous
rise in prices which had marked the year 1904 were
hardly a circumstance to the extraordinary buoyancy and unrestrained optimism that developed in
1905. The volume of business was on an enormous scale, and the advances in prices in some instances of almost unparalleled magnitude. It was a
year when unfavorable developments were almost
completely ignored.
Favorable features alone
seemed to count, and, indeed, the twelve months
were made up very largely of developments of that
nature. We do not mean to say that the course
of prices was continuously upward. It was not.
There were times of severe breaks in prices. Some
of these breaks, indeed, were of such proportions
that it almost seemed as if the market would completely collapse. The striking fact, however, was
that recovery followed almost immediately and
that apparently not a trace of ill-effects was left
behind. The latter part of the year some of the
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early favorites were neglected, but other stocks
were taken in hand and speculative enthusiasm appeared· to know no bounds, and prices kept soaring
upward even in the face of money rates ranging
from 15 to 125%. In the early months of the year
stocks were sent upward on rumors of a gigantic
combination among the railroads, to include the
Vanderbilt properties, •t he Standard Oil interests
and Union Pacific; it was also believed at that time
that there was to be a merger of the Southern iron
and steel properties. These expectations were disappointed, and tLi3, together with the collapse in
the wheat speculation, the Bigelow defalcation and
the insurance disclosures, caused a severe break in
values in April and May, during . which conditions
at times were almost panicky. But within a short
time afterward the market was · again soaring upward as if nothing had happened, and as if the expectations upon which the previous rise had been
based were actually going to be realized. The stock
sales on the New York Stock Exchange for the
twelve months reached 263,081,156 shares, which
compares with 187,312,065 shares in 1904 and with
265,944,659 shares in 1901, the latter the record year
for activity. The classes of properties most distinguished for sensational advances in prices were the
anthracite coal securities, the iron and steel shares
and the copper mining and smelting stocks. The
advances in these instances run from 25 to 195
points."
It is my opinion that good securities, preferably
the industrials, such as American Locomotive, Railway Steel Spring, American Car and Foundry, United States Steel, Distillers, etc., offer the best opportunities at present. Under present conditions I see
no danger of any sustained decline. Ordinary dips
cannot be foreseen, and if they occur because of manipulation, rumors or any other cause, they should
be confidently accepted as a basis on which to replace, or average stocks.
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January 30, 1909.
A riumber of clients ,have written me recently inquir-

ing why I recommend purchases of industrials while
expressing doubts as to the immediate future of rails.
These correspondents seem to think that if the "market"
goes down both rails and industrials will suffer and
vice versa. This is true so far as daily movements are
c·oncerned, but it is not true as applied to the longer
swing of prices.
In 1907 I was recommending at one time the short
selling of industrials in preference to rails, and this
same contention arose and was answered. In the letter
of May 4, 1907, figures were ,produced showing that in
certain periods .and under certain circumstances the two
groups gradually changed their price basis in a brief
period. I took for illustration the years 1901-1902, employing the figures for a fiscal year (from July, 1901,
to July, 1902,), giving the high points for the month at
the beginning and end of the period. T,he table is reproduced below:

RAILROAD STOCKS.
Stock.
Atchison
B. & o.
Con. Pac.
St. Paul
Erie ..
L. & N.
Mo. Pac .
Penna.

..
..
..
..
.. ..
..
.. .. .. ..
.. .. ..
B~i~~n~a·c: .. .. ..
Average prices .. .. ..

High in
July, 1901.

High in
July, 1902.

89~
108 ~
108¼
177¼
43~
III
121¼
151¾
47
110¼

95¾
112¼
139¾
189¼
39¼
145¼
II9Y,
161¾
69¼
IIO~

102.97

118.41

INDUSTRIAL STOCKS.
High in
July, 1901.

Stock.
Amalgamated ..
American Smelting
American Sugar ..
Anaconda
Colo. Fuel '& Iron
National Lead
T enn. Coal & Iron
Rubber
u. s St;el
u. S. Steel, Pfd .

..
..
..
..
..
.. .. ..
.. ..
.. ..

Average price

..
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High in
July, 1902.

124¼
58
145~
48¼
tt6¼
23
72¼
21¼
48¼
99¼

68¼
47¼
134¼
27

75.80

62.18

102¼
22

t/4

69¼
T7
41
92¼

"These tables show that during the fiscal year used
r.ailroad stocks advanced an average of over 15 points,
while industrials declined almost 14 points. In other
words the spread was 29 points. The man who bought
rails and sold industrials would have made on the average 29 points. T,his exhibit entirely overthrows any
argument that the market moves one way or the other
homogeneously."
The reason for referring to 1901-2 was that farsighted men were discounting a decline in general business conditions, and consequently in commodity prices.
This single factor was almost certain to adversely affect
industrials more than rails, as th_e reduction in commodity prices would be an advantage to railroad corporations an~ a decided disadvantage to producing corporations. The preced nt was adduced in 1907 on the
theory that commodity prices woul·c! ap-ain fall, or rather
react, in 1907 and 1908. It may be added that the theory
proved correct, and that a decided advantage was gained
both in short selling of industrials in 1907 and the subsequent purchases of -rails recommended in 1908.
In the last weekly letter the year 1905 was compared
tentatively with 1909. This is merely a reversal of the
proposition explained above. Commodity prices are
again rising to the benefit of the industrials and the
prejudice of the rails. In my opinion this will be reflected in the prices of industrial stocks as emphatically as was the case in 1905. Already we find limited
evidence of this ch<mge of form. During the last two
weeks rails have fallen behind :n the movement. On
January 15, average prices of rails stood at 98.87 and
industrials 71.78. At the close of ousiness Friday, January 29, rails were 98.59 and industrials 72.12. This is
not a startling advantage but it is an advantage nevertheless.
It is quite true that we h,3ve as yet no open evidence
of a rapid advance in .g eneral business conditions. That
is neither here nor there, so far as spec1tlatio11 is concerned. When we attain to a full resumption of normal
business conditions or a boom; there wil\ probably be
no good in buying industrial shares. The improvement
will then be known ,and fully discounted in security
prices. What we must do if we are to succeed in our
ventures is to form reasonable opinions as to how general business will look in say the latter part of 1909
and anticipate improvement or retrogression by 11resent
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Comparative Market Move:nents of 20 Railroad and 12 Industrial Stocks for Years
1902 to 1908, inclusive.
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purchases or sales of stocks.

I have already expressed

tihe -decided opinion that business is making satisfactory

' headway; that no one is disappointed in our progress
except the over-optimistic or unreasonably enthusiastic
elements; and that following the present periooc! of dullness, which is, by the way, quite normal at this time of
year, we will all have occasion to be entirely satisfied.
Leaving the immediate comparison of 1905-1909 and
reverting to the long movement of rails and industrials
since 1902, I have prepared a chart which . appears
in Vol. II.
It will be observed that indust rials, paying a
higher rate of return than rails, have gradually gained
on the latter class of securities. Capitalization must, of
course, be considered, but railroad capitalization increases largely in borrd issues, and prior liens cannot be
considered as an immediate benefit to junior issues.
This issuing ' of railroa-d bonds will be continued for
some time to come. Also there has been too much cutting of maintenance by railroad corporations and this
cannot go on.
It is interesting to compare the income returns on
rnilroad and industrial stocks. I have tabulatd the leading dividend payers in both groups below.
RAILROAD COMMON STOCKS.
Div.
Prices
Rate. Jan. 27th.
Atchison . . . . . . . , . . . . . .
101),a
5
Atlantic Coast Line , . . .
109
[12
Baltimore & Ohio . . • .
~
Canada Southern . . . .
2½
64
Canadian Pacific . . . . . .
173 ¼
Central of New J ersey ..
~
234
Chesapeake & Ohio . . . .
1
45¼
Chicago & Alton . . . . . . . . . . 2
65
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul... 7
150¾
Chicago & Northwestern . . . . . . 7
1771/,
Ch,., St. Paul, Minn. & Omaha.. 7
158
Delaware & Hudson . . . . . . . . 9
176
Delaware, Lackawanna & Western .. ,o
547
Hocking Valley . .
..
4
105
Illinois Central . . . . . . . .
7
146
Lake Shore . . . . . .
270
Louisville & Nashville
123
Manhattan Elevated . . . . . .
151 ½
Minn., St. Paul & S. S. Marie ..
144 )4
Nash., Chat. & St. Louis ,. ..
125
N. Y. Central . . . . . . . . . . . .
IJ l ~~
N. Y., New Haven & Hartford ..
158½
N. Y., Ontario & Western
2
92¼
Norfolk & Western
92¼
4
N ortbern Paci fir , .
140½
7
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Di, .
Yield.
4.94
4.59
5.34
3.9
4.04
3.41
1.53
3.07
4.64
3.94
4.43
5,[l
1.83
3.81
4.8
4 .44
4.06
4.62
4.16
4.
3.81
5.04
2.16
4.33
4.98

Div.
Rate.
6
4

Pennsylvania .•
Ptts., Cin., Chi. & St. Louis
Reading . . . . . .
Southern Pacific . . . . . .
Twin City Rapid Transit ..
Union Pacific . . . . • .

l

s

IO

3 I stocks.

183)/,

Prices.
Jan. 27th.
133¾
91

137l4
121ya
100¼

180
4S5S¾

RAILROAD PREFERRED STOCKS.
Atchison' . .
S
101¾
Baltimore & Ohio . .
4
93Ya
Chicago & Alton . . . . . . . . . . 4
76
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul.. 7
165
Chicago & Northwestern . . . .
8
225
Chi., St. Paul, Minn. & Omaha.. 7
175
Cl.I Cin., Chi. & St. Louis
s
105
Coo. & Southern, 1st Pfd. . .
4
83¾
"
"
"
2d Pfd. . .
4
Bo¾
Denver & Rio Grande . . . .
S
82¼
Great Northern . . . . . . . .
7
143¾
Hocking Valle;i, . . . . . .
4
93
Kansas City Southern ~ .
4
73½
Minn. & St.Louis . . . . . . . . . . s
90
Minn., St. Paul & S. S. Marie.. 7
157
Mo., Kans. & Texas . . . . . . . . 4
74¾
N . Y., Chic. & St. Louis, 1st pfd.. s
110
N. Y., Chic. & St. Louis, 2d pfd... s
86
Norfolk & Western . .
4
86½
Pitts., Cin., Chic. & St. Louis . •
S
110
Reading, 1st pfd.
4
91¾
"
2nd pfd. . . . . . . . . . . 4
93
St. Louis & San Fran., 1st .p(d.. 4
68~
Southern Pacific . .
..
7
123¼
Toledo St. Louis & Western
4
71
Union Pacific
.• ..
4
96
26 stocks.

130

2756¼

I NDUSTRIAL COMMON STOCKS.
Adams Express . . . . . . . . . .
8
200
Amalgamated Copper . . . .
2
78¾
Amer. Car & Foundry . .
2
50 ¼
Amer. Cotton Oil
3
s2¼
American Express
12
2 . r5
Amer. Smeltng . .
.. ..
4
86
Amer. Snuff . . . . . . . . . . . .
12
208
Amer. Sugar Refining_ . . . . . .
7
132½
Amer. Telegraph & Telephone..
8
125¼
• Anaconda . . . . . . . .
$2
46¼
Brooklyn Union Gas . .
S
120
Consolidated Gas . . . .
4
122
Distillers Securities
2
38 ¾
General Electric . .
8
1 5S ½
Granby Consolidated
8
103
Great Northern Ore
I
74
Mackay Co.'s.
4
73
National Biscuit
6
104
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Div.
Yield.
4.49

4.4
2. 91

4.94

5.

5.55

4.03
4.91

4.27
5.26
4.24
3.55
4.
4.76
4.77
4.95
6.08
4.86
4.3
5.44

5.55
4.45
5.34
4.54

5.81

4.62
4.54
4.35
4.3

5.85
5.66
5.63
4.16
4.71

4.

2.54
3.98

5.7
5.58
4.65
5.77
5.21
5.56
4.2!'
4.16
3.27
5.14
5.14
7.76
1.35
5.48
5.77

National Lead • • • • • •
North American • • . . . .
Pacific Coast . . . . • .
People's Gas . . • . . . . . . .
Pullman
.... ... .
Railway Steel Spring . • . .
Sloss-Sheffield . . . . . . . .
U . S. Express ..
U. S. Realty •.
U. S. Steel ..
Western Union ..
Wells, Fargo & Co.

Div.
Rate.
5
5

l
8
3
4
4
4
2

1½
8

Prices.
Jan. 27J_h.
So¾
84½
So½
106½
170¾
48
78½
88
71
54
68¼
325

30 stocks.
152½
3242
• Anaconda pays $2 a share, par value $25.
INDUSTRIAL PREFERRED STOCKS.
Amer. Agric. Chemical
96
Amer. Beet Sugar ..
86½
American Can . . . .
73
Amer. Car & Foundry
110
Amer. Cotton Oil ..
98
112
Pfd. j3,
82¼
Amer. Smelting
102½
American Snuff . . . . . .
97
Amer. Sugar . . . . . . . .
129 ¼
Amer. Tobacco ..
92
Amer. Woolen . . . . . .
94¼
Central Leather . . . . . .
102¼
Corn Products . . . . . .
76¾
Fed. Mining & Smelting
82
Federal Sugar . . . . . .
90
International Harvester
11 0½
International Paper
..
56½
International Steam Pump ..
83M
Mackay Co.'s. . .
70¾
National Biscuit ..
119¾
National Enameling ..
85
National Lead . .
..
107
Pacific Coast, 2d pfd. . .
85
Pressed Steel Car
102~
Railwar Steel Spring ..
100½
Republtc Iron & Steel
86¼
Sloss-Sheffield . . . . . .
109?i
Union Bag & Paper ..
69¾
U. S. Rubber, 1st pfd. . . . .
102
U. S. Rubber, 2nd pfd. . . . .
70
U. S. Steel . . . .
114¼
Va-Car. Chemical
114¾

~::~: }::i~1~~stivSec.

33 stocks.

208

3113

Div.
Yield.
6.19

5.91
4.97
5.62
4.68
6.25
5.r,9

4.54
5.63
3.7
2.19

2.46

4.70

6.25
6.93
6.85
6.36
6.12
6.25
6.08
6.82
6.18
5.41
6.41
7.38
6.84
7.81
8.54
6.66
6.33
7.08
7. 16
5.66
5.85
8.23
6. 54
4.7
6.83
6,9,;
8.08
6.37
5.73
7.84
8.57
6.12
6.97

6.68

Looking at the matter as investors only we naturally
give the rai lroad stocks precedence. There is something
in this, but the view is unduly accentuated by prejudice.
There are many industri.als which are good investments.
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The preferred stocks of the United States Steel Corporati on, t,he American Locomotive Company and several others are, in my opinion, perfectly sound. The
question of the stability of dividends on these securities is almost entirely a question of the gradual trend
of general business. They have passed through a baptism of fire without even a menace to dividends on
preferences. There is not much chance of a reduction
now. We may, in fact, look much more confidently foe
increased disbursements on the common issues during
the next year than for reductions on the preferences.
In addition to theoretical views I have naturally fortified my :a dvice in regard to inc.lustrials by an examination of the character of buying, the technical situation
and the location of securities. All these investigations
prove satisfactory so far. When we find in a fairly
active market that there are practically no s.a les of suoh
stocks as American Locomotive, American Car & Foundry, Railway Steel Spring, etc., and that even a popular
security like United States S'teel suffers only a point or
two in the face of tariff agitation and disappointing records of earnings and unfilled orders, we may be quite
sure that the stocks are not for sale. The market is
almost bare of the three stocks first named and of many
other like issues.
The question of tariff agitation or revision need give
us little concern. The ruling prices for stocks which
mig,ht be affected by changes in the schedule already
contemplate reasonable revision. That is to say, the
shrewd investor who buys the steel stocks to-day pays
a certain price for the shares and takes his chances on
the tariff. It is also the opinion of the most competent
judges that tariff changes will be of a mild and conciliatory oharacter.
Speaking of the tariff, on June 9, 1908, a letter discussing the probable effects of tariff revision on the earnings of different securities was issued from this office.
New subscribers who did not receive the letter, and old
subscribers who may have destroyed it, can receive a
copy on application.

The General Situation.
A conspicuous feature of the general situ.ation is the
continued low interest rates for money. Call money has
descended definitely to 1 ½c.- 1¼ %, and loans for six
months and a year are made at 3c.-3½%. This condi38

tion is being taken a·dvantage of freely by important
l>anking institutions in refunding operations. Capital in
large aggregate volume is seeking that class of investment. Bankers are careful not to overdo the 1bond pro, duction business at this juncture, but are giving gentle
encouragement to the theory that we are likely to have
a somewhat protracted period of cheap money, .although
it is doubtful if considerable amounts of time money
could be had in the loan market at quoted prices. The
larger programme of corporate bond flotation is forwarded by the impression made upon the owners of investment capital that they are not likely to lose by
prompt action. The early part of the year will witness
a practical clearing of the deck of such refunding operations as can be reached, leaving a free field for the enlistment of new capital. The situation is about as
bankers would like to see it, although there is an element among them wiho are impatient of prolongation of
low prices for the goods they have for s4le.
Manufactures are waiting on tariff revision and consumption is proceeding steadily at a rate which will reduce stocks of merchandise and manufactured wares to
i1 condition of meagreness not seen in years. The next
industrial boom, which everybody expects will sharply
follow Congress action on tariff, will start from bed
rock and empty store houses. The present situation, as
relates to manufacturing, is especially encouraging in
this respect. The country has not been called upon at
any time during the period of depression to suffer from
the burden of over production. It has been happily
spared that infliction, an experience almost unique and
one which augurs well for the future. There will be
no deadwood to clog the forthcoming progressive sweep.
Mr. Yoakum, of the Rock Island-Frisco system, is the
latest to emphasize the changing sentiment in the West,
Southwest and · South, toward corporations. The ,people
in these regions have discovered that they have hurt
themselves as ba-d as the corporations by unreasonable
legislation. The kick of the gun did more damage
than the projectile.
Almost no revival in speculative interest in the general stock list is observable. Operations are largely of
professional origin and signify merely the moods of
the hour. There is a notable absence of selling pressure either for long or short account
An unfavorable .feature is the activity of pools in
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some of the so-called "cats and dogs"-the "weeds" ,as
some one has aptly called them. No special harm can
come from this undesirable speculation, however, if
the public has the sense to keep away from them. As
a rule it is only the purely gambling element that gets
hurt in that sort of things-people who feel they are
losing life blood if they are not eternally at it.

The Technical Situation.
Inquiry among commission houses of all grades reveals several interesting facts.
As a general proposition there appears to be about the
normal long interest. The long account always and under every conceivable market condition shows important
speculative hol-dings, the volume varying, of course, according to current movements. It is, however, always
there, and must be considered. At the prese11t time it
may be· considered about normal, that is to say, there is
neither an unusually large public in the market nor are
the books at all scant of holdings for customers. It is
further learned that the long account is very much more
than usually well protected.
The burden of evidence is that while there is no
doubt of a lull in aggressive buying interest, for the
time being the market is full of orders from 2 to 5
points under the current range of quotations. Anything in the way of a great calamity or sudden change
in the situation for the bad would lead to a withdrawal
of ,a large proportion of these orders no doubt. There
appears to be no likelihood of any such convulsion and
it may be assumed safely that the bulk of the buying
orders now on the books will remain there. A knowledge of this condition ·d eters the bearish contingent
(which manages to keep well informed) from raiding
attempts. There are many stocks which could easily be
pushed down several points but the adventure would
only end in the sellers being obliged to buy back their
stocks on about the same scale that they were sold.
This would mean no profit and there would be in the
play an element of risk which speculators of that ilk
do not care to indulge in.
It would appear also that there is a considerable short
interest in New York Central, Smelters, Reading and
some of the favorites which were bulled with a spe~ial
violence on the upturn. This stubborn outstanding
short interest is very largely confined to the high-
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priced things, Smelters being about the only exception.
In this latter stock the belief is current and singularly
well grounded that ,a number of very rich men who
went short on knowledge of the organization oj the big
opposing company have not yet had opportunity to
cover to advantage. This is the principal element of
support in that specialty and the market is for the
moment •deadlocked. The insiders do not apparently
care to push the market up for fear of getting more
real stock than they have any use for, and the short
sellers are willing to wait, feeling sure of their position.
It is generally believed that a very considerable volume of Union Pacific, Reading, Southern Pacific, St.
Paul, Atchison, and in fact almost all of the late speculative favorites which were sold on the December culmination of the bull movement have not yet been delivered. Evidence upon this point is strong and entitled to credence. This fact would under some circumstances be looked upon as 4 menace to the market
but cannot now be so regarded. The amount of these
ambushed deliveries is considerably exaggerated and
in any event the people represented may be depended
upon to ta ke their time in making deliveries so as not
to disturb market conditions. Their public interests are
in the maintenance of prices around the current range.

Conclusion.
As stated in recent daily letters, I ·do not feel satisfied as to the immediate future of the high-priced rails.
I do not look for any great or prolonged smash, and it
is quite certain that eventually higher prices will be
reached. F or the present, however, we should stick to
the indu strials. As I feel satisfied t,hat more money
can be made in this group during the next "few months
than in any other quarter, and as the end and aim of
these advices is to make the best returns with the
minimum of hazard, I will devote my attention principally to industrials for the present. The rails will not
be neglected but industrials will be .given unusual attention.
Continue to advise purchases of American Car &
Foundry, American Locomotive, Pressed Steel Car,
Railway Steel Spring, Distillers and United States Steel
at this level or on any little dip. Amalgamated Copper
is suffering from rumors of an oversupply of the metal
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which it is impossible to pro ve or disprove. The
reaction in metal prices fr om the top of the recent Scent recovery is not unusual or alarming. There is no
more reason to expect a perpendicular and uninterrupted advance in copper than in wheat or any other
staple. One would think to hear some observers discuss this phase .of the subject that because of such a
fluctuation the copper business had gone ta pieces entirely.
As suggested .above, the industrial preferred stocks
are, considering safety of principal and income yield,
unusually attractive. The speculative possibilities in
practically all preferred stocks are curtailed because
dividend disbursements cannot be increased, but under
present tonditions one of two things must happeneithe, the price of money must adv.anc~ or the price of
tb-:se preferred securities must advance. Even a natural
hardening of money would not be an unmixed evil in
its bearing on this group, as such hardening would
most probably mean employment of funds in general
business and a consequent improvement which would
favorably ·affect the stocks of all corporations.
I am working on this Consolidated Gas question. Unless I am badly mistaken, it will be found that this
corporation is concealing earnings and assets or at
least that its report is very misleading. I have not as
yet recommended purchases of this stock, but think
an opportunity to make a very good turn will soon be
discovered. The results of the investigation will be set
forth in a special letter next week.
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Chart Showing Market Movements for January, 1909.
(Thomas Gibson' s . F iguret)
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February 6, 1909.
Anti-trust litigation and decisions of the courts in
such cases have occupied so prominent a place in the
news of the week that it is time to consider the whole
subject and its bearing on sto-ck values in a broad way.
It would be entirely foolish to accept the snap judgment of Wall Street, based as it generally is upon insufficient information and hasty conclusion, or the too
brilliant and inaccurate headlines in the daily press.
This matter of "trust busting," as it has come to be
called, has lately been brought ta the fore by: ( 1) The
Supreme Court decision against the Continental Wall
Paper Co.; (2) the offer of the Standard Oil Co., in a
brief filed with the Supreme Court of Missouri, to put
the company's business in that State under t·he complete control of the State, exercised through the Court
anid its appointees and ( 3) the report of Herbert Knox
Smith, Commissioner of Corporations, the chief point
of which is his declaration that t.he present anti-trust
law has failed. A fourth event might be added, the
refusal of the United States Supreme Court to grant the
Consolidated Gas Co. of New York a rehearing in its
contest against the 80-cent gas law. It might easily be
supposed from all this t-h at there had at last been a
turn in the tide of court decisions, which has been, as is
generally believed, so long in favor of the corporations.
One need only go a little further back to find some
other court decisions, such as the decree of ouster
against the Standard Oil Co. in Texas, of equally
serious aspect.
Now I have long held firmly to the belief that neither
our courts nor our legislatures have any intention of
greatly injuring, much less of destroying, the great producing and distributing organizations which are to--day
the larger part of the country's industrial life. No matter how radical the measures proposed in some states
or in Congress or how bitter the feeling that inspires
them, nine out of ten are honestly, if mistakenly
aimed at securing justice for all classes af the population, and preventing evil practices in trade or transportation, and the few that are not put forward in sincerity
are foredoomed to failure. It is impossible for me ta
believe that the American people, in a movement that
has no other object than the universal establis-hment of
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clean principles and usages of tra,_de, will ever go so far
as to put individual energy and capacity at a discount
or rob those who produce on a large scale of the true
economic profits of such advanced methods.
But of course an optimistic outlook upon the events
of the day, comfortable as it may be, is nevertheless
wrong if the events themselves do not justify it. In
other words, the possible evil effects of a-dverse legislation and court decisions upon the affairs of our large
stock companies cannot be warded off simply by refusing to admit that they can come. Therefore, I want to
present what to me are the most significant facts and
phases of recent anti-corporation activity. Unless I can
show that these are at bottom favorable to the continued and healthy expansion of our trade and manufactures, I can not expect my readers to share my
assurance as to the future of American industrial
combinations.
To take up first the cases immediately before us, the
·decision of the Supreme Court against the Wall Paper
combination was not, as a good part of the press and
many individuals seem to have supposed, a sweeping
declaration that a debt owed to a trust could not be
collected at law. Justice Harlan, who wrote the prevailing opinion of the Court, after reciting that the
agreements by which the Wa11 Paper combination had
bound the complainant and other purchasers of its goods
not to buy elsewhere all'd to se11 only under certain conditions were clearly and admittedly in restraint of trade,
said, further, "that the plaintiff cannot have a judgment for the amount of the account sued on, because
such a judgment would in effect be in aid of the execution of agreements constituting that illegal combination." It appears that the combination found illegal in
this case was not the bond holding the Continental Wall
Paper Co. together, but th e whole seri~s of agreements
between that concern and all who did business with it.
I am not aware of any decision of the higher courts
which declares it illegal for one company to produce a
large part or the whole of the country's production of a ·
given article of commerce. The decisbn of the United
States Circuit Court in the Southern District of New
York, against the American Tobacco Co. seems to come
near doing so, but that decision is yet to be reviewed by
the Supreme Court. Mere magnitude of organization
and operations has never yet been found illegal and
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there is ample ground for believing that it never will
be. The illegality found in the Continental Wall Paper
Co., and admitted by that company's attorneys, lay in
its restrictive and oppressive methods of exercising its
power, methods which business men understand pretty
well. If any further explanation of them is desired, we
need only turn to the testimony given before the Industrial Commission in 1900, in which the following letter
of the Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., to John Lucas &
Co., was read:
"Philadelphia, Pa., Oct. 27, 1900.
"Gentlemen : We have just been advised by our general office that any permission that has been given to
the jobbers whereby they were allowed to import plate
glass must be at once withdrawn, and we hereby beg to
notify you to this effect.
"We will ask you to send to this office, at once, a
memorandum of any foreign glass which you may
have ordered which you have not received .. Please indude in this memorandum that which may already be
on the water, as well as the portion that -h ad not yet
been shipped from abroad. Kindly give this matter
your prompt attention and oblige.
"Yours truly,
"PITTSBURG PLATE GLASS' COMPANY."
This is only a sample of the methods which a number of manufacturing corporations, big and little, have
sought to apply, not only to the importation of goods,
but likewise to purchases at home. If such practices
must stop, so much the better, even for the stockholders in the companies that have sought to profit by them,
for a commercial success built upon so precarious a
foundation is no lasting success at all. It can be said
that the managers of the best in vestment corporations
no longer countenance such vicious met.hods. One other
aspect of the Continental Wall Paper case deserves to
be noticed. The customer who resisted in this case the
collection of a debt of about $81,000 was a concern
which subsequently went into liquidation. It is highly
questionable whether any corporation or individual with
-a commercial credit to protect woul·d care to evade an
obligation deliberately entered into, even t-hough that
obligation involved an illegal restraint of trade. It is
going too far, therefore, to conclude that this decision
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opens the way to repudiation of debts to all the consolidations of formerly independent manufacturers.
The Standard Oil proposal in Missouri opens up in
a striking manner the possibilities that exist for all
-defendant corporations of meeting new conditions with
new arrangements of their affairs. The openness of the
offer and the detailed plan submitted prove that it was
made in good faith. Evidently the chief owners of that
stronghold of monopoly and secrecy ar~ not afraid that
even radical Missouri is unwilling to allow them fair
profits and a reasonable degree of freedom in the con-duct of their business.
The Commissioner of Corporations lays down the
broad principles whioh should guide the nation's advance in the regulation of corporations as follows:
"l. That the real issue is, What are the intent, methods and effect of a given combination or corporation?
What a great corporation does and how it does it is of
far more practical importance than the mere question
whether it is legally a combination or not.
"2. T,hat the first step in such an advance must be to
establish a broad system of corporate publicity through
a Federal office.
"3. That the system adopted shall provide, as far as
possible, a basis for the conference and co-operation of
all interests."
The Commissioner says further :
"Recognizing these facts, the aim of new legislation
should be to regulate, rather than to prohibit, combination. It is an obvious absurdity to attempt to do both
at the same time, and prohibition has practically failed.
Our present law, forbidding all combination, therefore needs adaptation to the actual facts . It is now
inflexible and indiscriminate. It takes no account
of the intent, methods and result of combination.
"If we are to do anything effective with the corporation question, we must make an advance on
our present legislation. The practical object is to
see that business opportunity and the highways of
commerce are kept equally open to all; to prevent
fraud, special privilege, and unfair competition."
Legal actions to dissolve "trusts" are no new
thing. The history_ of the Standard Oil Co., which
was compelled to abandon its original loose association of refining interests and did so with practically no interruption of its business, has recently
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been brought again to public attention. Its past
experience gives abundant reason to suppose that
with certain objectionable features eliminated,
would be able to meet an adverse decision in the
suit now pending in the Federal courts without the
loss of its property or any legitimate earning power.
The American Sugar Refining Co. is another case
in point. The old "Sugar Trust Co." was organized
in 1887, taking in a number of refineries and issuing certificates to represent their value in the sum
of $50,000,000. In 1890 the Court of Appeals of New
York State decided that the " trust" organization was
illegal. Arrangements to reorganize were interrupted by a suit for an accounting, in consequence
of which receivers were appointed, one of them
being H. 0. Havemeyer. In January, 1891, nearly
all the certificate holders having assented to the
plan of reorganization, the receivers. were discharged
and the present company launched, with $25,000,000
preferred and $25,000,000 common stock. Holders
of the old certificates received half the par of their
holdings in each class of new stock and a cash payment of $15 per share of old certificates. The old
company had paid quarterly dividends of 2½ % each
from October, 1887, to July, 1890. In the latter year
the October dividend was deferred, on account of
the pending reorganization. The new company has
paid 7 per cent. annual dividends on the preferred
stock since its organization, while the common dividends were first 8, then 10, then 12 per cent., remaining at the latter figure from April, 1893, until
April, 1900. In the latter part of 1898. began the
price war with the Arbuckles and others, which
nearly three years later led to the reduction of the
common dividend rate to its present level of 7
per cent. The following table shows the fluctuations in the price of the Sugar Combine's securities
before and after its defeat in the courts, and the
dividend rate for each year. This record is not
unlike that of Northern Pacific and Great Northern
before and after the dissolution of the Northern Securities Co., which I cited in a recent special letter
on the Harriman roads situation. The prices of the
present company's common stock only are given, as
the preferred was long ago absorbed by investors.

it
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AMERICAN SUGAR REF! ING CO.
Common stock (fractions omitted)
Market price.
Dividends.
High.
Low.
7%
137
98
1908
7o/o
137
92
1907
7%
.. . . . . 157
127
1906
154
130
7%
1905 ..
7%
.. .. .. 153
122
1904 ..
7o/o
.. .. .. 134
107
1903
7%
135
113
1902
7%
.. .. .. 153
103
1901
149
95
7¼%
1900 ..
12%
182
114
1899 ..
12%
.. .. .. 147
107
1898 ..
12%
159
109
1897 ..
12o/o
126
95
1896
12%
121
86
1895
12%
115
75
1894
134
61 12%&10% ex.
1893
115
78
10%
1892 ..
.. .. . .
93
57
*6%
1891
SUGAR REFINERIES CO.
Certificates (fractions omitted)
57
1891 (January) .. .. ..
57
48
1890 .. . . .. .. .. ..
95
5%
1889 .. .. .. .. .. .. 126
55
10%
In the present conflict of opinion over the regulation or dissolution of big corporations and its effects upon investments we need to bear in mind
the fact that a number of corporations have gone
through the ordeal and come out substantially unimpaired. Few persons really desire them destroyed
or even as much as crippled, while the great body
of intelligent public opinion, which, in the long run,
always controls, stands only for a reasonable degree
of supervision, to the end that di hone t and discriminatory practkes may be permanently suppressed.

* In 1891 quarterly dividends were begun in July
at the rate of 2%. In April, 1893, the quarterly rate
was raised to 2¼ per cent.
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The General Situation.
. The 85,000,000 people of the United States are
eating and wearing out visible stocks of everything
that is on the shelves and in the warehouses. Manufacturing is at a low ebb, and by the time Congress
gets through with its tariff revision the country wiJI
start in with a clean bill of health and nothing to
clog the machinery. Matters are working about as
they should for the restoration of complete health,
after the severe sickness and convalescence.
There is no sense in attempting to ignore the fact
that the country is awaiting Congress action on
tariff before resuming in earnest industrial activity.
At the same time it must be borne in mind that this
waiting period is entirely free from sense of nervousness or fear. Th at period is long since past.
In the minds of nearly everybody there is a deepseated feeling that when the forces now in leash are
liberated the country will start in upon an era of
abounding prosperity and advancement. On that
point there is practical unanimity of opinion and
that gives to the situation a quality of strength and
stability which is full of encouragement. The people
have committed themselves with patience to the duty
of going through this season of endurance, feeling
certain that it means added security and permanence
eventually.
Bargain-hunters for money are in evidence, and
they are playing the game cautiously in order not
to mark up the price of the goods on themselves.
The manufacturers and salesmen of bonds are going
about the business of securing capital with great
circumspection. Many things have contributed to
aid them in their campaign. The piling up of idle
funds has gone along and the situation has gained
an appearance of monetary plethora. It is really
more than an appearance; it is a fact, and those
whose plans contemplate the making of provision for
new capital are doing nothing to encourage a feeling
of optimism in those who have the money to loan .
It is to their interest to create the idea that dull
times may be prolonged. Buyers of money at anywhere near current rates are getting great bargains.
They can well afford to pay the 3¼ to 4% interest
charged on long-time bonds. They will make great
profits thereon during the next few years.
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The local money market has been measurably
relieved from the competition of commission houses
that had loaded up with time money during the
autumn months in anticipation of a big stock market
at the turn of the year. Quite a large aggregate
amount of money borrowed by stock exchange
houses under time arrangements was paid back on
and about the first of February, and competitive
lending pressure from that quarter was lifted. Under
the circumstances the banks and bond ho uses did
not seriously object to the competition referred to.
Its long continuance, however, would not have been
to the liking of the bankers, although they are quite
willing that their friends and allies, the makers of
new bonds, should be benefited.
Transactions on the New York Stock Exchange
were not enlivened by spectacular features. The
so-called Hawley stocks, and the issues which might
be in any way connected with Mr. Hawley's activities, were favored by speculators, and incidentally
the whole market sympathized. The metal and
equipment stocks fared well and met with good
support, although no special erfort was made to
advance them. It is recognized that many of these
stocks are now selling with the weight upon them
of undecided tariff legislation, and investors are
looking with friendly eyes upon many of these
issues, especially the preferred shares.
In cheerful contrast to the blue talk indulged in
by those who habitually do not look beyond the ends
of their noses, it is noticed that reports from many
of the industrial companies indicate a continued
business approaching normal. The American Tobacco for instance had occasion to declare an extra
dividend of 5% on top of its regular quarterly
dividend of 2½%. This makes 25% in extra dividends during the last twelve months. True, Tobacco
is almost in a class by itself, but, nevertheless, the
distribution tends to encourage those who might
incline to unwise pessimism, when they should be
facing the future with courage and cheerfulness.
The international trad e balance is running in our
favor at the rate of about $50,000,000 a month. This
average has been kept up now for fully fifteen
months. Stripped of the subtleties which involve
our foreign exchange and trade transactions, the

so·

conclusion forces itself upon us that the country
is building · up a healthy credit abroad which must
be a factor of immense advantage later on.

The Technical Situation.
A wary and not over-brave bearish element is at
.vork in the stock market. The result of its recent
operations is a small aggregate increase in the short
interest, not enough of itself possibly to materially
strengthen the market. The effect has been to
rather discourage important effort on the down s id e.
It can be said with absolute truth that there is
almost no pressure of long stocks on the market.
There is no evidence of any considerable lines of
securities being offered. Those who hav, the stocks
either for investment or on margin are content
to let their commitments remain undisturbed, the
general business situation being such as to reconcile
them to any momentary adverse changes in prices.
Trading on the Stock Exchange is almost entirely
professional. It represents the mere casual pursuit
of fractions or the passion for play which possesses
most of the traders whose business and duty calls
them to the Exchange every day. They must kill
time, and this is the way they do it. For all the
fluctuations mean these days, the traders might as
well flip coins and register the result on the tape.
A feature of strength in the technical situation is
the steady absorption of stocks. This has been going
on ever since the reaction in prices a month ago, and
is increasingly reflected in a marked reduction in
the floating supplies. This is especially noticeable
in the better class of industrials, and it accounts
for the hesitation of well-informed professionals
in taking risks on the down side of the market,
although most of them naturally incline that way.
They do not like the solid "feel" of the market.
The element of fear and nervousness is entirely
absent from the market. It is simply a case of
endurance. Those who have the goods feel they
have nothing to lose by standing pat, and that if
they should let go their stocks they might not be
able to replace them at figures anywhere near as
favorable.
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Conclusion.
I feel so very strongly entrenched in tne btill
position, especially on the equipment group of the
industrial division, that I unhesitatingly advise purchases for the long pull. This is such a tremendous
country and so full of buoyancy and j)'ttsh that it is
entirely safe to bet on its continued and progressive
development. There can be no prosperity without
the manufacturing 'industry participating in the
fullest degree. At a risk of being charged with
tiresome reiteration, I must again go on record
as being extremely bullish.
Now while the industrial list is in the shadow
of tariff revision and with everything possible
charged against the prices, is the time to buy and
keep on buying.
There is nothing in the situation to inspire selling.
On the contrary, it gives promise of subs tantial
improvement. That the market should dip or react
before the next great bull movement fairly sets in,
would not occasion surprise. On any such reactions, buy, buy, buy. The opportunity of the year
would be presented.
There has been a marked disposition to favor
industrials at the expense of rails. This is in line
with the advices sent out from this office persistently
during . the last few weeks. No mistake will be
made in taking on American Locomotive, American
Car & Foundry, Steel Spring, United Cast
Iron Pipe & Foundry, United States Steel and
kindred issues.
A chart showing market movements of stocks for
the month of January appears in Vol, II.
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February 13, 1909.
That a bull market could or should start from
the present apparently high level of prices is almost unbelievable to many inve~tors, speculators
and financial experts. These same persons have
b een puzzled and even mystified by the tenacity
with which prices have h eld up since early in November last.
After a practically continuous rise for over a
year, most men expected that a material decline
would occur soon after Taft's election. They reasoned that as the prices of railroad stocks rose, on
an average, between 45 and SO per cent. and those
of industrial stocks about 66 per cent. from November 15, 1907, to November 15, 1908, an unprecedented advance, at least in recent years, a rad ical decline was, on general principles and the la"'
of averages, overdue. They calculated that the bi :;
and wise holders of stocks, those who had been
carrying hundr,eds of millions of securities at panic
prices, would utilize the good news of Taft's election, and the buying which would naturally result
from such good news, to unload these great quantities of stocks.
Such reasoning was sound, and the deductions
would have proven true, under ordinary afterpanic conditions. As my clients know, I was inclined to adopt this line of reasoning up to the
time of Taft's election. Very soon after, however,
I realized, even more fully than l had done before,
that fundamental conditions were so far from ordinary that the expected decline in the prices of
stocks was not likely to occur nearly as soon as
most financiers imagined.
We know now that the prices of stocks refused
to go down more than four or five points at any
dme during the three months since the November
election, and that, apparently, they have resisted
the efforts of ma'ny of Wall Street's greatest financiers to put them down, and this, too, in spite of
the fact that improvement in industrial conditions
has jogged along at not much more than a normal
post-panic pace. That the average prices of stocks,
after rising more than SO per cent. in a year, should,
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for three months more, fluctuate inside of a 5-point
limit, is most remarkable.
As I have frequently indicated in my letters," the
most important factor in producing the extraordinary conditions which we are now witnessing
is that of gold .depreciation resulting from the increasing output of gold. This factor was not responsible for the good crops of last year but it had
much to do with the high prices obtained for farm
products. It is hardly necessary to say that but
for these high prices, and the resulting prosperity of our farmers, neither the indu strial nor the
financial recovery from the panic would have been
as rapid as it has been. The great importance of
this gold factor in pulling us quickly out of the
depression that followed the 1907 panic is appreciated by but few financial writers. The editor
of the Wal! Street Journal is exceptional. On
January 25, this journal said:
"It should never be forgotten that we have two
important factors making for quicker recovery in
business th.an has hitherto taken place after a
world-wide panic. One of these is the exceptionally strong position of our farming community,
where crop failures have been a feature of previous
periods of depression. The other is the steady increase in the world's production of gold which, other
things being equal, tends to stimulate an advance in
commodity prices and consequent commercial and industrial activity, even if such activity has a hazardous leaning toward inflation."
It is this same gold factor that prevented the
average price of commodities from declining more
than about IS per cent. because of the panic, and
that has, within eight months from the time when
the lowest prices were reached, caused a recovery
of nearly half the panic loss.
On February 1, Bradstrccts approximate index
number was $8.3022, a gain of four-tenths of 1 per
cent. over January 1, and of 7.5 per cent. over the
low point, touched on June 1, 1908, since which
time the advance . in commodity prices has been
practically uninterrupted. Compared with the high
point touched on March 1, 1907, the February 1
index numoer shows a decline of 9 per cent.
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Compared with prices during the following previous panics, the decline from 1907 to 1908 was small
and the recovery since June 1, 1908, was rapid-more
rapid, in fact, than the world ever before saw after
such a severe panic. Such things do not happen by
chance. There is a cause. I am convinced that
the cause is gold depreciation. As the production
of gold is still increasing about as rapidly as ever
and as, because of great improvements, the profits
of production are to-day believed to be greater than
ever before, this gold factor is likely to continue for
years to produce extraordinary conditions in the
industrial and financial world and to upset many
of the best laid plans of our great speculators.
Of course, if the prices of commodities had remained low since the 1907 panic, as they did for
four years after the 1873 and 1893 panics, neither
industry nor stock prices would show the great improv ent that we now see. That there should be
any improvement while tariff reduction-and, therefore, lower prices for some commodities-is pending
is the more remarkable. The upward tendency is
strong enough not only to overbalance the effects
of prospective lower prices of some commodities
and to indu ..e merchants and consumers to purchase
almost normal quantities of merchandise in the face
of adverse conditions, but to result in an advance
in prices.
In ~his connection, a big clothing dealer in New
York remarked, a few days ago, that he was carrying $300,000 less of goods than usual. He does not
want to be caught with a large supply of clothing
while free wool and cheaper clothing is a possibility
in the immediate future. For similar reasons railroads now hesitate to order large supplies of rails,
cars and locomotives; contractors and builders to
order large quantities of structural material, lumber, glass, paint, etc., and merchants generally to
stock up with as many goods as they otherwise
would carry.
Beyond question business is held in check by pending tariff legislation. Almost certainly a flood of
buying orders will be let loose by the passage of a
tariff bill. That the administration at Washington
appreciates the situation and will push the tariff bill
with all possible speed through the next Congress
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is reasonably certain. But prices are rending upward
so strongly, and optimism is so prevalent in the
business world, that coming tariff reduction cannot
prevent business from expanding moderately, and
Wall Street from discounting the great industrial
prosperity, which it is confident is not more than
four or five months off.
It is for these reasons that many Industries are
now quite prosperous and that a stock market boom
may b egin from the present high level of prices.
It is highly probabl e that merchants, railroads and
builders who have the courage to place orders at
present prices will fare better than wi ll those who
wait for the reductio ns that are expected to follow
tariff re.duction. It is not improbable that, as soon
as the Ways and Means Committee reports its
proposed tariff bill to the House (abo1•t March 15 ),
and the country can see about what changes are
likely, the flood of orders for goods will start and
that prices, in s tead of declinin g, will, in most cases,
begin to rise even more rapidly than they are now
doing.
While I continue to fav or the industrial more than the
railroad stocks, for a long pull, I should not be surprised to see the high-priced railroad stocks resume their
leadership in the next few weeks. They have been
comparatively weak and inactive for som'! time. Partly
because of their great advance last year there is probably a g reater short interest in them than in most other
stocks. These two facts afford some ba~is for thinking
that, as these stocks refuse to go down they must again
go up.
There are other reasons, however, for thinking that
high-priced railroad stocks are about to res ume their
upward course before having a further decline. On e
af these is that railroad earnings ,havt! shown up remarkably well recently, all things considered. In view
of the fact that most of our wheat was marketed early
and that, because of tariff agitation, the shipments of
iron, steel and coal have been very light, it is surprising
te see how well railroad earnings keep up. It must be
that the proportion of high grade freight carri ed is very
great. It is also probable that the railroads have been
raising fr eight rates more than is generally supposed
and that these advanced rates are now beginning to tell
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on earnings. On this subject the New York Journal of
Commerce, of February 8, said :
"Transcontinental rates have been quit,~ generally advanced and many others ,have been affected by changes
of classification and charges for services not included
in previous tariffs. One thing that plainly appears is
that while railroad men have been agitating the subject
of increasing rates on account of the increased cost of
labor, material and supplies, and trying to bring the public mind to an acceptance of the policy, incidentally giving the impression that •he matter is in abeyance, they
have really been busy making 1he advances by filing a
continual stream of schedules to take effect on thirty
days' notice."
That this semi-surreptitious method of raising rates
will almost su rely irritate the public and lead to r enewed hostility against the railroads, will not prevent
the increased earnings from having great effect upon
the prices of railroad stocks in the next few weeks or
months. As there are multitudes of schedules and millions of rates, as changes can be made on 30 days' notice to the Interstate Commerce Commission, and as
that body can interfere with changes only on complaint
of shippers as to specific rates, it is evident that general
advances in freight rates will, in most instances, be effective for many months before the Interstate Commerce
Commission will even have time to hol<1 hearings and
to adjust the particular rates complainecl. of. Practically, then, there is but little control over railroad rates.
It is not easy, in the face of general business conditions, to account for the excellent showing of many leading Western roa:ds, except through higher rates and
higher quality of freight carried. The Harriman roads,
in particular, make an astonishing showing. For the
six months ending December 31 last, the net earnings of
the Southern Pacific Co. were equal to about 6½ per
cent. on its $197,852,321 common stock, or at the rate
of 13 per cent. a year. During the same period the net
earnings of the Union Pacific Railroad Company were
equal to 10.72 per cent. on the $195,679,900 of the common stock, or at the rate of 21 per cent. per year.
Although both of these roads cut down their maintenance charges materially, during the six months, it
appears, from figures published in the Wall Street Summary of February 11, that disbu rsements for maintenance of way and structures, and for equipments have
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been on a liberal scale, as compared with former years.
Here are t,he figures per mile:
Un. Pac.
So. Pac.
Mn.
Mn.
Mn.
Mn.
W. & S.
equip.
W. & S.
equip.

1908
1907
1906
1905

....
. .. .
. .. .
....

$1,746
1,674
1,744
1,476

$1,570
1,583
1,554
1,421

$1,450
1,707
1,715
1,777

$1,382
1,394
1,317
1,285

11he following table shows the maintenance of equipment per locomotive, passenger and freight car, for the
past 4 years :
So1,them Pacific.
Locomotive ..
Pas. car .. . · . . . . . . .
Frt. car . . . . . . . . . .

1906 1905
1907
1908
$3,134 $3,563 $3,531 $3473
920
872
883
966
104
85
llS
ll3

Union Pacific.
Locomotive . . . . . . . . $3,069 $2,932 $3,060 $3,791
Pas. car . . . . . . . . . . 1,936 1,092 1,078 1,272
Frt. car . . . . . . . . . .
ll3
126
123
103

If these figures are correct-and I assume that they
are-but little fault can · be found with the officials of
these roads in the way of main,enance charges. The
great necessity for raising rates, to overcome increasing
costs of operation, are not, however, awarent in the
Harriman roads. But what most concerns us now is
the ability of these and of other roads to pay their present or higher rates of dividends. If, as appears, these
roads can earn more than their present dividends, while
industry is still depressed, it seems highly probable that
they can earn muoh more than their present dividends
when prosperity has fully returned. Thi~ being true, the
stocks of these roads are not high, especially when the
cheapness of money is considered. Much higher prices
for these stocks would, indeed, ~eem to be warranted, if
the earnings figures published ,ell a true story. Similar statements can be made concerning the St. Paul,
Great Northern, and many other Western, Northwestern and Southwestern roads.
Several of the minor western roads also have a thrifty
appearance, both as to present earnings and as to pros-
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pects. One of these is the St. Louis Southwestern,
which is showing increases in both gross and net earnings and which is at the rate of 2.9% on the $19,893,650
of preferred stock, for six months ending Dec. 31.
Its outlook for the next six months is radically different from that of the previous year. As one of the Gould
roads that has merit and has not, as yet, participated
much in the recent boom in so-called Gould stocks, a
considerable advance in the price of preierred and common in the near future appears h'ghly probable.
Tihe recent advance in the sto:ks auj bonds of the
Denver & Rio Grande, another Gould road, appears to
be justified not only on account of the:: business be1ng
done by the road, but because of benefits expected from
the completion, within six months, of the Western Pacific Railway. This new road will afford an outlet to
the Pacific Coast for all of the Gould systems. Two
other Gould roads that are now doing well, with bright
prospects, are Texas & Pacific and Missouri Pacific. As
Missouri Pacific owns much of the stock of the Denver
& Rio Grande, the stock of the former will benefit by
the rise of the stock of the latter road.
Perhaps no other short road has a more promising
future than the Kansas City Southern. After paying the
dividend on preferred, the net earnings for the year ending, June 30, 1908, were equal to 2.57% on common.
Net earnings are now running far ahead of those of a
year ago and will probably equal 5% on the common
stock this year. In January, as this road entered into
traffic negotiations with the Union and Southern Pacific
roads, which makes it a connecting link between Kansas
City and Galveston, its gross earnings are expected to
increase $1,000,000 during the first year of that agreement. In my opinion the common stock can be confidently regarded as a purchase.
The granting by the Public Service Commission of
the application of the Erie Railroad Cc. to issue $30,000,000 of 5 per cent. Collateral Trust Bonds is, notwithstanding rigid conditions that accompany the permission,
a bull argument on Erie.

The General Situation.

:Any change in the general situation in the last week
is on the side of improvement. This betterment is less
in evidence in the statistics of industry than in an increase of optimistic sentiment. Apparently, the wave
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of pess1m1sm which has been rolling over Wall Street
for two or three weeks is passing and without having
had much effect on the prices of stocks.
Notwithstanding the dullness and slight weakness of
most common stocks, t,he prices of bonds and of dividend paying preferred stocks have risen almost continuously. The investment -demand for securities is so
great that we hear talk of a famine ir: dividend and
interest-paying securities.
Transactions in bonds are running very high. The
demand for investment securities is probably accentuated just now because of idle money awaiting action on
the tariff bill. Many institutions and corporations are
investing their idle funds in bonds which they expect
to sell as soon as they have use, in business, for their
surplus funds. A quick revival in business, therefore,
may cause a sudden reversal in the bond market. Such
a change may occur sooner than is generally expected
-say in the next month or two.
It is not generally known that the total sales of listed
bonds on the New York Stock Exchange were greater
in 1908 than in any previous year. The next greatest
sales were in 1905 and the third greatest in 1904. The
sales in 1908 amounted to $1,085,091,700 and were more
than double those of 1907.
In January, 13 railroads floated bonds amounting to
$108,834,000. Bond flotations by industrial corporations
and by municipalities were also large. Still greater
flotations are expected in February and March. These
flotations are, however, being made judiciously as yet,
and with the evident intention of not spoiling a good
bond market.
While the trade is generally quiet and the business
situatiort somewhat irregular, ,here are many encouraging facts. Building expenditures in 83 cities, in January, were just double those of January, 1908. The
electrical business is also experiencing a great revival.
Contracts are said to have been placed with the General Electric Co. on a larger scale, since January 1,
than ever before. The boot and shoe business is also
improving_ Best reports, as usua:, come from the West
and Northwest, including the North Pacific Coast.

The Technical Situation.
But little change has occurred in the technical situation since last week. While most financial writers as60

sume that the rise in the prices of stocks that occurred
on last Wednesday and Thursday was due largely to
short covering, because of the coming holidays, it is
very doubtful if there is any real foundation for this
assumption. Just as likely the short interest is as great
to-day as it was a week ago. It may be greater in a
few days should 1Jrices tontinue to advance.
Liquidation on the part of large holders of stocks
is supposed to have ceased. Apparently another accumulation period has begun. How long it will continue is, of course, uncertain. In view of the change
of administration that will occur in \N ashington on
March 4th and the strong tendency of \Vall Street to
celebrate this change, the prices of stock3 may advance
more rapidly in the next two weeks th an is generally
expected.
•
There is nothing of importance in sight to disturb
conditions. The Japanese situation has practically been
shelved by the refusal of the defeat of anti-Japanese
measures in the legislatures of the threP Pacific Coast
states. That t,he situation was never serious is evidericed by the fact that Japanese bonds have advanced
steadily in price since January 1.
The improved foreign conditions and outlook is making a demand for our securities in Europe that must
help our securities. Quite likdy Europe will, in the
next two months, buy back a large 1)0rtion of the many
stocks that they have sold to us in the last two months.
Cheap money is the key not only tc improvement
in industry, but to higher values for securities.
There are still elements of dang-n in the copper situation, but the r eviva l in building operations and
in the electrical indu stry indicates a growing demand
for copper metal and, therefore, an improved outlook
for copper stocks.
The indicated loss of from $2,000,000 to $4,000,000
in the cash surplus of the New York banks will
have no appreciable effect upon money rates, which
will almost certainly continue low for several
months.

Conclusion.
I feel so optimistic for the immediate future, both
as to industrial and railroad stocks, that I want to
warn all who are short of stocks to cover them as
soon as possible, an d to at once take the long side.
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·Room should, of course, be left for more stocks,
should anything happen to cause a sudden decline.
I unhesitatingly recommend the purchase of any
of the railroad stocks above mentioned, that is, of
Union Pacific, _Southern Pacific, Great Northern
preferred, St. Paul, Kansas City Southern, St. Louis
Southwestern, · Texas Pacific and Denver & Rio
Grande. I also consider Atchison, Pennsylvania
and, in fact, many other· good railroad stocks, safe
purchases at present prices.
In the industrials I prefer American Locomotive,
American Car & Foundry, Steel Spring, United
States Steel and United Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry.
National Lead Common is in an excellent position.
It will be benefited by any reduction that may be
made in the duty on lead and by the increased sale
of paint that must result from increased building
operations. It is whispered that at the next quarterly meeting of the directors, three months hence,
the dividend rate will be increased. In any case
this stock looks good at the present price.
Smelters may advance with the rest of the market,
but it is suffering much from the decline in silver
in the last two years. It is helped slightly by the
recent rise of 4 cents in the price of this metal.
I consider it especially dangerous to be short of
Amalgamated Copper stock at this price. Consolidated Gas is another most dangerous stock to be
short of at present. It could easily advance 10, 20
or 30 points without warning.

/
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20,

1909.

Early in 1907 and during the period when these
advices were consistently bearish, I frequently referred to t-he similarity between 1903 and tentatively
1907. When the attitude was changed in favor of
higher prices, a position which was maintained
throughout the year 1908 with only three temporary
reversals, I continued to suggest that 1908 would
resemble 1904 so far as the course of stock prices
was concerned. It is now interesting to continue
this process, comparing 1905 with the probable
events of 1909.
It will be understood that in an analogy of this
character there is no intention of following charts
or depending upon anything resembling mechanical
speculation. If the matter were merely one of
co-extension it would be more r.easonable to look
for a reversal than a continuance of the market
action, for it is a simple and logical truth that a
long-drawn parallel which is only fortuitous approaches the point of divergence with each new
extension.
But the opinions offered in 1907 and 1908 as
to the probable similarity of stock price movements
with 1903 and 1904 were based, not upon chance,
but upon the theory that the causes which brought
about the decline of 1903 and the subsequent recovery of 1904 were surprisingly alike.
The numerous points of affinity in the periods
mentioned have already been fully discussed in
former letters, and need not be amplified. It is
sufficient to state that the theory, that like causes
and conditions would produce like effects, was
amply verified, as will be observed by the charts
which accompany this letter. (See Vol. IL, Book
of Charts.)
In the year 1905 we had one particular bear
factor or rather one factor which was popularly
esteemed a bearish one, i. e., the Russo-] apanese
war. I insisted in the early months of 1904 that
this was a bullish factor, in that the United States
stood in the position of a huckster, and that our
foodstuffs and other commodities would bring very
high prices. This view was also correct. Wheat,
6.1

for example, was sold throughout the year at high
prices in the face of good crops. We all know,
however, that the very word "war" is enough to
frighten a large class of operators who act before
they think.
We have at present, as in 1905, a bear factoror one considered as bearish-the tariff question.
Here again the reasoning is fallacious, or, to say
the least, indiscriminate. There are some industries which would be adversely affected temporarily
by drastic revision. The railroads as a group would
be benefited materially, and it is quite certain that
the stimulus imparted to general business by increased activity on the part of the railroads would
offset a great deal of the damage to the industrials
most affected. Also it is pretty certain that revision
will not be of a drastic character. The idea that
something is going to occur to upset the business
affairs of the nation is born of prejudice or unjustified
apprehension.
The crops of 1905 were large; what they will be
in 1909 we do not know, and this factor must be
accorded careful consideration.
A crop failure
might change all our plans. In this regard I wish
to state that my own expert will be kept in the
fields as soon as his presence there is warranted.
We had no trouble last year in getting a good line
on crops regardless of the numerous conflicting
reports and crop scares. I do not anticipate any
trouble on that score in 1909. It is simply a matter
of employing a competent expert who has no speculative affiliations and no instructions to color his
reports. It is too frequently the case that we can
depend on bearish reports from the experts representing a bear house, and vice versa.
It is pointed out by some observers th.at a radical
decline occurred early in 1905. This is true, but
before jumping to a conclusion that such a recession
will occur in 1909 it behooves us to examine the
nature and causes of the decline of April, 1905.
In my opinion the decline in question was merely
a big shake-out brought about by bad technical
conditions and an over-bought market. This view
is borne out by the suddenness and severity of the
decline and by the rapid recovery which followed.
On April 14, 1905, railroad stocks (Wall Street
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Journal's figures) averaged 127, the approximate
pinn acle after the decline of 1903. Industrials were
83.75, the extreme top. From April 14 to May 22
the market declined to 114.52 for rails and 71.37
for industrials.
Then began a steady advance, and
on Aug. 7 a new high record had been established
for rails (127.78) and industrials had reached 82.20.
The trend of the market continued upward with
some ordinary recessions until Septemb er, and at
the close of the year rails were 133.17 and industrials had far outstripped the r ails, reaching 95.84.
Now, in market action in the early months of
1905 we find further verification of the theory of
excitem ent and t echnical weakness. On January 1,
1905, rails were 118.18 and indu strials 69.45. On
March 13 rails were 127.01 and industrials 78.22.
Then followed a period o f distribution which culmin ated April 14. This advance was accompanied by
con siderable excitement in leading railroad stocks.
New Y ork Central advanced in seven days (Feb. 20
to 27) from 146¾ to 161 ; Union Pacific from 121
on Feb. 6 to 136¾ on Feb. 25; Great Northern
from 250, Feb. 3, to 300, Feb. 21; Northern Securities from 146½, Feb. 2, to 163¼, F eb. 20, etc. On
Saturday, Feb. 25, sales of stocks broke all previous
records for a two-hour session, reaching 1,272,891
shares. In March thi s activity continued. New
York Central reach ed 167¼. March 14 ; D. , L. & W.
jumped in ten days from 353¼ to 400 ; Great N orthern reached 310. The ind ustrials also b ecame active.
Locomotive rose from· 41 ¾ to 52 ¼; Smelters fr om
89¼ to 103½; National Lead fr om 33½ to 47 ½;
Steel common advanced f.om 30 to 37¾ in 28 days,
etc. Sal es of stocks for March wer e 29,138,838
shares, over a milli on shares a day for sh ort sessions
and all. It must be r em embered that all this
occurred after the great a·dvance of 1904-on top
of it-and that the culmination wh ich appeared on
April 14 was only t emporary.
The contention I wish to offer is this: that while
our experimental parall el of 1905 and 1909 is r oughly
justified, provided crops are good, the technical
situation is entirely different. How soon this will
be changed we can only determine by careful scrutiny. At present there is no r esemblance so far as
immediate movements founded on technicalities are
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concerned. No "shake-out" of largt proportions is
to be expected under present circumstances. There
is nothing to shake out.
It will ·b e understood that the opinion and analysis
offered does not contemplate reactions of a few
points. SucJt movements occur in all markets under
all cc,.iditions.
In order to show graphically t~e similarity between 1903-1904-1905 and 1907-1908 and to date I
have prepared a chart. (See Vol. II., Book of Charts.)

The General Situation.

.

The general situation is satisfactory. While business is, so far as surface ·evidences and statistical
exhibits go, improving very slowly, there are many
reasons to believe that both actual business and
prospects are better than is generally believed.
Private reports from manufacturers and wholesalers
reflect decided betterment, and arrangements are
being made for marked activity in a short time.
The talk of a reduction in steel prices and the
bearish talk inspired by such action appears rather
ridiculous when we reflect that a few weeks ago
the universal cry was that steel was the only industry
which had not been liquidated and that a cut in
prices would stimulate business and · make for a
rapid return ta normal conditions.
This is only
another evidence that news of any character can be
construed and exploited to fit the action of the stock
market. Every little decline in security prices,
wlhether it is occasioned by a perfectly natural reaction, a drive by professionals or from whatever
cause is made the basis of a lot of unfounded and
inconsistent stories. The talk of dividend reductions
in certain directions which has been heard for a
day or two is puerile. We are approaching a period
of dividend increases, not reductions. That unpleasant form of readjustment has been thorough. The
process of taking reports of corporations for the
year ending June 30, 1908, and trying to map out
future earnings from the histories of a panic year
is ridiculous, but this form of reasoning is unduly
indulged in when the market dips a little.
Money continues in good supply, and investment
funds will be even more plentiful because of the
reduction of interest rates by trust companies.
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Action of this kind invariably cuts down deposits
and advances investment. It is as natural a law as
water seeking its own level. This refers not only
to individual depositors, but also to institutions
which keep large balances with the trust companies.
The general s:ituation is healthy and satisfactory,
and futur'! prospects are excellent.

The Technical Situation.
While the technical situation was- weakened in
the early days of the week by undue enthusiasm
over the Erie decision and the elimination of the
Japanese question, such weakness is of a temporary
character. The attitude of the public is a waiting
one.
There is widespread confidence in the future
of both business conditions and stock prices, but
prospective buyers are inclined to hold off pending
a settlement of the tariff matter. This statement
is not a surmise, but is based on my extensive
correspondence with clients. There are a fair number of long accounts on brokers' books, but these
are, in the main, well margined and not vulnerable
to the ordinary attacks or flurries. Professionals
are very much mixed in their views and change their
positions rapidly. The short interest, as shown by
the loan crowd and private borrowing, is larger than
last week.
The technical situation may be described as normal
at the moment.
It may be added that the cheerful attitude of the
public is not a weakening influence, as it is sentimental and not of a participating kind. The chief
danger to the waiting element is that they will wait
too long and make their purchases at a higher
level of prices. No doubt a sudden burst of activity
and a sharp rise would bring these spectators in in
force. That is the history of the game.
Conclusion.
Without making any pretension of ability to guess
the exact extent or duration of reactions, I feel quite
safe in stating that we need not expect any serious
decline in this market. It is rather remarkable to
note the nervousness and apprehension which is
excited by a drop of a point or two from the
extreme top prices of the year. Such movements
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come every month-oftener than that. In two years
there has been but one instance where the market
moved in either direction for seven days without a
reaction. Even in the panic year 1907 there were
almost as many days of advance as of decline,
although the trend was decidedly downward.
The
trend for the last year has been upward, and, barring
crop failures or other unforeseen occurrences, it will
continue upward. By watching the situation carefully we may _provide against disaster from actual
probabilities or indications, but ordinary recessions,
founded on nothing, must be ignored, or, better still,
accepted as excellent points on which to make purchases or average holdings. Only too frequently
such setbacks are helped along by the very people
who are confident of higher prices and who naturally
want to scare out impatient or timid holders in
order to accumulate stocks to advantage.
Continue to recommend purchases of good stocks
on all little reactions or at this level. I still like
the industrials better than rails, but there are opportunities in both groups. Would buy Consolidated
Gas, American Locomotive, American Car & Foundry, Railway Steel Spring, Pressed Steel Car, Amalgamated Copper and Lead. Practically all of the industrial preferred stocks are too low, and operators who do
not want to take up the more speculative issues yet may
feel safe in buying such preferences as United States
Steel preferred or American Locomotive preferred.
These issues will not decline much even in a considerable
reaction in the general list and will advance steadily
before long.
In the high-priced rails Union Pacific and Great
Northern, Atchison and Baltimore & Ohio look
best.
In the lower-priced group Kansas City
Southern, St. Louis & Southwestern, Texas Pacific
and Denver & Rio Grande are attractive.
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Comparative Market Movements for Years 1903-4-5 and 1907-8-9.
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February 27, 1909.
· The sharp decline in stock prices this week has
been due to a combination of unforeseen circumstances, accentuated, as usual, by a grist of rumors
affecting practically everything on the list. The
declaration of an open market for steel was, of
course, the greatest adverse influence, and its effects
were unduly severe because the news took the entire
speculative fraternity by surprise. The question as
to the final effects of this action on the part of
large producers of steel and iron has already been
fully discussed. It is the opinion of the best posted
people in the Street that the move makes for a
betterment in business, but the active speculative
contingent, with the pertinacity in error for which
they are distinguished, can see nothing but ruin
and disaster in even the soundest economic readjust~
ments.
Similarly the renewed agitation of the
Balkan situation has been adversely construed. A
struggle in the Near East, in which we are not
involved, is, if anything, a bull factor on American
business, and consequently on American securities.
I have already referred to the fact that the Russo} apanese war, which poured millions in . at our back
door and nipped the panic of 1903-4 in the bud, was,
in its early stages, considered bearish and made the
basis of a considerable drive at security prices.
An unimportant decision against the New York
Central Railroad Company, in the sugar rebate case,
gave birth to a dozen rumors of adverse court
decisions, all of which were founded on nothing
more important than imagination or the activities of
the bears. Another rumor, flatly denied by the highest
authorities, had it that the Amalgamated Copper
Company was to close down its mines. The fact
that the great underlying fundamentals which
eventually decide the course of stock prices are
improving rapidly was, of course, entirely ignored.
President-elect Taft's cheerful and broad-gauge
views, and the optimistic utterances of a score of
prominent men, that our rehabilitation was now well
under way, have gone for naught.
The selling occasioned by fright, necessity on the
part of operators who do not provide against acci-
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dents, and the drives of the bear element, have been
potent to bring about a fall which, while not severe
or unusual, has disturbed the public mind and upset
the calculations of impatient traders. In spite of
the fact that such shake-outs as we have just
encountered occur several times a year regardless
of conditions, each new appearance of the clean-up
seems to surprise Wall Street and disgust people
who cannot help knowing that such temporary
reversals are components of all markets.
Us-:tally
such reversals can be foreseen, as they depend upon
technical conditions which may be read by the
careful observer, but when a decline occurs because
of an unforeseen development, it cannot be forecasted. There is never a time when the careful
operator is not provided against such movements,
and it may be most emphatically reiterated that
people who attempt to make money without ample
provisions against such surprises are chasing a
phantom. No matter how well informed a man may
be, and no matter how well advised, if he persists
in trying to make a get-rich-quick game out of the
business of speculation, it is only a question of time
until he loses all. I lay stress on this statement
for the hundredth time because there is always a
contingent who, after an advance of twenty or thirty
points, will lose everything on a decline of five or
six points, because of bad methods and for no other
reason.
While everything justifies the belief that the decline of this week represents a phase of a bull market
rather than a bear period, it would be rash to expect
an immediate recovery of the entire reaction. It is
almost invariably the case that after a spasm of
this kind we have a period of irregularity covering
several weeks, with frequently (not always) a final
drive at prices before the upward trend is resumed.
It is because of this action that the chart players
talk of their "double bottoms" and "double tops,"
etc. But the dependence placed on mere r epetition
is not justified. The methods fail every little while,
and when they do fail are so disastrous that we
have no single record of a continued success by the
chart followers. It is much better to analyze the
causes for such market action and modify our
operations to fit modification in these causes. By
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so doing we may gain all the advantage that the
mechanical speculators possess and escape many of
their failures. Also we learn something.
After a sharp drive at prices it is always the case
that a number of people who help prices by their
purchases are temporarily incapacitated.
Others
who fully intend to buy on the first decline are
frightened out of their well-planned intentions by
the stories which invariably accompany a drive at
prices. The more fortunate operators who do buy
on the break accept profits on the first sharp recovery, with a view to replacing commitments on a
recession, and this halts the market. The bears,
particularly the eleventh-hour element, are very
cocky and jump on the market confidently on every
advance, and last, but not least, the in,portant interests, who care nothing about fluctuations, do
nothing to help prices and not infrequently help
declines along in order to facilitate accumulation.
AU these things contribute to an unsettled and
irregular market, lasting anywhere from two weeks
to two months. Two months is not a long period
of time as the world goes, but it is a deuce of a
long time to the ordinary speculator.
In the weekly letter of July 6, 1907, I exhibited the
extent and duration of all important rallies and
reactions from 1897 to July 1, 1907.* The variations
were so great that any attempt to strike an average
was abandoned as untenable. There were numerous
reactions ranging in time all the way from seven
days to sixty days, and in extent from 3 points to 14
points. The majority of reactions in bull periods
did not exceed 5 or 6 points on the average.
In order to show the action of markets in a
majority of instances where unwarranted declines
were brought about by unexpected cccurrences or
bad technical conditions, I will give a few figures
showing movements by days. It is not difficult to
determine whether or not the decline was unwarranted, as a full recovery and a continuation of the
upward trend in a brief period is prima fade evidence
that the break was caused by transitory and not by
fundamental causes.
• This compilation will be found on page 94 of 'the bound
copies of market letters for 1907.
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One of the most severe and unexpected declines
of this character in recent history was the spasm
of May 8 and 9, 1901, occasioned by the fight for
control in Northern Pacific. The action of the
market by days from the beginning of this abrupt
recession to Jhe date of complete recovery was as
follows:
(Wall St. Journal's Averages on 20 Rails.)
Average Advance Decline
Date.
Price.
Points.
Points.
May 7, 1901 . . . . . . . . . . 117.05
8
. . . . . . . . . . 111.62
5.43
9
. . . . . . . . . . 103.37
8.25
10
. . . . . . . . . . 110.06
6.69
13
. . . . . . . . . . 109.63
.43
14
. . . . . . . . . . 104.54
5.09
15
. . . . .. . .. . 106.74
2.20
16
.. . . .. .. .. 107.85
1.11
17
.. .. .. .. . . 110.25
2.40
18
.. .. .. ... . 110.09
.16
20
.. .. .. . .. . 108.79
1.30
21
. . .. .. . . . . 109.54
.75
22
. .. . . .. .. . 109.36
.18
23
.. . . . . .. . . 108.65
.71
24
. . . . . . . . . . 108.99
.34
25
. .. . .. . . . . 108.71
.28
27
. . . . .. . . . . 108.53
.18
28
. . . . . . . . . . 109.31
.78
29
. . . . . . . . .. 110.16
.85
31
. . .. .. . . . . 112.15
1.99
June 1
.. . . . . .. . . 114.58
2.43
3
. . . . . . . . . . 115.69
1.11
Unchgd.
4
.. . . .. .. .. 115.69
.26
5
. .. .. .. . . . 115.43
6
. . . . . . . . . . 115.23
.20
.01
7
. . . .. .. . . . 115.24
.71
8
.. . . . .. . . . 114.53
10
.. . . . . . . . . 114.45
.03
.06
11
. . . .. . . . . . 114.39
12
. . . . . .. . . . 114.91
.52
13
. . . . . . . . .. 116.52
1.61
14
. . . . . . . . . . 116.73
.21
15
.. .. .. . • . . 117.55
.82
In 1905 the upward trend was interrupted by a
14-point decline, which Lo one of the most extensive
recessions found in che history of bull periods.
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While the inevitable excuses accompanied this recession, it was shown by future events to be largely
due to very bad technical conditions following rapid
and excited advanc es and headlong public participation.
The movement by days was as follows :
Average Advance Decline
Date.
Price.
Points.
Points.
April 26, 1905 .. ... . . ... 124.04
27
... ...... . 120.88
3.16
28
.......... 120.48
.40
29
. . . . . . .. .. 117.81
2.67
May 1
. .... . . . .. 119.81
2.00
2
. .. .... . .. 120.63
.82
3
.. .. .. .. .. 119.44
1.19
4
.. ... . .... 117.35
2.09
5
...... .. .. 118.96
1.61
6
... ....... 118.35
.61
8
..... ..... 117.61
.74
9
. ... .. ... . 118.47
.86
10
.... .. .... 118.23
.24
11
.. ... . .. .. 119.36
1.13
12
.. ... . .. .. 120.02
.66
13
... . .. .. .. 119.42
.60
15
.. .. .. ... . 119.85
.43
16
... . .. .... 119.33
.52
17
......... . 119.24
.09
18
.. .. ...... 117.44"
1.80
19
.... .. .... 116.91
.53
20
.. ... ..... 115.88
1.03
22
.. .. .. .. .. 11 :.52
1.36
23
.... . .... . 114.76
.24
24
.... .. ... . 117.36
2.60
25
.. ...... .. 116.47
.89
26
.. ... . .... 116.70
.23
27
.. .. .... .. 11 5.90
.20
29
.. ... . .. .. 118.57
1.67
31
.. .. ... .. . 119.30
.73
June 1
.......... 117.00
2.30
2
..... . .. .. 117.19
.19
3
..... . . . .. 117.16
.03
5
.... .. .. .. 117.58
.42
6
.... .. .. '. 116.59
.99
7
..... ..... 117.30
.71
8
.... ... .. . 117.42
.12
9
... ... .. .. 117.55
, l3
~
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Date.
June 10
12
13
14
15
16
17
19
20
21
22
23
24
26
27
28
29
30
July 1
3

Average
Price.
.. ... .. ... 119.42
...... .... 119.13
......... . 118.35
.......... 118.93
.. .. .. .. .. 11'.l.56
..... .. ... 118.78
... .. .. .. . 118.35
.. ... .. ... 118.86
.......... 119.69
.. .... .... 120.67
.. ....... . 121.27
....... .. . 121.50
.......... 120.91
..... ... .. 122.07
.... ... ... 122.01
........ .. 123.37
.. ..... ... 122.46
.......... 122.57
... ....... 123.38
... ..... .. 124.65

.

Advance
Points.
1.87

Decline
Points.

.29
.78
.58
.37
.22
.51
.83
.98
.60
.23

.43

.59
1.16
.06
1.36
.91
.11
.81
1.27

In the bull market of 1908 there were three reactions. The first started January 28, and all the loss
had been regained on March 19. The figures were as
follows:
(Gibson's Figures 0°f 23 R ils and 18 Industrials.)
Average Advance Decline
Date.
Price.
Points.
Points.
Jan.
28, 1908 ........ . . 63.43
29
. . . . . . . . . . 62.95
.48
30
. .. . . . . . .. 62.83
.12
31
. .. .. .. . .. 62.64
.17
Feb.
1
. .. .. .. . .. 62.11
.53
3
. . . . . . . . . . 61.92
.19
4
. . . . . . . . . . 62.25
.33
5
. .. . .. .. .. 61.46
.79
6
.. .. .. .. .. 61.43
.03
7
.. . .. .. .. . 61.16
.27
8
.......... 60.09
1.07
Feb. 10
. .. .. .. . .. 58.66
1.43
11
.. .. .. .. .. 58.84
.18
12
(Holiday, Stock Exchange closed.)
13
.. .. .. . .. . 58.62
.22
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Average Advance Decline
Points. Points.
Price.
.81
.. . .. .. .. . 59.43
.55
. . . . . . . . . . 58.88
.25
.. .. . .. . .. 58.63
.24
.. .. .. .. .. 58.87
.06
.. .. .. . .. . 58.81
. . . . . . . . . . 59.22
.41
. .. .. .. .. . 59.55
.33
(Holiday, Stock Exchange closed).
.. . .. . .. .. 59.58
.03
.. .. .. .. .. 59.29
.29
. . . . . . . . . . 59.24
.OS
.. .. .. .. .. 59.47
.23
. . . . . . . . . . 59.80
.33
.36
.. .. .. .. .. 59.44
.24
.......... 59.68
.OS
.. .. .. .. .. 59.63
.20
.. .. .. .. .. 59.83
4
.02
. . . . . . . . . . 59.85
5
.32
. .. . .. .. .. 60.17
6
1.47
. . . . . . . . . . 61.64
7
1.17
. . . . . . . . . . 62.81
9
.64
.. . .. . .. .. 62.17
10
.71
. . . . . . . . . . 62.88
11
.11
. . . . . . . . . . 62.99
12
.56
.. .. .. .. .. 63.55
13
.93
.......... 64.48
14
.71
.. .. .. .. .. 63.77
16
.SO
.......... 64.27
17
.97
. . . . . . . . . . 63.30
18
.38
. . . . . . . . . . 63.68
19
The second decline began May 18, and full recovery had occurred on July 17. The daily movements
were as follows:
(Gibson's Figures of 23 Rails and 18 Industrials).
Average Advance Decline
Points.
Points.
Price.
Date.
May 18, 1908 ........ .. . . 74.70
1.35
19
. . ....... .. . 73.35
.81
20
..... ..... .. 72.54
21
........... . 73.6,4
.51
22
.......... .. 73.13
1.65
23
........... . 71.48

Date.
Feb. 14
15
17
18
19
20
21
22
24
25
26
27
28
29
March 2
3
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Date.
May 25
26
27
28
29
30
June 1
2
3
4

5
6
8
9

10
11

12
13
15
16
17
18
19
20
22
23
24
25
26
27
29
30
July 1
2
3

4
6

7
8
9

10
11
13
14

Average Advance Decline
Price.
Points .
Points .
.. . . . . . . . . . . 72.20
.72
. . . . . . . . . . . . 71.33
.87
. . . . . . . . . . . . 71.12
.21
. . . . . . . . . . . . 70.5 1
.61
. . . ·-· . . . . . . . 71.24
.73
(Holiday. Stock Exchange closed.)
. . . . . . .. . .. . 73.19
1.95
. . . . . . . . . . . . 73.27
.08
. . . . . . .. .. .. 72.97
.30
. . . . . . . . .. .. 71.69
1.28
. . . .. . .. . . . . 71.97
.28
. . . .. . .. .. .. 72.5 1
.54
. . . . . . . . . . . . 72.43
.08
. . . . . . . . . . . . 72.03
.40
. . . . . . . . . . . . 72.32
.29
. . . . . . . . . . . . 72.25
.07
. . . .. . . . . . . . 71.19
1.06
. . . . . . . . . . . . 71.39
.20
. . . . . . . .. . . . 71.59
.20
. . . . . . . . . . . . 72.23
.64
. . . . . . .. . . . . 71.84
.39
. . . . . . . . . . . . 72.04
.20
. . . . . . . . . . . . 70.91
l..13
............ 71.03
.12
. . . . . . . . . . . . 69.95
1.08
.. . . . . . . . . . . 69.80
.15
. . . . . . . . . . . . 70.02
.22
. . . . . . . . .. .. 70.69
.67
.... .. ... ... 71.07
.38
. . . . . . . . .. . . 70.99
.08
. . . . . . . . . . . . 71.50
.51
. . . . . . . . . . . . 71.35
.15
. . . . . . . . . . . . 71.45
.10
. . . .. . . . . .. . 71.32
·.13
. . . . . . . . . . . . 71.59
.27
(Holiday. Stock Exchange closed.)
. . . .. . . . . . . . 72.65
1.06
. . . . . . . . . . . . 72.99
.34
. . . . . . . . . . . . 73.82
.83
. . . . . . . . . . . . 74.04
.22
. . . . . . . . . . . . 73.32
.72
.. . . . . . . . . . . 73.11
.21
. . . . . . . . . . . . 73.67
.56
. . . . . . . . . . . . 74.22
.55
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Date.
July 15

Price.
Average

.. .... ......
.. ... .......

.... ........

74.29
74.41
74.72

Points.
Advance

Points.
Decline

.07

.12
.31
The third recession began September 15 and ended
with full recovery October 13. Movements, by days,
16
17

were as follows:
(Gibson's Figures of 23 Rails and 18 Industrials).
Average Advance Decline
Points.
Points.
Price.
Date.
Sept. 15, 1908 . ....... ... 78.84

16
17
18
19
.21
22
23
24
25
26
28
29
30
1
Oct.
2
3
5
6
7
8
9
10

12
13

.. .... ... ..
...........
.......... .
. ... . ......
...........
.... ..... ..
. ..........
...... .. . ..
...........
...... .....
......... ..
..... ......
...........
. ..........
...........
........ .. .
...........
....... ....
.. .... . ....
...........
...........
...... . ....
.. .. ... .. ..
..... ......

77.73
76.54
77.59
76.61
75.09
74.57
75.81
77.00
77.64
77.22
76.97
76.64
77.27
77.17
77.94
78.60
78.28
78.32
78.61
77.59
77.48
77.65
78.76
78.82

1.05

1.11
1.19
.98
1.52
.52

.84
1.59
.64

.53

.77
.66
.04
.29

.42
.25
.23
.10
.32
1.02
.11

.17
1.11
.06

The present decline has extended to about six
points on the average. In measuring these recessions I have 11ot taken the extreme top of the
market as a basis, but the point from which activity
and marked decline occurred. If space permitted, I
could show many examples of this character, a
majority of which show an irregular movement for
some days or weeks after a setback. In the present
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instance it looks as if most of the bad news, genuine
or inspired, was out of the way, and it is quite
probable that many favorable developments will
appear in the near future. From the purely mechanical point of view, however, we can only hope to
get the best results from a careful scrutiny of the
character of buying and selling and the general location of stocks.

The General Situation,
Reports from private sources in practically every
line of commercial business show steady and healthy
improvement. There is some confusion in the steel
and iron trade owing to the open market and the
fact that Chicago is pushing Pittsburg into the
background as a price center. The Balkan situation
has aroused some apprehension among foreign
investors, but is not given serious consideration by
important interests on this side. I am informed
by a gentleman who has seen a draft of Mr. Taft's
message that it will be a cheerful document, containing nothing inimical to security prices or
corporate progress. The rumors which have already
been referred to reached a hysterical stage in the
early days of the week and are losing potency now.
For example, the fact that the Anaconda Company
temporarily closed one of its mines on account of
an accumulation of gas was made the basis of a
story that all Amalgamated mines would be shut
down. Finding that the "open market" for steel
did such good work, another rumor had it that there
would be an open market in copper. It seems incredible, in view of the fact that there has been a
wide open market in copper for over . a year, that
this tale should have any effect, but it did.
The general situation looks more promising than
at any time in a year.

The Technical Situation,
The technical situation has at no, time been decidedly weak, but has been rendered very strong by
the decline. Private borrowing demand reflects the
presence of a large short interest. It is stated by
competent observers that this interest is reckless
and confident, but that it is of a poor character,
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consisting of chronic bears who were soundly
whipped in 1908. It is my opinion that much of the
selling which emanates from London consists of
boomerang operations. Orders are cabled from New
York to London and returned to our market for
execution on the theory that "London se!Jing" is
more impressive than local operations. And it is a
fact that even though London's trading is a comparatively unimportant part of a day's transactions,
it receives more notice than action here. Consider
the technical situation strong.

Conclusion.
Allowing for a period of irregularity, the duration
of which cannot as yet be gauged, it is my opinion
that the present decline does not in any way represent a bear market, but merely a phase of a bull
market. The active operator will find his best
opportunities for the present in purchases on every
drive and the accepting of profits of a few points.
It is one of those rare periods when so-called scalping operations appear reasonably safe. Those who
do not care to indulge in the ordinarily hazardous
game of scalping should purchase confidently and
await results. The very best method is to begin
buying on the scale-order method or averaging
stocks already purchased at a higher level.
Specifically, .there is little choice in individual
stocks of the better class. The rails which have
suffered sharp decline will recover rapidly, but the
technical situation favors the industrials in the immediate movements, as the short selling is more
concentrated in that group, regardless of whether
the stocks sold were favorably or unfavorably
affected by the events which produced the break.
As to short selling, it is decidedly dangerous. The
short-seller at this level, and under present and
prospective conditions, is in about the same fix as
the man in the big game country who dressed in a
bear-skin coat so he wouldn't be mistaken for a deer.
The low-priced railroad group, such as Toledo,
St. Louis & Western, Colorado Southern, Denver &
Rio Grande, Chicago & Alton, Texas Pacific, Kansas
City Southern and St. Louis & Southwestern will
do better before long. In the dividend payers,
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Pennsylvania and Atchison offer the greatest promise
with the minimum of risk.
In th~ industrials, such preferences as Steel preferred, American Locomotive preferred, and others
of that character, are perfectly sound, and the sympathetic declin e in such stocks gives us an unusual
opportunity to pick u11 stocks showing a good di vidend return and a fair speculative opportunity. In
the common stocks, United States Steel common
should be purchased. People are afraid of this stock
now, partly because the adverse news centers on it
and partly because of the distressing recollections
of 1903. I do not hesitate to predict that Steel
common will sell 15 or 20 points higher before the
end of the year. Amalgamated Copper has been
weakened in its market position by the drive which
has cut down margin s, but this stock l"s well taken
and will advance very rapidly when it once starts.
Both these corporations have tremendous assets,
which give a high book value to the securities, but
this is lost sight of in a flurry.
Con solidated Gas has been made the subject of
two special letters recently, but it is hard to get
people interested in the security. The equities arc
very large, and the stock should g o materially higher.
The Chicago Gas Co. reduced its price on gas from
$1 to 85c. a few years ago, the dividend was cut
down from 6% to 5% at the time, resum ed at 6%
the following year, and is now advanced to 7%, the
highest divid end in its history. This shows what
can be done in that line.
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Chart Showing Market Movements for Pebruary, 1~0~.
(Thomas Gibson's Figures.)
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March 6, 1909.
In these advices I have frequently dwelt upon the
favorable position of industrial preferred stocks. In
my opinion this group of securities offers the best
speculative opportunities, together with probable
integrity of dividends and income yield. There is
a widespread prejudice against industrial issues as
compared with rails, but this prejudice has n ot appeared reasonable. The investors who favor railroad stocks are inclined to hark back to some of
the slaughters which have occurred in industrial
securities, but it may be pointed out that this group
is comparatively in its infancy and that almost all
new issues suffer a baptism of fire before they
become seasoned. This is true no less of railroad
securities than of in dustrials, but the.- fiascos in the
industrial group have been more recent and are
consequently more vividly impressed on the memory.
Also we find that the critics of industrial stocks
frequently argue from false premises. Probably n o
stock has been more cordially cursed in the last
nine years than Amalgamated Copper, but an examination of its dividend record and average prices
does not produce an unfavorable showing. The
figures are as fo llows:

Dividends.

1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908
2
4¼ 6¼ 7
2
8
7¼
2¼
2
High and Low Prices.
Year.

1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907

High.
99¼

Low.

79
75½

53
33911
43 ¼

130

82¼

1908

81

89¾
60¼

111¼

70

118¼

121 %

92¼
41 ¾

88¼

45¼

The stock is more erratic than standard securities,
and its dividends are more flexible, but, everything
considered, its return on capital compares favorably
with railroad securities, and many opportunities have
been presented to the operator who looked ahead
and exercised a little patience.
I give the above figures merely to show that
Amalgamated's bad reputation is not wholly deserved. No one admires the blind pool methods
which have been employed by the Amalgamated
Company, but even the blindest pools have frequently done well by stockholders-American Sugar,
for example.
But to return to the question of industrial preferred
'Securities. Whenever there is a decline in general
business excellent opportunities are offered to secure
:bargains in this group. The public, always trying
.to carry out the impossible method of speculating
,on the present and ignoring the promise or the
certainty of the future, comes to the conclusion that
business nas gone to the demnition bow-wows for
good and all. In 1903-4 the steel and iron business
suffered a relapse, and Steel preferred, a 7% cumulative preference, could be purchased under $50 a
share, netting 14% per annum on money and a
speculative gain of 60 points in four years. American
Locomotive preferred, which has always paid 7%,
sold at 67½ in 1903, at 83 in 1907 and at 85½ in
1908. Many other similar examples could be quoted.
At the i,resent time, with money easy and returns
on investment larger in these industrial preferred
stocks than in any other group of securities, I feel
confident that the most conservative speculativeinvestments of the entire list are presented. One
phase of our present bus:ness conditions, simple
enough in the abstract, but generally overlooked
by observers, is the fact that the plentiful supply
of money and the consequent ease with which bond
flotations are made, taken in connection with the
low prjce of copper and the recent cut in steel
products, offer to the railroads an unusually favorable opportunity to C'.lrry out improvements or
rehabilitate equipment.
It is not probable that
much extension or building of new roads will occur
as yet, but replacement and attention to the physical
needs of properties will soon give the manufacturing
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corporations all they can do. This will favorably
affect both the preferred and common issues of steel
and iron and equipment shares.
To show the present position of industrial preferred stocks the following table has been compiled:

Industrial Preferred Stocks.
Dividend Price
Rate. March 2.

Am. Agric. Chem... . . .
Am. Beet Sugar . . . . . .
*American Can . . . . . . . .
Am. Car & Foundry . .
Am. Cotton Oil . . . . . .
Am. Locomotive . . . . . .
Am. Smelt. Sec., Pfd. B.
Am. Smelting . . . . . . . .
Am. Snuff . . . . . . . . . . . .
Am. Sugar . . . . . . . . . . .
Am. Tobacco . .. . . . . . .
Am. Woolen . . . . . . . . . .
Central Leather . . . . . . .
Corn Products . . . . . . . .
Fed. Mining & Smelt..
Federal Sugar . . . . . . . .
Internat. Harvester.....
**lnternat. Paper . . . . .
Internat. Steam Pump..
Mackay Companies . . .
National Biscuit . . . . . .
National Enameling . .
National Lead . . . . . . . .
Pacific Coast, 2d pfd...
Pressed Steel Car . . . . .
Railway Steel Spring. .
Republic Iron & Steel.
Sloss-Sheffield . . . . . . . .
••*Union Bag & Paper.

6
6
5
7
6
7
5

7
6

7
6
7

7
6

7

6
7
2
6
4
7
7

7
4

7
7
7
7
4

97
86¼
75½
110½
103½
110¼
83¼
103
95
128
91¾
96¾
101
74½
83
85
112
52¾
83 ¼
70¼

120
82¾
108¼
85
94¼
99½
74¾
108
68¾

Income Margin of
Return.
Safety.

6.2
5.74
6.9
15.95
6.62
6.33
12.88
5.79
6.33
6.31
9.1
5.97N o rep'ts
6.79
8.26
6.31
18.09
5.47
12.44
6.57
21.73
7.27
2.87
6.93
1.66
8.05
4.70
8.43
0.36
7.06No rep'ts
6.25
7.63
3.82
2.3
7.16
3.01
5.68
3.32
5.83
8.71
8.51 Deficit
6.83
5.05
4.71
10.29
7.38 Deficit
7.03
8.58
9.41
4.4
6.48
15.08

5.86

• American Can preferred is a 7 per cent. cumulative stock.
Owing to the large arrears of dividends on this stock, now
amounting to .25¼ per cent., which, if paid, would -consume
twice the surplus profits account, no percentage of safety can
be stated.
**FuU dividend rate, 6 per cent.; now on a 2 per cent. basrs,
with 3 per cent. arrears of dividend.
***Full dividend rate, 7 per cent.; now on a 4 per cent.
basis, with 6¼ per cent. arrears of dividends January 1.

83

Dividend Price
Rate. March 2.

U. S. Leather pfd.
U. S. Rubber, 1st pfd.
U. S. Rubber, 2d pfd .. .
U. S. Steel ......... ..
Va.-Car. Chemical ... .

6
8
6
7
8

67½
111¼
115

33 Stocks . ......... 212

3208¼

128
102½

Income Margin of
Return.
Safety.

4.68
7.8
8.88
6.29

0.95
1.8
0.58
10.18

6.95

6.35

6.6

The margin of safety is based on the earnings of
the last fiscal year, which has been reported on, and
takes account of surplus earnings, after paying fixed
charges, preferred dividends, and necessary appropri:.tions for reserves, and before anything is paid
on the common stock or ot.1er junior issue.
Two things are to be considered in consulting
this table: First, that the exhibit covers a lean
period, and, second, that everything points to an
improvement in general business during 1909. Under
these circumstances few, if any, of the preferred
dividends are menaced, and some of them appear
as stable as bonds.

The General Situation.
President Taft's message to Congress fell flat so far
as stock-market influence was concerned for the
reason that its contents were pretty well known
in the Street before the document was made public.
The bearishly inclined made some stock of the
fact that all the Roosevelt policies were specifically
and favorably mentioned and that the opening paragraph of the message was a tribute to Mr. Roosevelt.
It is impossible to c.onceive of Mr. Taft's initial
message taking any other form when the circumstances which brought about his incumbency are
considered. It is gratifying, however, to note the
calm anc' judicial tone of Mr. Taft's message as
compared with the vivid and sometimes extravagant
language employed by his predecessor. Few unprejudiced people will criticise Mr. Roosevelt's
policies as such. but the method of enforcing them
was frequently ill-timed, noisy and interlarded with
personal rancor. To blame him for the panic of
1907 is unjust and ridiculous. That panic was fore seen by a number of students · of economics long
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before it appeared, and in their predictions political
affairs ha'. little, if any, consideration. Mr. Taft, if
he lives up to his reputation, will seek to bring about
a maximum of good with a minimum of friction.
And he will probably succeed.
The reduction in the prices of steel is, contrary
to the prediction of the pessimists, bringing out a
quantity of new orders. The new business of the
United States Steel Corporation since the cut has
averaged about 25,000 tons a day. It was suggested in these advices when the cut occurred that
the Steel Corporation would teach the small independents something about rate-cutting, and this is
verified by the fact that most of the new business
is going to the big concerns. The fact that no longterm contracts are accepted reflects a belief that
manufacturers do not look for a long period of
low prices.
Drives at copper stocks have been fashionable
this week, in spite of a number of large buying
orders in the metal. The argument of the bears
is that these purchases of metal are of a speculative
character and that, consequently, the supplies are
still on the market. It is rather difficult to follow
this reasoning. There is no so-called public speculation in the metal, and those who do indulge in
such operations are the best-posted men in the trade.
The speculation in copper metal comes largely from
London, and they have been right more often than
wrong in the past. If tl.ey are buying the metal
speculatively now, such purchases can be due to but
one reason, i. e., that they confidently expect the
price to advance and the market to broaden sufficiently to absorb their holdings at higher figures.
General business in all commercial lines is making
steady headway. Men who speak with authority
are confident of the future.
Bank clearings, always a good indication of business activity, are satisfactory.
Clearings for the
week outside of New York show a gain of about
11 % over the corresponding week in the year 1906.
It is not probable that labor disturbances will be
much of a factor this year. When the improvement in business reaches a visible and concrete form
less will be heard of wage reductions, and for the
present such reductions as occur will probably be
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accepted by workingmen. Prediction of wholesale
cutting of wages is, just at present, traceable to a
great extent to political efforts to array the working classes against tariff revision.
Railroad gross earnings should show much better
for February than for January, and this betterment
will conti,me for some time.
Earnings so far reported for the first three weeks
in February show a gain of 13% over the same
period in 1908, and a loss of only 4.3% from the
heavy business of 1907.
The greatest factor to be watched now is the
crops. As is customary, I will send a capable and
unbiased expert into the field5 some time this
month, and the special weekly letters on the progress of crops will be resumed. This is the most
important factor of all. I produced a chart in 1907
showing that, with a single exception, the stock
market had accurately re-fleeted cereal production
in all its principal movements in either direction.
The exception was 1896, and all signs failed us
that year, as our monetary standard was discredited
throughout the world and no one wanted our securities. What we want to do in order to get the
maximum benefit out of our investments in securities is to learn as early as possible what may be
expected in our cereals and staples. It can be done.

The Technical Situation.
Investigations this week show an increase in the
short interest instead of the decrease which was
expected in view of the sharp recovery in prices.
ln(]uiries made in a number of houses catering to
public traders bring out the fact that little covering
occurred on the rally, and that short lines were
averaged in the latter days of the week. The
buying is of a good character, but not aggressive,
purchasers being content to accept offerings quietly
for the present. The bear leaders are, on the other
hand, very aggressive, but not a good crowd to
tie up with.
Consider the technical situation strong.
Conclusion.
I do not think we have, as yet, passed out of the
period of irregularity and professional trading opera86
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tions, and continue to recommend the policy suggested in last week's letter, i. e., to purchase on
these moderate setbacks with a view to accepting
·fair profits on advances. Those who do not trade
actively should buy confidently at this level, prepared to average on dips and hold for substantial
profits. Short selling is dangerous. It will not be
long until we will get out of this narrow range,
but meanwhile the bears are meeting with little
opposition and will continue to jump on the market
now and then. Their grand finale will be a repetition
of the events of the last year. They are working
against the current and depending on force rather
than reason and on the present rather than the
future.
Still favor the industrial issues. United States
Steel preferred, American Car & Foundry preferred,
American Locomotive preferred, National Lead
preferred and Railway Steel Spring preferred look
particularly attractive. As to speculative possibilities
in these preferences, it should be noted that if
they reach a basis representing 6% on money a
seven-per cent. stock would sell at 115, and on a
basis of So/o, which does not appear to be an
unreasonable expectation in view of good business
prospects, easy money and the growing favor with
which these stocks are received, the price would
be 140.
In the common industrials, American Locomotive,
American Car & Foundry, Consolidated Gas, Pressed
Steel Car, Railway Steel Spring, United States Steel
and Amalgamated Copper offer good opportunities.
The stock last named has been a particular bear
target for some time on the "Kick him again, he
has no friends" theory, but the security has always
shown remarkable recuperative powers after a
bear raid.
In the dividend-paying rails, Union Pacific,
Southern Pacific, Great Northern, St. Paul, Atchison
and Pennsylvania look attractive. In the lowerpriced group, Kansas City Southern, St. Louis
Southwestern, Texas Pacific and Denver & Rio
Grande look cheap .
A chart showing market movements of stocks for
the month of Febr,uary appears in Vol. II.
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March 13, 1909•

•
frequently

In these advices I have
recommended the
employment o'f the scale order as the best method of accumulating a line of stocks. In' the year 1907 the same
method was recommended in putting out short Jines. I
wish to point out in detail the unusual merits and advantages of the scale order and the very satisfactory results which may be obtained by its intelligent employment.
The basic features of the method need little explanation. Thi; first fundamental fact is that a recovery of
half the decline on which purchases have been accumulated covers the Joss. That is to say, if we begin buying a certain security at 100 and scale our purchases
down to 80, the entire line averages 90. This merely
mathematical fact has, however, been responsible for
much abusing of the method. To place dependence on
the merit of the system alone and disregard other important factors is a dangerous policy. If we look over
the chart for the years 1907 and 1908, it is evident at a
glance that we could have started a scale order at the
highest prices of 1907 and now have . very large profits.
But such reasoning is ridiculous, as no ordinary purse
would stand such a strain, and no ordinary speculator
possesses either the patience or the stamina to follow
such a campaign. And it is only on the constructive
side that this showing of mechanical success is apparent,
even if money, patience and stamina are admitted. The
short seller who started scaling short sales a year ago
would be facing a cheerless future, and, incidentally,
suffering losses from every dividend distribution. The
man who started selling short in 1896 would not have
seen daylight up to date.
The proper way to employ the scaling principle is simple enough. We should buy only good securities when
they are cheap, making the initial purchase when such a
purchase, standing alone, would appear advisable. This,
of course, applies to short selling when prices are high,
but for the sake of simplicity, I will confine remarks to
purchases.
There are several things which operate against the
successful employment of scaling mtthods. The individual who buys, as suggested above, and does not get
an opportunity to average because there is no subse-
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quent decline is very much disappointed. It may be
said, however, that this does not often happen. In the
majority of cases, no matter how correct the views as
to values, technical conditions, etc., may be, we will find
an opportunity to increase cpmmitments to advantage,
and in some cases considerable lines will be acquired.
The greatest drawback of all is the fact that not one
man in a hundred will carry out his intentions as he
originally maps them out. He will either be frightened
from his position by the rumors and canards which are
always present during a decline, and stop buying, or he
will even sell his holdings voluntarily or by meaqs of
that miserable and illogical invention c..Iled the · stop
order. The use of the stop order in connection with
new ventures is a confession that the operator has no
faith in his own deductions as to the value 9f the security purchased, or that he is over-trading. How ridiculous it is to buy something because it is cheap and
simultaneously give instructions to sell it if it gets
cheaper. The method of averaging is the exact reversal
of the stop order. It contemplates buying something
when it is cheap and standing ready to buy more if, from
accident or manipulation, it becomes cheaper. Being
diametrically opposed to each other, one of these -principles must be wrong. It does not require much reflection
to decide which is the sound one. In former criticisms
of the stop order, I have been vigorously combatted,
but as most of the remarks have emanated from people
who like to gamble on two-point moves, regardless of
intrinsic worth of securities, or from brokers who find
that the stop order increases business and reduces risk,
I am not convinced.
I do not mean to say that if a man finds himself wrong
in his calculations he is justified in sticking stubbornly
to a bad proposition. There are times when we must
accept a loss and accept it cheerfully. Some losses must
occur every year, but if we get away at the end of the
period with a good net profit on all transactions it is
all right.
Some years ago I had an opportunity to examine over
4,000 speculative accounts, and the character of the errors
found therein was compiled and set forth in one of my
published works.* During that examination I found
dozens of instances where scale orders were started,
* The Pitfalls of Speculation, 1,y Thomas Gibson.
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but in only a few cases were they carried out unswervingly. To quote from the work mentioned:
"The inability ' of the average trader to
map out a plan and follow it was also distinctly exemplified. · Methods and systems
begun and pursued for a time with mathematical precision almost invariably ended
in a mass of indiscriminate operations,
caused apparently by fright or confusion in
case of loss and exhilaration and enthusiasm if successful."
In many instances where only a few lots had been accumulated on the scaling principle, I found that after
prices had advanced, the operator apparently became
obsessed with the idea that the market was getting away
from him, ·and began buying larger lots of stock in an
advancing market at just about the time when he should
have begun selling. The end was, of course, disaster.
In order to show what the possibilities of the scaling
system have been for the last two years, I have prepared
a chart which appears in Vol. II. To this I will
apply the trading position, either bullish or bearish,
according to my own investigations and letters during that period.
Early in 1907, it became apparent for a number of
economic reasons, that stock prices were entirely too
high. Sales on advances appeared to offer promise of
large profits, and that position was taken without change
until March 14, when it was considered advisable to
abandon the sho·rt side temporarily and gather in profits.
On March 20, the bearish position was again resumed,
but on the theory of selling only on advances and averaging. The market advanced about enough to give fair
lines on the scale, and then broke abruptly to former
low levels. Several other temporary reversals were suggested, and a good deal of switching from one stock
or group to another, all of which proved quite satisfac- .
tory. In the latter part of August prospects appeared
much improved and purchases of good securities on
breaks and on the scale order principle were recommended. This advice was a trifle premature, as the
banking and money scare was more severe than was anticipated or warranted, but the operators who had followed suggestions now had or should have had large
profits to fortify their new position, and in a short time
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larger profits appeared on the long side. Since then it
'has been clear sailing, all that has been necessary was
to buy and average. Some advantage has also accrued
through temporary changes of position.
I do not quote from my own advices as a matter of
self-advertising, but to show forcibly the necessity of
keeping informed on the long swing of prices and the
possibility of doing so over long periods in good times
and bad, and, further, to show how admirably the scale
order works out when combined with correct views as to
the long swings.
In this entire period of two years, which covered a
severe panic and a great recovery, the scaling system
did not fail JJS at any time, and when employed correctly, produced a maximum of profit with a minimum
of risk or mental disturbance. Of course it was necessary to have correct views as to the general trend of
the market, but this was also satisfactorily a_!:complished
by careful examinations of salient factors.
As to just how the scale order should be operated, it
may be said that no cut and dried rule is applicable. In
a low-priced inactive stock, orders may be placed very
close, say, one point below each preceding purchase. In
high-priced active stocks three to five or even ten points
is more reasonable. Everything depends on the character of the security, the possible dangers through
specific action against a certain stock or dangers
which affect all securities, such as crop failures, etc.
While I cannot pretend to give a rule of thumb, I will
be glad to reply to individual inquiries on the subject.
One of the strongest evidences of the sound principles of the method of averaging is the fact that in recent years it has been accepted by the most successful
and important operators in Wall Street.

The General Sitt:ation.
The general situation is growing very promising, not
only in the United States, but the world over. It- is
true that there is no boom in business as yet but that
marked improvement will occur in the latter half of the
year appears certain. The possibility of a crop failure
is always to be considered, and this factor should be
accorded unusual consideration this year. Prices of
stocks have reached a level which, while still low as
compared with money, makes the market more two-sided
91

and more susceptible to adverse influences than was the
case a year ago.
fhe tariff is not likely to prove much of a disturbing
factor. It is probable that the worst will be known
when the bill is received from the committee next week
and that the fight thereafter will be favorable to the
Protectionists. Even as they stand at this writing the
recommendations are, considered marketwise, bullish.
We have heard dozens of alleged authentic reports of
the forthcoming schedule, but they vary so much as to
leave us all at sea.
·
The recommendations are not complete, but they stood
as follows on March 11 : Crockeryware, unchanged;
earthenware, unchanged; glass schedule, 10% reduction;
iron ore, reduction from present rate of 40c. per ton to
20c. per tpn, may possibly go on free list; steel rails,
cut about 25%; structural steel, cut about 25%; other
crude iron and steel, cut about 25%; tin plate, still open,
may go on free list (draw-back unchanged); lead, still
open; zinc, probably le. per pound duty; lumber, cut
about 25%; paper, still open; sugar, no change (300,000
pounds free from Philippines); tobacco, no change except from Philippines; textiles, very little change; hides
free, and sole leather, reduced to 10%.
If the iron and steel schedule gets through, as above,
we will see a great rise in the steel stocks.
Labor troubles will play a very small part in stock
movements this year. Every demand or disturbance will
be worked upon by the bears, bu·t we need feel no apprehension on this head.
The general situation is sound and satisfactory.

The Technical Situation.
The technical situation is very strong. The short interest is large and of a poor character. Daily drives,
founded upon such foolishness as the Erie receivership
canard, nave resulted in nothing but an increase in the
short interest, and any attempt to cover exterisively
would bring about a very decided advance. Short selling has concentrated largely in the industrial group
through a misinterpretation of the real significance of
the ·reduction in steel prices, and such securities as United
States Steel are badly oversold. The short interest in
the equipment stocks is not large, but that group suffered a sharp and entirely unwarranted "sympathetic"
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decline last month, and will do better on merit atone.
High-priced rails are also oversold to some extent.
Conclusion.
In a recent conversation with Mr. Selwyn-Brown, in
regard to an examination of the world's industrial conditions which he is now preparing for this service, he
called my attention to our two forms af credit-the
credit which finances business enterprises and the credit
which finances security issues. The world's supply of
money, or gold, is not sufficient to finance both safely in
the same period. Applied to the movements af stock
prices this fact ·suggests the following theory as to stock
prices : At present there is a plethora of money and busiis in a waiting attitude. This money will seek employment in securities, not only because some form of employment -is necessary, but because well-founded anticipation of marked business improvement later on warrants such purchases. When the actual improvement
occurs funds will gradually be withdrawn from the stock
market to finance business enterprises. This is all plain
enough, and is only a repetition of financial history.
Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that by the time
our business is g;oing full blast stock prices will be high
enough, and that the transfer of money from securities
to commercial lines will at least check further advances.
But haw is this situation analyzed by the speculative
proletariat? Backward, of course. They will not buy
stoc,s until the business boom arrives and is prima
faci~then at higher prices and amid .t enthusiasm and
excitement they will purchase stocks. They will speculate on what is known, not what is probable, and will
wonder why in the world stocks went up when business was dull and are now going down when business
is bully. Incidentally they will hurl anathemas at Wall
Street and call it a skin game for no better reason than
that security prices are based not on the present but
on intelligent deductions as to the future. I presume
my friends smile at the constant reiteration of this preCLssion or anteriority of stack prices, but it is the most
important and most widely disregarded factor in the
entire proposition.
Continue to recommend purchases of good stacks at
this level or on little declines. It will probably be wise
to abandon the trading methods which have been ad-

93

vised for the past two weeks and take a more ,;eciJed
stand on the long side. In the high-priced rails Union
Pacific, Reading, Atchison and Pennsylvania appear best.
In the lower-priced rails Kansas City Southern and
M. K. & T. offer greatest immediate returns. In the
industrials, United States Steel, American Car & Foundry, Railway Steel Spring, American Locomotive, American Cotton Oil, Consolidated Gas and Amalgamated
Copper are very attractive.
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Market

ovements of 23 Active Rails and 18 Active Industrials, Showing the
Advantage of the Scale Order.
(Thomas Gibson's Barometrical Averages.)
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Moves of

March 20, 1909.
Comparatively few men understand the tariff
question in its general bearing upon industry and
commerce. Still fewer understand its effect upon the
prices of certain products and upon the values of
certain stocks. Never, perhaps, was the public more
confused and misled than by the present cuts in the
duties on iron and steel.
The "drastic cut" of "SO per cent." appears to
most holders of Steel common to spell ruin. Unless
the greater part of this cut can be restored by the
Senate these frightened holders expect to see Steel
common decline to $10 or $20 a share. Most financial editors seem to hold the same view-the same
ones who ignore the "small reduction" of 5 cents
per 100 pounds in the duty on refined sugar. And
yet the cut of 5 cents per 100 pounds in the duty
on refined sugar takes away two-fifths of the "differential" duty on refined sugar, or two-fifths of the
protection of the Sugar Trust, while the cut in
steel duties does not take away more than onefifth, and probably not one-eighth, of the actual
protection of the Steel Trust. Following is a rough
estimate of the effect of the reduced duties on iron
and steel on the profits of the U. S. Steel Corporation and on the value3 of its securities:
On iron ore, the present duty of 40 cents per ton
is entire!_ abolished. This will, of course, tend to
depreciate the value of the equities of the Steel
Corporation in iron ore mines. It is very difficult
to estimate the extent of this depreciation because,
in the first place, the Steel Corporation leases most
or its mines on· a royalty basis and also because no
one can know, until the experiment of free iron ore
is tried, how much foreign ore lies within practical
reach of our shores. During the last six years we
imported an average of n early 1,000,000 tons of iron
ore a year, valued at an average of about $2,500,000.
Roug-hly, two-thirds of thi s came from Cuba, oneeighth from British North America and the rest
from Europe. As ore can be brought from Europe
only as ballast, it is not likely that free ore will
much more than double the imports from that
quarter. Possibly the imports of Cuban ores would
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double under free ore and those from Canada treble
or quadruple. Total imports would, perhaps, within
five years, reach 3,000,000 or 4,000,000 tons, or something like one-twelfth of our total consumption.
All things considered, it is improbable that free
ore will depreciate the value of our ore lands more
than 10 per cent.-more near the coast and less on
the Great Lakes, in <:olorado, etc. If the equities
of the Steel Corporation in ore lands are now worth
$500,000,000 - a liberal estimate - the depreciation
would be $50,000,000. When distributed over 50
years, the depreciation would, including interest,
amount to not more than $3,000,000 or $4,000,000 a
year.
The reduction of the duty on pig iron from $4
to $2.50 a ton would have but little effect on the value
of Steel stock. Our imports for the last six years have
averaged about 300,000 tons a year, valued at about
$7,000,0 0. Roughly, four-fifths came from Great
Britain and the rest from Germany and AustriaHungary. In boom years in this country the imports are five times those of ordinary years. The
reduction in duty will probably not change results
much. The Steel Corporation sells little or no
pig iron and will gain almost as much as it will lose
by the reduction.
The duty on steel rails is reduced from $7.84 to
$3.92 per ton. As the domestic and export price of
steel rails has usually differed by about $7 a ton,
and as the Steel Corporation sold, in 1907, 1,733,814
tons of rails, the tariff profit was, at $7 a . ton,
$12,136,698. Under the new rate, the price of steel
rails would probably be reduced to $25 a ton and the
quality improved.
The tariff profit would be
$6,000,000 less. The railroads woufd gain all that .
the Steel Corporation would lose by the change.
Except as to iron ore and steel rails. the Steel
Corporation will lose but little by the reductions in
tariff duties on iron and steel. In most other instances the reductions are nominal and not real.
That is, the present duties are unnecessarily high
and the reduced rates will be sufficiently high to
enable domestic manufacturers to charge ordinary
prices for their products.
This fact is clearly illustrated by the tin plate duty
and prices. While the present duty is 1½ cents per
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pound, or $1.50 a box, the domestic price almost
never exceeds the foreign price by more than $1 a
box. That is, only 1 cent a pound of the duty is
ever utilized. The new duty is 1 1/5 cents per
pound, or 5 cents more than is needed or used.
Hence the estimated tariff profit of $16,000,000 on
tin plate (in 1907) would not have been disturbed
had the proposed duty been in force then.
Probably the duties on wire and wire products
yield more protection profits to the Steel Corporation than do those on any other kind of products.
These profits were estimated at $17,774,712, in 1907,
or an average of $12 a ton. The present duties on
ordinary wire vary from 1¼ cents to 2 cents per
pound. The proposed duties vary from 1 cent to
1½ cents per pound. The proposed duties, therefore, afford all of the protection desired and twice
as much as is now being utilized. Wire nails are
the most important of the wire products: On these
the duty is reduced from ½ cent to ¼ cent per
pound, on the larger sizes, and from 1 cent to ½
cent on the smaller sizes. The new rates afford
ample protection and will enable the Steel Corporation to maintain the present differences between its
export and domestic prices.
The item that contains the next greatest amount
of tariff profits is that of "merchant steel, skelp,
hoops, bands and cotton ties." In 1907 these tariff
profits were estimated at $10,531,096-an average of
$8 per ton. On cotton ties-an important part of
this item-the duty is reduced from 5/10 to 3/10
cents per pound.
On hoops and bands the
lowest rate is reduced from 5/10 to 3/10 cents
per pound.
On the thinner grades the new
duties run from 4/10 to 3 cents per pound. Practically the new rates would be just about as protective as are the present ones.
In 1907 the Steel Corporation produced 877,682
tons of plates on which the tariff protection was
estimated at $8 per ton, or $7,021,456. On these
the duties are changed from ½ cent per pound,
or more to 20 per cent. ad valorem. As plates
usually sell at $30 or $40 a ton , the new duty will
be almost as protective as is the old one.
The next most important protected item is that
of "tubing and pipe." On this the protection was

97

estimated at $7,047,774, at $6 a ton. As the present
duty of 4/10 cents per pound is changed to ¾ cent
per pound there will be no loss of tariff profits on
this item.
·
The two next important items are "finished
structural work" and "heavy structural shapes." On
the first of these the tariff profits were estimated at
$5,759,096, at $8 per ton, and on the second
$4,115,978, at $7 per ton. The present duty of 5/10
cents per pound is changed to 3/10 cents per pound.
The prices of structural material will not need to
be reduced because of this change.
The only other important item is that of "blooms,
billets, slabs, sheet and tin plate bars." On this
the tariff profit was estimated at $4 per ton, or
$3,793,495.
On these forms the present duty is
5/10 cents, and the proposed duty 4/10 cents per
pound. This change is, therefore, harmless to the
Steel Corporation.
The total of estimated tariff profits on all of
the other products of the Steel Corporation were
only $5,183,130, in 1907. The proposed duties on
these products will, in most cases, leave more
protection than is now utilized . That is, the proposed rates are higher than the effective rates of
the Dingley bill.
In ordinary years, of ordinary prices, then, the
proposed duties, except as to those on steel rails,
are about as protective as are the present duties. In
boom years, if very high prices, the new rates would
be less protective. In an average year the Payne
bill would yield, at a liberal estimate, $15,000,000
less of tariff profit to the Steel Corporation than
does the Dingley bill, which in the year 1907 yielded
about $80,000,000. The average net earnings of the
Steel Corporation for the years 1905, 1906 and 1907
were over $145,000,000 a year. Under the Payne
bill they would probably have been $130,000,000.
About $30,000,000 is necessary to meet the interest
and sinking fund on the bonds. About $25,000,000
is needed to pay 7% dividends on the preferred
stock. A liberal allowance for repairs, maintenance
and replacements is $35,000,000.
On this basis
$40,000,000 a year would have been left for dividends
on the common stock, or an average of 8 per cent.
a year. With the new Gary plant in operation, it
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is fair to assume that the net earnings for the years
1909, 1910 and 1911 will average fully $140,000,000
a year and that dividends of not less than 6 per cent.
will, or should, be paid on the common stock in
1910 and 1911.

The General Situation.
There is as yet no glaring evidence of a marked
advance in general business. It is my opinion that
the improvement is greater than is apparent to the
casual observer. New York is the point at which
news and statistics are most observed, and we are
naturally inclined to accept local figures as representing not only the state of affairs in the United
States but in the entire world. Local conditions
are certainly very forcible to the man of limited
perspective.
Grain brokers have frequently informed me that a farmer-speculator finds it very
difficult to judge of the conditions in wheat or corn
if they are not verified by conditions in his own
county. We even hear of an enthusiastic Chicago
speculator who sold wheat short in a drought period
because a sprinkling wagon passed the board of
trade.
My private correspondence from the West and
South does not bear out the pessimism which is
prevalent in the East. One gentleman, writing from
the Northwest, states that he understands from the
newspapers that we are in a period of depression,
otherwise he had not noticed it. And it is a fact that
there has been almost unbroken prosperity in the
agricultural districts and that this prosperity bids
fair to continue unless we run into a crop failure.
This crop factor is important because it is a matter
of history that with a single exception our security
prices nd our crops have moved upward and downward together for 25 years. The exception was in
1896. We all know why that divergence occurred.
I do not mean to state that panics are due entirely
to crop failures. There are many other factors.
But it is true, nevertheless, that in our panic years
we have had poor crops. In 1883 we raised 421,000,000 bushels of wheat, 1,500,000,000 bushels of corn
and 5,700,000 bales of cotton. as against 504,000,000
wheat, 1,600,000,000 corn and 7,000,000 bales of cotton
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in 1882. ln 1890 we made 400,000,000 bushels of
wheat, 1,S00,000,000 bushels of corn and 8,600,000
bales of cotton, as against 490,000,000 wheat, 2,100,000,000 corn and 7,300 1000 bales of cotton in 1899.
Cotton was larger in this year, but the oats crop
was a failure, falling from 810,000,000 bushels in 1899
to 520,000,000 bushels in 1900. In 1893 wheat fell
from 516,000,000 bushels in the preceding year to
396,000,000 bushels; corn and cotton were about the
same as 1892, but everything had fallen severely for
two years following the crops of 1891. Two years
of bad crops in succession. In 1903 we made 637,000,000 bushels of wheat, 2,250,000,000 bushels of
corn and 10,100,000 bales of cotton, as against
670,000,000 wheat, 2,520,000,000 corn and 10,750,000
bales of cotton in 1902. In 1907 our wheat was
634,000,000 bushels, corn 2,592,000,000 bushels and
cotton 11,500,000 bales, as compared with 735,000,000
wheat, 2,927,000,000 corn and 13,500,000 cotton in
1906. Oats was again a bad failur..: in 1907, falling
from 965,000,000 bushels in 1906 to 755,000,000 in
1907. We may follow the statistics of cereal production as far as we like and find that big crops are the
greatest single incentive to higher stock prices, and
vice versa.
It is of primary importance that men in any line
of business should keep ::n eye on our crop prospects
this year. Such knowledge is particularly vital to the
investor ,.nd speculator, for good crops will absorb
or make insignificant most of the minor evils which
may befall us.
With money easy the world over, a man of careful
and judicial mind in the Presidential chair, business
in many lines stimulated by reductions in building
materials, the hostility to corporations waning, railroad earnings improving and the basic business
structure sounder than for many years, we have little
to be apprehensive about. There are two factors
which have as yet been accorded little attention, but
which will be worked for all they are worth by the
bears in time. One is the continued gold exports
and the other is the impoverished condition of our
national treasury. In my opinion neither of these
factors will cause any serious decline. The significance of gold · exports is misunderstood or exaggerated by many observers. It is natural and logical
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that the second largest producer of gold in the world
should ship at least a portion of the surplus production under normal conditions and aside from the
fundamental view, we are sending away gold now to
restore the equilibrium which was disturbed by our
heavy importations in 1907. Of course, an outward
movement of gold might go too far, but there is no
reason to anticipate this at present.
The weakness of the treasury is not a serious
matter. The gap will easily be filled. There is
nothing in history to show that bond issues are bad.
England is in a chronic state of this kind. Fundamentally most writers contend that a constant deficit
is better than a surplus. Professor H. C. Adams in
his book, "Public Debts," contends that there are
three reasons why this is true, (1) the moral effects
of a deficit on electors and legislators as well as
upon the people at large, (2) the fact that a deficit
at the close of a year causes a revisionary study of
former expenditures, and (3) that in case of a surplus, large sums are withdrawn from circulation.
These are, of course, long-distance factors not
affecting immediate stock-price movements, and
many operators grow impatient at such discussions,
but it is necessary to look, first of all, at the solidity
of the foundation, and after this has been settled
to our satisfaction we may examine the probabilities
of intermediate changes which may occur because of
shifting technical conditions, manipulation, etc. If
our founc!ation is secure we need have little fear
of the ultimate outcome of our ventures, for declines brought about by unforeseen events, technical
weakness or drives at prices, will be of a temporary
nature, and even if we fail to detect one of these
lesser changes we are all right. Fortunately we
can, by exercising due vigilance, anticipate most of
the intermediate reversals unless occasioned by
accident or surprise. The people who made money
on the short side of the market in 1907 did not succeed because they were natural born bears or because they "thought they were too high," nor did th e
people who made money in 1908 succeed because
they had horns or because they "thought they were
too low." In both cases success was due to a
correct knowledge of conditions, present and probable.
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While I do not agree with the enthusiasts who
look for a big business boom in the latter part of
1909, it is my opinion that recuperation will be
gradual and healthy and that security prices, measured both by probable general conditions affecting
their earning capacity and by the yardstick of
money, should advance. There will be mo.re numerous and more severe recessions in 1909 than was the
case in 1908, as prices are now so much nearer
values. These changes we must, of course, look
out for.
And above all things we must look out for the
crops and be sure we do not form opinions on the
biased views and incorrect statements w.hich will
pour in from the interested or ignorant. For the
benefit of subscribers, I will put a first-class expert
into the fields next month and keep him there until
we feel fairly assured of the outcome. I need not
add that he will be entirely unhampered by any
"policy" and that we may reasonably expect to get
a good line on probable cereal production.

The Technical Situation.
The technical situation has undergone little
change this week. The short interest is still large.
Investigations made during the week show that the
short interest is not confined to New York, but
that there is a bearish contingent of large proportions in all principal speculative centers. Chicago
operators are heavily short even in such stocks as
American Locomotive.
There is, as yet, no effort on the part of the large
interests to attack the bear interest or manipulate
for higher prices.
Offerings are well absorbed,
however, and bear drives do not dislodge enough
stocks to pay for the process. Repeated efforts to
scare holders out have resulted in nothing, and the
manipulators for a decline are rather discouraged.
They are now waiting for something to happen to
help them out. When the short interest gets into
this position the chances are heavily against them.
Consider the technical situation strong.
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Conclusion.

~

See no reason to change my views this week.
Consider stocks a purchase at this level or on any
moderate recessions. Recommendations as to specific securities remain unchanged. The list last week
was Union Pacific, Reading, Atchison and Pennsylvania in the dividend payers; Kansas City Southern
and Missouri, Kansas & Texas in the low-priced
rails, and United States Steel, American Car &
Foundry, Railway Steel Spring, American Locomotive, American Cotton Oil, Consolidated Gas and
Amalgamated Copper in the industrials. To the
industrial list I will add Realty common. My very
bullish position on industrial preferred stocks has
already been explained in recent letters.
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March 27, 1909.
There has been little in the current news of the
week to arouse either b\lllish enthusiasm or bearish
activity. The fundamentals which warrant a belief
in higher prices are of a long distance character,
and active operators care little for academic factors
or disquisitions. The study and consideration of
probable conditions six months or a year hence is
really of primary importance in its bearing on the
course of the stock markets of to-day, but ordinary
speculators want something to talk about which requires no reflection or research. The questions of
the day are limited to the Balkan affairs, the tariff,
and the labor situation, and as the bears are in a
rather unpleasant position they work these things
for all they are worth. The bull party, on the other
hand, is not active and appear satisfied to let the
market take its course. There is, however, excellent
absorption of good securities on all little recessions
and the trend of prices is to a higher level. As is
invariably the case when a market is strong after a
decline, each advance is attributed to "short covering," but this hackneyed excuse is not at present
s_upported by scrutiny of the buying and selling
nor by the more superficial market action:
FOREIGN WAR CLOUDS.

The Balkan situation does .not appear to be sufficient warrant for a decline in our stock prices.
Only by a stretch of imagination can we construe
this annual fuss in the near East as a serious factor.
A few of the Jingos are figuring on a world war
growing out of the dispute, but such an issue appears, to say the least, highly improbable. One of
the schemes of the bear element just now is to
sell a few stocks in London before our market opens,
on the theory that operators on this side will think
foreigners are selling our stocks. There was a time
when the attitude of London was a factor in shaping
early sentiment, but of late the London quotations
are a joke and are accorded little attention. The
supreme indifference to the lower range of cabled
prices this week is good evidence that this form of
manipulation is understood and disregarded.
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LABOR PROBLEMS.

In regard to labor troubles, it is an axiom of the
Street that strikes are a poor basis for bear operations. In July, 1908, I issued a letter dealing
with this subject and showing by a chart and
statistics that labor troubles did not check bull
markets or create bear markets.• An examination
of all important labor disturbances from 1877 to
date showed that in a large majority of instances
they were not important as a market factor. The
conclusion reached in the letter mentioned was as
follows:
"In a general way, it may be said, with confidence,
that while serious strikes always affect earnings to
some extent, during the event, they seem to play
a somewhat inconspicuous part in stock market
movements. Some of them are brought on, in bad
years, by the necessity for retrenchment of corporate
expenses, and they have more than once probably
t ended to aggravate the pessimism of the hour and
accentuate the decline in stocks. But they are usually short lived. When they fail, the position of the
corporate interests against which the strikes were
directed has always been greatly improved. And
the real influences which dominate the stock market
in any given year are of such overwhelming force
that as an almost invariable rule they override the
influence of strikes, and carry stocks either upward
or downward almost regardless of the unrest in the
ranks of labor."
TARIFF LEGISLATION.

The tariff has already been discussed in these
advices. There is little to fear from this source.
General business activity may be curbed somewhat
until the measure becomes a law, but the liand-tomouth policy of buying which is due to uncertainty
about duties will not destroy anything. It will simply
defer the established customs of "stocking up." As
has been frequently suggested, the wor :t was known
about the tariff when the original recommendations
were handed in by the Ways and Means Committee,
and that worst is not very bad. I think, after the
• The letter referred to will be found on page
ume I, of the bouod volume of letters for 1908.
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true inwardness of this rev1s1on is appreciated it
will be considered a high protection plan.
FORCIBLE FACTORS.

As opposed to these issues which are, rightly or
wrongly, considered legitimate bear ammunition, we
find a number of factors which cannot be considered
otherwise than favorable to stock prices. Plentiful
money is a great bull keystone. When money first
became easy in 1908 I propounded the following
simple question to skeptics who were discoursing
about impending liquidation: "If the holder of stocks
which return 5% or 6% on money sells now, how
will he employ his funds?" The same question is
applicable now. Later on business will be diverted
from speculation, investment and flotation channels ·
to the needs of expanding or recuperating commercial enterprises, but by the same token, when that
time comes people who can see no reason for buying
stocks now will find a reason for purchases in visible
signs of business improvement. They will be too
late, for the prices of to-morrow will represent the
tentative benevolence of the future as measured by
the brightest minds of the investment world.
We have .. !so to consider the sound basis of our
financial institutions now. The last eighteen months
has been a period of drastic physicking. The expurgation has been thorough, and this lends stability to the foundation.
The question of large supplies or production of
pig iron, copper, etc., which I might have classed
as one of the bearish arguments, has not only been
discounted marketwise, but these accumulations represent wealth. I will not attempt to air my views
on this phase of the subject, but a little reflection
will show its significance.
The decrease in business failures, the increastng
bank clearings, gold production which is adding
one million dollars a day to our money and four
millions a day to our credit, the emphatic rebukes
which have been administered to the self-appointed
instructors who try to sweep back the ocean of
progress with legislative brooms; confidence in the
sanity of the present administration and the integrity of our tribunals-these and many other reassuring factors lead to confidence in the future.
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IMPORTANCE OF CROPS.

So much for the long perspective. Turning to the
influences which bear particularly on the more immediate future we have one complement which overshadows all others-the crops of 1909. I will probably harp on this feature for a time now assiduously,
as I have harp ed on the anteriority of stock prices
for the last two years. The extreme importance of
correctly anticipating or approximating our cereal
productio n in forming our opinions as to stock
prices and the difficulty of extracting the truth from
the flood of repo rts which will soon be upon us,
cannot be overestimated. I would not give two
cents for the views of a maj ority of the crop experts.
Most of the so-called experts are in the employ
of houses with a "policy" and their views are
moulded accordingly. There are exceptions, of
course. The government reports are improving and
are more reliable than the private statistics, but
even these figures are not sufficient. The reports
of the Department of Agriculture are based on the
written opinion s of farmer correspondents, who, in
many cases, argue shrewdly that they will gain an
a,dvantage in cereal prices if they make things look
bad. This accounts for the fact that government
estimates are usually too low. In 1899 the variation
was ridiculous. In that year wheat was estimated
547,000,000 bushels; corn, 2,078,000,000 bushels, and
oats, 796,000,000 bushels. The crops turned out to
be, wheat, 658,000,000; corn, 2,666,000,000, and oats,
943,000,000. I think my own plan of sending a
competent expert into the fields, devoid of any
policy whatever, is the best solution of this important question.
In referring to the crops as the most important
thing to be considered, I do not mean to say that
cereal production is everything.
Bumper crops
would not have entirely prevented the decline of
1907, but they would have lessened it and would
also have accentuated the advance of 1908. As it
was, the reducti on in wheat, corn, oats and cotton
in 1907 helped the decline along. 1907 cannot be
called a crop failure year, but when we reflect that
production s hould increase grad ually from year to
year as acreage and population increases, it will be
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seen that we had a considerable setback.
lowing comparisons illustrate this fact:

The fol-

CEREAL AND COTTON CROPS FOR 1905, 1906 AND 1907.
W4eat.
Corn.
Oats.
Cotton.
1905
1906
1907

•, • • • •
......
•,,, ,,

692,979,489
735,260,970
634,087,000

2,707,993 ,000
2,927,416,000
2,592,320,000

953,216,197
964,904,522
754,443,000

I r,319,860
13,550,760
II,581,329

Large or small crops will make a vast difference
in our calculations as to stock prices this year.

The General Situation.
The most forcible evidence of betterment in the
general situation is the improvement in railroad
earnings. .The Atchison report issued this week is
excellent. If we merely resorted to comparisons
with the lean months of 1908 the showings might be
criticised, but in the case of Atchison it is shown
that during the last eight months net earnings have
been at the rate of 14¾% for the common stock,
and many other corporations may be expected to
show equally good results. .
There has been a halt in gold exports, but the
moderate weakening of exchange is, in my opinion,
of a temporary nature. We may expect to ship ;,
further substantial amount of gold before the movement ends. This will not interfere with our money
rates, however.
The disturbing question of the financing of Erie
has been much simplified by the tentative acceptance of the plan offered by the Public Service Commission. The provision requiring the consent of 90%
of the coupon holders to the new financing is not so
rigid as was thought. The sentence, "90%, or such
less percentage as the commission may hereafter
designate upon satisfactory showing by the applicant
prior to October l," is very flexible. Another clause
in the Public Service Commission document leaves
the way ooen for a further extension of time beyond
October 1.
It is tl.e opinion of competent judges that no
further reductions will occur in steel and iron products nor in copper metal. If this proves correct we
may look for improvement in securities based on
these products, as the evils which have so far
occurred have been well discounted.
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Consider the general situation satisfactory and
promising.

The Technical Situation.
There is little change in the technical situation
this week. There is a substantial short interest of a
stubborn character which has been held intact or
nearly so through the recent moderate advance in
prices. There is also renewed short selling whenever the market becomes temporarily weak. Long
lines are well held and no liquidation appears when
drives at prices occur. There is also a considerable
waiting interest consisting of public speculators who
believe a sharp break will occur before there is any
marked advance. I do not find any good reasons
for this belief.
A good many bear stop orders are in force a
couple of points above the market, but no effort has
been made to reach them as yet. The stop orders
below the market are comparatively few.
Consider the technical situation strong.

Conclusion.
A broad view of the market, embracing both general and technical conditions, warrants a firm belief
in higher prices. I can see but one possible influence
which would bring about a material recession. If
larger interests have not already acquired all the
stocks they want, they might make a manipulative
coup in order to force out the weaker holders and
accumulate stocks at a lower level. Whether or not
such a condition exists, I cannot state positively,
but by deductive reasoning it does not appear at all
probable. We have just passed a sharp setback of
fair proportions, and this could have been easily
carried further by th~ interests mentioned, if such
had been their desire. There was good buying on
that break, and there is no evidence that stocks
purchased have as yet been sold. It would also be
much easier to sell securities at a level five points
higher than in the present dull and rather narrow
market. I believe that when we have attained a considerably higher level of prices, we will witness
activity and a great increase in public participation.
Then it will be time to look out for a shakedown.
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Just when that stage of the market will arrive or
just how far prices may advance before the present
holders decide to make a turn is guesswork. We
can best arrive at a correct solution by keeping a
close watch on technical developments.
In the daily letter of March 23 1 stated that so
far as the immediate future is concerned we may
look for more activity in rails than in industrials.
rool interests appear to be centered in railroad
stocks just now. The most popular pool stocks are
at present, New York Central, Union Pacific, Southern Pacific, Louisville & N as h ville, Atlantic Coa st
Line, Soo common, Canadian Pacific, Illinois Central,
St. Paul, Pennsylvania, Northern Pacific, Chicago &
Alton, Baltimore & Ohio, and Reading. These
stocks are not named in the order of their merit or
as representing the best bargains, but merely because of the attention accorded them by the more
active professional operators. Fundamentally I believe the industrials offer the best long-distance
speculative bargains.
.
Continue to recommend purchases of g ood stocks
at this level or on any little reactions. In the highpriced rails, Reading, Pennsylvania and Northern
Pacific now look best. In the low-priced group,
Kansas City Southern and Missouri, Kansas &
Texas are attractive. Think Chicago & Alton risky
now. In the industrials, prefer the equipment and
copper stocks. In my opinion such stocks as Amalgamated have seen bottom and will go materially
higher. As soon as people get it into their heads
that United States Steel is in excellent condition and
that the stock is selling ex-tariff and ex-depression
there will be a big advance in that stock.
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Ch art Showin g Market Movements for March, 190g.
(Thomas Gibson's F igures.)
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April 3, 1909,
After an advance of moderate proportions in stock
prices it is natural for operators who have made
advantageous purchases at lower levels to grow
n e rvous about the . probable continuation of the
movement. There is a continual fear that the top
has been reached and that profits will vanish unless
they are accepted at once. A little reversal of the
upward trend which may last only a day or two
a nd am ount to no more th a n an average recession
of a point is sufficient to di scourage holders, and
very frequently is responsible for liquidation at the most
inopportune time.
RECESSIONS ONLY NATURAL.

The fallacy and danger of being moved by such
trivial changes is easily demonstrable. We have
only to observe the numerous reversals which occur
in eith er a bull or a bear market to appreciate the
fact that such setbacks need create no apprehension.
In th e m onth just concluded (March, 1909) we had
sixteen days of average advances and eleven days
of averag e decline s, y et the month showed an
av erage advance of about five points.
Discu ssing this subject early in 1908, I pointed
out that in the great decline of 1907, there were 131
days of advancing markets out of the total of 300
market sessions. Yet in that year the market declined from January 1 to December 31 over 35
points. Only on one occasion did the market continue in one direction for a week.
Tt is n ow intere sting to examine the movements
by days for 1908 as shown in the following table:
D ays of Days of
Net
Net
Advance. Declin e. Advance. Decline.
1901➔.
14
12
2.52
Ja nu a ry
F ebruary
3.20
9
14
Ma rch . .
18
8
5.58
A pril . . . . .
16
7
3.56
May ... . . .
14
11
• 2.66
Jun e . . .
14
12
0.11
July . . .
6.52
20
6
Aug ust . . . .
2.62
16
10
111

Days of Days of
Net
Net
1908.
Advance. Decline. Advance. Decline.
September . •
9
15
. .. .
3.21
October . ...
16
11
2.61
November . .
13
10
6.16
December ..
14
11
1.59
This does not differ much from the showing of
1907. In that year of great declines there were 131
days of reversals out of 300 sessions, while in 1908,
a bull year, there were 127 reversals in 300 sessions.
As was the case in 1907, there was only one instance where prices moved in one direction for seven
days without a reaction.
FALLACIES OF "SYSTEM" TRADING.

The above statements are not-offered as a means
of formulating any mechanical method which will
assist in basing conclusions as to the probable dates
on which re~ctions or rallies are to be expected.
In my opinion any attempt to judge the one or twopoint moves is neither possible nor necessary.
During the last twenty years I have examined a
large number of schemes and systems for forecasting minor movements and none of them have been
worth the paper they were written on. I will digress for a moment to expose the most important
reason why these systems which look so fair on
paper fail in practice.
.
The man who lays a system before you shows
by figures what could have been done in the past
by employing certain methods. In exploiting these
methods he provides for purchases and sales, stoploss orders, etc., at certain prices, and demonstrates
to his audience the fact that these operations, religiously pursued, almost always resulted in profit.
But there is one R"reat flaw in his exhibit, He
assumes the possibility of executing his purchases
and sales and his stop orders at exact prices.
Every inan who has made a dozen commitments
knows this is impossible. Many times in the course
of a year we c1nnot buy or sell at the prices we
have decided on, even if those prices are reached.
Neither can we depend on the exact execution of
stop orders, even in the open market, to say nothing
of violent changes over night. The system player
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may point out the fact that he employs a twopoint stop and that only in rare cases does the
market change two points over night; but such reasoning is childish, for at the close of the market
your stop order may be only one-half or even oneeighth of a point away. These drawbacks are not
great considered individually, but at the end of a
year they usually amount to enough in the aggregate
to cancel all the profits demonstrated by the system
player. In short, the votary of mechanical trading
says: "If you follow my plan (which you cannot
by any possibility follow) you will make money."
Returning to the subject of intermediate and unimportant reversals, I will state briefly that the
object of the figures given was to show what constituted the trend of a movement and to reassure
those who get excited every time the market backs
up a little. The more important movements, say,
five points or more, can usually be anticipated. In
most cases such reactions are due to technical
weakness which it is possible to detect. If they are
occasioned by accidents or surprises they cannot be
foreseen, but if the trend is correctly judged even the
accidental reversals do not injure anyone who spe·culates along safe lines.
THE STOCK MARKET OF 1908.

In order to show the extent and duration of interruptions to the upward trend of 1908 I have
prepared a chart which appears in Vol. II. I
believe the man who examines thi s chart in connection wit:1 his own operations will agree with me
in the contention that there is more money and
less grief in making only four or five changes of
position a year than by attempting to gain the ultimate dollar in daily ventures. Of course, it may be
expedient, in order to get the best results, to
change from one stock, or from one group of stocks
to another frequently, but that is merely a matter
of rotation and cannot be called a change of position
as to the trend of prices.

The General Situation.
The general situation continues to improve steadily. This is particularly apparent in the West and
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Southwest. Bank clearings are considered a good
barometer of business activity, and it will be noted
that Chicago bank clearings for March broke all
previous records. The clearings for that month were
$1,202,801,000, as compared with $1,004,039,000 for
February and $1,030,034,000 for March, 1908.
I have recently talked with several business men
from the Southwest and they all point to excellent
conditions in that district. Texas seems to be
particularly favored and Mexico is apparently on the
verge of marked activity and improvement. This
should help all the roads traversing Southwestern
territory.
Money will be cheap for a considerable period.
The preparations for payment of about $150,000,000
in quarterly dividends is always a test of money
conditions at this time of the year, but in the present
case the matter did not cause a ripple. The reduction in the Bank of England's rate of discount dem-onstrates the ease in European markets. It is
-nrobable that this rate will be still further reduced
·in the near future.
Gold exports have ceased, but this cessation is, in
my opinion, only temporary.
It is probable that
gold exports will soon be resumed. As has been
stated, gold exports will not affect money rates here
for some months, but if we find, as may be the case,
that we cannot stop this outflow when it is found
expedient to do so, we may have trouble. Without
any desire to confuse or disturb readers, or any intention of qualifying my opinion of the immediate
course of the market, I will state that, looking into
the long future, we may be about as much concerned about this redundancy as we were in 1907
about stringency. We have the most miserable,
rigid currency system conceivable, and its evil
effects are not confined to the µushing of too much
gold out of the country. It creates a plethora of
money at times which encourages harmful" and disastrous speculation. Take, for example, the wheat
market. Manipulators have found it possible, under
present money conditions, to engineer bull movemen ts which produce nothing and which curtail our
exports. High wheat prices bring no economic
benefit to the country at large unless brought about
by conditions which bring us round prices for the

exportable surplus. High prices at home represent
merely swapping dollars. When we find prices bid
up by speculators to a point which permits exports
to Europe from the Argentine and prejudices our
own sales, we are suffering injury. This is only a
single instance of the dangers of redundancy. As
has been said, it is not yet time to look for trouble
from this source, but the matter is worthy of reflection and attention.
One of the most discussed events of the week
has been Mr. Harriman's triumphant return from
the Pacific Coast. For some unfathomable reason,
many speculators have been inclined to consider
his return a signal for stock-market activity. If the
present market were based on such grounds, it
would be time for wise people to get in out of the
wet. Mr. Harriman is a great railroad man, and
we are all glad to hear his opinions on business
conditions, etc., but many of his remarks are colored
with vindictiveness and personal animosity and are
consequently of no value. When Mr. Harriman
seeks to attribute the worldwide decline in business
in the year 1907 to the administration or to the
Standard Oil fine, he is simply talking through his
hat, and, what is more, he knows it.
In the metal business there is improvement per se
and prospective. There is a record-breaking demand
for agricultural implements, and in some branches
of the steel and iron business marked betterment is
shown. As yet there is no evidence of unusual
demand for railroad equipment. This will appear
later on.
Consider the general situation quite satisfactory.

The Technical Situation.
If we examine a file of newspapers for the month
of March, it will be found that in almost all cases
every day of improving prices is credited to "short
covering." We will also find several times during
the month that "the short interest has been largely
eliminated." However, the next day's advance is
again due to "short covering." This short interest
is a wonderfully convenient explanation for every
advance. One writer on a New York paper in an
attempt to explain Thursday's advance, states that
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it could be due to nothing but short covering, as
there was nothing in trad ! conditions to warrant
the advance. This is the same old story-an attempt to reconcile stock prices and stock movements with present conditions, instead of with the
probable condition5 six months hence, which are
always discounted in stock prices.
There has no doubt been some short covering
during the week, but this is largely offset by profittaking sales. It will easily be understood that if,
say, 25% of a weak short interest is eliminated on
an advance and coincidentally 25% of the weaker
long interest take profits, the technical situation is
unchanged. The readiness with which profit-taking
sales have been absorbed this week is an evidence
of strength.
There is still a stubborn short interest in the
market which has made no attempt to retire commitments, and there is also fresh selling every time
the market turns weak. The weakly margined long
interest is not large, as a great many of these
operators are waiting for a reaction. Continued
investment buying, both local and foreign, is also
reducing the floating supply of street certificates.
Consider the technical situation strong.
Conclusion.
As stated in the daily letter of March 31, there
is a better feeling toward industrials now. This
group should be more active in the near future,
and it is wise to keep some of the best industrials
on hand. I think before the end of the year such
securities wi:t make .. larger percentage of advance·
from this level than will the rails.
Continue to advise purchases of good stocks at
this level or on moderate reactions. In the highpriced rails Pennsylvania, Baltimore & Ohio and
Union Pacific look best. In the low-priced group,
Kansas •City Southern, Missouri, Kansas & Texas,
Colorado Southern, Denver & Rio Grande and St.
Louis Southwestern are attractive. In the industrials Amalg-amated Copper, United States Steel and
the equipment stocks are the best purchases.
A chart showing market movement s of stocks
for the month of March appears in Vol. II.
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April 10, 1909.
The week has been bare of important news, about
the only vital event being the publication of the
crop report on winter wheat. This document, while
not favorable as compared with the figures of the
preceding year, was better than anticipated. The
new form of calculation adopted by the government
led to some confusion, but this new method is much
: uperior to the old one. The new plan of computation recognizes the fact that in a large majority of
instances there is a considerable decline in conditions between the first reports and final crops, and
this decadence is averaged and allowed for in computations as to final crops. Thus, by the old form
of figuring, the indicated winter wheat crop would
be, on the figures just published, 436,306,000 bushels
but by the new method the indicated crop is only
373,550,000 bushels.
The table on page 123 will be found convenient
as showing the difference between first condition figures and the final crops, and also as a table of comparison with the reports which will now appear
monthly.
Ther ~ has been nothing in the market action this
week to suggest ,a culmination of the upward movement. Some increase of public interest has occurred
and foreign buying has been materially in excess
of selling. There was some selling near the week
end by speculators who did not care to go over a
protracted holiday with long stocks. This selling
was, as is always the case, partly due to fear of
some .- lverse happening during the period of closed
markets and partly to the more material element of
accumulated interest charges. The selling, however,
could not be designated as "distribution" in the
Wall Street definition of that term and more important operators did not show any inclination to
liquidate.
DANGER SIGNALS NOT VISIBLE.

As has been stated, there is nothing to suggest a
culmination as yet. I do not think that with public
interest aroused, but still in its incipient stages, the
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p~ol manipulators or other leading speculative interests would abandon their plans, even if conditions were not so favorable. 1t is more probable
that we will witness a spell of pronounced activity
and excited trading before any great reaction occurs.
Such signals are more or less arbitrary, but unless
some unforeseen accident occurs there is little to
fear as to the immediate course of prices. Looking
into the longer future we may see some clouds on
the horizon, and before long we may find it necessary to step aside for a time. It may appear
anomalous to advise purchases of stocks or the
maintaining of a bullish position and at the same
time point oilt dangers, but the dangers which now
threaten are remote and will not influence security
prices for some time.
COMING EVENTS REFLECTED IN PRICES.

For several years I have impressed upon readers
the necessity of consulting the probable future in
gauging the immediate stock-market movements.
Particular attention has recently been directed to
improvement in general business and money conditions. Many minor factors, such as the tariff,
gold exports, labor troubles, the overworked Balkan
situation, etc., have been accorded attention from
time to time, but these things have had their day
as vital influences. It is gratifying to note that
the consistent predictions of higher prices for securities long before any signs of betterment in general
business should be visible, have been borne out.
[ do not wish to take any great credit for forecastIng the movements of either 1907 or 1908. The signs
were so plain that they were easily read. Early
In 1909 I stated that we were facing a year in which
much difficulty would be found in gauging price
movements. This statement has not as yet been
borne out by events, but we are nearing the time
when unusual caution, research and vigilance will be
necessary to success. In 1907 our security prices
were high and we were in a period of credit expansion and extravagance. In 1908 security prices
were low and we were in a period of contracted
credits and economy. At present we are on more
neutral ground. Securities have reached prices which
might be considered normal were it not for the
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remarkable cheapness of money. I do not think
we have reached the top of the stock market, but
we are certainly nearer the top than we were a few
months ago. When stock prices were very high and
the great submerged fundamentals were bad, not
even the record-breaking business activity or any
form of specifically cheerful news could check the
decline. Per contra, when stock prices were ridiculously low no bad news could check the advance.
Just now the sensitive mechanism of speculation is
more evenly balanced and good or bad developments
would certainly bring about very wide fluctuations.
It is dangerous to blind ourselves to the necessity
of looking far into the future, even if we are
active operators.
TWO IMPORTANT FACTORS.

The trend is everything, and the factors which will
be in evidence six months from now have a most
important bearing on the price movements of the
present. It won't hurt to begin thinking about the
adverse influences which may appear later, even if
we operate for a time the other way. It is easy
for us to deceive ourselves in this game, and it is
of paramount importance that we should not do so.
I will therefore refer to two factors which may
prove adverse in the course of the next few months.
We have one extremely important factor before
us now which has been a dead issue, so far as the
calculations of the last six months are concernedi. e., the crops. Personally, I would not care to
buy even the best stocks at this level of prices if a
crop failure were imminent. Of course, this is
something we can get no definite light on at present, but something will be learned from week to
week from now on.
The most potent danger of all lies in the evils
of our currency system. This is a subject which
receives little attention as to its bearing on our
security prices, but it is capable of more evil than
any other influence, or, for that matter, all other
influences combined. It will not do to lull ourselves into a sense of false security because of the
remoteness of this danger. Changes in the present
system are. in truth, remote, and the actual effects
will not be acutely realized until they begin to
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operate, but on the sane and sound theory that
they will be observed by the important minority in
advance and discounted in stock prices, the probable
effects are not so far removed. I will not be surprised if in the next three months we encounter a
hulabaloo about our currency. I may go further and
state that I will be much surprised if we do not.
The plethora of money which exists is increasing
our imports and cutting down our exports and also
encouraging dangerous speculation, particularly in
commodities. Keeping our gold exports down by
sales of securities is only a temporary relief. Sales
of commodities are a permanent relief. We will get
our securities back, they are not for consumption.
EFFECT OF GOLD EXPORTS.

In recent letters I hav.: stated that the much
heralded cessation of gold exports is temporary.
We may be quite su :e of this. Exports will soon
be resumed ar.d while they will be ignored for a
time, it is only too probable that they will go
beyond the limits of safety and cause alarm. When
that condition arises there will be numerous conclaves of eminent bankers emphatically voicing the
opinion that we must find some way to cancel bank
notes or lend elasticity to our currency, but suggesting no feasible remedy.
The following leading editorial which appeared
in the New York Times of April 6 shows that
students are beginning to recognize our hazardous
position:
•
"The circulation of the country is only $3,086,000,0J0, against $3,080,000,000 last year. But the
increase is all in bank notes, while the more substantial elements of the circulation are deteriorating
in quality at a faster rate. Thus gold coin and
certificates in circulation ar, now $1,404,000,000,
against $1,437,000,000 last year. But silver dollars
and certificates are now $547,000,000, against $521,000,000 last year.
"'These are the times of surplus funds when
bankers make bad debts an,· speculators take on
stocks at prices which afterward are adjusted downward when the necessities of business demand the
money which is only to be found by shaking it out
of Wall Street first and by convulsing the world's
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gold market later on. It is to be hoped that the
chairman of the Monetary Commission is not too
absorbed in his tariff duties to keep an eye on what
is actually happening here, t 0 place it beside his
studies abroad."
This question of the pernicious effects of our
currency system is no new topic with me. In
recent letten I have made only brief references to
it, as it was pretty certain that moderate gold exports would have no immediat-! effect on stock
prices. As has already been stated, I do not think
we need apprehend any trouble from this source
for a time, but it is well to keep the matter in mind.
The two great things to watch now are, in my
estimation, the crops, and money. I have already
placed a first-class crop expert in the fields and hope
to be able to protect my clients from disaster from
either cause.

The General Situation.
The general situation continues promising. Structural steel business is still active and there is better
buying of pig iron. Railroad reports are very satisfactory, both as to gross and net. The dry goods
business is improving rapidly. The March building
figures show a large gain over last year. Sales of
mining machinery reflect increased activity in that
branch of industry. Money is easy the world over.
It is rather difficult to decide just why our tried
barometers of trade, such as bank clearings and
railroad earnings, should indicate exc d lent business
conditions while m oney r emains a dru g in the market. I think this due in part to the inclination to
limit our perspective to conditions in certain lines
of trade, such as the metals industries, and in part
to too much attention to local conditions at this
centre without due reference to affairs in the Western States. It would also be interesting to know
whether these increased railroad earnings are largely
due to eastbound or westbound traffic.
Consider the general situation satisfactory and
better than is apparent on the surface.

l2i

The Technical Situation.
There has been some improvement in the technical situation due to a reduction of the floating
supply of stocks purchased for investment both at
home and abroad. The day-to-day trading of the
week has brought about no important changes.
Drives at the stocks by the bear element have been
futile and no important lines have been dislodged
by such efforts. The disinclination to sell as yet
is demonstrated by the fact that on every decline
the market grows comparatively dull.
Consider the technical situation strong.
Conclusion.
No occasion to change views as to the immediate
course of prices. Consider stocks a purchase at this
level or on moderate declines. In the high-priced
rails I think Northern Pacific, Great Northern,
Pennsylvania and Baltimore & Ohio are safer than
the Harrimans now. In the low-priced rails Missouri, Kansas & Texas, Kansas City Southern,
Chesapeake & Ohio and St. Louis Southwestern are
good. Think Alton has gone about far enough for
the present. In the industrials Amalgamated Copper,
United States Steel common and the equipments
' look like excellent speculative bargains.
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COND IT ION OF CRO P S I N THE UN IT E D STATE S, MONTH L Y, F OR FOURTEEN YEARS.
Compiled from reports of the Department of Agriculture at Washington.

Years.

N

c.,,

1895 ...•
1896 .. ..
1897 ... .
1898....
1899 ....
1900 • • • .
1901. ...
1902 • •••

1903 ....
1904 .•••
1905 ..•.
1906 .. . .
1907 •. . .
1908 ...•

-

- - - Winter Wheat - - -

- - Spring Wheat - -

April. May. J une. J uly. Sept.

J une. July. Aug. Sept.

81.4
77.1
81.4
86.7
77.9
82.1
91.7
78.7
97.3
76.5
91.6
89.1
89.9
91.3

82.9
82.7
80.2
86.5
76.2
88.9
94.1
76.4
92.6
76.5
92.5
91.0

82.9
89.0

71.1 65.8
77.9 75.6
78.5 81.2
90.8 85.7
67.3 65.6
82.7 80.8
87.8 88.3
76. 1 77.0
82.2 78.8
77.7 78.7
85.5 82.7
82.7 85.6
77.4 78.3
86.o 80.6

*75.4
*74.6
*85.7
86.7
*70.9
*69.6 .
*82.8
*80.0
*74.7

....
... .

.....

....
....

97.8 102.2
99.9 93 .3
89.6 91.2
100.9
95.0
91.4 91.7
87.3 55 .2
92.0 95.6
95.4 92.4
95.9 82.5
93.4 93.7
93.7 91.0
93.4 91.4
88.7 87.2
95.0 89.4

95 .9
78.9
86.7
96.5
83.6
56.4
80.3
89.7
77.1
87.5
89.7
86.9
79.4
80.7

....
....

....
....

....
.. ..

... .

.. ..
... .
66.2
87.3
83.4
77.1
77.6

----Corn----

- - -- Oats----

July. Aug.

Sept. Oct.

99.3 102.5
92.4 96.0
82 .9 84.2
90.5 87.0
86.5 89.9
89.5 87.5
81.3 54.0
87.5 86.5
79.4 7.13.7
86.4 87.3
87.3 89.0
87.5 88.1
80.2 82.8
82.8 82.5

96.4

J une. J uly. Aug. Sept.
84.3 83.2 84.5 86.o
98.8 96.3 77.3 74.0
89.0 87.5 86.o 84.6
98.0 92.8 84.2 79.0
88.7 90.0 90.8 87.2
91.7 8.5.5 85.0 82.9
85 .3 83.7 73 .6 72.1
90.6 92.1 89.4 87.2
85.5 84.3 79.5 75.7
89.2 89.8 86.6 85.6
92.9 92.1 90.8 90.3
85.9 84.0 82.8 81.9
81.6 81.0 75.6 65 .5
92.9 85.7 76.8 69.7

91.0

95.5
90.5
77.1
82.0
82.7
78.2

79.3
84.1
85.2
80.6
51.7 52.1
84.3 79.6
80. 1 80.8
84.6 83.9
89.5 89.2
90.2 90.1
80.2 78.0
79.4 77.8

* I ncludes winter and spring.
The condit ion of winter wheat in Dec ember was reported by th e Department of Agriculture as follows:
1908-85.3; 1907-91.1; 1906-94.1; 1905-94. 1; 1904-82.9; 1903 %.6; 1902-99.7; 1901-86.7; 1900-97.1 ;
189ir-98.2; 1896-99.5; 1895-81.4.

April 17, 1909.
The numerous conflicting factors which are now to
be considered in their relation to stock prices render
the task of prophecy an extremely difficult one. So far
as superficial evidences are concerned, everything is
rosy. The tariff question is not entirely eliminated as
a possible evil influence, but it is not probable that much
trouble will appear from that source. We have passed
through the crucial period of labor disturbances with
little animosity or friction; our railroad earnings are
making a most satisfactory showing, and bank clearings reflect decided business activity in most sections.
MONEY AN IMPORTANT MARKET FACTOR.

Money, which is an extremely important factor, remains in plentiful supply. It is easy to appreciate the
acute effects of money stringency on stock prices when
we look back to the squeeze in the latter part of
1907 at d realize that many securities sold at prices
which were ridiculously low for no reason except
that our funds were tied up or hoarded. The prices
established in November, 1907, were purely artificial
and did not in any way represent the values of
securities. Such a spasm would be impossible under
the conditions which now prevail.
l;lut this same redundancy of money is now one of
our most threatening factors. It is fostering undue
speculation. I do not refer merely to such affairs as
the speculative orgie in Chicago, but to the more submerged speculation which goes on in all lines of business. Our decreased exports of wheat . are an instance
of what may occur when prices are pushed above values,
and our increased imports are evidence of speculative purchases in anticipation of a great business boom. If this boom does not materialize or, what
is more probable, if its extent is overestimated by enthusiasts, we will suffer from the evils which invariably
follow over-confidence.
THE SITUATION IN EUROPE.

Our money affairs would not show so favorably were
it not for the fact that Europe has purchased our securi-
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ties freely of late and may continue to do so for some
time to come. The same ease of money which is stimulating speculation in commodities is stimulating speculation in stocks, but if this speculation carries stock
prices to a level which proves attractive to these European purchasers and we are called on, which we certainly will be, to take back a large portion of our securities, there will be trouble. The trouble would be
aggravated if this foreign liquidation appears after we
have shipped a lot more of our gold, and it looks reasonably certain that we will ship more gold and that
the selling of securities will not appear ·at once.
THE ELEMENT OF DISCOUNT.

There is another point _to be considered, and that is
the extent to which our improvement, present and prospective, has been discounted. Since November, 1907,
the price of 41 rails and industrials has risen from an
average of 56.24 to the present average of about 89.00,
or approximately 60%, and this advance has been interrupted by only reasonable reactions. This represents
the discounting of many favorable developments in general business. And in reflecting on this advance we
should also accord due consideration to the altitude
which has been attained and the mathematical certainty
of reactions from that altitude being more severe than
those encountered at lower prices. For example, a decline of 10% from an average of one hundred is 10
points, while a decline of 10% from an average of fifty
is only five points. Aside of this, the delicate machinery of speculation is more easily disturbed when prices
are nearer an equilibrium than when they are low
enough to warrant the ignoring of adverse news. We
have all noticed how little effect bear news has had
in the past year-it will have more pronounced effect
in the future.
A PERPLEXING MARKET.

But in the face of these long-distance danger signals
I find a market which absorbs profit-taking or shortselling without any material decline, and a strong technical situation. There .has been some liquidation during the week in the high-priced rails.
This selling
comes from go·od quarters, but the buying is also
good. The signs which indicate a sharp decline are ab125

sent, and therein lies the perplexity to which I have
referred in recent letters. It is certain that the habitues
of brokerage offices who come in in force around the
tail-end of a bull market have not yet put in an appearance. The short interest is large; business is better than at any time since 1907, and while the eleventh
hour speculators are not active, they are itching. There
is a very large contingent who are convinced that the
next important movement will be a marked reaction,
and that such a reaction will be a magnificent opportunity. There is danger in adhering indiscriminately to
this view. It is quite probable that on a reaction the
very securities which should be avoided will be public
favorites. The Harriman stocks, which as a group are
higher, everything considered, than any stocks on the
list, would be eagerly absorbed and the industrials would
be despised. Yet everything points to greatest speculative opportunities in the industrials. The rails have
received a great deal of attention and the industrials,
which will, from now on, be the principal gainers from
business activity, have been comparatively neglected.
They will have their turn. I have frequently pointed
out the similarity between the years 1903-4-5 and 1907-8
and so far in 1909 and offered reasons why we might
expect a continuation of a parallel which has so far
been surprising. From May 1, 1905, to December 31,
1905, rails advanced, according to the Wall Street Journal's averages, from about 120 to about 133, and industrials from about 77 to about 96. Thus rails advanced
during the period covered 13 points, or 10%, and industrials 19 points, or 25%. The investor or speculator
who operated in industrials in the latter part of 1905
had a tremendous advantage. I think he will have the
same advantage in the latter part of 1909.
CAUTION ADVISED.

It is not my desire to disturb anyone by interlarding my more hopeful views with pessimistic utterances.
For over a year I have pushed aside the bear canards··
which have been frequently promulgated and have steadily advised confidence during a period of nervousness
and uncertainty. Now, with our horizon presumably
clear, and with dangers before us which are not canards
and which have not as yet been enlarged upon, it is my
business to see that my clients don't get stung. It is
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also my business to show wherein we might get
stung. There are times when boldness is an asset;
an essential to success. We were warranted in being bold a year ago. There are, per contra, times
when boldness is a synonym for rashness and caution becomes the asset and the prime essential.
Such a time we arc now about to enter.
For the sake of simplicity I will continue to recommend purchases or sales according to what I can see
of the near future . The only difference is, that advice
which has been unqualified in the past will have a string
to it until the situation is clearer. I make this statement so no one will be surprised at a sudden and briefly
explained right-about-face at any time, with no studied
effort to appear owlishly consistent.

The General Situation.
It has been frequently suggested in these advices
that general business has been recovering more rapidly
than has been apparent on the surface. This is now
demonstrated in almost every line. We have given too
much attention to items which are ordinarily considered
barometrical. The cut in iron and steel prices and
the lassitude of that business have proven poor guides
during the past year. The reduction of prices has been
particularly misleading, for we find that the breaking
down of this rigid price barrier has stimulated business wonderfully in the structural field. Later on the
prices of iron, steel, copper, etc., will rise as the prices
of wheat, corn and cotton have already risen. And
before long the signs of business activity will be written
so large that he who runs may read. We may feel
pretty sure that a spirit of improvement will ' follow
the settlement of this tariff question, but it will be wise
not to expect too much from that source.
The excited speculation in wheat is a bad factor.
It is quite natural that the leader of the bull forces
should explain to us that the present higher prices are
due to natural causes. There is just enough truth in
that statement to lend it plausibility. No speculator
ever boosted anything without insisting that merit, not
at all represented by his operations, was doing the work.
We can count these great wheat deals one by one
from Old Hutch to Patten, and find in thei•r wake a
long period of low prices and a long line of epitaphs to
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busted speculators. The speculation which is represented by purchases of wheat, cotton, stocks or anything
else because prices are too low, is sound and legitimate.
Speculation which forces prices too high is injurious
and the detriment is felt in every part of the business
world.
There are now indications that cotton will be advanced rapidly before long. This is not so bad for
the country at large as further manipulation in wheat
would be. The price of cotton is not so high as compared with other commodities, and high prices for the
staple do not shut off exports. The world must buy
cotton from us at our price. This is not true of wheat.
The Turkish complications will not, in my opinion, be of any importance market wise. It will, at
times, be made much of by th.! exponents of lower
prices, but will probably blow over.
Aside from the dangerous speculation in wheat and
"its far-reaching effects if continued, the general situation is quite satisfactory.

The Technical Situation.
The technical situation has not suffered during the
week and is still strong. There has been some selling
of stocks by good holders, but the offerings have been
well absorbed and the irregularity and reactionary tone
of the market has incited fresh short commitments.
The commission house traders are in a comparatively
"sold out" position and would return to the market
quickly at higher prices if a change of sentiment should
occur. There are a good many stop loss orders in the
high.priced rails, but few in the industrials.
Consider the technical situation strong.
Conclusion.
See nothing to be alarmed about so far as immediate
movements are concerned. We should not give too
much attention to moderate reactions of a point or two.
. We get them every month. The highest average price
for rails in the year 1909 was 103.51 and the highest
price for industrials 75.73. At the close af business
Friday night the figures are 101.97 and 74.40, respectively. This, of course, amounts to nothing and could
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easily be regained in a single session. S'uch ordinary
movements should not be considered as advance guards
of the possible danger referred to in this letter.
I think the safest thing to do now is to dispose of
railroad stocks on any sharp advances and buy industrials on dips. Would not climb for stocks, but, on
the other hand, would not sacrifice holdings on the
theory that we are on the downward path. There is
plenty of time. Next week I will produce a table showing more specifically the properties which have already
reached reasonable prices and those which are still below their value. It was originally intended to produce
this compilation in the present letter, but owing to the
work involved it could not be prepared in time.
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April 24, 1909.
There is better buying in the industrial stocks than
in rails. I do not refer to the volume of buying, but to
its character. A few years ago, when industrial securities as a class were new things in the Street, they were
looked askance upon by speculators and investors great
and small. This caution was magnified by the disgraceful hippodroming of a few stocks like National
Cordage and Distillers and Cattle-feeders.
INCREASING PUBLIC INTEREST IN INDUSTRIALS.

The prejudice against industrial stocks is gradually
disappearing, •however. This is evidenced by the attitude of banks toward industrial collateral, and by the
interest taken in such corporations by prominent financiers-the Morgans and Rockefellers, for example. In
the bear market of 1903 this prejudice was still in evidence and res,ulted in many absurd sacrifices, Steel prefer.red, for example, selling under $50.00 and the common around $8.00.
The average decline in industrials in 1903 amounted
to 36¾%, while rails lost only 27%. In the bull
markets of 1904-5, however, industrials advanced 119%,
while rails made a recovery of only 55 %. Aside from
the prejudice mentioned, there are great economic forces
at work which .are helping the business of producing
corporations and working against the rails.
The gradual but steady upward trend of commodity
prices is the most powerful factor in favor of industrials. This question has already ·been fully discussed
in these advices and needs no further extended comment.
RAILROAD EARNINGS AND GENERAL BUSINESS.

Another factor which is quite important from the
purely speculative point of view is that railroad reports
are now showing up very favorably and the misguided
horde of speculators who must have something specific
in the way of good news before they venture are favorably inclined toward the railroad group. On the other
hand, there are no open signs of great improvement
in the metal industries or the equipment business. On
this showing many operators and advisors are arguing

l.10

tha_t -rails should be better than industrials. This fallac10us reasoning needs no exposure to the experienced
s~e~ulator, It is merely another evidence of the proclivity to try to speculate on what is already k11own.
A COMPARISON OF PRESENT STOCK PRICES.

In order to show the extent of decline and recovery
in leading stocks I have prepared the tables which follow. As these figures are necessarily compiled from
the last annual reports, that portion of the tables showing earnings and margin of safety is rather obsolete,
but this has been explained briefly in the accompanying
notes. The principal point is the comparison of recovery in prices of rails and industrials. In rails we
find that in several cases present prices exceed the hlgh
figures attained in 1906-7 and that others are not far
away from former tops. We must, of course, give due
consideration to increased capitalization, as in St. Paul,
Great Northern and Northern Pacific. The industrials
are, in many instances, still far behind the procession.
Steel common has made a full recovery. J think this
is due largely to the fact that the affairs and possibilities of this corporation are more generally recognized
and understood than is the case in any other stock. It
is quite naturally the advance guard of an upturn in
industrial securities.
In consulting the following tables we must give
attention to the great flexibility of industrial earnings
as compared with railroads. It will be noted, for example, that during a period of good business the fixed
charges of the Steel Corporation were much smaller
as compared with net than at the present time.
I cannot pretend in the limits of this letter to go into
exhaustive analyses of the different properties, but they
will be touched on from time to time in special letters.
The gist of the argument is that our recovery in railroad earnings has carried that group of stocks well
upward, while there has as yet been no recovery in
general business which would incite purchases in the
industrial group. That improvement will come in
time, and before it is openly evident industrial securities will reach much higher prices.
It will be readily understood that the ratio of operating expenses rises very rapidly in the manufacturing
corporations in the periods of slack business. This is
quickly cured in good times.
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TABLE SHOWING EXTENT OF DECLINE AND RECOVERY IN LEADING
SECURITIES.
RAILROADS.

,n
~

Price.

...:.
0

..'g

w
N

STOC1'

'Atchison .. .. ..
Bait & Ohio . . . . ..
Ches. & Ohio . .
• Chi., Mil. & St. Paul
Colo. & Southern
Denver & Rio Gr.
• Erie .. .. .. .. . .
2

1

"' °'

, ~M

:Il

110½
125 ¼
65¾
199¾
41
51 ¼
50¼

...:.
0
8'

-;
0

• ..l

66¼
75 ¼
23¼
93½
17
16
12¼

......u

~ ~ 0\

C:

• 0

-~~~
0
107¼
114¼
76¼
149¼
65½
53
31

~-SQ,,.;

~]rl'~
~-o
x. g
_....,
Q)

~

47.9
55.83
57.43
39.6
56.93
55.37
104.08

~u

"bOci.

-

c:·

.5
~.,,()~...

oo~]

""., e u.
C:

-=~~:E
....,
... ">
.......

0

w
7.33
5.10
1.79
10.9
4.81
2.36

::el

U)

to.O.o
~!'

71.76
73.57
66.5
69.33
67.18
63.96
82.17

C:

00
0

•

:; u 0.

~

«1rt.1Cl."t:I

2.33
0.79
3.9
2.81
2.36

def.

Atchison reports taxes in operating expense. Recent earnings look like 8 per cent. on the common stock.
Now earning over 8 per cent. on the common stock.
In March, 1909, the $100,000,000 of new St. Paul stock was fully paid for and now enters into capitalization. On this increased capital, on the basis of 1907-08 business, the common stock earned 3.81 per cent.
• There was a deficit of $2,199,226 in the fiscal year of 1907-08, which has been more than made up in the
seven months ending Peb. 28, 1909.
2

3

Price.

.:.
0

'°
~~
-o

STOCK

-

<,>
<,>

• Great No rthern .. ..
Kansas City South . .
• Louis. & Nash .
Missouri Pacific ..
N. Y. Central
'Northern Pacific ....
Pennsylvania ..
• Reading .. .. .. ..
• Rock Island . .
0
' Southern Pacific ..
"Union Pacific .. .... ..

:i::

348
37¼
156¼

106¼
156¼
232¼
147¼
164
32¼

97¼
' 195¾

"
0

~

-;

0
,.J

107¼
19¼
85¼
44¼
89

...
-"
--o.o"'
,::

.

~< ~

0

144

45¼

70¼

138
74
129¼
144¼
135½
146¼

11 ¼
63¼
100

119¼
186¼

100¼
103¼

28¼

"'

~500

"g

--·;,] ~1

0

t,l

;g

><t.l

"~tioU
-Ui cni

·..:

x .... ~

., ,:: 0,

~] ~-=
0

32.54
48.06
69.02
64.32
73.13
30.33
47.05
63.19
*71.3
50.39
30.15

".
boP.tn
,::

-E"'

~

~P.0

66.43
65.7
75.29
71.54
73.63
58.42
71.47
74.33
*72.37
68.68
54.83

.,.,·
00

~ c.i
~ eo.

10.01
2.57
7.52
3.86
5.08
11.03
6.53
8.72
7.41
16.23

o

...;

0 -c
C >, C QJ

; ~ O,;a

3.01
2.57
2.52
3.86
0.08 •
4.03
0.53
4.72
def.
1.41

,,;23

• April 7, 1908, the last installment was paid on $60,000,000 of new stock.
If it had been entitled to dividends in 1907-08 the entire $210,000,000 of stock would have earned 7.14 per cent.
8 Owing to recent handsome increase in earnings, L. & N. is now earning about 9 per cent. on the stock.
' In January, 1909, $93,000,000 of new stock was added to the capitalization.
Last year's earnings would
have yielded 6.9 per cent. on the whole stock.
8 Fixed charges and operating expense are for the Railwar, and all companies.
• • Fixed chaq~es and operating expense are for the Railway alone.
10 Southern Pacific is now earning about 8½ per cent for the - common stock.
11 A large increase in earnings of Union Pacific indicates something like 20 per cent. for the common stock.

INDUSTRIALS.

.,,

Price.

"
0

..;,
·o
~~

STOCK

.....

{,-)

"""

l:i::

Amal. Copper
127¼
Amer. Car & Fdry........ .47½
1
Amer. Locomotive
78½
174
• Amer. Smelting ..
157
Amer. Sugar.
28
Corn Products ..
Distillers' Sec. ..
74%
National Lead ..
95¼
• Pressed Steel Car
64%
• Ry. Steel Spring.
62¼
• Rep. Iron & Steel
40¼
• U. S. Realty ..
94½
u. S. Steel .. . .
50¼

-Dividend

":::·
0

-;

0

.J

41¼
24¼
32¼
58¼
92¼

8
25
33
15%
21½
12
36
21¼

"~bOU
.. .:c,.
bO (II

:S<~

~] en~
"g] ~.:!

75¼

Taxes only.

50
53¼
88%
134
22
38¼
88%

"

•

c:-= °'
·- 0. 0

u

37½
39½
22½

81
51¼

-~--- 0

"'

>< 0

"bO p.. Iii
,:: . .,
0

.

~.,,
.. C 00
.....
g_ o.O

•- V

0

No data

9.22
86.7
8.9
No data
Taxes only.
6.1
52.34
Taxes only.
92.02
"
Na data.
83.52
14.35
83.17
47.3
14.01
M.97
77.13

.:·
oo

,::

'8 §u

58 Ct
!al
4.44
12.88
9.1
7.02
7.45
2.04
1.12
5.79
def.
def.
2
7.72
4.04

()0.,]
C:

>-5

CL)

·&,] ~]
""'C1'

i.. . -

~., c:>.-o

2.44
10.88
4.1
3.02
0.45
2.04
def .
0.79
def.
def.
2
3.72
2.04

1
on common, passed in November, 1908, to conserve working capital.
2 The company reports recent earnings as over 8 per cent. on the common.
• This companl, earned 17. 25 per cent. for the common stock in the calendar year of, 1906.
• In the calen ar Jcar of 1907, 8.58 per cent. was earned on the common stock.
• Taxes are inclu ed in operating expense. In 1907 about 8½ per cent. was earned on the common stock.
• In 1907, when business was in full swing, fixed charges on U. S. Steel were only 19.02 per cent. of net.

The Wheat Market.
The discussion of the merits of present wheat prices
continues. In my opinion high prices are warranted,
but not higher prices. It is only a little over a month
since I abandoned the long side of this cereal. For a
year prior to that time purchases were confidently advised on the theory of an advancing trend in com,modity prices, accentuated by the statistical position of
the cereal. Advances from this level are of a speculative and manipulative character.
Mr. Patten's contentions that higher prices for wheat
are warranted do not appear very convincing. He fortifies his argument in the first place by unsupported
statements that the Government estimate of wheat in
farmers' hands is incorrect. The Government, it will
be remembered, gave 20,000,000 bushels more than Mr.
Patten could find. The estimates of the Department
of Agriculture are usually below, and not above, final
figures. Farmers have a natural habit of making supplies and conditions appear as poorly as possible in the
belief that this action will keep prices up, and reports
based on replies from the agricultural .community seldom overstate stocks on hand or future prospects ..
Secretary Wilson, in replying to Mr. Patten's strictures anent the Government report, makes the following statement:
"There is sufficient wheat in the country at normal
prices to make bread for the American people up to
the time when the new crop comes in.
"The reporters of the Department of Agriculture are
farmers living on farms, and know, if anybody knows,
and have knowledge, if anybody has knowledge, of the
facts. We cannot whistle these men down the wind.
If we seek an honest class of the community and hesitate to take the word of the American farmers, we will
not establish truth by going to the gamblers."
As to average prices of wheat under any and all
conditions, the following table is interesting:
TABLE SHOWING HIGH, LOW AND AVERAGE PRICES
OF CASH WHEAT FOR TWENTY YEARS.

1889
1890
1891

High.
108¼
108¼
116

Low. Average. Total Crop.
75¼
86¼
490,560,000
74¼
89¼
402,050,000
85
97
611,780,000
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1892 .
1893 .
1894 .
1895 .
1896 .
1897 .
1898 .
1899 .
1900 .
1901 .
1902 .
1903 .
1904 .
1905 .
1906 . .
1907 .

1908 .

.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
•

High.
91¼
88
65¼
85¼
94¼
1()()
185
79½
87½
79½
95
93
122
124
94¼
122
111

Low.
69¼
54¼
50
48¼
53
64¼
62

64
61½
63¼
67½
70¼
81¼
77¾
69¼

71
84½

Average.
79¼
57¾
57¼
62½
62½
85¼
89¼
71½
70¼
72¼
74¼
78¾
103½
100¾
79¼
91¼
97½

Total Crop.
515,949,000
396,131,000
460,267,000
467,103,000
427,684,000
530,149,000
675,148,000
547,303,000
522,229,000
748,460,000
670,063,000
637,821,000
552,399,000
692,979,000
735,560,()()()
634,087,000
664,602,000

The average prices given above are not middle prices
between the high and low of each year. An arithmeti•cal average of that kind would not be fair, as only a
few thousand bushels may have been handled at or near
the top. In order to minimize this trouble I have taken
-_the average prices by months and reduced the whole to
a final average.
It will be observed that prices recently established are
far above the average for any year or period of years
and that only once in the twenty-year period ( 1898, the
Leiter corner) have prices exceeded those of the present
movement.
If we have a crop failure our present high level might
be maintained or exceeded, but as it stands we are practically discounting such a calamity.
Mr. Patten's reiterated statement that he has nothing to do with prices because he owns only an infinitesimal proportion of the world's wheat, is not worthy
of consideration. The statement is true, but it has been
true in all cases where wheat was pushed to artificial
prices. Mr. Leiter didn't "own" any more wheat than
Mr. Patten, but he was able to make quite some noise.
His claims were identical with those of the present
manipulator and with those of all other manipulators.
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The General .Situation.
The general situation is showing decided improvement. The net earnings of rai lroads show a gain over
the corresponding period of last year, and there is a
gradual improvement in the steel business. At the inception of the price cuts in steel and iron little increase in business was noted. It is invariably the case
that in any action smacking of a trade war consumers
hold off for a time in the hope that lower prices will
be established. Trade organs are now a unit in agreeing that buyers are becoming active. The "Iron Trade
Review" states that increased business is being enjoyed
in the pig iron market and that inquiries are much
larger. The "Iron Age" states that numerous buyers
are endeavoring to cover requirements for the second
half of the year at the present range of prices. Keen
competition is, however, noted in all lines.
Dividend and interest disbursements on May 1 will
exceed $90,000,000, as compared with about $85,000,000
on May 1, 1908. Dividend disbursements on railroad
securities will total about $8.750,000, as compared with
$7,300,000 in 1908 and $7,144,000 in 1907. On industrials the amo unt will be about $6,204,000, as compared
with $5,800,000 in 1908 and $8,600,000 in 1907. This is
another evidence that our recuperation in industrials has
not yet gone ve ry far.
Private reports of general business show an improveing tendency in most lines.
Consider the general situation good, with promise of
continued betterment.

The Technical Situation.
The technical situation remains strong. The sentiment against the market which was prevalent last week
resulted in a considerable increase in the short interest,
and there is no sign of extensive covering as yet.
While investors abroad are buying our securities the
foreign speculative element is sho rt. This statement
is not based on gossip, but is confirmed by my correspondents abroad.
There is a much larger short interest in the highpriced rails than in the industrials. This helps the railroad issues tempo rarily, but advances founded on mere
technique are not so satisfactory or safe as those brought
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about by accumulation. There is still a larger shortage
in United States Steel common than in any other industrial.
Consider the technical situation strong.

Conclusion.
Find no reason to alter the opinion expressed last
week that the best policy now is to work gradually out
of rails and into industrials. As has been explained,
this does not mean that rails will not go higher. Advances in that group are now more or less frothy,
however, and founded more upon speculation and strong
technical conditions than on accumulation. The hazard
is ,g reater than in the industrial group.
The best rails appear to be Pennsylvania. Northern
Pacific and Great Northern. Think the stock first named
will decline comparatively little in a reaction and reach
much higher figures before long. In the low-priced
rails I like the despised Erie issues best. In the industrials prefer United States Steel common, Amalgamated
Copper, American Locomotive, American Car and Foundry and American Smelters. Smelters is in a much
better position than it has been for some time.
As suggested in the daily letter of April 22, the
absence of a large short interest in industrials and the
desire to keep prices down to facilitate accumulation
may make this group appear comparatively weak for a
time, but the day of improvement is not far distant.

Chatt Showing Market Movements for April, 1909.
(Thomas Gibson's Figures.)
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May 1, 1909.

In the last weekly letter I called attention to the
great flexibility of the earning of industrial corporations. This is particularly noticeable in a
period of business depression. Earnings of corporations which have been making very large returns in
good times shrink in a surprising manner after the
collapse in business activity. We may find much
comfort, however, in the fact that rehabilitation is
also very rapid. ·
In order to show the changes which occur in
industrial stocks during the periods of depression, I
will refer briefly to the progress of a few of the
leading issues recently mentioned favorably in these
advices.
AMALGAMATED C0PPER.

Accurate figures of net income return were not
available on this stock until 1906. In that year the
earnings were $9,161,537, or 5.95 % on the stock; in
1907 they reached $14,154,400, or 9.20%, and in 1908
dropped to $6,680,000, or 4.34'}"o. The surplus, however, increased as follows: 1906, $9,255,000; 1907,
$11,483,000; 1908, $12,000,000. The corporation has
acquired about $100,000,000 oi valuable timber and
ore lands in addition to its mines, and I am reliably
informed that considerable reduc.tions are being
made in the cost of producing copper. The price
of the stock began declining in January, 1907, although that year proved the most profitable in its
history. From January to October, 1907, the stock
dropped from 121 ¼ to 41 ¾.. Since that time the
trend has been upward.
AMERICAN CAR & FOU NDRY.

Net income, surplus and per cent. earned on the
common stock from 1902 to 1908, inclusive, was as
follows :
Per
Year Ending
Cent. on
Net
April 30.
Income.
Surplus. Common.
1902
$4,295 ,602
$6,670,551
7.32
10,730,454
16.51
1903 . . ..
7,059,902
139

Year Ending
April 30.
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908

Net
Income.
4,496,863
2,628,117
3,807,660
8,139,536
8,214,618

Surplus.
12,227,317
12,755,434
14,113,094
19,552,630
22,367,247

p aCent, on
Common.

7.99
1.76
4.52
20.13
14.68

In 1903, a year of very large earnings, the stock
declined from 41¾ in Jar.uary to 17¼ in NovembeF,
but in 1904 and 1905, two bad years, the trend wa~
upward, and in October, 1905, a new high record
was established ( 42¼), although no dividends were
paid in that year. The earnings for 1908-9 will show
very poorly. The seven months to October 31, 1908,
givii.g only $1,378,705, as against $5,368,621 in the
corresponding seven months of the preceding year.
The su~plus increased slightly ($22,395,953).
This is a very conservatively managed corporation
with a bright future. The working capital is now
$17,184,715, and ample sums have been continually
charged off for new construction. A fund of
$1,000,000 has also been created out of earnings as an
insurance reserve.
AMERICAN LOCOMOTIVE COMPANY.

The figures fo.- this corporation since 1902 were as
follows:
Year Ending
P . C. on
Surplus. Common.
June 30.
Net.
1902 .... .. .. $3,107,777
$224,235
0.9
5,053,410
2,205,280
1903 .. .. .. ..
6.36
1904 . . .. .. ..
5,663,766
4,880,820
10.7
1905 . . .. .. ..
4,353,668
5,488,744
2.43
190G .. .. .. ..
6,462,505
6,605,373
5.72
1907 .. .. .. ..
6,771,105
7,963,580
10.43
4,986,790
8,469,212
1908 .. .. .. ..
9.1
Another conservatively managed corporation with
a large working capital. The growth here has been
more steady than in most industrial corporations.
In 1905, $1,883,557 was charged off for improvements
and betterments ; in 1906, $3,001 ,~64, and in 1908,
$2,000,000. $2,000,000 of an issue of $4,000,000 short140

term notes has also been paid off in the last two
years. In 1907 the stock declined from 75¼ in February to 32¼ in November. The dividend was
passed in September, 1908, principally to conserve
working capital. This was a good business move.
The corporation issues only _annual reports, so no
late figures are available, but it may be stated that
the showing for 1909 will be very unfavorable. This
is a record of the past, however, and future prospects are very promising.
PRESSED STEEL CAR.

Statistics since 1902 were as follows:
Year Ending
P. C. on
December 31.
Surplus. Common.
Net.
1902
$4,578,114
$4,331 ,479
27.22
1903
2,768,897
4,568,985
13.
707,111
2,531,874 Deficit
1904
.Loss
1905
1,106,901
2,588,775
0.37
3,381,884
1906
4,745,659
17.25
1907
2,907,920
6,413,579
13.34
265,478
5,694,057
1908
The business of thi s corporation is a striking example of the flexibility of earnings of industrial
corporations. From a deficit on the common stock
in 1904 the company attained to earnings of 17.25%
two years later.
The corporation is not badly managed. The
slump of 1904 was due to the fact that competition
became very keen in that year, and r at her than
accept business at a loss the company simply stayed
out of the market until they could accept business
at a profit. In 1908 railroads only ordered 39,000
cars from build ers, as against an average of about
200,000 annually.
The price of the stock declined
from 65¼ in January, 1903 to 22 ¼ in November,
1903, and the trend was i,pward in 1904 (January,
low, 27; October, high, 44¼). The reason for italicizing this statement will appear later on.
UNITED STATES STEEL.

The figures covering the progress of this corporation have already been fully covered in these advices,
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but are repeated for the purpose of bringing out the
points I wish to make in this letter.
Year Ending
March 31.
Net.
1902
.. $133,308,764
1903
109,171,153
1904
73,176,522
1905
119,787,658
1906
155,624,273
1907
160,964,674
91,847,710
1908

P.C. on
Surplus. Common.
10.73
$77,874,597
66,096,682•
4.72
61,365,446
0.99
84,738,451
3.35
97,720,714
4.51
122,645,244
4.99
133,415,214
4.04

In the year 1903 the stock declined from 39¼ in
February to 10 in November. In the year 1904 the
stock advanced from 9¾ in January to 32¼ in
November.
In the above tabulations there is, of course, no
pretense of producing complete figures which may
be considered basic. The idea is to emphasize two
points ; first, the rapidity of decline and recovery
in the business of such corporations, and, second,
the fact that stock prices never move in concordance
with conditions, but anticipate the probable future.
The extreme importance of appreciating this anteriority of stock prices is, in my estimation, so vital
that I probably lay myself open to undue reiteration
on this head, but until it is thoroughly assimilated
we are greatly handicapped in our speculative ventures. The matter appears simple enough in the
ab stract, but is constantly ignored. In referring to
this question in 1907, I caused some surprise by
stating that the man who some years ago sold Steel
common on the day its maximum dividend of 4%
was declared and purchased it on the day dividends
were eliminated entirely, would have sold at the
approximate top and purchased at the approximate
bottom. The statement was correct, nevertheless.
Applying this precept, or precedent, to the immediate future, it is safe to figure that we have still
before us a period of increased earnings, dividends,
etc., and that it is a mistake to await open evidence
of these things before purchasing stocks. We are
already beginning to see advance guards of betterment in business, and unless our confidence in the
future is shattered by a crop failure or some like
142

Comparative Market Movement of 20 Rails and 12 Industrials for the Years
1904-S and 1908-9.
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calamity, we will witness higher prices for industrial
shares before long.
I realize that investors are chary of securities
which are so unstable as the industrials are shown
to be by the exhibits offered above; but in this
letter I discuss the speculative opportunities particularly. It may be pointed out in passing that
many industrial preferred stocks are in a very strong
investment position, regardless of ordinary vacillations in business, and they also offer fair speculative
opportunities, as their prices will advance in response to an increase in the margin of safety.
The similarity of conditions in 1903-4 and 1905 and
1907-8, and, tentatively, 1909, has been frequently
referred to. In order to illustrate the manner in
which industrials came into their own In the latter
part of 1905, a chart has been prepared which appears in Vol. II., Book of Charts.
The advan.ce in industrials in the year 1905 was
about 25 points, or 36 %; in rails about 16 points,
or 13%. In the last six months of that year rails
advanced 8 points, or 6½%, while industrials advanced about 17 points, or 21½%. So far in 1909
there has been little change, but eliminating the
calendar and going back six months, we find an advance since October 1 of about 17 points, or 16%,
in rails and 9 points, or 11 %, in industrials. 1 have
employed the Wall Street Journal's averages in this
compilation, as my own figures do not go back far
enough.

The General Situation.
The most cheering feature of the general situation
is the decided evidence of improvement in the steel
and iron busine ss. Bookings of new business by the
Steel Corporation for April are much heavier than
for some time. It is reported on good authority
that April bookings will be more than double the
amount secured in February and March combined.
Coming activity in these lines is also suggested by
the advance in prices of plates and bars by th e
Carnegie Company and Jones & Laughlin .
According to my crop expert, who is now in
the West, conditions in Winter wheat have materially improved since the last government and State
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reports. He also anticipates a very large acreage
of corn and oats.
The Turkish imbroglio, which has never been accepted as a serious market factor ex_c ept by bearish
operators, is probably now out of the way altogether.
The settlement between miners and operators in
the anthracite district is encouraging. It is a sign
of comparative industrial peace so far as the near
future is concerned.
Railroad earnings continue to make a satisfactory
showing, and we will find marked betterment in the .
forthcoming statements of roads which have made
a very poor showing recently. The drastic economies, enforced or voluntary, which have been
adopted by such roads as Erie, Missouri Pacific, etc.,
will greatly improve the earnings of the next year.
Money continues in plentiful supply, but it is
thought a hardening of rates will occur during the
next few months. We may also expect a resumption
of gold shipments very soon.
The general situation is quite satisfactory.

The Technical Situation.
Tl}ere has been some covering of shorts this week,
notably in United States Steel common and Union
Pacific. This buying was not extensive enough to
materially weaken the technique of the market.
There is still a stubborn speculative short interest
of considerable proportions, both at home and
abroad. So far as any slight weakening of the
technical position of stocks by purchases on the part
of the "two-point stop" bears is concerned, it is
certain that on any sign of weakness selling will
occur in considerable volume. The situation will
not become weak pr d.1ngerous until more public
enthusiasm is witnessed, and people get tired of
looking for a big reaction. A sharp advance would
now undoubtedly result in short covering, eleventhhour buying and purchases on the part of the disgusted operators who have long waited for a decline on which to load up. When this occurs it
will be time to look out.
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Conclusion.
Continue to recommend profit-taking on highpriced rails, and placing of proceeds in industrial
issues. In my opinion higher prices will be established in all quarters before there is any decided
setback. As has been explained in recent letters,
I may find occasion to change this view very
quickly, but see no signs of a culmination as yet.
The reasons for preferring industrials to rails is
largely comparative and without prejudice to the
immediate future of the latter group. In advising
selling of high-priced rails on advances, I make a
cardinal exception of Pennsylvania, which will reach
much higher prices. In the low-priced issues I still
like Erie, Rock Island and Southern Railway. In
the industrials prefer United States Steel, Amalgamated Copper, American Locomotive, American
Car & Foundry, Pressed Steel Car, Railway Steel
Spring and American Cotton Oil. Smelters may also
be purchased, but on weakness only, as the temporary technical position of the stock is not good.
The short interest has been much reduced. and a
moderate long interest of a weak character exists.
Owing to lack of space in this letter the customary
chart showing market movements of stocks for the
previous month will not appear until Saturday,
May 8.
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May 8, 1909.
In the letter of April 17 I explained my position
in regard to our present upward movement and
stated that while I considered railroad stocks high
enough from a fundamental point of view, there
were as yet no evidences of a speculative culmination. While this is still true, we are beginning to
see some signs which warrant us in exercising
great vigilance and employing discretion and discrimination in the choice of securities.
We cannot ignore the fact that while many railroad shares have not yet reached the highest prices
recorded in the past, the present prices, in their
relation to earnings, are considerably higher than
-in 1906 or 1907. We may, of course, have further
:improvement in earnings - I think we will - but
,even this tentative betterment has been discounted
-to some extent. We must also reflect upon the
-very large advance which has occurred since 1907
·with only moderate reversals of the trend. Our
,advance has, in fact, been greater, measured by
percentages, than at any time in history. That is
·.t o say, in the two years following a panic we have
never before made so full a recovery without serious
interruption. In 1905, it is true, stock prices exceeded the average high points of 1902, but in the
interim we had a very severe setback. I refer
to the decline which began April 14, 1905, and culminated May 23. In this brief period the average price of twenty railroad stocks fell 13 points,
which, of course, meant declines of 20 or 25 points
in the leaders. This decline was attributed to factors which would have been inconsequential if the
superstructure had been sound. The excuses offered were the defalcation of President Bigelow
of the First National Bank of Milwaukee, amounting to $1,635,000; the teamsters' strike at Chicago,
and other labor troubles; the New York law taxing
stock transactions; the Russo-Japanese complications; the Northern Securities decision, and the
insurance companies controversies. In reality the
decline was due largely to the overextension of
speculators in both stocks and grain. May wheat
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in Chicago dropped from 118¼ on April 6 to 86¼ . ,
on April 29, and many enthusiastic operators who
had spread themselves on the long side of both
stocks and grain were forced to liquidate. In the
stock market alone there had been a great rise in
March, the sales averaging over a million shares
a day for the entire month, including short sessions.
That the severe recession was due entirely to
technical weakness rather than to basic events is
pretty well evidenced by the rapidity with which
prices recovered and began making new high
records.
At the present time we have not as yet entered
the zone of extreme technical danger. The excitement referred to in 1905 is not yet found in
the stock market, but it is certainly the case
that we are on the outskirts of misplaced enthusiasm. The wheat speculation is present, but I
do not find any extensive participation in cereals
on the part of stock operators. We are having a
million-share day now and then and brokerage
offices are beginning to fill up. We are also getting prima facie evidence of improvement in the
steel and iron trade and other lines of business,
and there is always an eleventh-hour speculative
contingent, whose perspective extends about a
quarter of an inch beyond the ends of their noses,
who could not be convinced that stocks were a
purchase a year ago, but who will buy freely now.
These people are beginning to get busy.
J n the letter referred to in the first paragraph,
I stated that for the sake of simplicity I would
continue to recommend purchases or sales according to what could be gleaned as to the technical
situation. I have consequently ,followed this plan
and continued to recommend purchases, and may
do so for some days or weeks to come, but I would
like to have clients understand that the unqualified
confidence I have expressed during the last year
is not present now. It does not necessarily follow
that, because stocks are high enough, they are too
high, or that they will not go nigher; but it certainly behooves us, after such a recovery as we
have witnessed and with the advance guards of
technical weakness appearing, to restrict our commitments to reasonable lines, amply margined, and
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to beware of the dangerous greed which incites us
• to work for the ultimate dollar after a successful
campaign. The financial sky is practically cloudless now. With the passing of the coal lands law
and foreign strife, it is difficult to point out specifically an adverse factor overhanging the market.
It is too early to say much about crops, but neither
Winter wheat nor cotton prospects are entirely satisfactory. In my opinion we will soon resume our
gold shipments, and while this factor has been
ignored for several months it will be accord ed more
attention from now on. And we must keep steadily in mind the fact that, at this level of prices, bad
news of any kind will be much more effective than
at any time since 1907.
In the above remarks I have referred particularly to railroad issues. The industrials are in
a much stronger position. It is needless to state
that in the event of a sharp recession in rails, there
would be a sympathetic reaction in industrials, but
these issues would not go so far and their recovery would be rapid. If rails remain irregular
and do not advance much, I think the industrial
group will gradually reach higher prices. This has
been pretty well evidenced in the market action
of the past week.
THE COMMODITY CLAUSE DECISION.

About the only event of the week bearing on
security values was the Supreme Court decision
as to the commodities clause of the Hepburn law.
This matter has been so thoroughly threshed out
that there is no occasion to amplify it here. It
may be said in passing that this is only another
rebuke to the high-brow legislators who have attempted to form laws menacing property rights
savoring of confiscation.
In this particular case
the founders of the measure referred repeatedly to the fact that only one corporation (the
Lackawanna Company) was free from criticism as
to its methods. We may well smile at the sequitur,
for as the law is expounded by the highest tribunal of the land, the Lackawanna Company is the
only corporation falling under its ban. The fact
that all these recent hysterical fines and stifling
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restrictions have melted away in courts of last resort
is not, as the ·cynics would have us believe, evidence of corruption in high quarters, but evidence
of sanity. If legislators found their efforts to curry
favor and cater to public opinion by throttling
progress upheld, we would be in bad shape-but
one after another such measures have been repudiated.
THE GOVERNMENT CROP REPORT.

The monthly report on Winter wheat proved a
negligible factor so far as the stock market was
concerned. Condition was better than expected but
abandoned acreage was disappointing. It must be
remembered, however, that this acreage will be
devoted to other cereals, so the matter is not so
bad after all.

The General Situation.
There is a very decided improvement iri the general situation. The steel and iron business is gaining rapidly. Light steel rails have been advanced
from about $22 to $27. These rails are used principally by trolley lines and the demand has been
very small recently. The Carnegie plant is running
about 75% of capacity, and it is said that, considering all plants of the United States Steel Corporation, they are running about 65% to 70% of capacity.
This means 75% to 80% of production as compared
with former years, as capacity has been considerably increased of late. Rogers, Brown & Company
in their weekly letter of May 1, say, in part:
"There is doubt expressed in some quarters as to
whether consumption has as yet increased enough
to advance prices materially in the near future, but
the opinion that we have seen the worst and that
conditions will improve from now on seems to be
universal. Altogether, the tone of the market is
more cheerful than it has been for a long time,
and in certain quarters the tonnage booked is larger
than at any time in the last two years." Conservative trade organs are also more confident. The
"Iron Trade Review" states that favorable developments are plentiful in all branches of the iron trade.
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Improvement is also noted in the copper metal
situation. The United Metals Selling Company,
which acts as distributor of Amalgamated and
others, sold about 25,000,000 pounds last week at an
average price of 12.80. For the first three days of
this week almost 35,000,000 pounds additional had
been disposed of. It is understood that the price
will now be advanced to 13c.
In the textile trade there is also marked betterment. The president of the American Woolen Company states that business will this year exceed by
$20,000,000 the largest year in the company's
history.
Mercantile business in all lines is satisfactory.
The general situation is better than for many
months.

The Technical Situation.
The technical situation is considerably weakened
by heavy short covering in most active speculative
stocks. The largest short interest probably exists
in Reading, as the stock was quite freely sold on
the sharp advance following the commodities decision. There was also a large short interest prior
to that time and only a portion of this has covered. The short side of this stock is very dangerous.
The foreign speculative shortage in our securities
continues proportionately heavier than at home.
These speculators will take more punishment than
the American professional before retiring. In St.
Paul and New York Central there is still a fairsized short interest, but in Union Pacific the bears
have covered quite freely. In the industrials the
only large short interest is in Amalgamated Copper. In many cases, however, the prospects and
merits of industrial securities are great enough to
warrant advances on accumulation alone. Such advances are, of course, much more genuine and
stable than quick upturns occasioned by attacks on
the bears.
Consider the technical situation fairly strong but
not so good as last week.
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~onclusion.
We frequently hear unsuccessful operators complain that speculation is an irrational game. These
complaints usually emanate from those who sold
stocks early in 1908 because business was stagnant
and earnings small, and who will soon buy stocks
because business is good and earnings large. There
is nothing irrational in the game at all, but we cannot speculate on what we know. We are now entering the confines of a period in which good news
will be a matter of every-day routine, and while it
is probable that stock prices will continue to advance until the incipient boom reaches its pinnacle,
we may be very sure that prices will overleap themselves and enter the soda-water stage before a
culmination is reached. Many railroad stocks are
already as high or even higher than is warranted
by conditions, and further advances will be of a
wholly speculative character. We may, and probably will, find large profits on the long side of good
industrials, and it is far safer to operate in this class
of securities for the present.
With the exception of Pennsylvania, Erie, Southern Railway, Rock Island and, temporarily, Kansas
City Southern and Chesapeake & Ohio, I think
active rails should be sold on hard spots and such
issues as Amalgamated Copper, United States Steel,
American Locomotive, American Car & Foundry,
Railway Steel Spring, American Smelters and
Pressed Steel Car taken up instead.
As to a continual weakening of the technica1 situation, which mill"ht bring about a sharp reversal at
any time, there 1s not sufficient evidence as yet to
warrant a change of position. Every precaution will
be exercised, however, in keeping track of this
phase of the situation, and clients will be promptly
notified of danger.
As is customary, a chart showing market movements of stock for the month of April appears in
Vol. II., Book of Charts.
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May 15, 1909.
In a recent daily letter it was suggested that a
great stock market movement had three divisions:
(1) the period of depression and stagnation during
which stocks passed into very strong hands; (2)
the period of reconstruction during which stocks
gradually advanced on investment demand and the
pressure of idle funds seeking employment, and (3)
the period of excitement, public participation and distribution. In the last period, stocks again pass
from strong to weak hands and a decided recession
follows. While such a recession is frequently unjustified by values or conditions, plenty of excuses
are found for the action. Even if stocks are to
reach eventually higher figures, it requires but little
reflection to see that when once the public element
becomes enthusiastic and builds up short margined
lines of stocks, it is not only possible for important
operators to attack this vulnerable po sition and
drive the weaklings from the market, but it is a
profitable proposition. The good feeling and enthusiasm which occurs during the anti-climax period,
permits of distribution to advantage and the amiable
process of "shaking 'em out" is rendered easy.
I have traced the course of important market
movements back for many years and have found
that, without exception, a rapid rise is the finale
of a great upward movement and also the precursor
of a sharp reaction. There aopears to be, so far
as precedent goes, no exception to this rule, but
there is somewhat of a modification as to extent
and drastic action, probably due to the very gratifying fact that many people are getting wiser as the
game grows older. It may be roughly stated that
the third stage, as outlined above, covers from 20
to 30 per cent. of a movement. That is to say, the
tail-end advance, which is founded more upon speculation, pure and simple, than upon a recognition
of values or a pressure of investment fund s, is
quite an important part of the total advance.
I have in the last two years referred frequently
to the similarity of the conditions of 1903-4 and
1907-8. It is my opinion that the panic of 1907
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was a deferred or broken-off portion of the panic
of 1903. In the earlier period we were saved from
more severe trouble by the great increase in gold
production and were also helped by the Russo] apanese war, which poured millions of dollars in
at our back door. Certainly if we place any confidence in the ten-year cycle theory, 1903 was more
logically the place for a panic than 1907. If we
accept the general parallel of 1903-4-5 and 1907-8-9
as being more or less reasonable, we may find it
interesting to trace the course of the culmination
of 1905 and the tentative culmination of 1909. It
may be added that, so far, the similitude in the
three years named, has been so accurate that charts
of the two periods may almost be superimposed
without showing important variations. It may be
further added that the period of culmination is essentially like that following all other long advances.
The low point of 1903 occurred on August 8 of
that year. ·(Average price 90.70 for 20 Active Rails;
Wall Street Journal's figures.) From this point
there was a steady advance until December 5, 1904
(119.36). This was followed by a reaction of six
points, bottom being reached on December 12
(113.53). Then the market turned upward and by
March 10 had reached 126.46. The advance from
August 8, 1903, to December 5, 1904 (16 months).
was approximately 30 points. From December 12
to March 10 (3 months) the advance was 13 points
and almost ten points of this advance occurred between January 25 (117.26) and March 10 (126.46).
This was the period of anti-climax. We 3hould note,
however, that the time of greatest excitement and
public participation was from March first to April
14, and during that period stocks only advanced
about two points. Securities were being distributed,
but at the same time every encouragement was
offered to buyers. From March 14 to May 22 there
was a steady decline (127.01 to 114.52). Then the
advance was resumed.
During the months of January and February,
1905, we had condition much like those of to-day.
There were many rumors of railroad combination,
most of which never materialized. The most persistent story of all related to a combination of
the Harriman-Standard Oil-Vanderbilt interests, the
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most impressive feature of which 'was that Chicago
& Northwestern was to be taken up at high figures
with an issue of joint bonds. Several dividend advances or declarations occurred, and money was
easy. The total sales of stocks in January reached
20,792,000 shares and in February 25,239,000 shares.
In March 29,138,000 shares were handled. Business
_began to improve and money rates advanced sharply
in March. This had something to do with the decline, as loans were pretty freely called and highly
speculative interests were forced to reduce commitments. The decline of April could not be attributed to any cessation of good business prospects;
in fact, it could not be attributed to any adequate
cause or development except overspe<..ulation and a
weak technical position.
While I cannot pretend in a brief letter to enter
into all the points of similarity between the events
of 1905 and our present conditions, it may be stated
that we have entered the third stage now, and that
sooner or later we will get the same kind of
medicine we did in that year.
It might appear that when we get into a stage of
the market where advances are frothy and depend ent
largely on foolishness and manipulation, it would
be better to step aside, but I have already stated
that this soda-water portion of a rise often equals
20 or 30% of an entire movement, and very · few
speculators-or investors, for that matter-like to
miss it. If we should resort .to the ultra-conservative view and dispose of stocks now, our action
would probably prove premature. Aside from that
there is little danger in pursuing the long side until
there is more decisive evidence .o f a reversal. We
are not on as solid ground, however, as we were a
year ago, and if we partake of the enthusiasm, which
is very contagious, we will jeopardize our interests.
It is an error on the side of prudence to go slow
and provide more ample margins than heretofore,
also to exercise discrimination in the choice of
securities.
Looking at another statistical feature of the situation, we find that while rails have made a full recovery to the prices which obtained early in 1907,
industrials are still lagging behind. On January 2.
1907, my barometrical figures showed rails 105.27 and

Similarity of Market Movement of 20 Rails During the Years 1903-4-5 and 1907-8-9.
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industrials 86.41. At present rails are about 105
and industrials about 78. I have favored industrials
recently, not because of this mechanical discrepancy,
but for reasons already fully set forth. However,
it is worthy of note that in 1905 industrials made a
great advance in the latter part of the year, while
rails remained comparatively dormant.
A chart showing the similarity between 1903-4-5
and 1907-8-9 will be found in Vol. IL It will be
understood that this is not offered as a basis of
trading, but merely as an illustration of what occurred at a time when conditions influencing the
stock market were similar to those which have
obtained in the last two years, and which, in my
opinion, still obtain.

The General Situation.
The general situation continues to improve, or,
more properly speaking, to show prima fade evidence of improvement. Future prospects are also
good. The metal industries are waking up to an
extent which surprises even the believers in betterment. Improvement in the business of electric
comoanies is particularly pronounced. The management of the General Electric Coml)any predicts
that business for the fiscal year will be the largest
in history. The stock of copper carried by the
United Metals Selling Company is the smallest in
two years.
Money is in plentiful supply. Offerings of foreign
money are large and this has something to do with
our continued ease in a period of business rehabilitation.
Railroad earnings continue to show favorably,
and bank clearings, usually the best barometer of
business conditions, are at record figures.
The week has been a very favorable one for crops,
and timely rains have bettered the crop prospects
materially,
Consider the general situation very satisfactory.

The Technical Situation.
The technical situation is improved this week.
A good deal of profit-taking occurred. but offerings
were quickly absorbed. On every sign of weak155

ness in the market, bears who turned tail last week
renewed short lines, and the shortage is larger now.
While some of the profit-taking was in considerable
volume and emanated from good interests, the buying was equally good. In the daily letter of May
10, I changed my views on Union Pacific because
it was found that the heavy selling of that stock
had little effect on prices, and that the buying was
even better than the selling. This applies to a
number of issues.
The public Jong interest in the market is increasing, but accounts are unusually well margined and
would not be disturbed by ordinary reactions.
The technical situation is stronger than for several weeks.

Conclusion.
I find no reason for a change of position as yet.
The market is in a strong but sensitive position.
That is to say, adverse developments now would
bring about a very rapid and sharp reaction, not
because of any weakness in the general or technical
influences, but because a large number of pools are
at work and would lighten up loads or at least suspend activities if danger threatened. There are also
a good many operators who have large profits and
who naturally do not want to see them vanish.
This element would sell, not from necessity, but
voluntarily on any genuine sign of trouble. The
bear element would also become active under such
circumstances. It is impossible, however, to base
our operations on possibilities of accident, and the
intelligent course of action now is to go ahead, at
the same time exercising caution and vigilance and
providing ample margins. Personally, I have opened
every avenue of information possible and stand
ready to notify clients promptly of any discernible
danger.
In the daily letters this week I have made one
point which will bear reiteration. We may expect
great irregularity, and a process of rotation will
now prove expedient. For some time past it has
been all right to follow a special security up wh.en
it sprang into activity. From now on it will probably
be wiser to accept profits after a sharp advance and
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s_w ing into a stock which has been neglected for a
time. This will apply to the groups as well as to
individual stocks. Industrials gained heavily on
rails last week; this week they have been comparatively dormant. They will again be taken up
in their turn.
Continue to advise purchases of stocks on all little
reactions. Prefer the industrial group. The industrials are safer, and opportunities are greater in
these stocks.
In the high-priced rails think Union Pacific and
Reading will go higher. Pennsylvania is an excellent proposition for the long pull and will not
decline much in a reactionary market. In the lowpriced rails still favor Erie, Rock Island and Southern Railway. In the industrials prefer Amalgamated
Copper, United States Steel, Smelters, American
Locomotive, American Car & Foundry, Pressed
Steel Car and Railway Steel Spring.
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May 22, 1909.

The week in the stock market has produced nothing important in the way of news and no occasion
is found for a change of position. The death of
Mr. H. H. Rogers and the increase in dividends on
Chesapeake & Ohio and Atlantic Coast Line attracted some attention, but did not in any way
affect security prices. In looking over the history
of stock prices it is quite evident that the death of
a prominent financier seldom affects prices materially one way or the other. The only instance
we can find of a decided movement in prices directly
attributed to the removal of an individual, occurred
after Governor Flower's death in 1899; but future
events proved that the collapse in values was due
to inflation and over-speculation rather than to the
loss of Mr. Flower. The decline would have certainly occurred anyway. His death was merely an
excuse for the rap id falling off of prices.
The two dividend increases referred to were anticipated and pretty well discounted. While they had
no effect on the market, it is gratifying to observe
that we are entering a period of numerous dividend
declarations and increases. There will be many
changes for the better in dividend distributions before
the end of the year.
In the absence of any new developments commanding immediate attention, I have made a careful
examination of the general business situation and
prospects. The result is presented below.
In conducting this investigation about the only
pessimistic views · were uttered by New Yorkers.
Some months ago I stated that business was improving rapidly and that this fact was not visible to
New York observers because they were giving too
much attention to local conditions. It is very easy
to lose sight of the fact that if our western farms
and mines are doing well, we will have no trouble
here. To employ a rough simile: our commercial
cow has her head in the West grazing. We only
milk her here.
Rarely has the commercial horizon had a clearer
outlook than that existing _ at present. Neither at

home nor abroad are there any disturbing political
factors to retard progress. The Balkan question has been
settled and is past history. Turkey has obtained a
new government which will strive to develop the
natural resources of the country and establish the
commerce which Turkey's position will enable her to
possess, once a stable and liberal government is
assured. The labor troubles in France, which a
few weeks ago threatened to disturb French financial conditions, have been overcome by the enlightened and firm policy of the government.
Throughout Europe money is plentiful and cheap,
and business is steadily improving. The rapidly
returning prosperity in the Orient, due largely to
the good harvests in India and China, is beginning
to be reflected in Europe and America. The improved position of the silver market is not the only
effect of the improvement in commercial conditions
in the Far East. The textile and woolen industries
are receiving large orders on Oriental account, and
the demand for the various metals is increasing.
The only political factor of importance in the
United States at present is the tariff question now
before Congress. Slow progess is being made with
the bill.
Its opponents are striving to prolong discussion as long as possible. Senator Aldrich, however, who has charge of the bill, is determined to
expedite its passage. He proposes to request the
Senate to meet and discuss the bill in the morning,
afternoon and evening, with the view of closing the
debates within the time originally proposed.
The tariff debates have not aroused much public
interest. It is generally felt that serious changes in
the existing tariff are impossible. All that the public
demands is a quick ending of the debates, because
while the bill is recognized to be in friendly hands,
it is· not to be expected that financial activities will
be promoted by extending the discussions on proposed modifications.
With such a peaceful outlook both at home and
abroad, and with the good crop prospects disclosed
in the special letters dealing with that important
subject, it will now be interesting to rapidly review
conditions, in some of the more important industries, with a view of gaining such views as will assist
us in looking a little ahead.
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CONDITIONS IN THE TEXTILE AND DRY GOODS
TRADES.

The demand for textiles often serves as a useful
gauge for indicating the trend of commerce in the
near future. The textile trades usually anticipate
business conditions well in advance. Just now,
the mills are largely engaged in turning out materials to be worked -up into goods for winter use.
Reports from all the manufacturing centers indicate
a steady increase in business. Textile prices generally show a tendency to advance and the amount of
idle machinery is rapidly decreasing.
The ·woolen mills are starting to operate on a
large scale. Owing to the changes in fashions, which
will cause much woolen material to be used in the
next winter's goods, the prospects of the woolen
mills are better than they have been in some years.
All the large mills report having booked heavy
orders. This state of things is, naturally, reflected
in the wool market, which has been strong for some
time. There is a good demand for the new domestic
and foreign wool clips. Prices are advancing for
all grades of wool. Domestic scoured wools are
selling between 68 and 70 cents per pound. The
prices of the finer grades of imported Australian
wools are between 70 and 80 cents per pound.
THE BUILDING TRADES.

Advices to "Bradstreet's" from about 100 important
cities throughout the country from coast to coast
show that during April permits were issued by the
municipal authorities for new construction work of
a total value of $85,285,131. The value of this new
work is greater than that commenced in the same
cities in March, which amounted to $84,272,876, and
is much larger than the amount expended in the
corresponding period last year. The construction
work permitted in April, 1908, was valued at $58,830,429. The increase in the value of new permits
granted in April shows a gain of 1.2 per cent. over
those for March. When the April figures are compared with those for April, 1908, they show that
nearly 45 per cent. more building work was started
than in the corresponding period last year. The
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new building statistics for the first four months
of the prese:.t year show a gain of 73 per cent. when
compared with those of the corresponding period in 1908
and of 20 per cent. when compared with those of 1907.
Reports from the various cities state that the statistics for April will probably be surpassed by those
for May and several following months. A gratifying feature of the revival in building activity is that
it is not confined to any special area, but is noticeable throughout the country; although it is most
pronounced in the far western cities in California,
Washington and Oregon, and in Chicago, St. Paul,
Minn.; Syracuse, N. Y.; Rochester. N. Y., and New
York City. The new buildings commenced in New
York City in April will cost, according to the estimates filed, over $26,719,059. The steel, lumber and
hardware industries will naturally be considerably
stimulated by this great building activity.
THE HARDWARE MARKET.

The railroads are now in the market for large
quantities of hardware goods to satisfy Jong-needed
requirements, and other large consumers, like the
car, wagon and automobile trades and builders and
furniture makers, are increasing their hardware
orders. Good business is reported in wire products.
The demand for wire nails and barbed and plain
wire is better than it has been for many months.
Copper and brass g'l)ods are in good demand, and
the price of copper wire, for electrical use, has
lately been advanced to 14½ cents per pound. Brass
tubing is beiug bought well around 20½ cents per
pound. The market for bolts and nuts and other
small iron goods is now in good shape.
Quotations all round have stiffened up. The outlook for builders' hardware is so good that manufacturers have advanced sash fasts prices 10 per cent.
in the last few weeks and intend increasing the
prices in other lines.
IRON AND STEEL.

The Iron Age reports that there is a heavy tonnage
for bar iron booked at present low prices, and that
structural steel is in active demand. Leading pro161

ducers express the opinion that the recent cuts in
prices were too radical and many of them announce
withdrawing their lowest quotations strictly. Locomotive builders are placing big orders for quick
delivery.
There is a fair amount of buying of pig iron.
The leading open hearth steel makers are taking
large amounts of special grades of pig.
COPPER.

Large buying orders are being placed daily for
domestic and foreign account in the New York
market. Under this influence prices are gradually
working upwards. The figures of the Copper Producers' Association covering last month show that
production is steadily increasing, and is now about
3,800,000 pounds per day, as compared with 3,776,000
pounds per day in March. But deliveries are increasing more rapidly than production.
In commenting on the copper market, the last
issue of the Engineering and Mining Journal reported
that:
"The reception of the April statistics was so
favorable that they, together with the influence
of some large purchases by manufacturers, led to
an advance in the price of the metal. The holders of the accumulated ~to-:k are in no uncomfortable position. Money being still so cheap,
they argue that copper is really worth more than
it has ·been selling for lately, and they propose
to continue to carry the stock, if necessary.
This situation is well recognized by the manufacturing consumers, who do not expect on the
one hand to· secure any materially better bargains than have lately been going, and, on the
other hand, do not in any way fear the prospect
of having to pay the prices of a runaway
market."
·
The European copper markets are likewise experiencing more activity than in months past. All
recent reports indicate that copper prices are now
starting on the up grade again.
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GF.NERAL BUSINESS.

The wholesale houses in New York report improved business and good prospects for the immediate future. Orders are being booked on a larger
scale than formerly and collections of accounts are
easier than in a long time. People are beginning
to spend money more freely. In most departments
of the stores old stocks were worked off at bargain
prices during the depression and new stocks are
now being accumulated. Many of the wholesale
firms state that the reports of their traveling salesmen are most favorable for the summer business.
The people in the interior States are beginning to
spend the money accumulated during the past two
years, and the outlook for the crops and farm produce is producing a good deal of optimism among
the agricultural population, which is capable of
putting much money into circulation when it is so
disposed.
RAILROAD EARNINGS.

Railroad earnings are getting better each month.
Last month the returns of 50 leading companies
showed gross earnings of $191,806,638, as compared
with $173,891,825 in April, 1908. The returns of the
same companies for the present month promise to
show a large increase over those in April. The
accompanying table, compiled by the Financial Chronicle,
exhibits the weekly and monthly railroad returns from
the last week in February to the first week in May.
The returns, from which the table of gross earnings ·. -S compiled, show that railroad companies'
accounts are now kept more accurately than for merly, and that the expense account, which once hid
many sses, is now under complete control. Notwithstanding the recovery in gross earnings the
figures disclose, expenses are not increasing much.
The increase in gross earnings with many companies corresponds with a gain in net earnings.
Crop movements at present are not as large as
the railroad officials anticipated at an earlier date in
the year.
The aggregate of the grain receipts for the five
weeks ending May 1, 1909, amoun,ted to 34,351,934
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bushels, as compared with 43,120,972 bushels in 1908.
Cotton movements are showing up better than
grain. The total receipts at southern ports irt April
amounted to 499,377 bales, as against 313,078 bales
in April, 1908.
CHEAP MONEY.

Money rates are very low in all commercial centers in America and Europe. Call money in New
York varies between 1¼ and 2 per cent. The rates
for time money are 2¼% for July, 2¾ to 3% for August,
3% for September and October, 3¼ o/o for N ovember and 3¼ for December. For maturities running
into the new year 3¾ o/o is asked. These rates are
higher· than those ruling a month ago ar.d indicate
an improved outlook in the money market.
It is probably unnecessary to state that such a
cheerful presentation as this does not prohibit very
sharp reversals in security prices. We have discounted a great deal. But we may be sure that
under such conditions speculative reversals will be
of a temporary character. The foundation is good
and no genuine bear market can occur unless there
is a decided change for the worse.

The T echnical Situation.
The technical situation has not been strengthened
by the movements of the week The most peculiar
feature of the present technique is the existence of
numerous stop orders, both above and below the
market. This reflects a decided diversity of opinion
and also perplexity on the part of both bulls and
bears. No one seems sure of their premises. The
chronic bear s sell rather freely on advances and
more freely on declines, but the proportion of the
two-point stops on such commitments is larger
than usual.
The bullishly inclined buy on reactions, but also place stops on purchases. While
the extensive employment of these methods does
not seriously affect the ultimate trend of prices, it
makes for irregularity and wide fluctuations. We
may easily trace the probable results of sharp advances or declines under such circumstances as those
detailed above. If prices rush upward quickly the

.
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bear stops are reached and the technical position
is weakened by their elimination. If the market
declines quickly the reverse is true. Not only that,
but the existence of close stop orders in volume
both above and below the market invites aggressive
action by manipulators of either class, and the
logical result is an erratic market.
The more important technical situation is strong.
I refer now to the character of buying and the investment absorption. Buying in most issues is very
good, weak public accounts are not large and there
is no sign of important distribution. There are
many people who are out of the market, either because profits have been accepted or because they are
waiting for a lower level of prices at which to buy.
On a decline of a few points these people would buy
freely. Investors do not show any inclination to
dispose of holdings as yet for the simple reason
that they cannot employ funds to as good advantage
in any other line. New investment buying is steady
and in considerable volume. My best guide as to
the volume of money seeking investment is my own
correspondence, and I find more money pressing for
employment now than was the case a year ago.

Conclusion,
While everything points to ultimately higher
prices for stocks, there are factors in the situation
which warrant more conservatism and Ca\ltion than
we have been called upon to exercise at any time
in the last year or more. Our rapid business recuperation and a portion, at least, of our future prospects, have been discounted in the prices of many
stocks, particularly in the railroad group. We have
still to consider as possible adverse factors changes
in money conditions, crop conditions and the tariff.
The factor last named will not, in my opinion, have
much if any evil effect on immediate movements, but
developments as yet unforeseen might crop out.
We are sailing before the wind now, but it won't
do to R"et overconfident.
In my opinion the best and safest method to pursue now is to stick to the industrials and to buy
only on reactions. For the active operator I would
suggest temporarily a trading position, buying

165

stocks on sharp reactions and accepting fair profits.
This view is largely based on the technical situation
as outlined above, and might be changed at any
time.
To that class of operators who have larger lines
now than at any time during the great advance, I
would say most emphatically: Reduce commitments and do not face the danger of overspeculating
in a period of high prices and speculative excitement. We can take chances freely when stocks
worth 100 are selling at 50, but it is different when
stocks worth 100 are selling at 100, -and we depend
upon speculation to carry them above their values.
That is the difference between present conditions
and those which obtained a year ago. Our railroad
securities are, as a group, about up to the high
levels of 1906-7. This is not true of industrials. The
increase in earnings, both gross and net, in railroad
stocks has also incited some belated enthusiasm in
that division of securities, while the evidences of
improvement in industrial issues have not yet made
their appearance. We may expect t_o hear better
things about industrial earnings from now on.
There is a chance, in fact, a strong probability,
of further advances in this market before a material
recession occurs, and in pursuance of the policy
outlined in these advices some weeks ago, I shall
maintain my position on the long side until good
reasons are found for a change. If reasons for such ,
a reversal are discovered the change may be very
abrupt and possibly after a slight decline in prices.
So far no such reasons are apparent.
I hear from good sources this week that the Hill stacks
will be made leaders in the next speculative advance.
While I do not favor the high-priced rails on general principles, there is reason to believe the program now contemplates a more pronounced upward
movement in Great Northern and Northern Pacific.
In the low-priced rails, Erie, Rock Island and
Southern Railway offer the best opportunities. Buying of Southern Railway is particularly good.
In the industrials prefer Amalgamated Copper,
United States Steel issues, American Car & Foundry, American Locomotive, Pressed Steel Car and
Railway Steel Spring.
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RAILROAD EAR NINGS . WEEK LY A ND MO N THLY.

Current
Weekly Summaries.
Year.
Four th week in Februa ry ( 45 roads) .$10,690,604
F irst wee k in Mar ch (44 ro ads) . . . . 10,422,328
S econd week in Ma rch (45 roads) . . 10,570,149
Thi rd week in March ( 43 roads) . . . . 10,562,507
Fourth week in March (47 roa ds)
. 16,017,203
F irs t wee k in April ( 49 roads) . . . . . 10,762,884
S econd week in April (42 roads) ... 10,040,826
Third week in April (41 roads) . . . . 10,109,928
_ F ourth we ek in April ( 49 roa ds) . .
14,051,625
~ First w eek in May (32 r oads) . . . . . 8,872,015
Current
Monthly Summaries.
Year.
July, 1908 (97 r oads) .. .... ... . . $156,103,383
Au g ust, 1908 (105 roads) . . . . . . . . . 179,781,772
Septemb er, 1908 ( 114 roads) . . . . . . 210,014,059
Octobe r, 1908 ( 119 roads ) .. . . .. ... ~23,931.291
November, 1908 (118 roads) . . .. . ... 205,963,343
Decemb er , 1908 (234 r oads ) . . . . . . . 215,251,439
January, 1909 (712 roads) . . . . . . . . 181,027,699
February, 1909 (689 roads) . . . . . . . 168,336,557
Mar ch, 1909 ( 48 r oads) . . . . . . . . . . 51 ,321 ,597
April, 1909 (50 roads) . . . . . . . . . . . 48,753,048

Previous
Year.
$10,940,295
9,534,627
9,805,011
9,805,930 14,194,326
9,563,209
9,144,139
9,056,824
12,232,959
7,859,507
Previou s
Year.
$183,365,993
209,690,782
223,964,945
240,652,757
213,913,648
204,476,660
171,740,858
156,156,486
46,239,241
43,104,976

Increase
o r Decrease.
$249,691
+ 887.701
+ 764)38
+ 756,577
+ 1,822,877
+ 1,199,675
+ 896,687
+ 1,053,104
+ 1,818,666
+ 1,012,508
Increase
o r Decrease.
-$27,262,110
- 29,909,010
- 13,950,886
- 16,721,466
7,950,305
+ 10,774,770
+ 9,286,841
+ 12,180,071
+ 5,082,356
5,648,072

+

Per
Cent.
2.28
9.31
7.79
7.61
12.85
12.54
9.81
11.63
14.78
12.88
Per
Cent.
14.87
16.64
6.23
6.95
3.71
5.27
5.41
7.80
10.99
13.10

May 29, 1909.

The trading position has proved the correct one during the week, fluctuations being in a narrow range, with
little pressure in either direction. The industrial shares
have been favored in the buying and have consequently
made a better showing than rails. It is possible that
this seesawing will continue until the market receives
an impulse in one direction or the other. The impulse
will, in my opinion, be toward higher prices. The only
immediate danger of bad news which may now be apprehended, lies in crop damage reports, and it looks as
if the crop-killers have already stretched their reports
of disaster far enough to cover something more than the
truth. In a daily letter this week I called attention to
the astonishing estimate of only 60,000,000 bushels of
winter wheat in both Kansas and Oklahoma, and stated
that this was entirely at variance with my own expert's
report. (He estimates 80,000,000 bushels for Kansas
.alone.) The Secretary of Agriculture in Kansas now
designates the smaller estimate as a farce, and I think
he is justified in his statement. I have naturally no object in trying to make things look more cheerful than
·is warranted by facts, but the expressions of some of
these so-called experts are so badly out of line as to
make us suspicious.
From my private correspondence . and the reports of
my own expert, I can find no reason whatever to antidpate a crop calamity. There will be some shortage in
winter wheat, but this is mostly due to abandoned acreage which has been replanted in other cereals. It is as
yet too early to speak of the crop as a whole, but there
is no good reason to figure that our total cereal crop will
not be a satisfactory one. In fact, present indications
are more favorable than was the case three weeks ago.
The outcome of this year's harvest is now the most important factor bearing on stock prices, and we can, as
usual, depend upon hearing numerous canards and
extravagant statements, but by exercising care there
will be no trouble in arriving at the approximate
yield.
A significant development of the week is the statement of the Erie Corporation that they will be able to
get along without issuing the much-discussed $30,000,000
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of bonds. A few weeks ago it was openly stated fhat
Erie would have to go into a receivership, as they could
not fulfill the requirements of the Public Service Commission as to this bond issue. Later the strictures of
the commissio·n were modified, and now after all the
hullabaloo, we find that the road does not want the
money. This may reflect greater improvement in business prospects than was anticipated, but it also reflects
some pretty smooth work to enable acc·umulation of the
Erie securities at low prices. Such accumulation has
been going on for some time.
Press comment and the letters of brokerage houses
reflect a great diversity of opinion as to immediate
market action. This is quite natural, as the situation
is more perplexing than at any time in two years so far
as the intermediate movements are concerned. On two
points, however, there is marked unanimity in the way
of presumptive conclusions. First, that a reaction will
not at present go far, and second, that our bull market
will reach the point of culmination as soon as the tariff
bill becomes history or shortly after that event.
There is always reason in forming opinions, a priori,
of stock market movements, to view with suspicion deductions which are unanimously accepted. In the nature
of things, marketwise, any participation growing from
a one-sided consensus of opinion quickly creates a
technical situation which makes the popular side of
the market temporarily hazardous, no matter how
correct the basic views may have been.
In regard to the first division of the question, i. e.,
that a reaction will not go far under present conditions,
a great deal depends on what is meant by a reaction. If
the ordinary recessions which are a component part of
every market and which occur for no particular reason
are referred to, the view is probably correct. But if we
refer to the decline which would occur in case the larger
interests considered a "shake-out" advisable, or in the
event of adverse news, it is pretty certain that the decline would go much further than most people imagine
possible. We cannot base our operations on possible
accidents, but we may get a good Jim on the probability
of a "shake-out" by watching the te-.:hnical end of the
matter. If I should find the customers' rooms of brokerage offices packed with public speculators, or dis- ·
cover a preponderance of weak public accounts, I would
be inclined to advise my clients to get out and await,
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not an ordinary reaction, but a good big one. So far
there is no evidence of weakness to warrant such a
warning, but it will come sooner or later, and the result
will be the same whether it comes before or after the
tariff is settled.
As to the tariff itself, the issue is rather innocuous.
We know ' about what is going to happen in that line
and to figure now on either holding stocks until the
matter is out of the road or on selling them as soon as
it is, smacks of a mechanical prearrangement wholly unsupported by either reason or precedent. If we could
map out with any degree of accuracy a certain course
for the market to follow regardless of developments,
there would be no necessity for continual investigation
and study, and, incidentally, market letters would
have no raison d'etre.
It will be understood that I do not pretend to state
that stocks will not remain firm or advance until the
tariff bill is passed, nor that the market will not decline
shortly after the bill is passed. What I want to get at,
is that people who operate on these two conclusions, ignoring possible developments or changes in the technique,
are taking dangerous chances.
There has recently been a great deal of discussion as
to the effect of hardening money rates on the course of
the stock market. I have personally held the opinion
that a great deal depends on technical conditions at the
time of advancing interest rates. If the pools are very
active and encounter curtailment of the funds with
which they a·re at present plentifully supplied, we might
get a pretty severe setback. There are many precedents,
however, of !!Jaterial advances in security prices during
a period of advancing money rates. 1905 and 1906 present a striking example of this. There is more danger
from money troubles caused by excessive gold exports
than by a natural advance in loaning rates because of
the fuller employment of funds in our own business.
In order to show graphically the course of stock prices
as compared with rates of interest, bank clearings and
surplus, I have prepared a chart which appears in
Vol. II. These different factors and their probable
effects on the course of security prices have already been
discussed from time to time and do not call for further
comment.
The ten railroad stocks, whose course since 1889 inclusive is illustrated in the chart, are: Central of New
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Jersey, Chicago and Northwestern, Chicago and Rock
Island, St. Paul, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St.
Louis, Delaware and Hudson, Illinois Central, New
York Central, Reading, Union Pacific; except that
from 1899, inclusive, to date, Pennsylvania is substituted
for Rock Island. Any other set of ten or more rails
would make substantially the same showing. The chart
begins with 1889 and 1890, because it shows from what
point the market fell in 1896, the bottom of the great
depression of that period.
Attention is called to the break in 1890 caused by
financial troubles abroad and the Baring failure;
the break in December, 1895, caused by Venezuelan
complications and Mr. Cleveland's famous message
on that subject: the May panic in 1901, due to the
Northern Pacific corner; and the spring decline
in 1905 which grew out of the Supreme Court decision against the Northern Securities merger coming coincidently with the collapse of Gates's attempt to corner the wheat market. These incidents are important to remember, as showing to
what danger a bull market is sometimes exposed,
even when backed by the most important financial
interests.
The declines in panic years speak for themselves.
The causes of each are well understood.
That part of the chart representing Surplus Reserves of the New York banks is so drawn as
to show the vanishing point of the ability of those
institutions to finance both speculative and business
enterprises. A deficit in reserves always makes
trouble, and the slight deficit in 1906 showed clearly
enough what was coming in 1907. Bull markets
originate
in a time of ample reserves and low
interest rates on long-time loans, as exhibited plainly
in the chart.
The graphic representation of rates for time loans
must not be taken too literally. Loans have always been made to some extent at less than the
highest rates shown, and at more than the lowest
rates of any given period. The chart shows the
extreme swing of the interest rates. In a general
way, high interest rates coincide with low reserves
and activity in business enterprise, and vice versa.
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The General Situation.
The improvement in the general situation is exceeding the expectations of the most sanguine optimists. The feature of this betterment which appears to surprise observers most is its rapidity.
But I do not think this view is justified. What
is now mistaken for rapid general improvement is
due, in many cases, to prima facie statistical evidence of what has been going on for some time.
lf we look on the bank clearings as our best barometer, we find a steady increase covering a considerable period. A good many critics express the view
that we are going too fast and that this betterment
will soon peter out; but the statement seems to be
founded on nothing more tangible than pessimism.
Many competent judges are of . the opinion that we
are in for a long stretch of good times.
It is stated, on good authority, that the current
month's business of the United States Steel Corporation will be 1,000,000 tons. This would break
all records for a single month. Sales of copper
are also reported as being very heavy and this
improvement is going on in conjunction with advancing prices.
Railroad reports continue satisfactory, with increases in almost all directions.
There is no occasion to change the cheerful estimate of the general situation as presented in detail
in last week's letter.

The Technical Situation.
The technical situation is better than last week.
A great deal of profit-taking has largely eliminated
the weaker speculative accounts and considerable
short selling has occurred. The most impressive
factor making for technical strength is the small
floating supply of stocks. Drives by the bears do
not dislodge stocks and the only effect of this selling is t o increase the short interest. Aside from
the day-to-day sales of believers in a decline it is
found th at a considerable shortage exists growing
out of the sales of privileges. London has been
selling calls on our securities steadily for several
months and the Englishmen are very stubborn about
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Chart Showing Market Movements for May, 1909.
(Thomes Gibson's Figures.)
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accepting losses on this form of operation. I am
informed that London operators are responsible for
many calls on Steel common which they have
not yet covered.
In view of the reduced speculative long interest,
the small floating supply and the short interest, it
is my opinion that it would take very little manipulation to bring about a sharp advance in stocks;
if such a movement is considered. advisable.

Conclusion.
I find no reason for altering my op1mon that the
long side of the market is still safe, but we cannot
allow ourselves to get over-confident. Conditions in
the stock market can change very quickly and we
should be prepared to change our position just as
quickly ,if we are to get the best results.
During the last week I have recommended a
trading attitude; buying on recessions for fair
profits. This has proved satisfactory and may continue to be good policy for some days. But if we
once break through the level of stock offerings we
will witness a decided, and probably an excited,
advance. The neutral attitude would not be a good
one under such circumstances. It is well to keep
some stocks on hand now in order to reap a benefit
from the possible action suggested.
It is still my opinion that industrials are safest
and offer the best opportunities. Advise buying
Amalgamated
Copper,
American
Locomotive.
American Car & Foundry, Pressed Steel Car, Railway Steel Spring, United States Steel, America n
Malt preferred and common, and Distillers. In the
low-priced rails Erie, Southern Railway and Rock
Island are good. In the dividend-paying rails Union
Pacific, Pennsylvania and the Hill stocks offer the
best speculative opportunities,
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June 5, 1909.
The week in the stock market has produced
nothing new in the way of developments which
may be considered fundamentally important. The
reports of continued improvement in general business are now accepted as a matter of course and
havt., in themselves, little effect on stock prices
for the simple reason that stock prices have been
advancing for over a year in anticipation of just such
germination. In some lines of business, particularly that of equipment corporations, there is as
yet little demonstration of the material betterment
which is so openly shown in other quarters. The
rehabilitation of railroad earnings is the most pronounced factor bearing on stock prices; and bank
clearings for May, which are considered our best
barometer of general business conditions, will exceed
those of May, 1908, by about 20%.
In spite of these salutary and invigorating facts,
it would be high time to regard the movements
of the stock market with some suspicion were it
not for the continued strong technical situation.
The advance of the last eighteen months has carried
prices more directly upward without a severe reaction than at any time in history. But it will not
do to desert the long side for no better reason
.than that precedents have been shattered. An examination of former severe reactions in a bull
market shows quite definitely that such reversals
were due to one of two causes: accident or technical weakness. I employ the word accident in a
broad manner, to cover everything which cannot
be foreseen, whether it be a disaster such as the
San Francisco earthquake or unfavorable financial
developments. To the possibility of such happenings
we can, as speculators, pay no attention. They
are part of the hazard of the game the year round.
We may qualify this statement, however, by reflecting that under adverse circumstances a market will
fall more rapidly and more extensively from a high
level than from a low one, and at present we are
justified in exercising more caution and discrimination and providing more ample margins than in
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the past, so that in case we are disagreeably surprised at any time we can weather the squall and
carry commitments to an ultimately successful
conclusion.
As to the probability of a considerable recession
because of mere technical weakness, it is found
that in the past, declines of five to fifteen points
on the average have frequently occurred for no
other reason than that excited and weak-margined
public participation reached a point where the larger
operators found themselves in dangerous company
arid proceeded to slip out of the market and exert
their efforts toward bringing about a decline which
would purify the atmosphere and incidentally allow
them to recover their securities at lower prices.
During the great decline in the year 1907 the only
reversals in my position on the short side were
due to the discovery of an unwieldy short interest
and, per contra, the only recommendations to
"clean up" on the long side in 1908 were due to
overconfident bullish participation. So, even if we
feel that securities . have advanced far enough to
discount our favorable business developments, we
are not justified in a change of position until there
is more weak buying and more public interest. It
may be stated that there is, and has been for some
weeks, a great deal more evidence of public interest
than at any time during the advance, but this
interest has not yet entered the form of concrete
participation to a sufficient extent to endanger the
t echnique. My own correspondence, which is quite
diversified, shows that many people who have waited
in vain for · reactions on which to make ventures
are beginning to get nervous. Brokerage houses
catering to public trade inform me that they have
many resting orders a few points below the present
l evel, and that on the limited reactions which have
occurred this . week there has been considerable
buying. The final wind-up under such circumstances
is usually a concerted ru sh' to buy stocks by people
who are sore because they have missed their market
and who decide to wait no longer. When that
occurs we will be near a temporary top.
In speaking of a reaction I have frequently stated
that no reference is made to drops of a point or
two. Such movements are merely fluctuations. A
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reaction of five points or more on the average would
scare a good many people to death, however, even
if not warranted by conditions. We want to get
away from such a movement if possible, and the
technical situation will Ile closely watched. Unless
basic conditions change, this is our only guide.
I note that a good many people who could not
be induced to buy Steel common around 30 and 40
are now quite interested in the stock. This is, of
course, an old story. In my opinion the stock will
reach higher figures and before long we will hear
much talk of a dividend increase, and we will get
the increase too; but the stock is gradually beginning to shift into weaker hands. In the last two
or three days there has been, for the first time,
some pretty good selling of the stock, and it is not
nearly so safe a proposition now as it was a month
ago. The numerous stories of retiring the preferred
by a bond issue, etc., are not traceable to any authoritative source. The listing of the stock on the
Paris Bourse is not a fundamental factor. We may
look upon this much-heralded incident in two ways:
It broadens the market for the shares, which is a
favorable feature, but when extraordinary efforts are
made to create a market for anything, it is a matter
of simple logic to assume that such markets are
made to sell in. The more important speculators
(I do not hesitate to apply the word to the Morgans
or Rockefellers) certainly do not strive to create a
competitive demand for things they want to buy.
It was suggested last week that accumulation by
large operators had been pretty well completed and
that efforts of pools and other manipulators would
now be directed toward advancing prices more
rapidly. It goes without saying that such manipulation would be more pronounced in the leaders at
first. This opinion is borne out by market actio n
this week. There is some plain evidence of pool
manipulation in leading stocks. Others will, no
doubt, be taken up in turn.
It is interesting, at present, to tra-ce the course
of railroad earnings and bank clearings since our
banner years, 1906 and 1907, and compare them
with _the showings of 1909. The following tables ,
have been prepared in order to make the comparison graphic. The tables require no comment.
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MONTHLY BANK CLEARINGS FOR THE ENTIRE UNITED STATES.
January.
$16,333,604,104

1906
1907
1908
1909

15,020,747,342

1 l,359,Jo8,232
14,047,081,636

February.
$12,477,037,577
11,792,953,798
8,756,701,857
I 1,255,550,289

April.
$12,902,156,095
12,636,807,179
9,764,431,744
13,689,794,291

March.
$13 ,007,090,991
14,625,282,333
9,777,937,943
12,615,416,024

RAILROAD EARNINGS BY MONTHS, 1906-7-8-9, GROSS AND NET.

Atchison.

-

'l
'l

January
February
March
April

········.

···········
............

- - - - 1 9 0 6 - - - - - 1 9 0 7 - - - - ----1908
Gross.
Gross.
Gross.
Net.
Net.
Net.
$6,536,985 $2,286,437 $7,697,253 $2,578,494 $7,316,675 $1,941,859
I ,942,221
6,487,556
6,752,552
2,573,163
7,352,247 2,386,499
6,280,620
6,696,958
3,106,566
2,404,160
8,379,627
2,547,793
6,492,316
7,361,388
2,620,815
2,329,189
8,429,356 3,204,475

----19ogNet.
Gross.
$6,063 ,475 $2,124,565
5,923,093

2,142,116

6,931,S17
8,006,009

2,924,033

3,123,123

Baltimore .t Ohio.
January ..........
February ...... . . •
March ........ , . ,
April

----190
Gross.
Net.
$6,573,465 $2,447,906
5,8o2,508
1,874,317
6,711,095
2,488,817
6,304,733
2,237,444

----1907---- ----1908---- ----19ogGross.
Net.
Net.
Net.
Gross.
Gross.
$824,200 $5,363,454 $1,165,671
$6,365,559 $2,000,434 $5,177,120
1,462,328
4,682,348
1,052,548
5,939,293
4,955,670
573,340
5,310,640
986,518
1,63 l,356
6,493,268
1,619,379
918,499
5,204,785
1,104,560
1,833,II6
7,107,670
2,438,745
5,761,925

~nuary ......... .
cbruary .. . .. . ...
March .. . .......•
April

----190
Gross.
Net.
$2,225,816
$883,664
1,967,689
780,481
2,146,559
853,090
2,005,871
741,211

----1907---Net.
Gross.
$612,401
$2,000,288
582,169
1,931,139
2, 250,793
723,926
2,209,621
743,825

············

···· ········

Chesapeake .t Ohio.
----1908
GrO!,S.

$1,884,762
1,575,574
1,946,931
1,718,852

Net.
$508,504
354,216
672,775
577,904

----190
Gross.
Net.
$2,109,652
$629,636
1,874,035
544,453
2,249,642
885,798
859,004
2, 183,•H

kAILROAD

EARNiNGS BY

MONTHS, 1906-7-8-9, GROSS AND NET.

Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul.
----1906----

Gross.
January .... ... .. .
February ........ .

March ......••...
April ••.•••••••••

$4,335,358
4,045,356
4,537,679
4,343,801

Net.
$1,331,295
785,361
1,808,468
1,023,516

----.1907----

Gross.
$4,776,378
4,331,720
5,035,81 l
4,995,664

----19081'----

Net.

*

Gross.
$4,135,355
3,937,988
4,777,616
4,224,629

Net.

----1909--

_Gross.

Net.

$1,170,525
930,256

$4,308,998
3,931,519

$1,066,127
713,800

1,745,079

5,064,982

2,114,108

1,I16,782

Chicago & North Western.
----1906-

January ......... .
February ....... . .
March .... .... .. .
::::; April ••••••••••••

Gross.
$4,849,550
4,589,363
5,067,306
5, 148,018

Net.
•

----1907----

Gross.
$5,292,816
4,834,236
5,706, I 04
5,410,595

00

- - - - 1 9 0 8 - - --

Net.

*

Gross.
$4,393,853
4,078,222
4,935,619
4,406,279

Net.
$1,453,427
1,075,742
l ,987,078
1,448,010

----1909----

Gross.
$4,656,739
4,691,857
5,408,063
4,942,763

Net.
$1,316,857
1,293.435
1,902,538
1,409,953

Denver & Rio Grande.

January . .... .... .
February .. . . ... . .
March .......... .
April ........... .

----1906----

----1907----

Gross.

Net.

Gross.

Net.

$1,586,451
1,405,981
1,482,707

$619,053
495,966
449,463
543,808

$1,594,143
1,485,440

$542,956
468,156

----1908----

Gross.

Net.

$1,433,123
1,223,008

$450,624
441,676

----1909--

Gross.

$1,569,468
I ,340,473
1,676,302
1,723,952

Net.

$358,302
254,949
384,153
445,142

1,672,631

642,423

1,310,319

406,198

1,696,069

665,223

1,432,772

437,172

----1906- ----1907---Gross.
Net.
Gross.
Net.
$1,052,747 $4,126,002
$921,763
3,750,64;
711,537
761,747
4,185,061
1,036,782:
4,560,961
1,135,038
3,517,262
891,822
4,671,§05
1,451,024

----1908--Gross.
Net.

----1909--

$3,561,328
3,223,26~
3,251,368
3,639,733

$3,069,350
3,233,420
3,805,455

$658,163
914,393
1,481.696

4,013,465

1,020,971

1,556,181

Erie.
January ......... .
February . . ...... .
March .. ... ..... .
April .. .... ... . . .

$4,201,436
3,635,419

• Net not reoorted.

$209,563
169,780
846,422
767,664

Gross.

Net.

RAILROAD EARNINGS BY MONTHS, 1906-7-8-9, GROSS AND NET.
Great Northern,
- - - - 1 9 0 6 - - -~

January ......... .
February ... ..... .
March ......... . .
April .... . ....... .

Gross.
$3,647,560
3,188,259
4,066,470
4,172,95 7

Net.

----1907----

Gross.
$2,543,526
2,656,873
4,440,155
4,923,598

•

----1908---

Net.

Gross.

•

$3,313,130
2,840,938
3,218,293
J ,437, I 7 5

Net.
$364,002
417,723
981,534
1,070,404

----1909----

Gross.

Net.

$2,729,995
3,212,151
3,996,094
3,887,371

$280,037
770,977
1,657,640
1,279,542

Illinois Central
----1906----

Gross.

_

January ........ . •
February ........ .
March ........... .
April ......... . . .

$4,516,438
4,366,91 I
4,640,563
4,233,912

Net.
$1,512,129
1,389,381
1,536,971
1,091,031

~

----1907- - - -

----1908----

Gross.

Net.

Gross.

$4,659,059

$1,388,112

4,428,661

1,201,462

5,076,630
4,741,286

1,779,957
1,203,334

$4,202,745
4,096,613
4,425,455
3,810,848

Net.
$969,458
814,139
1,137,493
814,588

----1909----

Gross.

Net.

$4,519,965
4,202,497
4 ,660,543
3,590,935

$1,226,379
986,528
1,217,060
800,667

Louisville & N ashville.
----1906---

Gross.
January •. . .......
February ....... . .
March .......... .
April ... . .. . . . ..•

$3,749,549
3,432,952
3,712,381
3,542,044

Net.
$1,128,535
913,714
1,115,894
908,500

----1907----

Gross.

Net.

$4,077,101 $1,099,847
3,696,996
868,328
4,317,156
1,175,931
3,998,602
1,008,947

----1908----

Gross.
$3,299,869
3,253,872
3,548,766
3,271,226

Net.
$620,848
671,266
851,194
616,908

- - - - 1 9 0 9 - -- -

Gross.

Net.

$3,754,769
3,518,846
3,907,397
3,619,650

$1,106,958
99ji,873
1,262,653
1,048,960

New York Central & Hudson River.
- ---1906----

Gross.
January .. .. . .. .. .
February ..... .. . .
March ... . ..... . .
April .. . ... . ..... .

$7,185,768
6,582,124
7,524,362
7,370,829

• Net not reported.

Net.
•

----1907-- -

Gross.

Net.

$7,412,494
6,562,113
7,814,163
8,039,260

$1 ,233,204
987,439
1,365,255
1,673,654

----1908----

Gro~
$6,636,494
6,045,538
6,478,232
6,782,253

Net.
$1,071,908
916,629
1,271,785
1,700,660

----1909----

Gross.

Net.

$6,549,606
6,083,491
7,264,075

$ I ,436,040
1,247,357
1,985,488
2,361,02s

; ,..110,82 9

RAILROAD EARNINGS BY MONTHS, 1906-7-8-9, GROSS AND NET.
Northern Pacific.
----1906-

Gross.
January . ........ .
February ........ .
March .. . ....... .
April ........ ... ..

$4,556,115
4,023,405
4,807,249
5,001,557

Net.
•

----1907----

Gross.
$4,125,163
3,577,006
5,455,949
6,268,326

Net.
•

----190,s----

Gross.
$4,433,813
3,942,718
4,732,116
5,1g8,051

Net.
$1,528,177
I ,460,943
2,048,631
2,250,910

----1909----

Gross.

Net.

$4,147,390
4,309,818
5,477,835
5,280,862

$1 , 170,275
1,596,955
2,657,765
2,167,328

Pennsylvania (All Lines East of Pittsburg & Erie).
----1906----

- - - - 1 9 0 7 - - - - ----190<>---- - - - - 1 9 0 9 - Net.
Gross:
Net.
Gross.
Net.
Gross.
Net.
January .. . . . . . . . . $12,002,512 . $3,185,634 $12,583,712 $2,942,399 $10,563,312 $2,247,201 $10,891,952 $2,562,762
February ....... . . 10,824,060
2,377,162 11,452,860
1,989,109
9,814,960
1,633,515 10,018,627
2,102,415
March .... . ..... . 12,SJI,269
J,675,919 JJ,t66,969
J,153,809 I0,997,169
2,352,91 I 12,J 19,803
2,912,724
10,249,188
2,973,856 13,370,388
3,384,156 10,521,888
2,720,256 ll,875,388
3,117,256
~ April .......... ..

Gross.

Rock Island.
----1906----

Gross.
January ......... .
February ........ .
March . . ....... . .
April . . . .... . ... .

Net.

----1907---- ----1908----

Gross.

Net.

$4,177,675

$1,111,774

$4,849,801

$1,334,732

3,979,204

1,011,1 JJ

4,628,137

1,204,501

4,167,877
3,800,204

1,049,195
782,236

5,270,6qo

I ,484,088

5,021,911

1,115,193

Southern Pacific.
----1906--

January ......... .
February ........ .
March . ....... . . .
April ........... .

Gross.

Net.

----1907----

Gross.

Net.

Gross.

4,904,292
4,281,369

Gross.

$3,344,690

$9,320,488

2,012,441

10,132,568

3,160,962

8,214,280

8,974,747
8,662,723

3,166,638

10,259,544
10,456,227

2,597,729
2,877,053

9,450,949
9,138,097

• Net not rcJ1ortcd.

$2,299,398 $10,785,544

1,192,798
1,002,224

----1908,,__ _ __

8,001,844

$8,181,124

Net.

----1909--

Gross.

$4,647,237 $1,124,576 $4,814,978
4,266,oll
671,267
4,574,736

Net.
$2,000,482
2,195,619

S, I 14,417
4,618,012

Net.
$1,039,051
1,019,949
1,509,808
1,406,213

----1909--

Gross.

$8,802,612
8,337,430
2,509,542 10,oSo,795
2,691,357
9,926,274

Net.
$2,231,513
2,760,857
3,305,569
3,348,253

RAILROAD EARNINGS BY MONTHS, 1906-7-8-9, GROSS AND NE'l'.
Southern Railway.
----1906--

Gross.
January •... . . .. ..
February . . . . .. .. .
March ... . .... • . .
April ... . .. ... .. .

Net.

$4,553,356

$ 1, 124,234

4,433,002

1,075,852

4,869,328
4,356,062

1,311,030
592,980

----1907- - - -

Gross.

Net.

$4,616,719
4,507,702
5,013,527
4,768,457

$684,058
592,640
812,692
718,202

----190~8----

Gross.
$3,802,217
3,786, 152
4 ,321 , 511

3,787,680

Net.

----1909----

Gross.

Net.

$590,g83 $4,035,975 $1 ,105,108
4 , 062,232
1,139,097
527,376
4,668, 154
1,305,908
1,034,257
1,103,592
4,229,606
1,292,ilO

Union Pacific.
----1906----

Gross.
-

~

January . . . . . . .. ..
February .... . . .. .
March • . ......•..
April • . ..• . .•••••

$5,115 , 176
4,728,351
5,106,913
5,339,805

Net.
$2,265,122
1,937,951
2, 196,986
2,141,882

----1907 -- - -

Gross.

Net.

$5,954,978 $2,704,768
5,053,898
I ,88 1,774
6,200,050

2,~00,573

6,414,196

2,261,323

----190~8----

Gross.
$5,189,921

N et.
$1,098 ,513

----19og-

Gross.
$3 ,284,415

Net.
$1,494,23 0

41640,115

1,00 0,642

2,9 18,644

t,IJ 2i.70 5

5,345,264
5,966,854

2,195,466
2,807,277

6,157,494

2,906,24 7

The General Situation.
The figures given above show in the broades1
way the progress of general business. In specific
branches of commerce there is no cessation of the
steady upbuilding. Copper metal has reached 13½
cents, and the continued demand warrants a belief
in still higher prices. The most favorable factor
of all is the improvement in crop prospects. The
government report to be issued on Tuesday, June 8,
will be an important document. My regular weekly
crop letter will be issued on Thursday of next week,
instead of on Tuesday, in order to fully cover the
government report.
The general situation is very good.

The Technical Situation.

It is now necessary to look at the technical situation from two points of view; the day-to-day operations of professional and other traders and the more
important underlying position. So far as the first
division of the question is concerned, the short interest has been considerably reduced. It would
quickly increase again, however, on any sign of
weakness in the market. This cutting down of the
professional short interest subjects the market to
sharp and quick reactions of limited extent. There
are so many resting orders under the market that
such declines would be quickly checked both by this
buying and the increased shortage which is sure to
appear on weakness. Recoveries therefore bid fair
to follow reactions quickly at present.
The more important underlying situation with
which we are particularly concerned at present is
strong. Stocks are, as a whole, in the hands of
strong interests, and the public accounts are well
fortified with margins. Profit-taking has reduced
public lines materially during the last week. The
weaker element is nibbling at the market and parti- .
cipating moderately, but, as has been stated, they are
not yet in stocks to a sufficient extent to constitute
a menace. The manipulative element is powerful
and will find it expedient to advance prices to a
higher level in order to keep the pot boiling and
facilitate ultimate liquidation.
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Conclusion.

In my opinion it is still safe to purchase gooq
stocks on reactions. The industrials still offer the
best speculative opportunities. We may easily see
what a great advantage we have had in this group
for the last two months by a glance at the following
table of average prices.
AVERAGE PRICES OF ACTIVE RAILS AND INDUSTRIALS,

Rails . . . . . . . . . .
Industrials . . . . . .

April 1.

May 1.

June 1.

102.52

104.Z0

73.90

76.08

105.97
80.00

Reducing these figures to percentages, which is the
correct way of measuring them, it is found that from
April 1 to June 1 rails advanced about 3.36o/o, while
industrials advanced about 8.23%. The advice to
give attention to industrials in preference to rails
was well timed and, I hope, satisfactory all around.
At present I am more concerned about telling
clients when to sell than what to buy. We will witness higher prices, and some profits are still to
be secured on the long side before a severe decline occurs, but the best of the movement lies
behind us. We must keep steadily in mind the fact
that advances from now on are of a more speculative
character than heretofore; that once the public gets a
good portion of the stocks it will be a very simple
matter for controlling interests to frighten out weak
holders; that serious accidents, a change in money
conditions, or bad crop news would be much more
potent for evil than at any other period of the advance. We must also remember that the technical
situation can change very quickly. A few days, or,
at best, weeks, of public excitement would destroy
our present strong technique. We must be ready to
abandon our position temporarily just at the time
when things look rosiest and when confidence in
further advances is most widespread and emphatic.
In the high-priced rails, think Union Pacific and
Pennsylvania offer best chances with the greatest
degree of safety. Advances in Union Pacific will
be of a more speculative character, but probably
more rapid than in Pennsylvania.
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In the low-priced rails I favor Erie, Rock Island
and Southern Railway.
In the industrials like American Car & Foundry,
American Locomotive, Pressed Steel Car, Railway
·Steel Spring, Smelters and Amalgamated Copper.
The chart for May appears in Vol. II.
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June 12, 1909,
The most important factor this week was the Government Crop Report. The report, although bearishly construed by a great many people, is no1
unfavorable. The condition of winter wheat wa!
80.7, as against a ten-year average of 80.5. Taking
last year's acreage as representing 100, the preseni
acreage is 91.8%. This indicates a smaller yield o!
winter wheat. The condition of spring wheat ii
given at 95.2, as against a ten-year average of 92.6,
and acreage is 106.9% as compared with last year,
Oats condition 88.7, as against a ten-year averag(
of 88.4, and acreage 100.2. Cotton condition 81.l.
as against a ten-year average of 81.4. Acreage 95.6.
There is nothing in the nature of a probable crop
calamity in these figures, and everything points to a
record-breaking corn crop, roughly estimated al
3,300,0.00,000 bushels. We may also note thaf every
day of propitious weather is a distinct advantage at
this stage of the growing crops, and that weather
has been favorable since the date of the government
document. •
We may also find it interesting to consult the
probable value in dollars of this year's crop as
compared with that of 1 st year. It is, of course,
impossible to say what prices will be at harvest
time, but we may form. a rough estimate of the
difference in prices by comparing the prices of
June 1, 1908. and June 1, 1909, and reducing the
yields of both years to dollars. Thus:
CROPS OF J908.

Wheat
Corn .
Oats .
Cotton

Final Crop.
. 664.602.000 bu.
. 2,668.651.000 "
. 807.156.000 "
. 6,323,335,600 lbs.

**Cash Price,
Chicago. Value.
.96
$638.017,920
.73
1,948.115,230
.52
419.721,120
*9.90
626,0H),224

$3.631,864,494
*New York price.
** Chicago prices are for several different grades.
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CROPS OF J909, ESTIMATED.

Wheat
Corn.
Oats .
Cotton

**Cash Price,
Final Crop.
Chicago.
Value.
. 651,000,000 bu.
1.40
$911,400,0CO
. 3,000,000,000 "
.75
2,250,000,000
. 947,000,000 "
.59
558,730,000
• 6,370,000,000 lbs. *10.75 ,
684,775,000

$4,404,905,000
•New York price.
** Chicago prices are for several different grades.
I have allowed for only 3,000,000,000 bushels of
corn in this compilation, although we have reason
to expect. considerably more. Eliminating the question of price changes between now and the marketing of crops, this indicates a much more important
money crop than we secured last year. It would
not be reasonable to assume that higher prices for
our crops represent literally that much more wealth,
for higher prices represent to some extent the mere
swapping of dollars. But higher prices mean increased wealth so far as the exportable surplus is
concerned, and they are also a guarantee of the
-proper distribution of wealth. If the farmer is prosperous we will find little to complain of in general
business.
The crops are now our most important factor, and
-as the new method of measuring indicated yields is
not generally understood, "the following explanation
-is offered:
Following the publication of official reports in
each season declaring a percentage growing con~
dition on grain, appear figures from several sources
asserting their equivalents in quantity.
With the
many who have given the subject little consideration,
such quantitative figures are little questioned. If
they were harmonious there is no reason why they
should be questioned, but they vary so · widely at
times that the public mind is confused.
· It may seem strange that so few ever take the
. trouble to do a little figuring for themse!ves. There
is nothing in the renditions beyond the limits of
simple arithmetic. Quantitative expressions began
years ago in a method that is . being supplanted by
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one proving more acceptable in its closer approximations·. While undergoing change there are two
methods in vogue, designated as the old and the new.
In the first place, it should be understood that growing conditions have no fixed meaning in quantity.
Such being the case, any estimates built upon them
are approximations only. A condition of 100 on
growing wheat, corn or oats has no expression in
fixed bushels per acre. It represents a different
quantity in different states, and is widely different
in different seasons.
. The old method based all months on the conditions and yields at harvest, determining a par therefrom, and making application to all months without
allowance for the deterioration in condition and
lessening of acres attaching to crops in the past.
Official conditions on winter wheat, appearing in
December and April, are on the entire area sown.
In ' May, the abandonments are given, and a condition on the acres remaining. And, on the acres
remaining, ,is given the conditions of June, July and
August.
.
· Crop estimating is simply judging the future by
the past, but in any figuration the past should be
fairly treated. The past shows varying monthly
~onditions with but one yield for all. Because of
this the fair way is to handle each month separately,
and on the basis of that month in previous seasons.
The old method allowed for no deterioration. The
new method does. The conditions of each month
and resultant yields enable a par determination for
each month. Just why a determination for all
months at harvest is applicable, does not appear. A
/:itriking instance of the two methods was lately
presented in . the treatment of spring wheat. The
report gave a growing condition of 95.2 on 18,391,000
acres sown. The new method, on the basis of June
conditions and attending yields past five years, made
the crop suggestion 254,700,000 bushels, or 13.85
' .J:>ushels per acre. This is a goodly acreag and one
seldom exceeded.
The old method asserted 303,451,000 bushels, or 16½ bushels per acre. The country has never raised an average crop like that.
'Fourteen bushels is a big crop. The figures were
all of 2½ bushels per acre too high. This is about
'fifteen per cent., and that happens to be about the
0
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deterioration from June to harvest in the past five
seasons, The old method figures reduced that much
brings the two methods in harmony. The figures
given below are those made on the crop of 1908:
WINTER WHEAT.

Old
New
Method.
Method.
April . . . . . . •..
493,996,000
410,111,000
May ..
460,680,000
428,414,000
June . . . . . . . . . .
442,888,000
440,315,000
July . . . . . . . . . .
414,089,000
416,514,000
August ... . . .. .
419.252,000
425,940,000
Crop declared was 437,908,000 bushels.
SPRING WHEAT.

Old
New
Method.
Method.
June . . • . . .
292,753,000
247,940,000
July . . . . . .
276,866,000
244,398,000
August . . . .
255,400,000
233,772,000
September . .
241,000,000
240,856,000
Crop was declared 226,694,000 bushels on 17,208,000
acres. Estimates were made on 17,710,000 acres.
It is noteworthy that the old method declares
very high estimates and impossible crops in May and
June because no allowance is made for deterioration
to harvest, and deterioration is so frequent it may
be termed a rule. The condition figures on winter
wheat for May, June and July, which are given on
equal areas are:
July.
May.
June.
80.6
86.0
89.0
1908 ..
78.3
82.9
77.4
1907 ..
82.7
85.6
90.9
1906 ..
82.7
85.5
92.5
1905 ..
77.7
78.7
76.5
1904
78.8
82.2
92.6
1903
76.1
77.0
76.4
1902
87.8
88.3
94.1
1901
82.7
80.8
88.9
1900
76.2
67.3
65.6
1899

86.0

Average ..
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80.5

79.64

MONTHLY CONDITIONS FIVE YEARS
WHEAT.

1908
1907
1906
1905
1904

.. -..

June.
95.0
88.7
93.4
93.7
93.4

ON SPRING

July. Aug.
89.4
80.7
87.2
79.4
91.4
86.9
91.0
89.7
93.7
87.5

Sept.
77.6
77.1
83.4
87.3
66.2

Average
92.84 90.54 84.84 78.32
Average Joss, June to S'ept., 15.68 per cent.
Average loss, July to Sept., 13.50 per cent.
Average loss, Aug. to Sept., 7.69 per cent.
The new method was termed by Mr. John Hyde,
who was statistician of the Department of Agriculture at Washington, as the only fair treatment of
condition figures in estimating crops.
If we suffer the ordinary deterioration between
now and harvest time, our crops as now measured
by the new method will be no smaller than now
indicated. If the deterioration does not occur we
will have larger yields.

The General Situation.
The general situation continues to improve
steadily. All lines of business show satisfactory
betterment.
In comparing railroad earnings for the first ten
months of the fiscal year 1909 with the fiscal year
1908 we find some very marked increases in net.
Louisville & Nashyille shows 53% increase, Atchison
25%, Union Pacific 21 % and Southern Pacific 14%.
Copper production is now above normal and prices
for the metal are very firm. It is the opinion of
competent judges that we will have 14-cent copper
before July 1. With the cost of production decreased in the leading mines, the great advantage
gained by every trifling advance in the selling price
of the metal will be easily appreciated. For example, putting the production of Amalgamated at
200,000,000 pounds, an advance of one cent a pound
means $2,000,000 added to net; and the copper mining
business of the Amalgamated Corporation is only
approximately two-thirds of their income.
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The tariff legislation brings about some quibbling
and naturally some apprehension, but it may be
stated that seldom has an important piece of legis-Jation progressed with so little friction or contained so little that might prove inimical to the
stock market.
In the iron and steel ousiness, conditions are
excellent. The weekly output of iron advanced
from an average of 412,000 on May 1 to 422,000 tons
on June 1. According to the "lron Age" requirements for rails for the Harriman System have been
expanded to 150,000 tons. The Missouri Pacific
has placed 35,000 tons, Chicago & Alton 9,000 tons,
Northern Pacific 15,000 tons and Erie 4,000 tons.
Baltimore & Ohio is in the market for 135,000 tons.
Both time and call money rates have hardened
during the week and will probably continue to show
a gradual advancing tendency. This will later be a
factor for serious consideration, but not while the
powers that be are in control of the market. The
weakening of exchange rates has checked our gold
exports, but in this direction also there is danger
of a disturbance later on.
Taking our cereal and cotton crops as a whole,
there is no oc;casion for apprehension so far as
present indications go. This, however, is not only
the most vital factor bearing on stock prices, but
the conditions are subject to radical changes and the
crop prospects should be closely studied.

The Technical Situation.
There is some improvement in the technical situation this week. Offerings which have hung over
the market in such stocks as Union Pacific, Atchison and Northern Pacific have been absorbed by
good buying and no longer act as a check to manipulative advances in these stocks. There has been
some liquidation in Steel common, but all that is
for sale at this level has been taken and the stock
is in a better technical condition than last week.
The little recessions which have occurred have
served to eliminate some weak and nervous long
accounts and also to increase the short interest.
The technical situation is strong.
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Conclusion,
I find nothing in the situation to warrant a change
of position as to the immediate future of the stock
market. Ther-e is, however, a vast basic difference
between the price level of a year ago and that
which obtains at present. The student of values and
probable future conditions could in 1908 say with
perfect confidence that securities were cheap. In
forming this opinion he scrutinized most particularly
the prospects of the future, and unless stultified by
undue pessimism or handicapped by imperfect reasoning or inadequate information, he arrived with
facility and accuracy at the conclusion that business
rehabilitation would be rapid. Adding to this an
appreciation of the anteriority of stock prices, he had
no hesitation i11 predicting higher prices.
At present we cannot, except by stretching the
imagination, call railroad stocks "cheap." There is
nothing in statistics nor in a hopeful perspective to
make this term applicable to prices just now.
The good things we anticipated are now before us,
and, by the same token, the advances warranted by
such developments have already taken place. Unfortunately, there are a great many people who
could not be convinced that stocks were cheap
twenty points lower, who are satisfied that they are
cheap now.
But even if we consider prices high enough, as
measured by values, present or prospective, there
remains the factor of speculation for our consideration. Over a month ago I stated that in my opinion
the market had entered the soda-water stage, but
that I believed in further advances. So far this view
has proved correct, and·, as a rule, the speculator
does not care why stocks advance as long as th ey
do. A soda-water dollar is as good as a value
dollar. That is reasonable enough, but our foundation is weakened. When we purchased railroad
stocks a year ago we were in the true speculative
lines; at present we are in the gambling stage.
There is, however, little probability that anything
except accident or disaster can check the advancing
trend of prices. There are manipulative schemes on
foot and they will probably be carried out. John W.
Gates once made the 'remark that if he boosted a
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stock from $50 a share to $100 a share with a view
to disposing of it at an average of 75 and found
that he couldn't do it, he would put it to 125 and
sell it at 100. His trite expression is new only in
its phraseology. The foremost manipulators know
full well that it is easier to dispose of stocks in
an excite~ high market than in a dormant low
market. When Union Pacific reached 150 a short
time ago it was not considered cheap, but let it break
from the present price to 175 and it will look like a
bargain. It appears paradoxical to say that a stock
looks cheaper at 175 than at 150, but we all know
it is the truth. We can always expect stocks to
swing above their values in good times, just as they
swing below them in bad times. Under such circumstances we can hope to approximate the top only by
a careful and continual examination of technical conditions and by judging when the schemes of those
who have stocks for sale have been consummated.
In my opinion these schemes are not yet completed.
I have specified railroad stocks in the above remarks, because of a decided opinion that industrial
securities have not, as a class, fully discounted our
business improvement. Relatively speaking, many
of the industrials are still cheap.
In looking at the question of reactions we may
feel confident that under present technical conditions only ordinary reactions will occur and that
these will be followed by rapid recoveries to a new
high level. Nothing is more calculated to inspire
public confidence and increase public interest than
such movements. In the early stages of a distributive market, the first few recessions, how.ever slight,
create nervousness. As one such dip after another
is followed by recoveries, this fear evaporates and
securities are purchased in greater volume on each
recurring reaction. But the time always comes
when the market reacts and keeps light on reacting.
That is the period we want to lo.ok out for.
For the present continue to recommend maintaining the position on the long side. In the high-priced
rails Union Pacific, Northern Pacific and Pennsylvania look most attractive. In the low-priced rails
prefer Erie, Rock Island and Southern Railway.
In the industrials Amalgamated Copper, American
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Locomotive, American Car & Foundry, Pressed Steel
Car, Railway Steel Spring and United States Steel
are best. The industrials are safer than the rails,
and for the long pull they offer greater opportunities.
I wish to reiterate the statement that when we
are depending upon technical conditions and manipulation as a guide to market movements, the whole
aspect of affairs may change very quickly and that
a decided and radical change of position might be
w~rranted at any time.
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June 19, 1909.
The technical situation, which is our only guide
as to probable intermediate reversals in a bull
market, is weaker than for some months and suggests danger of a considerable re1ction before the
upward swing is continued.
The nervousness
and perplexity of holders of securities has resulted
in the widesprea<;I employment of stop-loss orders,
and a number of the weaker pools are growing
impatient because of the failure of public traders to respond to the upbidding of certain stocks or to swallow
the stories which accompany such manipulation. Several
of these pools show an inclination to lighten their loads
on hard spots and in the event of a further decline might
abandon their position entirely. There is, at present,
more danger from this source than from .the public operators. The public interest now in existence is, as a rule,
well margined and it is not probable that a great portion
of their holdings could be dislodged on a moderate decline except in the instances where stop orders are
employed.
In recent letters I have frequently referred to the effect
of the increasing popularity of stop orders on the technical situation. It is rather remarkable that many brokers
and almost all market advisors strongly recommend the
use of this form of protection. If only a few people
ir•dulged in it there would be no cause for apprehension;
but when thousands of such orders are in existence only
a short distance below the market, the bear element has
received a distinct invitation "to drive prices down until
these orders are uncovered. If the first .bunch of stops
reached ended the matter, these little drives would be of
no importance; but the trouble is cumulative. A drop
<if two points frequently leaves the situation worse than
it was originally, as new stops exist a little lower and
new ones are daily introduced by operators who grow
nervous over the moderate decline. It is true that in
the last analysis the shake-out is healthful, in that it
eliminates the weak spots and creates a short interest,
but frequently such declines go further than anyone anticipated. The break of over six points on the average in
February, 1909, was really due more to a weak technique
than to the excuses offered. We may always be sure
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to June 15, 1909,

Average Daily Market Movements of 41 Stocks from J anuary
Illustrating the Fallacy of" the Stop O rder.
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The barometrical averages used in the above chart are Thomas Gibson's figures
for 23 Rails and 18 Industrials-41 stocks in the aggregate.

that some excuses will accompany every decline. Wall
Street must have reasons, even if they are invented.
The basic theory of the stop order is that prices will
swing beyond the point at which the stop is placed;
that thus losses will be curtailed and opportunities presented to replace lines at a lower level. The limit most
frequently employed is two points from the prevailing
quotation. It frequently happens that the market does
swing beyond the two-point limit. It also frequently
happens that it goes just about far enough to clean a
trader out. But the greatest trouble lies in the fact that
in nine cases out of ten, the opportunity is not accepted
to replace commitments even at a lower price. lt is
gratifying to note that a stop order was executed at, say,
8'l and that the market is now 86, but later on when the
market has reached 90 again, we cannot make any money
by reflecting that we had the best of it temporarily.
Every trader has experienced this drawback.
Discussing the stop order in a published work some
years ago, I offered the opinion rather grudgingly that
stop orders might someti.mes be used to advantage in
order to protect profits. After observing the growth of
this method in recent years I am inclined to withdraw
even this opinion.
So far as the use of stop orders to protect original
commitments; that is to say, placed at the same time
the original trade is made, it is my opinion that such a
method is ridiculous. We have no business buying anything unless there are good reasons to expect an advance. If these reasons are canceled, the thing to do
is to sell out; if, however, the reasons remain in force, we
should consider buying more on a decline instead of sacrificing what has already been purchased. With the stop
order, used as mentioned, we buy something because it
is considered cheap and at the same time contemplate
selling it if it becomes cheaper. I canno: imagine any
defense of this form of operation other than that the
operator is simply guessing at quotations. He works on
a purely mechanical basis on the theory that his particular
machine will upset the calculus of probabilities and run
further in one direction than in the other.
In order to show how little advantage is gained by
the stop order as a protection and also to show the
unusual duration of our recent advance without a reaction, the following table has been prepared and a chart
illustrating the table will be found in Vol. II Book of
Charts.
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TABLE SHOWING ALL REACTIONS OF TWO
POINTS OR MORE SINCE JANUARY, 1, 1908.
( 41 Rails and Industrials.)
Total
Declined Dec.
to.
(points)
1908Highest.
58.63
6.39
Jan. 17 to Feb. 17. . . . . . . . 65.02
65.02
2.11
Mar. 25 to Mar. 31 . . . . . . . 67.13
April, no decline . . .. . .. . .
4.19
May 18 ta May 28 . . . . . . . . 74.70
70.51
69.80
3.47
June 2 to June 23. . . . . . . . 73.27
July, no decline ... .... . . .
2.92
77.62
Aug. 10 to Aug. 15. ..... 80.54
74.57
6.07
Sept. 9 to Sept. 22 . . . . . . . . 80.64
Oct., no decline .... . .... .
2.02
84.14
Nov. 17 to Nov. 21. . . . . . . 86.16
2.98
Dec. 10 to Dec. 21. . . . . . . . 87.14
84.16
190984.61
3.28
Jan. 2 to Jan. 30. . . . . . . . 87.89
80.66
6.45
Feb. 15 to Feb. 23. . .. .. .. 87.11
Mar., no decline .. .. . .... .
April, no decline . . .... . . .
May, no decline ... ... . .. .
The most striking feature of this exhibit is that no
average decline of two points has occurred since February 23- almost four months-until this week. It is
my opinion that there is no way to judge when a reaction is "due" by merely consulting the lapse of time or
the extent of advance, but even in the best of markets,
under the most favorable conditions, we find recessions
of several points now and then.
I have not
based my opinion that a reversal was imminent
on the duration of the advance, but it may be
admitted that if ever a reaction was due, one is
due now.

The General Situation.
The general situation continues good. There is nothing in business conditions to warrant a decline in
stock prices. The opinion telegraphed from this
office on Tuesday last, that stocks would go lower,
was based entirely on technical conditions and not
on fundamentals. All lines of business show steady
progress and this will assist our market as soon as
the weak spots are eliminated.
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The report of the Hughes Committee on Speculation is a sound and satisfactory document in most
respects. The recommendation that brokers be required to exact heavy margins in order to keep the
small fry out of the market, is open to criticism,
however. It smacks of paternalism, of which we
have had about enough. Personally, I have always
recommended margins as great or greater than those
suggested by the commission, but each man must
be his own judge in that regard. I think every
reader of this letter would resent being told on what
terms he might venture his funds. It is impossible
to justify this recommendation by stating that it
decreases gambling. We can as easily gamble on a
twenty-point margin as on a ten-poi_nt margin. This
sort of restriction, if carried far enough, would
prevent the poor man from speculating, and the
poor man is the only one who can afford to speculate.
Advice to always provide 20 per cent. margin is
laudable, and I think practically every respectable
broker or advisor gives such counsel, but an effort to
dictate to people how they shall handle their own
funds in what the commission itself characterizes as
a legitimate business, will be bitterly resented.
A number of inquiries have been received as to
the probable effect of the proposed 2 per cent. tax
on net earnings of corporations in case the projected
measure becomes a law. As I understand the proposition in its present form a tax of 2 per cent. on the
net earnings of corporations, if fully and fairly collected on earnings properly computed, should depreciate the values of securities just two per cent.
"Net earnings" is, however, a -s lippery term.
Hardly any two corporations compute earnings in the
same way. Nor, indeed, is uniformity in methods
of i;omputing them possible or desirable. Nor is it
conceivable that these taxes can, by means of any
sort of federal supervision, be fairly and impartially
collected from all corporations-not even if the
books of all corporations were audited by government experts entirely familiar with all of the bookkeeping requirements of all of the different industries
under consideration.
Generally speaking, though, this 2 per cent. excise
tax would probably be more fairly and fully col-
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lected than are most other taxes. Hence, as the
selling prices of most stocks depend mainly upon
earnings, it is evident that most stocks should sell
at least 2 per cent. lower with than without this
tax. If, as in many cases, from one-third to onehalf of net earnings go to pay interest on bonds,
then this 2 per cent. tax on net earnings will depreciate the value of stocks from 3 to 4 per cent. If,
as frequently happens, four-fifths of net earnings go
to pay interest on bonds, a 2 per cent. tax on net
earnings would depreciate the market values of such
stocks by 10 per cent.
A few specific instances will make these figures
clear:
Three corporations have net earnings of $5,000,000
each. Each, therefore, pays a tax of $100,000 a year.
The first corporation has no bonded indebtedness
and no preferred stock. The tax, therefore, diminishes by 2 per cent. the net earnings of this corporation applicable to dividends and depreciates the
market ,value of this stock by exactly 2 per cent.
The second corporation has $50,000,000 of 5 per
cent. bonds and one-half of its net earnings are
consumed in fixed charges. The 2 per cent. tax,
therefore, diminishes by 4 per cent. the net earnings
applicable to dividends and thus depreciates the
market value of the stock of this corporation by 4
per cent.-assuming that there is only one kind of
stock.
The third corporation has $80,000,000 of 5 per
cent. bonds and four-fifths of its net earnings go as
fixed charges. The 2 per cent. tax diminishes the
earnings applicable to dividends by 10 per cent.,
and, therefore, depreciates the value of the stock by
10 per cent.
Of course, preferred stocks are equivalent to bonds
for the purpose of computing the effects of this tax
on common stocks. But the chances are three to
one that no law will be pas5ed this year carrying
out President Taft's recommendation as to a 2 per
cent. tax on the net income of corporations. In fact,
it is highly probable that this tax is suggested only
or mainly for political purposes. As the Washington correspondent of the New York Evening Post
says, "The Aldrich following has taken up the
project of a tax on net earnings of corporations
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simply to kill off the movemerit for an income tax.
In this they probably will be successful."
Mr. Aldrich does not want this tax and does not
want the federal supervision of corporations that
would, almost necessarily, go with it. Neither does
he want to meet with defeat on the income tax
proposition, as he was, apparently, about to do. He
has, with the aid of the President, made a strategic
political move which will probably divide his opponents into factions. In this way he will probably
avoid a present evil and take hi. chances later of
escaping from another evil.
The short interval of time that has elapsed since
President Taft sent his message to Congress has
prevented other than the hasty analysis of the operation of this tax presented above. At the moment
there are many conflicting opinions among experts
as to the exact method of reaching "net earnings,"
therefore the effect on corporations designated above
as "Second" and "Third" may possibly be somewhat modified later. The mooted point is whether
or not fixed charges are to be considered in the net
earnings.

The Technical Situation.
The technical situation has been fully discussed in
recent letters and requires little further comment. The
decline so far has not yet rectified the trouble. The
elimination of stop orders has not been thorough and
new ones have supplanted such as were reached.
The weaker pools are also in an uncomfortable position because of the failure of the public to respond
to their antics in certain securities and also because
of the possibility of having loans called in anticipation of July disbursements.
I do not consider the technical situation safe or
satisfactory.
Conclusion.
In anticipation of numerous inquiries as to how
far the reaction will go, I will state that I have no
idea. That must be decidee by future developments
and any attempt to map out a certain number of
points, would be guesswork. It might be found be-
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fore the ink is dry on this letter that the decline
had improved conditions, and that we were again
justified in resuming the bullish position. I hardly
think, however, we can expect so quick a cure. It
may be a month before the horizon is clear. I do
not intend to be in a hurry about advising purchases,
preferring to miss a point or two advance rather
than to take chances through an attempt to catch
the extreme bottom. We may witness some deceptive rallies in the next few days. They usually occur
•in a market of this kind, but it will not do to
become enthused by such movements. It is better
to keep out until we discover good reasons for
buying.
While~ I do not pretend to gauge the extent of
this reaction, it may be stated with confidence that
there will be no big smash. As has been stated,
the setback is in no way fundamental and the influences which have caused our great advance are
still operative. Recovery will be rapid and complete; I even think that scale orders in industrial
stocks ~•ill show excellent results if a little patience
is exercised. If we feel satisfied that the break is
artificial we can start a scale order at any time now
on the theory that a further decline is desirable.
Will telegraph promptly when good reasons are
found for resuming the bullish position,
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June 26, 1909.
In view of the attempts now being made to have
United States Steel common shares listed on the
Paris Bourse in competition with European securities, a few words relative to European investments
will be of interest.
There is fashion in investing as well as in everything else. Sentiment everywhere co,ors market
preferences. The national temperamem of a people,
also, largely influences the character of their investments. This is the reason for such differences
in investment preferences noticeable in adjacent
markets like those of Amsterdam, Hamburg and
Brussels, or of London and Paris. Some investors,
like the British and American, like to take risks,
but most of the European investors regard security of investment as of great importance and
avoid risks as much as possible. The Dutch and
French are remarkably conservative investors.
Political changes often influence investment preferences in a remarkable manner. Prior to 1900,
for instance, trustees in England were limited by
the trustee investment laws to investments in British consols and certain British municipal, bank
and railroad bonds. This resulted in there being a
large demand for such bonds and a reduction in
the yield to very low rates.
The Colonial Stock Act of 1900 enabled trustees
to invest trustee funds in Colonial Government
loans. The area over which English trustees were
able to invest their trust funds thus became worldwide. When they came to investigate the characteristics of the newly permitted securities they found
that they yielded higher interest than English bonds;
they were sentimentally attractive, in that they
largely represented investments in solid, reproductive enterprises like railroads and docks, and were
in this respect unlike consols, which represented
only debts, and, furthermore, colonial securities
fluctuated less than any other securities on the
English markets. In the past ten years the Australian, Canadian, New Zealand and South African
government bonds, yielding from 3% to 4%, varied
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only 13¼ %, as compared with variations of 21 o/'o
in bonds of British municipal corporations, 23 3-16o/'o
in consols and India bonds, and 19 9-32% in foreign
government bonds.
The result of such investigations was the withdrawal of immense sums of trustee funds from
home securities and their reinvestment in colonial
government loans.
These great changes naturally attracted the attention of investors generally, and greatly stimulated investments in all classes of securities in
colonial and foreign markets.
French Rentes are the least variable of all European investments. In the interval 1899-1909 French
3% Rentes had a marginal variation of only 9½
points, as compared with 23 points in British consols.
The stability of French investments is due almost entirely to the large interests held by the
poor in all important bond issues. The French
government and large corporations have encouraged the working and commercial classes to save
and put money into their bond issues. The French
laws favor the small investor and market rigging is
therefore difficult in France. This results in Jess
variability in stock exchange security prices than
otherwise would be the case.
BRITISH INVESTMENTS.
In glancing over the lists of shares traded in on
the London Stock Exchange, the most noticeable
features are the enormous number of companies
listed and the great variety and extent of their
activities. Colonial government, home, municipal
and foreign government bonds lead the lists. The
4% inscribed St. Lucia bonds are dealt in on the
London Exchange with as much ease as Chinese,
Siamese, Danish or Russian and French government bonds. Hardly a single country in the world
remains away from the London money market when
about to issue loans.
Home railroads appear next in importance on
the list. These are followed by home, colonial
and foreign corporations doing banking or financial businesses, and similar corporations doing
trading, manufacturing or exploration businesses.
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Mining follows in importance, and then shipping,
foreign railways, home breweries, canal, gas, electric power, spinning and weaving, tramway, omnibus and water companies.
FRENCH INVESTMENTS.
French and German investments are much more
limited in number and variety than English and
American investments, and the daily trading on
the Paris Bourse and the Berlin Borse are much
less in extent and value than on the London and
New York stock exchanges.
French government and colonial bonds are prominent in the trading on the Paris Bourse. Home
bank and railroad shares are next in favor. Foreign and colonial rails, and home industrial bonds
and stocks also play an important part in the
daily transactions. Among foreign rails, preference
is shown to Hungarian, Italian and Spanish rails.
A few American rails are bought for investment.
Atchison, Baltimore & Ohio and Canadian Pacific
bonds are chiefly favored. There is little or no
investment in British rails made on the Bourse.
'toal-mining investments are popular in France,
and there is a fair . investment in local copper, iron
and phosphate mines and in British South African
gold mines.
GERMAN INVESTMENTS,
German investments are wider in scope than the
French. Home and foreign government bonds are
most popular in Germany. Bank and financial stocks
are in good demand, and a fair amount of trading ·
is done on the Borse, in home and Austrian railroad stocks and bonds. German investors favor
the same American railroad investments as the
French. This indicates that they look for stability
in their investments and are afraid to touch speculative shares like United States Steel common or
Colorado Fuel & Iron. For such stocks to become popular with European investors it would be
necessary for their margins of variation over long
periods of time to be greatly diminished. They
would have to be changed from the highly specula-

203

tive to the conservative investment class of securities.
Most of the German cities possess electric street
cars, and electric traction shares are popular and
profitable. In recent years chemical and industrial corporation shares and shipping shares have
become popular with German investors. A separate
department of securities is formed by German
brewery securities. Shares in the leading breweries are extensively traded in on the various German exchanges. German mining investments -are
limited to a few European copper, zinc and lead
mines, British South African gold mines and local
coal mines. The Germans, , like the French, are conservative investors and abhor speculation. They
are satisfied with moderate returns, provided their
securities are sound, and are not subjected to much
variation. Preference is strongly shown to home
and patriotic investments. Very little German
capital, comparatively speaking, flows to foreign
lands. England is still the world's banker and
the pioneer in the world's financial development.
In studying the comparative table of American
and European security prices and yields, it is at
once seen that there is a general tendency to uniformity of yield. The returns from the leading
German securities, given in the following table, are
somewhat higher than those yielded by the investment securities of the other countries. The average
yield of the world's leading securities is about 4½%.
The average of the principal German securities is
over 5%. French securities yield · 4 4-5%; as compared with 4½% by American securities and 3 4-5%
by British.
The table also indicates that English and American investors strongly favor railroad securities,
while German and French investors look favorably upon industrial securities.
AMERICAN STOCKS.

Railroads:
Atchison . . . .
Union Pacific ..
St. Paul .. ... .
Southern Pacific

. ... ..
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Price.
$114
192
152
130

Yield.
4.3%
5.2
4.6
4.6

AMERICAN STOCKS.

Railroads:
Price.
Baltimore & Ohio . . . . . .
117
Delaware & Hudson ....
188
Great Northern . . . . . .
149
Pennsylvania
.. .. .. ..
136
Canadian Pacific . . . . . . . .
181
Northern Pacific . . . . . . . .
151
Chicago & Northwestern . . . . . .
220
New York, New Haven & Hartford.
169
New York Central
133
Illinois Central ..
148
Industrials.
American Tobacco
$435
United States Realty ..
81
United States Steel (common) ..
66
American Tel. & Tel.. . . . . ... .
141
Peoples Gas . .
.. .. .. .. ..
113
North American . . . . . .
83

Yield.

5.1
4.7
4.7
4.4
3.8

4.6

3.1

4.7

3.9
4.7
5.7%

5.6
3

5.2

5.3

4.5

ENGLISH STOCKS.

Price.
Railroads:
Caledonian ..
£89
London Central ..
70
Glasgow South West. . . . .
31
Great Eastern · .. . . . . . . . .
64
Great Northern . . . . . . . .
95
120
Great Wes tern . . . . . . . .
Highland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
114
136
London & North Western ... .
134
London & South Western ..
London, Brighton & South Coast .
110
Midland..
. ... . .
63¼
North Eastern . . . . . . . .
127¼
71
South Eastern . . . . . . . .
Taff Vale . . . . . . . . . . ..
80¼
154
Bengal & North Wes tern ..
112¼
Burmah R. R. . .
. ...
Public Utility Corporations:
City of London Electric Light .. .
10¾
124
South Metropolitan Gas . . . ...
Mining:
Rio Tinto (copper mine) ..
79¼
10
Rand Mines (gold)
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Yield.

3¼%

4¾

2¾
3¼

4¼

4¼
4
4¼
4¼
4¼
3¾
4¼
3¼

5¼

4¾
4

5¼

4¼
3¼
4¾

GERMAN STOCKS,

Railroads:
Bri:ilthal . . . . . . . . . . . . Marks
Crefelder . . . . . .
Frankf.-Giiterbahn
Ki:inigs berg-Cranz
Leignitz-Rawitsch
Lubeck-Biichen.. . .
Mecklenbg. Frd. . .
Niederlausitz.. . . . . . .
Salz. Eisenb. . . . . . . . .
Suddeutsch Eisenb. . . . .
Czakat-Agram Eisenb ...
Oest. Ung Sttsb ...
Orient Betr. . . . . . . . .
Tractions:
Aachen Local Strassb.
Breslauer Elect. Strassb.
Danzig Elect. Strassb. . .
Gr. Berliner Strassb. . . . .
Breweries:
Berliner Uni ons Brauerei
Buchner Erfurt Brau ...
Schwabenbrau . . . .
Steamships:
Hansa Dampschiff . .
D'tsch-Austral-Dpfsch ...

Price.
88.50
118.30
64.50
101.50
101.50
186.30
105
49
91.50
121.90
103.40
155.75
123

Yield.
4.5%
5.5
4.6
3.4
4.5
4.3
4.3
7.0
3.8
4.5
4.8
4.3
4.8

147.50
124.10
123
179.80

5.4
4.8
5.2
4.6

95
98
126

3.1
6)
6.3

132.50
122

4.5

5.7

FRENCH STOCK S.

Est (railroad) . . . . . . . . . . Franc s
Lyon-Mediterranee (railroad) . .
Midi (railroad) ..
Nord (railroad) .
Orleans ( railroad)
Ouest (railroad) ..
Est-Alger.ien (railroad) . .
Ouest-Algerien (railroad) . .
Voitures a Paris (cab) . . .
Cie. Gen. de Tram. (tractio n ) . .
Cie. Gen. Eaux (water) ..
Eaux de Vichy (water) ....
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Price.
900
1303
1153
1740
1355
934
700
661
210
180
1915
2112

Yield.
3.9%
4.2
4.3
4.1
4.2
4.1
4.2
4.5
4.7
4.1
4.4
3.7

FRENCH STOCKS.

Price.
Edison Electric (indust rial)
Petit Journal (newspaper) ..
Union Gai (gas) ..
Gaz Lebon (gas) . . . . . . . . . .
Gaz et Eaux (gas and water)
Gaz Beige (gas) . . . . . . . .
Courriers Charb. (colliery) . .
Epinas (r.olliery) . . . . . . . . . .

1425
375

840

1495

607
1018
2800

1620

Yield.
7
6

5.3
4

4.9
4.9
3.2
5.5

The General Situation.
The general situation continues satisfactory. In
mercantile lines good conditions are reported. In
the metals industries there is more activity than
at any time since 1906. Thursday's transactions
in copper reached about 15,000,000 pounds at a
price about ¾ cent below the highest price established this year. This shows a tendency to do business in volume on any slight concession in price.
Crop conditions continue to show decided improvement, and, barring very unfavorable climatic
conditions during the next two or three months,
we will get good crops all around.
Money conditions are rather puzzling. It is not
probable that the easy conditions which now exist
can continue long. T.here is a tightening of the
loan markets in some parts of the United States,
notably the Northwest and al so in London, but
funds continue in plentiful supply in New York. If
our expected activity in general business is to be
realized, I do not see how we can avoid some flurries here before long. Even a moderate tightening
of money now would adversely affect the stock
market to a moderate extent.

The Technical Situation.
The technical situation has not been greatly improved during the week. The sharp declines of
Monday and Tuesday eliminated many stop orders,
and the short interest grew considerably larger
temporarily. The short selling, however, was con-
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fined almost entirely to professionals and room
traders and was greatly reduced in the ensuing advance. Add to this the fact that considerable buying of a rather weak character has occurred on the
rally, and there is no reason to accept the theory
of a much improved technique.
·
It is found that when short selling occurs it concentrates on the high-priced issues. Union Pacific,
St. Paul, Northern Pacific, etc., -are sold short much
more freely than the lower-priced issues. This
assists the manipulators materially in making demonstrations. It is probable that another recession
to the low points reached on this movement would
do more to strengthen the technical situation than
did the initial break. The weak traders who have
followed up this recovery would get out and stay
out on another break, while the bears would be
greatly encouraged by the fact that the rally did not
hold, just as the bulls were encouraged by the
recovery. .
Do not consider the technical situation satisfac•
tory.

Conclusion.
It has been suggested several times since the
reaction started that rallies would undoubtedly occur and that they would be deceptive. We are
all peculiarly susceptible to tape appearances. I
have never known a man who could entirely overcome the tendency to let his mind run with the
market. We can sit down in cold blood and figure
that the most natural thing in the world will be a
rally or a reaction; but when our judgment is confirmed by market action we begin to scratch our
cocoanuts and wonder how it happened and what
it means. Because of this tendency, I am inclined
to be very careful about .changing a position adopted for some good reason, with no better ground
for reversal of opinion than the moving influence
of posted quotations. A change of position may be
apparently justified by a subsequent movement of
a point or two in the direction indicated; but if this
is all that occurs, the change is usually an unsatisfactory affair. If, for example, the trend is to con-
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tmue upward, with an indicated break of, say, two
pomts on the average, it is highly probable that
pointing out such a break would more frequently
result in disturbing people than in accomplishing
anything beneficial. Just at present this reasoning
1s applied to such rallies as occurred on Tuesday
and Wednesday of this week. With the situation
uncertain the plan of trying to catch a few points
profit on rallies is fraught with danger.
In my opinion it is safer to wait awhile before
starting another campaign on the lortg side. There
will probably be manipulation in high-priced rails,
accompanied by numerous canards and possibly
some actual developments of a favorable nature,
but a good many of _these high-priced rails are for
sale-I am satisfied about that. I am also satisfied
that our next great stock-market movement is to
be in the industrial securities, and the man who
turns his attention to this group will make the
greatest profit with the smallest risk. The industrials may drag a little for a time, because they are
comparatively neglected, but they will be the features before long.
In the event of marked declines in the general
list, would buy Amalgamated Copper, United States
Steel, American Locomotive, American Car & Foundry, Railway Steel Spring, Pressed Steel Car, AllisChalmers preferred, United States Realty, Republic
Iron & Steel, American Smelting & Refining, American Beet Sugar and National Lead. Many of the
industrial preferences are paying a higher income
rate than the high-priced dividend paying rails and
are better propositions than such stocks as Union
Pacific, St. Pa11l, etc. It is a mistake to think that
the industrial preferences cannot advance because of
the restriction to their rate of disbursement. There
is a big gap between the price of a railroad common
stock paying 7% and an industrial preferred stock
paying the same rate. As to the stability of dividends on the industrial preferences, we find that
most of them have been able to keep up their payments for many years, even in bad times. We find
a few exceptions, but as a rule this class of securities has a good record. We can run through the
list very quickly and establish this statement, thus:
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DIVIDENDS ON PREFERRED STOCKS OF INDUSTRIAL CORPORATIONS
SINCE 1900.

Stock.

1900.
American Agricultural Chemical .. 6%
American Beet Sugar . . . . . . . . 6
American Car & Foundry . . . . . .7
American Cotton Oil . . . . . . . . . 6
American Locomotive . . . . . . . ....
~ Amer)can Smelting . . .... ..... 7
o American Sugar . . . . . . . . . . . ·. 7
American Woolen . . . . . . . . . . . 7
International Steam Pump . . . . . .6
National Biscuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
National Enameling & Stamping .7
National Lead . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
Pressed Steel Car . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Railway Steel Spring . . . . . . . ....
Sloss-Sheffield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S¼
United States Steel . . . . . . . . . ....
Virginia-Carolina Chemical . . . . • 8

'01. '02.
6% 6%
6
6
7
7
6
6
l¾ 7
7
7
7
7
7
7
6
6
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

'03. '04.
6% 6%
6
6
7
7
6
6
7
7
7
7
7
7

8

8

7
6

'05. '06.
6% 6%
6
6
8¼ 7
6
6

7

7
7
7
7

6

6

7
7
7
7
6

7
7
7
7
5¼ 7
7
7
7
3½ 7
7

7
7
7
7
7
7
7

7
7
7
7
7
7
7

7
7
7
7
7
7
7

8

8

8

8

Present Present
'07. '08.
Price. Yield.
6% 6% 101
5.94%
6
6
95
6.32
7
7
116
6.00
6
6
105
5.71
7
7
116
5.98
7
7
110
6.36
7
7
120
5.83
7
7
104
6.73
6
6
87
6.86
7
7
125
5.60
7
7
89
7.86
7
7
107
6.55
7
7
103
6.80
7
7
103
6.80
7
115
7
6.09
7
7
124
5.64
8
123
8
6.50
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Chart Showing Market Movement for June, 1909.
(Thomas Gibson's Figures.)
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On a six per cent. income basis, a seven per cent.
stock would sell at about 115, and on a 5% income
basis at 140. There is no reason to believe that
these industrial preferences will not settle around
a 5% basis after their growing stability, large return and good dividend record is assimilated by investors.
As shown by the preceding table, many of these
securities have passed through the industrial depressions of 1903-4 and 1907-8 unscathed, and as we
are now in a period of reconstruction, it is highly
improbable that dividends will be menaced in any
quarter for years to come.
In recent daily letters I have spoken of the probability of a speculative campaign in Interboro-Metropolitan. Further investigations confirm this view.
Think the preferred may be bought for a good turn.
The contemplated movement., however, is of a
wholly speculative character,
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July 3, 1909.

In •recent letters I have referred to the industrial
securities as being in a better position both speculatively and intrinsically than the railroad stocks. This
view does not necessarily refer to immediate movements. In fact the day to day operations rather favor
the rails as · they are more attractive to traders on account of the comparatively wide swings in prices and
the short interest concentrates on these high-priced
securities, which gives them a temporary technical advantage. There is practically no short interest in the
lower priced industrial shares. The advances in this
group must therefore be based upon accumulation
rather than on shifting technical conditions.
Attention has frequently been called to the similarity
of conditions during 1903-4-5, and 1907-8-9. We might
naturally expect a divergence in a long continued parallel if the parallel were merely fortuitous; but in this
case, market action has simply responded to similar
conditions and there is as yet no change in the basic
factors. I produced charts not long ago showing that
market action in 1907-8 and up to date in 1909, was so
like the movements of 1903-4-5 that the charts could be
superimposed without showing any marked variations.
This was not caused, as many "chart players" believe,
by an inherent tendency of the market to repeat itself,
but was due solely to the fact that like conditions were
producing like results. There is every indication that
conditions during the latter part of 1909 will resemble
those of the latter part of 1905. We have now the easy
money, the promise of good crops and the excellent
business prospects which caused the rapid advance in
industrial securities in 1905, and unless something unforeseen occurs to disturb our plans, we may expect
some surprising advances in the industrials before the
end of the year.
I refer particularly to the industrials because it is
my opinion that railroad stocks have already advanced far enough to discount the improvement in
conditions affecting this class of securities. The reduction in expenses, due to a temporary shrinkage of
commodity values and the great advantage gained by
the increase in the efficiency of labor, have had their
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day so far as railroad earni'ngs are concerned; and
these improved conditions have been adequately discounted in the prices of railroad shares. There are
exceptions, of course, and some bargains may still be
found in the rails, but they are few and far between.
Prices for these securities have advanced to practically
former high records, and the advance has placed the
dividend payers on an income basis of about 4.½ %, It
is, of course, contended that many dividends will be
advanced and that segregations, combinations, and various other schemes will enhance the value of securities;
but there is a good deal that is purely imaginary about
these forthcoming emoluments. Advances in the rates
of disbursements may occur here antl there and advantages may be gained by the perfecting of some of
the plans now contemplated; but such changes are part
of the history of progress every year, and do not give
sufficient warrant to the widely held opinion that we
are entering a period of unusual and undisturbed prosperity for the railroad wrporations. The advantages
accruing to railroad companies because af declines
in prices of materials and labor, cannot endure. They
will, on the other hand, suffer reversals from these
same influences before long.
Commodities are already advancing rapidly, and the
upward trend of prices generally has been resumed.
The continued increase of gold production is bound
to force commodity prices steadily upward, and this
means that wages will also advance a little later on.
This will work against railroad net earnings as it always
has in the past. The combinations and segregations
referred to cannot offset the loss occasioned by the
increasing cast of producing transportation. The only
way the economic drawback can be overcome is by
advancing the selling price of transportation, and that
is a hard thing to do.
The producing industrial corporations do not suffer
from advances in cost of labor and material, for their
selling prices move upward with the general trend of
commodity prices.
Reverting to the parallel between 1905 and 1909, we
find that £rem July 1 to December 26, 1905, industrial
stocks advanced from 77.48 to 95.84 (Wall Street Journal's averages) while in the same period railroad stocks
advanced from 123.38 ta 133.17. In the last quarter of
the year, the impetus was much more pronounced in the
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industrial group. From October 2 to December 26,
1905, industrials advanced from 82.17 to 95.84, while
rails only gained a little over one point (131.99 to
133.17) . We will see something like this in the latter
half of 1909 unless something occurs to change the
complexion of business affairs.
• The question of the gold supply and its influence on
the different classes of securities has already been fully
discussed in these letters and in the published works
of several writers who have given close attention to
the matter. As is always the case when an important
economic subject is under discussion, a few writers
have arisen who are inclined to vigorously attack the
theories expounded by the thoughtful minority. These
writers, while they refute the views of older students
in emphatic or even intemperate terms, they offer no
explanations of their own for this steady advance in
commodity prices. We may exercise a great deal of
tolerance toward these non-conformists, however, when
we reflect that they are, with a few exceptions, very
young men and that, in their adolescence, they like to
take the combative attitude.
But whether the advancing prices of commodities
are due to our increasing gold supply or to some other
undiscovered cause, its effect on security prices and
values is the same. Commodity prices are advancing
and have been advancing for years, and no matter what
the basic reason for the tendency may be, its results are
impo·rtant. Mr. Byron W . Holt in his book "The Gold
Supply and Prosperity" says :
"This is the great problem that now confronts the
:financial world and demands solution of every investor. Not to solve it may mean great loss and
possible failure. To solve it means success and greatly
enhanced wealth for all who now have either a fair
share of the world's goods or who have credit and can
intelligently go in debt for a large amount."
Mr. Holt is right. The man who through carelessness or prejudice ignores this vital factor, is either
going to get into trouble or lose many of his opportunities.

The General Situation.
Nothing has developed during the week of sufficient
importance to materially change the general situation.
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A renewal of the outflow of gold has occurred, l!he
greater part of the shipments being headed for Holland, in settlement for American securities which they
have recently parted with. All of the $5,000,000 African gold arrivals in London was taken by the Bank
of England. Shipments of gold to Europe for the
first six months of the year total over $60,000,000,
which is unparalleled since 1905, when the shipments
for the same period were over $68,000,000. These
shipments and the call by the Treasury Department
for $25,000,000 of Government funds on deposit with
national banks practically cancel the obligations incurred during the money stringency. Another matter
for congratulation is the ease with which July 1st
dividend and interest disbursements were met. Very
little notice was taken of this phase of the money
market. The banks are also in a strong position with
reference to the new crop movement requirements.
Cro-p news continues very encouraging, although
there were some rumors of rust in the Northwest.
There is nothing unusual in this sort of talk. In
fact it would be more of a matter for comment if we
did not hear it. Its only effect was temporarily higher
prices in the Chicago wheat pit. The Secretary of the
Kansas Millers' Association estimates the wheat crop
of that State at 75 to 80 million bushels. Our own
expectations are that the combined winter and spring
wheat crop will approximate 655,000,000 bushels, corn
at least 3,000,000,000 bushels and oats nearly 1,000,000,000 bushels. Granger roads report favorable
weather and prospects of large yields, particularly of
corn. Harvesting is progressing rapidly in Texas,
Oklahoma and Kansas. The outlook for the cotton
crop is not so goo·d, but there is no reason to expect
less than 11,000,000 bales, and it may possibly reaoh
12,000,000 bales with a reversal of climatic conditions.
Activity among the New England and Southern textile mills is on a large scale, despite the advance in raw
materials. In the South, business in this branch of
industry has increased 40% over that of a year ago.
In New England, preparations are being made for
operations this fall on a full capacity basis, and improvements arc reported from that section- in other
lines of activity. There appears no lack of funds with
which to finance the expected large increase in production.
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Prices for copper metal show but little change from
last week, and although transactions are not large the
undertone is firm. London advices say that the recent
fall in copper metal prices in that market was due to
an over-extended bull account, and that the liquidation will prove beneficial. Our exports of copper during the month of May amounted to $8,710,000 vs.
$7,502,000 in May, 1908, and for 11 months $75,496,000
vs. $95,454,000 a year ago, and $84,376,000 two years
ago.
The iron and steel trade, under the influence of
generous orders for rails and the demand for finished
products, shows steady improvement accompanied by
advancing prices. Mills are now running at 80 to 90%
of their capacity as against 40 to 45% a year ago. The
inquiry by agricultural implement concerns for bars
and shapes is becoming more urgent and replacement
on an enormous scale of worn-out railway equipment
appears to be near at hand. Exports of steel and iron
during May, $12,993,000 vs. $11,281,000 in May, 1908,
and for 11 months, $131,200,000 vs. $172,304,000 a
year ago, and $164,304,000 two years ago. The protest against the open shop policy is confined to the
sheet tin-plate workers. The great majority of the
mill men have been weaned from union affiliations by
the profit-sharing opportunities extended to them.
The financial ability of the large industrial concerns
to handle an expansion in business is shown by the reports of 34 companies of an increase in cash on hand
of nearly 50% over the period of money stringency.
Railroad earnings continue to meet expectations both
in the gross and net as compared with last year. Work
on the tariff and other revenue measures is progressing
satisfactorily and at the moment is a negligible factor.
Taken as a whole, there is no fault to be found with
the general situation.

The Technical Situation.
The technical situation is not good. Stop loss orders were reduced considerably in the recent decline,
but are gradually growing larger. The short interest
is smalJer than at any time in the last three months.
There has been some selling of high-priced rails on
the ralJy. Union Pacific, Reading and S't. Paul are the
favorites with the bears, and the shortage is larger in
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these secunt1es than in the . stocks selling twenty or
thirty points lower. In the industrials the same conditions obtain. There is practically no short interest in
such stocks as American Locomotive, American Car
and Foundry or the other equipment securities. Amalgamated Copper and American Smelters have been
sold short to some extent because they are higher in
price than others in the group. There is a distinct tendency to choose high-priced stocks when selling short,
regardless of the real merit or value of securities.
This proclivity gives to the higher priced issues a technical advantage at present.

Conclusion.
Industrial stocks should be purchased on declines
or on a scale down. It is not good policy to follow up
advances even in the most promising securities. We
will get plenty of reactions during the next month or
two. Would not buy the high-priced rails even on reactions. The rails may go higher, but our greatest
opportunities are in the industrial group.
Amalgamated Copper, American Car and Foundry,
Pressed Steel Car, American Locomotive, Railway
Steel Spring, United States Realty, Smelters, United
States Steel, Republic Iron and Steel, and in fact, almost
any listed industrial can be bought confidently whenever
the market dips. Declines in these stocks will be largely
due to sympathy with the rails. If a rapid decline
occurs for any reason in the popular railroad stocks,
the industrial~ will, of course, follow the trend of the
leaders, but recovery will be very rapid, and such sympathetic declines should be considered and acted on
as opportu•nities to pick up stocks.
In speaking of the industrial stocks I do not include
the tractions. The urban' traction lines are in a bad way.
Increasing cost of material and labor is working
against them in a most decided manner. It is practically impossible to advance the price of urban transportation. The five-cent fare is proverbial.
There is a strong pool in the lnterboro stocks, but it
is of a highly speculative character, and while purchases
of this stock on breaks may show profits. the whole
affair is a gamble. So far as Third Avenue is concerned, the stock is selling at twenty dollars and I
cannot figure how it is worth twenty cents. I do
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not like to recommend short sales in a period of reconstruction and good tirr.es, but if there is a short
sale on the list it is Third Avenue.
A chart showing market improvements of stocks
for the month of June, appears in Vol. II.
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July 10, 1909.

The most interesting development of the week
was the appearance of the Government crop report.
The document was entirely satisfactory, but no better than expected. It was, in fact, disappointing to
many of the extremists, and the stock market gave
it a rather cold greeting.
There is considerable misunderstanding as to
what a condition report means. Condition figures
have absolutely no quantitative expression. Approximations of what a crop may be are made by
comparison with conditions on corresponding dates
in the past and the yields following these conditions.
In other words, an official condition report cannot
be stated in bushels. There is no fixed yield per
acre on any grain in any state. The whole process
of figuring a quantity is entirely outside of the official range. It is simply an arithmetical proceeding
in which an attempt is made to judge the future
from the past. How much of the past is employed
makes great differences, as will appear in the averages of five and ten years on corn which follow.
The corn crop of the United States is its most
important crop. As officially given, the acres in
corn for the crop of 1909 are 109,006,000. This area
is much in excess of the 101,788,000 last year, which
was the largest on record to that time. The condition of 89.3 suggests, on basis of July conditions
and resultant yields past five years, a crop of
3,165,563,000 bushels. If you take ten years as a
basis, the suggestion is for 2,953,114,000 bushels,
and, if you exclude the poor crop of 1901, the
suggestion on nine years' average is for a crop of
3,059,108,000 bushels. Any average is a compromise of extremes and in estimating crops an extreme may be an index better than an averagenew extremes are possibilities. In any event there
can be, and undoubtedly will be, honest differences
of Opinion in expectations as high as 3,200,000,000
bushels, or as low as 2,900,000,000 bushels.
What the report suggests on the basis of July
conditions, in each year of the past ten years, is
given herewith. The reader will understand the fig219

ures are approximations based on the only possible procedure and that the figures of 1901 are
explained by that year's crop failure.
The probable corn crr>p of 1909 on basis of
1908 is
3,079,855,000 bu.
1907 "
3 143 188 000 "
1906 "
3'.370'.902'.ooo "
1905 "
3,212,407,000 "
1904 "
3 019 466 000 "
1903 "
3:12s:202:ooo "
1902 "
2,981,314,000 "
1901 "
1,999,170,000 "
1900 "
2,752,401,000 "
1899 "
2,847,237,000 "
On the official estimates of population the crop
of 1904, five years ago, was 30.3 bushels per capita;
in 1908, 30.7 bushels, and, if we get 3,000,000,000
bushels in 1909, it will be 34 bushels per capita and
far ahead of any production in the past. The crop,
however, is by no means assured. There is no
certainty until maturity and that means in October.
The report on wheat was generally expected,
albeit it routed the low estimates that have been
on parade from traveling experts. It is usual for
some loss to occur on winter wheat from June to
July. This year a gain is presented and the crop
suggestion is better than a mo nth ago. Condition
of 82.4 is indicative of a production of 409,703,700
bushels, which is 14.7 bushels average per acre.
It was to be expecte.d that the condition of spring
wheat would be lowered. Not because of any complaint particularly. but it appears to be the rule.
The condition of 92.7 was a loss of 2.5 points since
a month ago and less than the average loss. The
suggested crop of spring wheat is 254,347,530 bushels.
Total for all wheat is 664,051,230 buEhels. Our
needs for our growing population are increasing
12,000,000 bushels a year. To that extent our exportable surplus is impaired.
The indicated oat crop, on the condition of 88.3,
is 965,975,600 bushels. The crops of oats have been
small for the past two years, being put 807,156,000
bu sh els in 1908 and 754,443,000 in 1907.
.
The treatment of the barley and rye crops suggests full crops of both.
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One other feature of the report was mention of
the amount of old wheat in farmers' hands of 2.3
per cent. of last year's crop, or 15,062,000 bushels,
against 33,797,000 bushels a year ago. There are
many to question so much in first hands with all
the late price inducements to bring it out.
The summary is that we will have but a fair crop
of wheat; a good crop of corn, contingent on no
mishaps, and average crops of oats, barley, rye
and hay.
In looking over our crop prospects it is well to
take into consideration the fact that crops should
increase as population increases, and to observe
whether or not this ratio of increase is maintained.
What may be considered bumper crops by comparison with the preceding year may look very different
when we go back a few years and allow for the
natural ratio of increase. In examining this phase
of the question I prepared a tab le covering the
gradual advance in production, and as it is an interesting exhibit it is produced herewith.
By looking over this table and considering the
rate of increase referred to, there is not much to
indicate extraordinary crops, even if they come up
to present expectations. Corn is a record breaker,
but cotton, which is our great export crop, is disappointing. There is no evidence in our figures
of a crop disaster. We bid fair to secure fair
crops, for which, let us be duly thankful; but, on
the other hand, there is nothing in tl.e way of
"bumper crops" to get excited about.
One of the most important factors bearing on the
future of stock prices is the question of our money
rates. In order to verify my own expressed opinion
on this subject I have asked Mr. David Oc;hs, who
makes a closer study of this question than any man
I know, to give me his opinion. Mr. Ochs replies
as follows:
"You submit the question as to the prospect of
money moving from here both West and to foreign
countries at the same time, and of possible higher
money rates here in consequence.
"An answer is difficult, because it would have to
presuppose a hypothetical concurrence of events,
each of which in turn is dependent on some other
financial or economical developments.
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UNITED STATES PRODUCTION OF WHEAT, CORN, OATS, HAY AND COTTON BY YEARS FROM
1880 TO 1909.
Wheat.
Corn.
Cotton.
Oats.
Hay.
Bushels.
Bushels.
*Bales.
Bushels.
Tons-2,000 lbs.
3,163,000,000
664,000,000
966,000,000
11,500,000
65,000,000
1909 (est.)
2,668,65 I ,000
664,602,000
807,156,000
1-3,587,000
1908
70,798,000
2,592,320,000
634,087,000
754,443,000
63,677,000
11,375,461
1907
z,927,416,091
735,260,970
964,904,522
13,595,498
1906
57,145,959
2,707,993,540
953,216,197
10,804,556
692,979,489
60,531,611
1905
2,467,480,934
60,696,028
894,595,552
552,399,517
13,679,954
1904 ····· ·· ·· ······ ·
2,244,176,925
784,094, l 99
10,045,615
637,821,835
61,305,940
1903
2,523,648,312
987,842,712
10,827,168
670,063,008
1902
59,857,576
1,522,519,891
736,8o8,724
748,460,218
9,675,771
50,590,877
1901
809,125,g89
2,105,102,516
50,110,906
10,266,527
522,229,505
1900
796,177,713
2,078,143,933
56,655,756
9,459,935
1899 ·· ···· ····· ····· 547,303,846
730,906,643
1,924,184,660
66,376,920
I 1,534,303
675,148,705
1898
698,767,809
60,664,876
I I,29J,7I8
1,902,967,933
1897 ················ 530,149,168
2,283,875,165
707,346,404
59,282,158
8,739,642
427,684,346
1896
2,151,138,580
7,142,Ji2
824,443,537
47,078,541
467,102,947
1895
662,036,928
1,212,770,052
10,025,534
54,874,408
1894 · · ··· · · ·· ······· 460,267,416
638,854,850
1,619,496,131
65,766,158
7,486,639
1893 ··············· · 396,131,725
66 t ,OJ 5,000
1,628,464,000
6,658,313
515,949,000
59,823,735
1892
2,060,
I
54,000
738,394,000
60,817,771
8,940,867
611,780,000
1891
523,621,000
8,562,089
I ,489,970,0DO
399,262,000
60,197,589
18io
2,112,892,000
66,829,612
751,515,000
7,472,5II
490,560,000
18 9
701,735,000
415,868,000
1,987,790,000
6,923,775
46,643,094
1888
6,884,667
1,456,161,000
659,618,000
456,329,000
41,454,458
1887
624, I 34,000
6,314,561
1,665,441,000
41,796,499
1886 ················ 457,218,000
629,409,000
I ,936, I 76,000
6,369,341
44,731,550
1885 . , ... , . , . , ...... . 357,112,000
583,628,000
5,491,288
48,470,460
512,765,000
1,795,528,432
1884
571,302,400
5,521,963
421,086,160
1,551,066,895
46,864,009
1883
1,617,025,100
488,250,610
6,833,442
38,138,049
504,185,470
1882
416,481,000
1,194,916,000
5,1J_6,447
35,135,064
383,280,090
1881
417,885,380
31,925,233
6,356,998
498,549,868
1,717,434,543
1880

..........
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··· ·············..
..............
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················
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················
········· ·······
················
······ ···· ······
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* Equivalent 500-pottnd bales gross weight.

"It may be stated, however, at once, that it is
quite possible and even not unlikely that gold will
continue to go abroad, even after money rates
shall have gone higher here, either from gold export or currency shipments to the West, or both.
"Interest rates here, although low, are nevertheless higher than in Europe and have been so for
months, yet gold has been exported. Ninety-day
loans here are at present about 2½%, or double
the interest rate for 90 days' acceptances in London
and Paris, where these now are in the neighborhood of 1¼%,
"This shows that capital is not overabundant
here, although there is a superfluity, or inflation,
of our note currency. If capital were here in excess of demand, there would have been no necessity to float so-called finance bills on Europe,
which are estimated to amount to about 100 million
dollars. Moreover, an indefinite, but probably larger
amount is being borrowed abroad on stocks and
bonds by or through our bankers, and attempts
are being made by these continuously to se!l there
some of the stocks carried there and some of our
other large stock and bond issues.
"Currency It the same time has been for a year
in excess of supply, so much so that gold export
of over 60 million dollars in the first half of this
year has not noticeably affected interest rates here.
A point has, however, been reached when either
continued gold export or the shipment of currency
to the interior may each alone suffice to cause a
rise in interest rates here.
"It must not be left out of consideration, either,
that the government's treasury cannot be leaned
upon for assistance in harvest time, as in the past,
but that it is more than likely to have to draw on
the banks either by call for return of the remnant of
deposits or for proceeds of bonds which the government may sell. Such proceeds would have to
come from the banks, whether the government
sells the bonds to them or to the public.
"The national banks have not been able for a
year t0 keep in circulation the amount of bank notes
issued. The banks have thus to carry an unusual
amount of such notes as assets, not earning interest, or have difficulty to avoid this condition. They
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will not want to issue more of them under these
circumstances, and in any case it would not increase bank reserves on which to grant loans.
"In view of our large floating debt to Europe,
which as yet is still increasing, it is quite possible that gold exports will continue until just
before the height of our produce export season
and will be resumed right afterward, say in November or December, and continue into next year. Of
course, a great deal will depend not only on our
having a large surp lus of grains and cotton, but
that it will be coincident with a good demand from
abroad to pay for our debit balance.
"In any event, however, a large crop would require much money to be drawn from here by the
West and South. We have had several times the
experience that under our faulty financial system money may very suddenly change from extreme
ease to abnormally high rates, and also that bankers in the interior who had boasted of having all
the cash needed for moving the crops would then
be the most urgent drawers of cash from the East,
which this time has sent much of the western
money remitted here in past months to foreign parts
in the shape of gold.
•
"It would be prudent, therefore, to consider the
probability of higher interest rates in no distant
future, even by next month. Security values, based
on income compared with present low money rates,
would undoubtedly adjust themselves to eventually
higher rates in money markets. But this would
be economically a less unfavorable consequence
than if inactivity in our commerce and industries
would keep money rates low, and if in consequence
our commodities and products would be kept above
the range of the markets of the world."
In his conclusion Mr. Ochs is rather no11committal, but the statement, "Security values, based
on income," etc., plainly means that security values
would decline as inte rest rates advanced.

The General Situation.
The general situation as a whole presents but
little change from last week. Money rates are
easy in spite of the continued outflow of gold and
224

,

the interior demand for currency with which to
move the crops. In this connection it is of interest
to note the National City Bank's circular, which
shows a falling off in circulation of $8,000,000, as
compared with June 30, 1908, notwithstanding an
increase in bond-secured circulation of $27,000,000.
Bank clearings in the United States for June
show an increase of 45% over June, 1908, and for
six months an increase of 30% over the same period
in 1908. The figures for New York City show increases of 61 % and 40% respectively.
Some important railroad financing has been ac- .
complished during the week, notably the $50,000,000
bond issue of the Missouri Pacific and the flotation
in Europe of $10,000,000 Frisco bonr'..s.
The tariff bill as passed by the Senate is about
in line with expectations.
·
·
Railroad earnings are good and in some instances
extremely good, but some of the recent reports
indicate that an increase in the proportion of expenses to gross earnings may be expected from
now on. Some of them are beginning to show the
effects of trimming in the maintenance in the recent
past. Freight movement on western roads is increasing steadily and there is a pronounced decrease in the number of idle cars reported.
Crop prospects are satisfactory, although some
complaints of excessive moisture in the harvest
fields come from the Southwest.
The cotton mills industry is in a flourishing condition, with factories running on full time, and
orders booked for months ahead. The demand for
dry goods is excellent notwithstanding some additional advance in prices to meet the increased
cost of raw material s. The woolen miJls ,;1re keeping pace with the cotton -trade.
Business in iron and steel is booming if the big gain
in pig iron producti o n. which closely approximates
the record year of 1907, can be taken as an indication.
The figures for June are 1,929.884 tons vs. 1,883,330
in May. For six months 11,000,000 tons, an increase
of 59% over the first half of 1908 and a decrease
of 18% from the first half of 1907. The big increase, however, is confined to the furnaces connected with the steel mills, and probably reflects
the activity of the railroads in replacing equip-
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ment. The production of the merchant furnaces
shows a drop of lOo/o in June as compared with
May. The United States Steel Corporation reports
87o/o of furnace capacity in operation against 82o/o a
week ago, and orders being booked at the rate
of 40,000 tons daily. Cast-iron pipe interests are in
the market for fair-sized quantities. Finished steel
products are in good demand and the usual summer
dullness in that branch is absent, due particularly
to the upset prices. Orders for railroad equipment
continue to come in. The Harriman lines have
given orders for 5,200 new cars, amounting to
$5,200,000. The Pennsylvania Railroad is reported
to have placed an order for $500,000 worth of third
rails for use in the company's New York subways
and tunnels, and has ordered into immediate ser. vice 400 engines which have been idle for many
months. The strike of the tin plate workers has
not spread to any appreciable extent, but there is
some danger that the quarrel may be taken up by
the United Mine Workers.
The usual signs · of unrest in labor circles during
a period of restoration of the business and financial
structure are not wanting. A great deal of this
discontent is due to the oft-times exaggerated published reports of rapidly improving conditions. Later
this factor may become a menace, but at the moment deserves but small consideration. One of the
largest lamp chimney manufacturers in the United
States has announced a complete restoration of its
wage scale, amounting to 25 o/o .
The demand for copper metal appears to be slowly
overtaking the output, and although transactions
are small, there is a slightly better inquiry and producers seem to be in a position to hold present levels.
Exports during June were 74,813,760 pounds, as
against the previous high record of 84,414,400 pounds
in December, 1907, and compares with 70,387,520
pounds in the previous month and 67,197,760 a year
ago. There is a consequent increase for the month
of 22,534,000 pounds in the European visible, which
now totals 149,900,800 pounds. There is nothing
alarming in the last group of figures for the reason
that stocks of copper are likely to dwindle with
great rapidity under the influence of any expansion
in trade. The increase in production in this coun226

try is not at all commensurate with the increase in
exports. The Lake Superior output during June
was 20,566,300 pounds vs. 19,917,500 in May; six
months, 115,909,100 pounds; same six months in
1908, 112,494,334 pounds. The leading manufacturers report orders for June greater in amount
than for any month since the recent panic and 25o/o
over the month of May.

The Technical Situation.
There has been considerable shifting of stocks
from strong to weak hands during the week. While
the so-called public has not appeared in force, there
has been a steady demand for stocks f.r,om various
sources. I cannot state that the buying was what
is designated as "bad," but it cannot be considered
so good as the selling. I am rather inclined when
seeking for the source of this absorptive power
to reflect on Walter Bagehot's statement that, "At
particular times a great many stupid people have
a great deal of stupid money." In my opinion, it
is only a plethora of available funds which could
incite purchases of certain widely touted stocks at
present. We are safe in the assumption that if we
find stocks passing constantly from strong hands
they are passing to weak hands, or at least to
weaker hands.
~
There is also considerable buying by the semiprofessional Wall Street element. The introduction
of numerous stop-loss orders two or three points
under the market is sufficient evidence of the activity · of this class.
The short interest is small. This is not demonstrated in the loan crowd just now, but appearances
in the loan crowd are very deceptive when shrewd
speculators want to make them so. One of the
oldest tricks in the trade is for a prominent operator when he wishes to dispose of stocks, to sell
"short" and borrow the certificates for delivery instead of delivering his own holdings. The stocks
do not appear in his own name as a seller, and the
floating supply is reduced. As an illustration of
this, I remember that late in 1907, when Atchison
was selling around 70, a flood of certificates were
delivered in the name of a man who knew a lot
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about Atchison. This natm:ally created the impression that he was selling his holdings, but I
happened to know that he had sold that stock
"short" twenty points higher and was buying heavily
at the time the original certificates were delivered.
I would not occupy space by relating this incident if
it were not pertinent just at present.
With stocks moving gradually out of the hands
of the powers that be into general channels, with
the market full of stop orders and with no short
interest of importance, we may confiden~ly call the
technical situation weak.

Conclusion.
In calling attention in the first part of this
letter to certain factors which are not so favora'6le
as the extremists would have us believe, I have
no intention of howling calamity. I merely wish
to check so far as possible the undue enthusiasm
which is certain to appear at or near the top of a
movement. Conditions are satisfactory enough and
the general business situation is very promising, but
prices of many stocks have reached a level as high
as is warranted by either present or prospective
conditions. Railroad stocks have made almost a
full recovery from the crash of 1907 and they have
done this with only slight reactions. The rise has
been almost perpendicular. This group of stocks
has, in my opinion, fully discounted everything
favorable. The high-priced stocks are for sale, and,
while it may be found expedient to whoop things
up for a few points here and there in order to
arouse interest, I do not think there is much prospect of a material advance in this group and there
is a possibility of a considerable decline. We cannot
afford to take the long side of the market in order
to snatch a possible two or three-point profit,
while we face the danger of a fifteen or twentypoint decline.
The industrials are in a more promising position.
On sympathetic declines they should be purchased,
but even in this group it is well to move cautiously.
The safest way is to scale down such stocks as
Amalgamated Copper, American Car & Foundry,
Pressed Steel Car, Railway Steel Spring, United
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States Realty, Republic Iron & Steel, Smelters and
United States Steel. The industrial preferred stocks
can be purchased on quick declines with the greatest
confidence. This class of securities has the merit
of attractive investment return, stability t>f dividends and good speculative possibilities.
When it becomes necessary for an advisor to suggest to clients that they sell out their holdings and
do nothing in the market there is always some
dissatisfaction on the part of nervous people who
want to trade every day. This is quite natural,
and I attempt to receive the criticisms which emanate from those who want positive rather than
negative advice in all good nature; I consider it
as much my business to keep people out of the
market when there is danger as to get them in when
the time is ripe. I do not propose to be moved
from a position adopted for good reasons. A personal remark of this kind is not necessary so far as
old subscribers are concerned, as they understand
and appre.ciate the methods employed, but some
of the new ones appear to think I should tell them
to buy something whether or no .
. Continue to recommend a neutral attitude for the
present, confining purchases to indu&trial securities
on sharp declines only,
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July 17, 1909,

The buying of industrial stocks during the week
has been very good. This was not shown in the ·
course of quotations, as the group made new low
records for the month of July on Tuesday and Wednesday, while rails held comparatively strong. It
was discovered, however, that while the railroad
stocks were bolstered up by some rather obvious
manipulation and were for sale on all hard spots,
the industrials were being accumulated in an unostentatious way by very good interests. There was
even some manipulation for the purpose of depressing certain industrial stocks in order to facilitate
accumulation. This was particularly noticeable in
Amalgamated. The simple and natural way to depress. the copper stocks, is to juggle the metal and
circulate gruesome stories of overproduction, etc. It
may be stated definitely that on the recent decline
in copper metal, quotations have been lower than
the actual selling price. With quotations at 12¼
on the Metal Exchange this week, copper has been
selling readily at 13¼,
I have frequently referred to the equities of the
Amalgamated Corporation outside of its copper
mines. It is unfortunately the case that the corporation gives us a very meagre annual report-little
more than a balance sheet-but careful research
brings out the fact that they own much valuable
property. The Amalgamated Corporation owns outright, the stock of the Big Blackfoot Milling Company, which controls over 1,000,000 acres of timber
land, estimated to contain about 4,000,000,000 feet
of standing timber, and sawmills with an annual
output of 85,000,000 feet. They also own directly
the Diamondville Coal & Coke Company, which in
turn owns about 73,000,000 tons of unmined coal
with an annual output of about 600,000 tons. The
Washoe Copper Company, owned by the Amalgamated, controls about 1,900 acres of Bear Creek Coal
lands near Red L odge, Montana, and several important coking plants. In a conversation with an
engineer who made a private examination of the
outside properti es of the Amalgamated Corporation
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about eighteen months ago, he estimated the value
of such property at close to $100,000,000.
We are hearing a great deal just now about the
increases in dividends which are going to take place
in the railroad group, and but very little about
larger distributions in industrials. The fact is, however, that we cannot hope for much in the way of
increased dividends on rails, and such increases as
are probable have been widely advertised and pretty
well discounted in stock prices. About the only
industrial which has had an increased distribution
heralded, is Steel common, and this stock has come
nearer to discounting the probable increase in dividend than any other industrial on the list. A great
many other stocks in this group are almost certain
to make good showings before the end of the year,
and it is a good plan to buy them before they are
talked into the clouds. In the railroad stocks we
are able to learn fro.m monthly figures just what is
going on, and the great improvement is a known
factor. In most cases the present business of the
industrial corporations is a sealed book, except to
those who have unusual facilities or who take unusual pains to find out what is being accomplished.
Next week I will try to offer a compilation showing
about what the relative position of the different industrials now is. This is a rather difficult thing to
do and involves some guesswork, but I will get the
best information obtainable.
There is a general idea that stock prices may be
expected to drift in a narrow range during the summer months. There is, however, nothing in history
to confirm this view. In examining the movements
of prices not long ago, I noted some interesting
peculiarities about certain months. For example,
there has been only one instance in twelve years
when stock prices did not advance in August. The
exception was in 1907. September showed almost a
reversal of this trend; only two advances occurring
in that month in the twelve years consulted.
I mention this more because it is interesting than
with the idea that it bears any great significance.
We may, of course, figure that the semi-annual disbursements are again appearing in the market in
the latter part of July and during the month of
August, and that this helps the upward trend, and
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that money rates operate against the market in September, which is a crop-moving m9nth. We might
also add to this analysis that when money is seeking investment it is usually encouraged by manipulative upbidding of prices. This analytical reasoning,
however, is dangerous when based only on precedent, for each year has its own particular environments and we can do better by consulting the present surroundings and conditions, than by depending
on parallels which may be only fortuitous. An exhibit like this brings joy to the heart of the "chartplayer," but it has its dangers. For example, if one
of the disciples of mechanical speculation had, in
1907, stumbled on that fact that for ten years past
there had been no decline in the month of August,
he would have been quite enthusiastic about it, and
he would have been beautifully dumped in following
his precedent in 1907.
The figures referred to are given below:
TABLE SHOWING MOVEMENTS OF STOCK PRICES IN JULY,
AUGUST, S°EPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, 1897 TO 1908, INCLUSIVE.
"WALL STREET JOURNAL'S" AVERAGE PRICES
FOR 20 RAILROAD STOCKS. FIGURES GIVEN ARE AVERAGE
PRICES AT THE OPENING AND CLOSING OF EACH MONTH.
THUS AVERAGE PRICE ON JULY 1, 1897, WAS 55.04 AND
ON JULY 31, 58.05,

1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905

.
.
.
.
.

July.
Opening 55.04
Closing. 58.05
Opening 65.47
Closing. 65.98
Opening 83.53
Closing. 84.83
Opening 75.28
Closing. 76.95
Opening 115.35
Closing. 107.76
Opening 120.67
Closing. 125.85
Opening 104.01
Closing. 96.48
Opening 97.53
Closing. 100.52
Opening 123.38
Closing . 126.28
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Aug.
58.44
63.81
66.00
68.59
84.52
84.93
76.33
77.13
107.74
111.00
125.78
127.23
96.37
98.05
101.20
1{)5.22
125.63
129.57 '

Sept.
63.91
62.30
68.59
66.20
84.73
80.93
77.03
75.35
111.54
108.21
127.96
124.78
97.46
89.75
105.31
108.78
128.41
131.86

Oct.
62.70
60.84
65.95
66.74
79.84
83.38
76.00
79.55
108.18
110.79
124.61
121.68
91.45
92.81
109.11
11:3.36
131.99
132.33

Oct.
Sept.
Aug.
July.
Opening 121.76
136.10 136.86
130.45
131.37
Closing. 129.11
135.20 135.92
1907
98.73
Opening 105.72
99.44
104.86
84.02
Closing. 105.26
97.83
98.35
1908
105.91
Opening 99.92
109.13
106.90
109.57
Closing. 106.76 109.10
105.95
In twelve years there have been 9 advances and
3 declines in the month of July; 11 advances and 1
decline in the month of August; 2 advances and 10
declines in the month of September, and 8 _advances
and 4 declines in the month of October.
1906

The General Situation.
Reports affecting the general situation are monotonously cheerful. Those from the iron and steel
tra·d e are particularly optimistic. Some of the larger
independent companies have advanced prices on a
number of steel products $1 per ton, and eastern
merchant iron pipe manufacturers will probably
follow the recent advance by western makers of $2
per ton. The Steel Corporation is refusing to make
contracts beyond October 1, and there is said to be
a virtual famine in billets in the East. It is estimated that the United States Steel Corporation in
the current year will bring down from the Great
Lakes district 24,000,000 tons of iron ore.
The demand for pig iron is more general. A
number of furnaces in the South and in Pittsburg
and Buffalo districts are being made ready to blow
in at some time within the next few weeks. A
great deal of the activity in the iron and steel trade
is undoubtedly due to the orders being given by
the railroads to the equipment companies for steel
cars and locomotives. According to Judge Gary
the constantly increasing production is not keeping
pace with the demand for immediate consumption.
The only cloud upon the prospects of the big iron
and steel companies is the continuation of the tin
plate strike, and a resumption of the hostilities in
the Great Lakes district. These, however, are not
serious. Serious rioting is reported at the Pressed
Steel Car Company's works near Pittsburg.
The threatened strike against the- Pittsburg Coal
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Company has been forbidden by the president of
the Mine Workers of America. The International
Harvester Company is preparing to inaugurate a
profit-sharing plan similar to that in operation by
the United States Steel Corporation.
The future of the copper metal market is bright
in spite of what appears to be a manipulative reduction in prices, which has resulted in a better
inquiry. Producers are confidently expecting a
re-entrance of consumers in the market within the
next few weeks. The surplus stocks of lead accumulated during dull times have about reached the
vanishing point.
Reports from the New England manufacturing
centers show an unprecedented access of factory
building which extends to all lines of industry.
This is also true · in a slightly lesser degree in the
South. Building permits in the United States for
the past six months aggregate 67% greater than
for the same period in .908.
Business in the textiles is booming. Dealers
in woolen goods have done as much business since
April 1 as they would normal!y do in six months.
The hide and leather market is on the upgrade,
and lumber is only waiting for the settlement of the
tariff question.
Crop prospects are practically unchanged, although some damage has been done by storms in
the winter wheat belt, and dry weather is needed
in some districts to facilitate the harvest. The big
advance in the Chicago wheat pit was due to acutely
congested technical conditions accentuated by the
slow · movement of rrew wheat and thus has little
significance as regards security values.
Railroad earnings and movement of freight are
satisfactorily large.
More gold went to the Argentine this week, and
additional engagements to that point are reported
for next week in spite of the drop in foreign exchange. So far this year we have shipped $30,400,000 to South America, or within $600,000 of the
whole amount previously shipped there during the
past ten years. Europe is in a position to ask us
to liquidate some of her debits on this side because
of our small exports of staples during the past year.
We may be called upon to send gold to Capada to
2.14

take care of their crop of wheat which, it is now
thought, will yield 12% greater than a year ago.
Our shipments of gold to Canada last year aggregated $17,500,000. The movement of currency to
the interior for crop-moving purposes began last
year on September 5 and ended on October 10, the
drain being $8,285,000. In 1907 $47,516,000 was sent
out between August 3 and December 28. The outflow this year will likely begin early and the prospects for a bumper corn crop in addition to a good
yield of wheat indicates a heavy drain on this
center, especially if the present high prices for
cereals are maintained.

The Technical Situation.
There is little change in the technical situation
this week. There are a great many stop-loss orders
under the high-priced rails which would make them
quite vulnerable if any concerted drive should be
made at prices. The bears, however, are without a
leader and appear to be very timid They have
been pretty badly whipped in the last year and are
quick to retire on any sign of strength.
The short interest in the general list is small.
We cannot expect much assistance from this factor
at present.
The industrials are in a stronger technical position than the rails. There is not much shortage
in the group, but tlie long interest is of a good
character and the market is not menaced by stoploss orders.
Taken altogether, the technical situation cannot
be called strong.

Conclusion.
There is nothing to add to the advice given in
recent daily letters to buy industrials on all reactions or on a scale-down. The character of the
accumulation in this group leads me to believe that
even if a quick setback of considerable proportions
should occur in railroad stocks, indu:;trials wilt
meet enough buying to prevent any severe decline.
There is also a chance that rails may receive some
impetus from an upward movement in industrials.
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_This may appear somewhat like the tail wagging
the Jog, but the fact remains that a sharp upward
movement in even one industrial, imparts some
sympathetic strength to the entire list. United
States Steel has been particularly powerful in this
way.
In my opinion, purchases of Amalgamated Copper, Smelters, American Locomotive, American Car
& Foundry, Pressed Steel Car, Railway Steel Spring
and United States Realty on breaks of a point or
two, are perfectly safe. It is a conservative plan
to be prepared to increase lines in case reactions go
further than anticipated. There is no question at
all in my mind that, regardless of immediate fluctuations, all these industrials are going to reach
materially higher prices before long. They will be
advancing when rails are comparatively dormant.
We have, so far as I can see, an excellent and
profitable campaign before us in the industrial
stocks, and a little vigilance, patience and discrimination will result in large returns.
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July 24, 1909.
The market has been rather featureless this week.
Several incipient booms have petered out without
attracting much attention. Numerous tips have
been circulated, covering practically everything on
the railroad list and manipulation has been present
to a moderate extent. The return of J. P. Morgan
was the event of the week and his approach was
heralded as a reason for a big bull movement. Mr.
Morgan was interviewed before he had set foot on
dry land. After mature deliberation he stated that
the reason Steel common had advanced was because
there were more buyers than sellers-a remark
which aroused great enthusiasm among the bulls.
The most remarkable phase of the present market
is the manner in which bear news is ignored. The
three ,most important factors bearing on stock prices
at present are money, crops and the tariff. Any
unfavorable developments in one of these quarters
would, under ordinary market conditions, cause
much apprehension, but during the last week unfavorable news affecting all three factors has been
dismissed without any attention. The continued
and extraordinary gold exports; the hitch in the
tariff bill and a cutting down of estimates on wheat
production have all been pushed aside as unworthy
of attention. The market does not follow natural
lines, but it is quite evident that it is being handled
by people who thoroughly understand their business and the temperament of the speculative public.
Whenever attention is attracted to any form of bad
news the powers that be respond by shoving stocks
up a p.o int or two. This, so far as the public is concerned, is a forcible and satisfactory reply. They
are perfectly willing to accept the evidences of the
tape instead of the warnings of conservative observers. Statements that railroad stocks have been
rising without interruption for almost two years,
th.at prices are as high as conditions or income
return warrant and that manipulation at present can
·have but one object, i. e., the distribution of stocks
bought at much lower prices, all fall on deaf ears
so long as the pot is kept boiling by means of extravagant stories and advancing quotations.
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We have at present two stock markets. Each has
its own peculiar technical situation, its own foundation, its own manipulative tactics and its own prospects. I refer, of course, to the railroad stocks as
compared with the industrials.
The technical situation is infinitely better in the
industrials than in the rails, as will be explained in ,
another part of this letter. The foundation on
which the industrials rest is sounder because this
group of stocks has not discounted business conditions and has not been inflated by promises of all
kinds of dividends and distribution. Only a few of
the promises of this character anent railroad securities will be performed. There is; on the other hand,
every reason to believe that some of the industrial
corporations will be able to conservatively increase
or institute dividends before long. The coming increase on Steel common has, however, been talked
to death and has been well discounted in the price
of the shares. American Locomotive, American
Car & Foundry, Amalgamated Copper and several
other industrials will be able to go on a dividend
basis of 5% or more before long. This is demonstrated by their present statistical standing and
their future business prospects. But all these advances will be heralded before they appear and
about the time expectations become actualities, the
stock prices wil! be at or near the top. That is
why it is advisable to buy these securities now instead of waiting until the speculative equation is
absent. Speculation cannot be successfully conducted on known facts. We know all about the
rails-all that is true and a good deal tl.at is not
true.
I have frequently referred to the popular fallacy
that the market moves as a unit and that if rails
advance industrials will advance, and vice versa. It
is true that in the long swing of prices as they are
broadly affected by good or bad conditions, the
general level rises and falls. There are numerous
instances, however, where the two groups have, for
a period, been at cross purpo"ses, or where one group
has ·advanced or declined, while the other was dormant. In the last three months of 1905, which corresponds more exactly in all ways with 1909 than
any year in history, we find rails almost lifeless,
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while industrials made a great advance. There are
other peculiarities in the movements of the two
groups which are best illustrated by the series of
charts accompanying this letter which appear in
Vol. II.
It will be observed in these charts that in the
decline of 1903, during the first six months of the
year rails declined from about 122 to about 99 (23
points); while industrials fell from about 66 to about
57 (9 points). In the advance of 1904-05 rails advanced in March, 1904, to 132 in August, 1905 (40
points), while industrials advanced in the same
period from 47 to 82 (35 points). The advance in
this period was about equalized when considered in
percentages, but the growing stability and importance of industrials had not .been discounted,
while rails had reached their pinnacle. From
August, 1905, to the end of the year rai,ls simply
worked in a trading range, while industrials advanced from 82 to 96 (14 points). A 14-point average advance in a group of stocks means a bull
market.
In the first three months of the year 1907 rails
dropped from 107 to 79 (28 points); while industrials
dropped from 88 to 69 (19 points). This drop was
more homogeneous than was the case in 1903, but
was due largely to the fact that some ridiculous
figures had been established for certain industrials
late in 1906, for example, 174 for Smelters, and the
pricking of the bubbles brought down the average
very rapidly.
Since the low point of November, 1907, rails have
advanced from 66 to 108 (42 points), while industrials have advanced from 47 to 81 (34 points). It
is my opinion that the same conditions which pro, duced the marked advance in industrials late in 1905
are now present and that the same sort of movement will be experienced. These conditions have
already been fully discussed in former letters and
require no further treatment at my hands. In 1907
I insisted from the first that the year was going
to be a repetition of 1903; similarly in 1908 I drew
the comparison with 1904 and have so far stuck to
the tentative theory that 1909 would resemble 1905.
These opinions were not based on any form of
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"chart playing," but were drawn deductively from
similar conditions which were bound to produce
similar results market-wise.

The General Situation.
The prevailing optimism in regard to the general
situation finds justification in the reports which have
come to hand during the week. In all lines oi
activity a disposition is shown to go ahead in preparation for a boom period to come in the not distant
future, notwith~tanding the lack of concert among
the tariff managers which has recently developed.
The strike at Butler, Pa., against the Standard
Steel Car Co., affecting 2,500 men, ended by the
company making concessions, but the Pressed Steel
Car strike at McKees Rocks is still on. There are
threats of trouble with the shoe workers in New
England, the packers in four of the factories having
already walked out. Several other smaller affairs
are reported from different sections. These evidences of unrest among wage earners are sure
harbingers of increasing activity in the manufacturing world.
The iron and steel business is increasing in volume with prices advancing. The U. S. Steel Corporation is expected to follow the lead of the
independents, who recently added $1.00 a ton to the
prices of a number of finished steel products. The
U. S. Steel Corporation report for the second quarter is expected next Tuesday and estimates of the
net profits run from $27,000,000 to $33,000,000. The
company is running about 90% of capacity, which
is equal to 97% of the 1908 capacity, and is booking
orders at the rate of 40,000 tons a day. The
National Tube Co., at Kewanee, I!l., added 500 men
to its pay roll this week. The Republic Iron &
Steel Co. has reached an agreement with its men.
The iron department is now running at practically
100% of capacity and its new tube plant will soon
be completed. Additional finished steel mills are
in contemplation. The Illinois Steel Co. last week
booked orders for 32.000 tons of rails. The International Harvester Co. has ordered 3,000 tons of
sheets and plates. The sheet and tin plate industry,
however, is somewhat demoralized, owing to the
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continuation of the trouble over the · open-shop
policy. Pennsylvania steel makers have taken 44,000
tons of pig iron. The American Locomotive Co.
has given orders for heavy machine tools aggregating $500,000.
The railroads are coming into line with rail and
equipment orders in a very liberal manner. Orders
for rails as recently reported and in contemplation
are as follows:
Boston & Maine, 21,000 tons; Harriman Lines,
19,000 tons; Central of Georgia, 15,000 tons; Brazilian roads, 50,000 tons; St. Paul Road, 15,000 tons;
Chicago & Oak Park Elevated, 500 tons; Lehigh
Valley (bridge steel), 2,000 tons; St. Paul (bridge
steel), 10,500 tons; St. Louis & Southwestern (bridge
steel), 1,800 tons.
-Orders for cars: C. & N. W., 2,000 box cars;
Ala. Gt. Southern, 750 gondolas; Harriman lines,
3,325 box cars, 1,200 flat and gondolas, 420 stock
and box cars; C. & 0., 1,000 steel hopper cars,
200 box cars; Nor. Pacific, 2,000 box cars; Bu£.,
Roch. & Pitts., 1,000 box cars.
Orders for locomotives: C. & 0., SO; Mo. Pacific,
30; Can. Pacific, 15; Rock Island, 15.
Inquiries for equipment: N. Y. C., 2,400 steel
underframe box cars; C., B. & Q., 2,000 steel underframe box cars, 500 refrigerator cars; C., N. 0. &
Tex. Pacific, 700 steel gondolas; Penn., 20,000 cars
of various kinds; B. & 0., 8,000 cars of various
kinds; C. & N. W., 6,000 cars of various kinds.
The copper metal market is in a stronger position than for some weeks past, prices being
well above 13 cents as a result of purchases by
brass and electric companies. The Boston Elevated
took 3,000,000 pounds at a price slightly under 13c.
anci the Mass. Elec. Co., 900,000 pounds. Sales were
reported as high as 13½c. Speculation in the metal
in London has been revived and the producers expect a rapid reduction in European stocks in the
near future, particularly if prices are maintained or
advanced on this side.
The Westinghouse Elec. Co. reports a deficit for
the year ending March 31, but operating costs since
then are said to be much smaller in proportion
to the business done on account of the low price
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of copper. The General Elec. Co. will also derive
benefit from this factor.
.,
The big rubber companies w.elcome the recent
rise in crude rubber for the reason that they stocked
· up at the lower levels.
The National Biscuit Company's sales for June
were the largest in the history of the company
for that month.
·
The cotton goods market is strong, but the
woolen market has run into summer dullness.
Freight traffic ' is increasing and · railroad gross
earnings for first week in July average 8¼% over
same period a year ago.
Th!!re is little change in ·the money situation.
Nearly $8,000,000 gold was shipped to Argentina
this week. The probabilities are that the outflow
to South America will cease w.hen the demand from
the interior for crop-moving purposes becomes
more insistent.

The Technical Situation.
The technical situation is not strong in the railroad group. There are many stop-loss orders close
under the market and the weak long interest is
increased by the continual shifting of stocks from
strong · to weak hands. It is true, however, that
the market is at present in the hands of very
powerful manipulators and that their object is to
sustain and create public interest which will facilitate the distribution of stocks. Tkis clique of
operators have everything their own way at present,
as the bears are without a leader, without courage
and a little shy of money.
The industrials are in a much better condition
technically. There is no large short interest to be
squeezed, but the recent buying has been of a good
character and excellent accumulation is in evidence on every little decline. There are comparatively few stop-loss orders in this group.
Conclusion.
I find no reason to alter or modify the views
recently expressed, that our greatest opportunities,
together with the greatest factor of safety, lie in
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the industrials. Every effort will be made to arouse
interest in railroad stocks, as they are the ones m
which a public demand 1s desirable. This action,
earned out by the master mantpulators, may apparently refute my own pos1tton at times, but such
appearances will be decep11ve. 1 would not undertake to prophesy that rails would not go higher,
bu,!: I am fixed in the op1mon that there 1s danger
in that group and that we are much better off m
the comparatively neglected industrtals. The very
best plan is to pick up such stocks as Amalgamated
Copper, American Car & Foundry, American Locomotive, Pressed Steel Car, Railway Steel Spring,
Realty and the other stocks wl:ich will be mentioned
in these advices as fast as something can be
learned about their value and market position, on
every reaction of a point or two, being prepared
to increase ·l ines if declmes, for any reason, go further than anticipated.
The great essential now is discrimination. The
haphazard buying of industrial securities may result
in trouble, even if the bull market in these securities
appears.
Having adopted the stand on this cla \ S of securities, I will devote particular attention to getting,
as nearly as possible, at the facts and prospects of
the different corporations. As fast as reports appear
they will be analyzed and covered in special letters.
The rails will not be neglected, but particular attention will be given to stocks which will offer the greatest promise of profit, at least until things appear
more satisfactory in the railroad group. 1t was my
intention to give a comparative table of industrials
this week, but the difficulty encountered in obtaining information delays this exhibit. l t will be produced as soon as possible. Meanwhile I particularly
favor Amalgamated Copper, American Car & Foundry, American Locomotive. Pressed Steel Car, Railway Steel Spring and Realty common. Almost
all the industrial prefe1 f'nces are bargains at this
level.

243

July 31, 1909.
The greatest danger which confronts the specu- •
lator or investor now is overconfidence and the
tendency to ignore important fundamentals which
. are not satisfactory. We know that general business is good, that crops offer fair promise, that the
tariff will soon cease to be a menace, that ea1 nings
of railroad and industrial corporations are improving and that the stock market behaves very nicely
under the guidance of the most powerful manipulators in the world. It is a natural inclination to
look upon the bright side of things and it is also
natural to give particular attention to what is immediately under our noses rather than to what is
more remote. This is a very bad error, for the
stock market discounts coming events from six
months to a year ahead of their appearance. It is
the more or less obscure influences which are
really important in making stock prices.
In my opinion the things which should be given
greatest consideration now are the money situation,
the st?ite of our trade balances, the prospects of
exports atd imports and other such factors bearing
on the more distant future. We may accept the
business situation, the tariff and the crops as being
satisfactory, and if we do so accept them, they cease
to be speculative factors.
Of course eternal vigilance must be exercised in order to detect changes
in these influences, but such changes are more liable to be adverse than favorable. With many
stocks again at the highest level in history we have
a very different proposition from that which obtained two years or even a year ago. Our expectations of rapid rehabilitation have been more than
fulfilled both in general business and in the stock
market, and for us to go gaily on expecting that
improvement to continue in the same ratio forever,
is piling Ossa on Pelion. We have been warranted
· for some time in directing investigations toward the
discovery of good things-the good things are here.
From now on scrutiny should be directed, without
prejudice, to conserving the factor of safety.
As has been stated in recent letters, one of the
great essentials now is discrimination. Not long
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ago we could buy any old thing without much fear,
but now certain securities will decline or be dormant
while others will have good advances.
It is my intention to give considerable space for
a time to the discussion of our money affairs and
trade balances, supplementing my own opinions by
discussions with men who are making a close study
of these important factors. I expect to have some
important letters from high authorities on these
rather involved but very important subjects.
In reply to a communication to Mr. David Ochs,
who has been making a careful study of money
conditions for forty years, I have received the following interesting Jetter:
New York, July 26, 1909.
"At this juncture the question of eventual high
money rates in the approaching season of crop
movements and thereafter would naturally become
a subject for discussion. In fact, 1t is under consideration by prudent bankers, holders of securities
:ind would-be investors. Judging from the continuing soundings still made by them they have not
reached any positive conclusions. Usually well informed parties are reluctant to express definite
opinions, inasmuch as some of the determining factors have not sufficiently developed.
If it were not apparent that many interested parties are overlooking, ignoring or not appreciating
some of the most important factors in the situation,
it would seem of little use to enter into the subject
just now. Yet just those factors which are not
generally discussed have already reached a visible
development or are at least progressing towards it.
It may therefore be well to consider them and their
probable effect on the future of the money market
and the possible consequences on all our other
markets.
Let us first review the situation as it appears on
the surface. We find that the factors that are principally relied on to prevent high money rates are
the big supply of funds held at the present time,
here and abroad, the large and continuous production of gold, and the Vreeland-Aldrich bill.
On investigation it has not developed that the
apparently great supply of available capital would
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not be fully exhausted, if it were to be used in absorbing the large stock and bond issues both here
and abroad, which are still in the hands of the first
holders, underwriters and bankers. In London there
have been emitted about 145 million pounds sterling
of securities in the first half of this year, and a
good part of it is still undigested. It is also supposed
that many of our security issues bought by our
bankers are still carried, mostly in Europe where
business is slack and interest rates are low. A
number of large capita1 issues are evidently projected here-and there may thus be ample employment on that score for any surplus capital at better
rates.
Regarding the Aldrich Bill, not much need be said.
Its authors and advocates have themselves declared
it a mere expedient-a plaster for a sore when it is
breaking out-not a remedy. Moreover, the better
class of banks, for sufficient reasons, are so averse
to join any of the 'Currency Associations' which
have to be formed before any of the notes can be
issued, that we do not hear of any such associations
having been formed up to this time. It is not probable that recourse will be had to the issue of Aldrich
notes. Before it comes to that it will be found that,
as heretofore, it wiJI be necessary to get real money
by selling securities or products to Europe at prices
which the buyer wiJI pay. Aldrich notes would not
be serviceable as reserve money when the banks
need to strengthen their reserves.
However, there is a predominance of believers in
the continuing efficacy of ·the factors referred tofor preventing higher money rates. But even those
of them who may take it for granted that there
will be the usual rise in money rates in the fall
months expect that such rise will be moderate ;:tnd
not of long duration. They point to the fact that
for this reason there is not the normal anticipatory
effect of declining markets for securities and commodities.
The real cause for this seems to be that because
of the revival of business in many directions, a
hardening of money rates would signify to them that
the promise of large crops and good prices for these
were being realized and i-1iat this would cause a
further rise in the security markets. This view of
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the present situation is fostered, as is well known
by our most prominent financiers and captains of
industry.
It has, indeed, often occurred, under similar circumstances, that even with abnormally high money
rates, there would be a rise in stocks, after it had
been started on the basis of cheap money. There
would be anticipation of higher dividends on railroads and industrial shares and advances in nondividend-paying stocks which would seem to approach a dividend earning basis or even without
that. At the same time, securities with fixed interest
or dividends would be Jagging.
It should be remembered, however, that we have
had, at times, high and advancing security markets
and great business activity, solely caused by an inflated currency, which goaded the country on to
lavi~h expenditure of capital, until it had to borrow
excessively abroad, whilst under the same influence
the Treasury would be emptied. Nearly all of our
monetary crises and financial convulsions were bred
in that way and appeared when the country was
seemingly in the greatest prosperity.
That was so when President Harrison in 1892
appealed to the country for re-election on the ground
of its unparalleled prosperity and he went out of
office in 1893 pointing to that fact. No longer ago
than the end of 1907, in another period of unapproached prosperity, we had a violent panic and
almost complete collapse. Yet there had been no
calamity such as general crop failure, disastrous
war or any other misfortune of national dimension.
What had happened was that our country had
over-reached itself, by spending more capital than
it had available. It had run up a large floating debt
.in Europe, until the creditor wanted no more
I. 0. U.'s, no more finance bills, but bills with documents attached for goods shipped or representing
such. The creditor wanted gold value in products,
and as we needed about 100 million additional gold
to straighten ourselves out again we had to sell
our products and securities at the prices which the
foreign buyer practically dictated-that is, at recessions up to 40 or 50% or over. Under similar conditiovs; in the '70s and '90s, they took our securities
at bankrupt prices only.
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Our Treasury is no long~r affluent. Its former
surplus has vanished under inliuences of currency
inflation. There has been less consideration accorded to the spending of 50 million dollars for acquiring
the rights to the deserted Panama Canal than is
now necessary for the raising of half that amount
of additional revenue-or to the selling of Panama
Canal bonds on terms acceptable to the banks.
Thus these prominent factors have to be con·
sidered: the state of our international balance, the
working of our currency inflation and the condition
of the Treasury.
Our international balance is heavily against us
and is still running that way at a great rate. It
is not so excessive as yet as at the end of 1907, but
only because the bankers abroad have reduced their
limits since then on finance bills. Direct borrowings on securities are probably very large, but the
aggregate balance has been kept down by our continuous shipments of gold in part payment or by
tempting Europe to buy our bonds and stocks. It
is to be su1wosed that at least during our product
export season we will keep on an even keel. But
we are alreadt now de})endent to quite a degree
on changes in European interest rates or to the
possible calling home of foreign capital.
Our currency is overabundant-inflated. That is
now seen and admitted. That inflation has caused
our-securities, products, commodities and everything
to be held above the price range of the world. At
the same time that part of the people or of the
country which has profited by the inflated prices
or by the activity produced has been accordingly
spend-thrifty or, lavish in expenditure. We have
thus had increasing imports and decreasing exports.
The result is large exports of gold, which so far
this year have been over 73 million dollars. It
must be ultimately felt if the interior wants funds
from here.
The Treasury's funds are now low, and it may have
to call for money from the banks or rather it will have
to sell bonds. The proceeds will then have to be
furnished by the banks, whoever buys the bonds.
The lawful money so taken from bank reserves
would not be ,replaced by issuing new bank note
circulation against new bonds. It is admitted that
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if this were done it would soon drive out more
gold.
There are thus good chances of higher interest
rates. But if the moneys drawn into the Treasury by
sales of bonds should each time be paid out again
in consequence of fiscal , deficits of the Government
-and if an incentive should be given to increases
of note circulation, in the provisions for the issue
of new bonds-the further inflation would obstruct
a rise in money rates and would tend, or give opportunities, to inflate the prices of stocks. However, the final, adverse results of inflation-financial
convulsions-are known to be as inevitable as in
the past.
The vital factors dwelt upon have reached sufficient development to make it advisable not to
ignore them but to watch any further progress or
change in them and hereafter to give them due
consideration."

The General Situation,
The situation in general has been only slightly
modified by the occurrences of the w·eek. The Steel
Corporation's report for the quarter just past merely
confirms what everyone has known for some time~
that business in the iron and steel trade is good and
that earnings are increasing. The best part of the
report was the showing of unfilled orders, most of
which were booked at advanced prices. The conservatism of the directors in disregarding popular
clamor for a 4% dividend on the common stock reflects, particularly, a desire to maintain the strong
position of the company's preferred stock and bondholders. There is no gainsaying the fact that, in
the iron and steel and railway equipment industries,
business is forging ahead rapidly, and this phase
of the situation will take care of itself. The impor··
tant point to consider is how far the stocks
in this department have discounted in the market
these improved conditions and how much of the
ruling prices represents what may be in store.
Structural steel mills are crowded with orders, wire
products have been advanced $2 and iron bars $1
per ton, and the carrying capacity of the iron ore
fleet on the Great Lakes is being strained to the
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utmost. Agricultural machine and radiator concerns
are large buyers of iron. The tin plate strike appears about to collapse and notwithstanding the defection of their men the effective capacity of American Sheet & Tin Plate Company is greater than
before the beginning of trouble over the openshop policy.
•
The strike against the Standard Steel Car Company at Butler, Pa., has ended, but the Pressed Steel
Car Company's men at McKees Rocks are still out,
although they have asked for arbitration of their
demands. The railroads continue to order new
equipment on a fairly liberal scale.
The copper metal market is quiet, with some
easing off from last week's advance. London advices say that the leading manufacturers are working 85 % of their 1907 capacity, against 60% in the
early part of the year.
.
l n general business circles there is an evident. disposition to go ahead. This is especially marked
in the Southwest, where crop returns more than
meet expectations and where high prices are being
obtained for grain coming from the harvest fields.
The black rust 1n the Northwest, which formed the
basis of a sharp advance in wheat prices, comes too
late to justify any change in the excellent spring
wheat promise. Cotton crop prospects are not alluring.
A tendency in the West toward hardening of New
York Exchange would seem to refute the idea that
there is money enough in that section for cropmoving purposes without calling upon this center
for help. As a matter of fact, the West has on
deposit here an unusual amount of money, enough
to cut a big figure as one of the depressing influences in the local monev market. Whether .they
call for their own or borrow in this market for their
crop needs the result is the same. The fact should
not be lost sight of that this year the United States
Government is not in position to help the situation,
as heretofore, becau se the Treasury Department has
no surplus to deposit in national banks. How far
the provisions of the Aldrich Currency Law will go
toward relieving the tension this fall is problematical, and its operation will be watched with a great
deal of interest. Additional shipments of gold were
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made to the Argentine this week, but for the moment this factor has ceased to attract attention.
While labor conditions have improved in some
quarters, there are some fresh unheavals, notably
among the Brooklyn tailors and isolated cases of
cotton operatives in New England. The street car
men of Chicago and Western Federation of Miners
are discussing the advisability of strikes. These disturbances, however, should not cause any uneasiness.

The Technical Situation.
The ordinary method of gauging the technical
situation by the extent of the short interest, the
presence of stop-loss orders or weakly margined
long accounts, does not work out very well under
present circumstances. Measured by these things
alone the technical situation would be designated
as very weak. There is no considerable short interest except in a few of the high-priced rails, notably Union Pacific and Reading. There are a great
many stop-los s orders considering the volume of
trading, and the weak long interest is slowly expanding. The reason this weak situation has no
effect lies in the manipulative tactics employed.
Important operators appear determined to let no
marked decline occur just now and the market is
so dull that incipient bear movements are easily
checked. I have never seen more pronounced support and I do not believe it is very expensive support. The small amount of stocks purchased to
check declines can easily be disposed of when the
market is washed upward. This keeps the market
in a very narrow range, but as long as it is continued no material set-back will occur. I feel satisfied that there is considerable washing of quotati ons at times. In fact this time-honored method
of manipulation has been very palpable during the
last two weeks in such stocks as Union Pacific,
Reading and Steel common.
While the support in the market overcomes the
inherent weakness of the t echnical situation, we
must remember that if the plans of the important
operators are con summated or the support is for
any other reason withdrawn, the collapse would be
more severe than if the market had been allowed
to take its natural course.
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Conclusion.
Find no reason to alter my opinion that our next
real bull market will be in the industrial group.
Many of these stocks are in a very strong position.
The danger of injury from drastic changes in the
tariff is past; the increasing supply of gold works
steadily in favor of producing corporations as compared with railroads, and general business is good.
From the more speculative point of view we may
argue that the industrials have not yet had their
innings. Steel common is an exception and for the
present has had its movement. Advances in this
stock now will be of an artificial nature and the
shares will be for sale on hard spots. Before long
we will begin to get good reports and talk of
dividend increases in other industrials. There is
already some quiet information of this character.
I hear from a very good source that a project is
now on foot to form a gigantic combination of
Copper interests. The Amalgamated Co. will have
the initiative in this move and once the matter is
publicly promulgated it will have a great speculative
effect.
I have referred from time to time to the fact that
good accumulation was going on in certain industrials, but that no attempt was made to bid these
stocks up until the desired lines were obtained.
As a specific instance of this I found a few days
ago that Smelters had been steadily purchased by
important people for over a month. The instructions were to keep the stock down, or at least to
keep it in narrow limits, checking advances by the
withdrawal of orders, or, if necessa·ry, the sale of
some stock. I think these buyers have about completed their lines and that the next important move
in Smelters will be upward.
Recommend purchases of Amalgamated Copper,
American Car & Foundry, American Locomotive,
Pressed Steel Car, Railway Steel Spring, Smelters,
U. S. Realty and American Woolen on all little
reactions. Many other industrials are good, but the
shares named offer, in my opinion, the best immediate opportunities.
While I do not favor the rails as a group, I continue to make an exception of Pennsylvania in the
high-priced dividend payers and Erie in the lowpriced stocks.
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Chart Showing Market Movements tor July, 1909.
(Thomas Gibson's Figures.)
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August 7, 1909.
The market during the week has shown a broadening tendency. Public traders have participated
more freely than for some months and they have
been afforded many opportunties to gather profits.
The industrial list has outclassed the rails in net
gains and the equipment stocks have been easily
the leaders of the industrial group. On Monday,
August 2, 23 rails advanced an average of .23, while
18 industrials advanced .60. On August 3, rails declined .07, while industrials advanced .39. August 4,
rails declined .04 and industrials advanced .06. On
August 5 rails had a little the best of the bargain,
declining .37, while industrials declined .66.
On
August 6, rails advanced 1.31, _a nd industrials 1.05.
The average for the week being an advance of .82
for rails and 1.85 for industrials.
These differences do not appear remarkable either
in the extent of the movement or the spread in
prices, but if the tendency continues for several
months we will find that opportunities have been
much greater in the industrials. It is my opinion
that the industrials will improve as compared with
the rails, in an even more decided manner than that
noted above. I have frequently reverted in these
advices to the similarity of conditions in 1905 with
those which now exist, and to the fact that in
the latter part of that year industrials advanced
about 14 points on the average, while rails stood
still. It will be seen at once that under such conditions the speculator or investor who carried rails
through the period named was out his interest and
commission, while the operator in industrials was
reaHy enjoyin~ a bull market.
The industrial stocks, with one or two exceptions, such as Steel common, have not attracted the
public to any great extent. The rails, as usual,
have been the first to move and have the advantage
of listings in London and on other foreign exchanges. With the exception of Steel securities
and Amalgamated Copper little is heard of industrial stocks in London, but before long we may expect a broadening in this regard.
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The industrial stocks also suffer from the meagerness of their reports and the fact that annual
statements, which are now coming in, cover the
period of greatest business depression and do not
make attractive reading for that very large contingent which is always trying to speculate on the
past. As an instance of this, I have been making
a sort of pet of American Car & Foundry for some
time. On the appearance of the annual report for
the fiscal year ending April 30, 1909, I received a
great many letters asking how I could talk bu!lishly on a stock which showed earnings applicable
to the common stock of less than 3% . ln order
to show my own method of reasoning, which I
am naturally gratified to see borne out by the
market action of the stock, I will produce the fol lowing table:
EARNINGS.
Year ending
Net
Gross Sales .
Income.
April 30.
1900 ( 14 mos .. . Not pu9}ished $5,734,949
4,055,820
4,29 5,602

1901

1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909

• After

7,059,902

4,496,863
2,628,117

$69,040,638

3,807,660
8,139,536
8,214,618
2,895,830

100,006,296

.

104,319,560

. Not published
deducting

$1,650,000

for

Earned on
Surplus. Common.
$3,698,648 12.45%
5,074,949
6.50%
6,670,551
7.32 %
10,730,454 16.51 %
12,227,317
7.99%
12,755,434
1.76%
14,113 ,094
4.52%
19,552,630 20.13%
22,367,247 *14.68%
22,563,078
2.65%

general overhauling

and

improvements.

It will be observed that the net earnings for
the year 1905 represented only 1.76% applicable
to the common stock. This covered the business
depression of the fiscal year 1904-5 following the
stock market panic of 1903 just as the last report
covers the depression of 1908-9. The man who was
deterred from purchasing the stock by this 1905
showing was working a1ong the same line of reasoning that the present critics are. But in 1904 the
stock sold at 14¾; in 1905 it reached 43½, and in
1906, 46¼.
Reverting again to the table above, it will be
noted that in 1906 the corporation earned 4.52%
on the common stock and passed about $1,300,000
, to surplus; in 1907 they earned 20.13% on the com254

mon and passed over $5,000,000 to surplus, and in
1908 they earned 14.68% on the common stock and
passed almost $3,000,000 to surplus, as well as
deducting $1,650,000 for general overhauling and
improvements.
There is no reason why their future showings
should not be as flexible as those of the past; in
fact, there is every reason to believe they will.
The surplus has grown in ten years from $3,698,648
to $22,563,078, and $17,380,000 of this is working
capital, in addition to which the corporation has
$5,600,000 of material on hand . (figured at market
prices) which may to all intents and purposes be
considered working capital. I will not atte;npt to
enter into a detailed analysis of the affairs of the
American Car & Foundry Company in this letter,
but it may be said that book values are far above
the established quotations for the stock; that the
future is very promising and that they can easily
place the security on a 5% basis and keep it there.
So far as that is concerned, dividends are not
everything. Conservatism and the conservation of
capital are more important than distributions, particularly where such distributions are premature.
Almost every industrial concern, including the
United States Steel Corporation, has, in its infancy, paid dividends which should not have been
paid, and by •so doing has prejudiced the standing
of their issues. People will stand by a corporation
which refrains from paying dividends, but if a dividend basis has once been established and is then
reduced they are filled with wrath and indignation. United States Steel common should never
have sold as low as $8 a share, and it never would
have sold there if the directors had not been too
precipitate with their divisions of profit.
In regard to American Car & Foundry, it may
be added that there is a fly in the ointment. I refer
to the following paragraph over President Eaton's
signature, in the last annual report:
"Your management deems it advisable
hereafter to omit the resume of the company's
business which it has heretofore been its practice to present quarterly. This decision has
been reached after very careful consideration
and is based upon the conclusion that a quar255

terly statement does not always fairly reflect
the condition of your company's affairs in
their entirety. In the conduct of so diversified a business as is done by your company, a
quarterly statement sometimes gives an apparent and undue advantage to one quarter
over another. Your management has hesitated to make any departure from its prior
practice, but feels that its decision on this
subject is fully justified and that it will be
a better and more satisfactory plan to have
our reports based upon the result of the operations of our entire fiscal year."
This is very weak. The truth should be published, good or bad. It is an era of publicity, and
corporations which obtain their capital from public stockholders should voluntarily produce statements of their standing as frequently as possible,
and if they will not do so voluntarily they should
be compelled to do so. An honest company, well
managed, and with a bright future, as I believe
the American Car & Foundry Company to be, makes
a great mistake in adopting a policy such as Mr.
Eaton outlines. . The wisest men of affairs are
realizing this. The Pennsylvania Company seldom
allows a week to pass without giving to the press
or to its stockholders some frank statement of what
is being done in the executive offices. The quarterly report of the Steel Corporation is a classic.
This is as it should be. Concealment, no matter
how speciously explained, suggests only one thing
to the experienced man, and that is stock-jobbing.
In regard to the general market, there is much
that is unsatisfactory in the perspective. Business conditions are all right, and we are going to
round out a good year in almost every line of business. If this was not almost certain our stock
prices would not be where they are. The anteriority of stock prices and the certainty that they
will discount anything obvious, is the simplest, the
most important and the most disregarded of all speculative features. In prodncing special letters on
money conditions, trade balances, etc., which may
appear to have a pessimistic ring, I have no desire
to frighten any one or to howl calamity. I can do
much better as an optimist, but it is necessary to
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look things squarely in the face. 'vVe have had a
long and successful campaign on the bull side and
we don't want to lose our gains. Also we don't
want to lose our opportunities. The stock market
may, and probably will, go considerably higher, but
we must now work very car.e fully and exercise unusual vigilance if we are to escape a most drastic
reversal.

The General Situation.
There is much in the situation, particularly with
regard to general business conditions, to suggest
that, while recovery has been rapid, there is yet
room for further extension. This is especially true
of copper metal and Western mercantile lines. rn
the former the price is still low and consumption
has not yet overtaken production, although our exports are showing very gratifying growth. During
July we sent abroad 75,754,560 pounds, against 74,813,760 pounds in June. These figures have been
exceeded but once, when 84,414,400 pounds were
shipped during December, 1907. Advices from
abroad are extremely hopeful for an early beginning
of a movement which will clean up their accumulations of the metal.
Western, Southwestern, and Northwestern merchants, according to advices from those sections,
are making ready for an immense Fall business to
follow the successful harvesting and marketing of
huge crops at record prices. There are also a great
many enterprises throughout the country which
have been awaiting the settlement of the tariff
squabble.
The enlargement of the iron and steel trade has
of late been so widely advertised that we may well
pause long enough to consider whether this branch
of industry should begin to slow down a trifle until other branches can catch up. The figures showing the production of pig iron for the month of July
approached very nearly the record month of October, 1907. Prices for finished products, however,
have not yet reached their highest · limits. In the
collateral industry of railway equipments there is
already great activity, but it is by no means overdone. The railroads are a long way from the high
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point of efficiency in their rolling stock and must
continue to place orders for some time to come.
Their orders during the past week have been fairly
liberal. A partial settlement of some of the labor
difficulties among the car builders is a help to the
situation.
The restlessness in labor circles, however, is
being made manifest in some new quarters.
A
general strike of Chicago Street Railway employees
is threatened, and Manhattan coatmakers are preparing to join the Brooklyn malcontents. The Swedish ·
labor war has almost reached revolutionary proportions.
.
A new phase of the money market was developed
this week by the shipment of $1,000,000 gold to
Japan and the engagement of an additional $3,000,000
for the sa.me place. At the moment the interior
demand for currency for the movement of crops
has not manifested itself beyond a slight hardening
of time rates. $5,000,000 Denver & Rio Grande
bonds has been placed in Berlin. A great many
short-term notes issued by railroads during panic
times will have to be taken care of before long.
This will quite likely be accomplished by issuing
new securities. Unless the exchange of these securities is well handled the use of a very considerable amount of cash may be required, as the holders of these notes may find a more advantageous
use for their funds in commercial and industrial
fields.

The Technical Situation.
The technical situation is not good. Stop-loss
orders continue to increase, and there is only a
small short interest. The public activity centers
largely in the railroad group, and it is here that
most of the stop orcters are found. On the other
hand the short interest, what there is of it, is also
in the high-priced rails, and this helps them somewhat. The industrials are moving upward more
because of steady , accumulation than because of
support or technical conditions, and are consequently in a stronger market position than the rails.
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Conclusion.
There is nothing in the situation which warrants
a change of position as yet. It looks as if the
market is booked for higher prices temporarily.
Important interests have stocks to distribute and
they are beginning to get an audience for the
first time; possibly they did not want an audience
before. The manipulators know full well that they
cannot sel\ large holdings in a day or a week and
they know that they must encourage the newcomers if they want to get them in. That is what
is going on now, and there are still some opportunities on the long side, particularly in industrials.
After distribution has been effected every effort
will be bent toward driving out the eleventh-hour
bulls and recovering stocks at a lower level. The
next real reaction, when it appears, will not be a
joke; it will be very severe.
Continue to recommend purchases of American
Car & Foundry, Amei;ican Locomotive, Pressed
Steel Car, Railway Steel Spring, American Woolen,
United States Realty, American Smelters and
Amalgamated Copper. Many other industrials are
good, but the stocks named offer, in my opinion,
the best immediate chances. In the rails I still
favor Pennsylvania and Erie.
A chart showing market movements of stocks for
the month of July appears in Vol. II.
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August 14, 1909.
Following the panic of 1903 and that of 1907
the course of money rates and stock market prices
invites inevitable comparisons between the two
periods. Up to the present tin)e the parallel is
striking, which being the case, the question arises
as to whether the parallel is to be completed. A
resume of conditions in 1904 may be suggestive as
to the probable course of the prese nt market.
In January, 1904, money became very easy, due
to a large flow of currency from the interior, in
addition to which gold imports were heavy. The
Treasury also contributed on balance to the banks.
For the four weeks to January 30, the money holdings of the clearing house banks increased over
$50,000,000, and surplus reserves advanced from
$9,541,875 on January 2 to $26,072,675 on January 23.
Although "call" money rates touched 6% in the
early days of the month, they did not go above 3%
after the sixth, and closed at 1¼ % to 2%. "Time"
money also declined, the quotation on January 30
being 3½% for thirty days, 3¼% for sixty days
and 4% for ninety days to four months. In the
early <lays of the month the stock market was weak.
Coincident with the decline in money rates, however, the market developed strength.
As at the
start of the present "bull" market, the bond market
was the distinctive feature, both investment and
speculative issues sharing in the activity.
In February money rates showed a further weakening, "call" money closing at 1¼% to 2%. "Time
loans" were 2½% to 2¼% for thirty days, and were
simil_a rly weak for other maturities.
The stock
market for this month was generally lower and
irregular, due to the outbreak of war between Japan
and Russia, the fire at Baltimore and other minor
reasons.
March, however, saw a distinct change in the
characteristics of the stock market. After the announcement of the Northern Securities decision on
the fourteenth, great activity developed, accompanied
by a marked advance in prices. During the month
"call" money ranged fr om 1½% to 2%, and "time"
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money ruled at about the figures of the previous
month. April saw a further rise on the Stock Exchange, although there was a small reaction at the
close of the month. In spite of the large gold exports, the banks contmued to gain money, and on
April 23 surplus reserves were $34,203,700. "Call"
money dropped to 1% @ 1¼ %, with a further weakening in "time" money.
During May special weakness developed in United
States Steel issues and the low record price of 8¼
was made on May 13. During this time the balance
of the market remained dull, and did not suffer
correspondingly to the steel issu'!s. "Call" loans
were made as low as ¼ of 1%, notwithstanding the
large gold exports and the government's $49,000,000
Panama Canal payments.
In June the agricultural outlook improved, the
government reporting a condition of winter wheat,
as of July 1 of 78.7 % against 77.7% on June 1. The
stock market became extremely dull, but with a
gradual hardening of prices. Surplus reserves
reached $38,869,875 on June 18, and "call" money
again touched ¼ of 1%,
The activity was increased in July. Crop prospects became more encouraging and surplus reserves reached the remarkable figure of $55,989,600
on July 30, with "call" money ranging from ¼%
to 1¼%.
Marked improvement in the stock market dated
from August, when independent steel companies
cut the price of billets, followed by reductions in
the prices of its products by the American Steel &
Wire Co. The demoralization in steel prices may
be compared to that so recently passed, when the
"independents" were underselling the United States
Steel Corporation, and that company made
drastic cuts. During the demoralization in steel
prices the stocks of the United States Steel Corportion showed stubborn strength, and sharp advances were scored in these stocks, as _well as in
the general list. There was no change in money
conditions except that surplus reserves grew to the
maximum of the year, $58,613.075. on August 20.
"Time" loans were made at 2% for sixty days.
The August reductions in steel prices were followed by further cuts in September, this action
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finally stimulating consumption and large orders
were placed. The stock market's activity increased
and the trend was decidedly upward, transactions
of over 1,000,000 shares being recorded on several
days. The Steel stocks were especially strong, leading the whole market upward. Surplus reserves
fell off strikingly to $19,913,425 on October first.
However, during this month the iron and steel
trades continued to improve both in activity and
in the price for steel products. The stock market
became positively buoyant, transactions of approximately 2,000,000 shares per day being made on
several occasions. Some spectacular advances occurred, as for example, a rise of 7 points in St. Paul
in one Stock Exchange session. United States Steel
issues continued to be leaders.
"Call" money ranged from 1¼% to 2¼% and
"time" money advanced correspondingly. Surplus
reserves got as low as $12,636,900 on October 8,
recovering somewhat later in the month.
During November still greater buoyancy was
shown in the stock market, one day's transactions
totaling 2,328,000 shares.
Steel common got up to 32¼, against the low
record price of the year, 8¼. Many other striking
advances were scored. Gold exports became very
heavy and surplus reserves declined to $8,539,075.
Money became distinctly firmer, going up to 4%
on "call" and 4% for sixty to ninety days.
There was a further strengthening in the money
market in December, "call" money advancing to 5%,
the banks discriminating severely against certain
collateral. After the long-continued advance the
market was in a vulnerable position, and a sharp
break in prices occurred; which has been called
"The Lawson Panic." Conditions, however, were
ripe for a decline, due to overspeculation and the
great rapidity of the rise.
From this digest of the course of the market
following the panic of 1903, containing so many
features of similarity to the recovery from the
panic of 1907-8, a spirit of caution should be gained.
The low money rates, the period of stock market
hesitancy, the slow recovery, the general marking
up of prices, and, lastly, the rapid and spectacular
rise following the earlier panic, has been repro262

duced in all essential details in our present "bull"
market.
The last stage has evidently been reached in our
present market-the period of distribution. How
long this may be continued, it is, of course, impossible to say. In the process of distribution, it
is possible material advances may still be scored,
but the parallel of the two periods is so striking
as to suggest that it is wiser to let others secure.
the froth at the top of the rise.
It is interesting to note in connection with the
more distant future that after the wild break in
prices of December, 1904, which corrected technical
conditions, the advance was resumed and new high
record prices were made in 1905.

The General Situation.
Perhaps the most important specific development
of the week was the publication of the Copper Producers' figures which shows the metal to be in a
rather more favorable statistical position than it
has occupied for some time. According to this
report stocks of copper decreased during July
32,261,455 tons. Some of this is due, of course, to
exports which will show up in the visible supply
on the other side, but about half of the decrease
represents an increase in deliveries for home consumption. Another evidence of the expansion of
business among copper consumers is the report
of the Wes tern Electric Company which shows
sales up to July 31 50% greater than during the
same period in 1908. Copper metal prices here
are again well above 13 cents, round lots having
sold as high as 13½ cents.
The only flaw to be found in the position of the
iron and steel trade is in Pittsburg, where sales
of pig iron for late delivery have been made at
varying prices. Otherwise the position has been
well maintained. Inquiries for steel rails for 1910
delivery are on a large scale. Car builders, as a
result of the recent 01:ders, are in the market for
plates. The total number of cars ordered recently
by various railroads is in the neighborhood of 25,000
and orders for locomotives are on a correspondingly liberal scale.
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Some prominence w·as given to the compilation
made by the Interstate Commerce Commission of
the reports of the railroads of the United States
for the month of May, which shows the ratio of
operating expenses to gross earnings 67.44%, against
71.01 % in May, 1908. When the railroads begin to
meet the bills for new equipment orders which
have been so widely advertised during the past few
months, the comparisons of operating expenses with
last year will not make such a favorable showing.
The trade in cotton and woolen goods is satisfactorily brisk. General mercantile business has already begun to feel the stimulus of big crops.
· Although commercial paper has not yet begun
to appear in volume in the money market as a
result of the expected expansion in general business
enterprises following the settlement of tariff matters, there is sufficient evidence in the columns of
trade papers that extensions of old plants and building of new ones is progressing steadily.
The money market is quiet with last week's
slight tendency toward firmness maintained. The
probable amount of funds necessary for crop-moving
purposes is yet an unsolved problem. Authorities
on the subject do not agree. The prevailing high
prices for farm products will undoubte.dly offset to
a considerable degree any plethora of money held
by banks in the farming districts.

The Technical Situation.
The technical situation is very bad. There has
not been a time in two years when 'the short
interest was so nearly eliminated. In the loan
crowd there is no borrowing demand at all. The
market is honeycombed with stop-loss orders a few
points below the present level of prices. The long
interest is of an indiscriminate character, and they
would become demoralized very easily if left to
their own devices . The market would never hold
with such technical conditions as exist now if it
were not supported by very strong operators who
have their plans t o carry out. Any change in these
plans, o r the completion of distribution , would find
the market in an unusually vulnerable position and
prices would crumble very quickly.
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Conclusion.
In the daily letter of Thursday, August 12, I
stated that I did not care to recommend any new
commitments in stocks at this level. In the letter
of August 13 I went further and suggested that it
would be better to sell holdings on rallies and wait
for a lower level before buying again. I am not
ready to recommend short sales as yet, but it will
probably not be long until such a recommendation
is offered. This action was taken after much deliberation and a careful study of market conditions.
My reasons for adopting this attitude are as
follows:
The market at its present level of prices is fully
as high as is warranted by values or future prospects. There are exceptions, of course, but the
rule holds good. I have recognized this state of
affairs for some time, but have continued to stick
to the long side for no better reason than that
probabilities pointed to further advances, due merely
to manipulative tactics. This position has proved
all right so far, but it is not a sound one, and I
prefer to abandon it too early rather than too late.
It will be easily understood that the position
of an advisor in a period of this kind is an ex·tremely perplexing and difficult one. If the market advances a few points more I will be called a
false prophet until the reversal occurs, and the
wisdom of the advice given is appreciated. I
prefer, however, to subject myself to such tem·porary criticism rather than · to follow a course
which must eventually end in disaster.
The stock market has advanced without any
serious interruption since November, 1907. It has
advanced so rapidly in this period that we have
not only regained all that was lost in the panic of
1907, but are close to the highest points ever
established (January, 1906). The recuperation has
been rapid and no doubt justified, but it has, in
my opinion, gone as far as conditions warrant.
There is a very large speculative contingent waiting for a reaction, meaning a reversal of, say, five
points. In my opinion this element is in greater
danger than are the operators who buy now or on
the little one or two-point setbacks which are a
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component part of every market. The market will
not react five points until the manipulation and
distribution is completed, and then it will react ten
or fifteen points, and the people who buy on the
five-point reaction will either be tired out or shaken
out. ·
Another thing: I do not like a one-man market.
There is no case in history where a bull market
based on a Deus ex Machina has not ended in
trouble.
There are a number of stocks which should go
considerably higher on their merits and book
values. American Car & Foundry, American Locomotive, Railway Steel Spring, Pressed Steel Car,
Amalgamated Copper, Realty and Woolen, are all
w6rth more money, but we must remember that
since these stocks were recommend~d they have
advanced ten to twenty points, and it is quite certain that in a decided break in the rails they would
sympathize to some extent.
In view of the attitude outlined above, I cannot
recommend the long side of the market for the
present. Later in the year we .viii have a bull
market in which the industrial issues will be the
leaders, but we can probably start our campaign
from a lower level and with a greater degree of
safety.
I will not relax my vigilance because of this
temporarily neutra1 attitude. If for any reason it
appears advisable to sell short, clients will be
promptly advised. A general telegram will be sent
if anything unusual develops.
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August 21, 1909.
In recent years great developments have taken
place in both the mming and metallurgy of copper.
Mining operations are now carried out on an extensive scale and the metallurgical treatment of
copper ores has been so improved that the metal
is now reduced at a cost which is less than onethird of that ruling a few years ago. The result
of these changes has been a large increase in the
annual production of copper and a consequent increase in the profit of copper mining. The wonderful profits earned and large dividends paid for
several years past by many of the world's large
copper mining companies have attracted much attention to copper mining. At the present moment ·
more attention is given to copper than to any other
form of mining. The public is interested and is
only waiting for the price of the metal to advance
to invest in copper mining stocks. It has been in
this state for some time and is becoming disappointed with the course copper prices are following. Copper prices were expected to advance rapidly with returning prosperity. They have failed
to do so. Their recovery is very slow. The price
of electrolytic copper in New York during July was
12.88 cents per pound as compared with 12.90 cents
in February, 1908, when production was less than
it is to-day. Under such circumstances it is not
surprising that those who are not well informed
regarding the copp er mining industries should become pessimistic. Many of the articles now ap- "
pearing in both the popular and technical press
relating to copper mining and the outlook for the
copper industries, are written in a decidedly pessimistic manner. Basic conditions, however, do not
warrant such pessimism, and while those who are
not conversant with copper mining are becoming
pessimistic all who are materially interested in
the mines and smelteries are very optimistic and
are following up their optimism by increasing their
in vestments in copper mining operations throughout the world.
At the · present time copper is chiefly used in
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the electrical industries, in brass makini, and in the
chemical trades. Now these industries do not regain their normal activities after a severe financial
and commercial depression until after many other
industries are well established under normal conditions. Metallurgists usually look for a good advancement in the prices of steel and iron long
before they expect copper prices to advance to high
figures.
Engineering work consuming steel and
iron is usually more urgent after a depression than
that requiring copper and brass. When this is appreciated and the recent course of iron and steel
prices is compared with that of copper, and the
conditions surrounding the production of copper
and of iron since the panic in 1907 are kept in
view, it will be found that copper prices have held
up well and that their tendency must henceforth
be towards advancement, rather than, as some
writers suggest, to decline.
The average prices of lake and electrolytic copper
since the first of the year, compared with those
during similar periods in 1908, in cents per pound,
may be tabulated as follows:

January.
February
March ..
April ..
May . . .
June ..
July ....

'

-Lake.1909.
1908.
14.280
13.901
13.295
13.098
12.826
12.875
12.9375 12.928
13.238
12.788
13.548 12.877
13.363
12.933

-Electrolytic.1909.
1908.
13,893
13.726
12.949
12.905
12.387
12.704
12.5625 12.743
12.893
12.598
13.214
12.675
12.88
12.702

These figures do not vary greatly, but prices
during the present year show a tend ency to harden.
Statistics of the world's copper production during
the present year are not now available, but mining
and smelting activities in all the leading copper
fields are similar to those prevailing in the United
States, where statistics are available every month.
Since the first of January, 1909, the production of
copper in the United States, according to the figure's
published by the Copper Producers' Association, has
amounted to 799,430,871 pounds. Production is in268
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crea ing each month, but against this a broadening
tendency ts exhibited by consumption statistics. The
consumption and production figures for the United
States during the present year are as follows:

January.
February
March
April.
May ..
June ..
July ..
Total ..

Consumption.
51,862,624
43,578,118
48,871,964
47,546,010
61,163,325
60,591,116
75,520,083

Exported.
38,499,797
30,968,496
51,191,043
65,110,111
70,542,753
70,996,457
75,018,974

389,133,240 410,297,631

Total
Production.
90,362,421
74,546,614
108,063,007
112,656,121
131,706,078
131,557,573
150,539,057

799,430,871

It is estimated that the stocks of copper on hand
and in transit in Europe and America are equal to
about two months' consumption at the present rate.
It is too early to expect a pronounced revival in the
electrical industries, but it is a significant fact that
both the General Electric and Westinghouse Manufacturing companies are working their machine
shops on full time. Brass melters and founders are
fully engaged and the wire-drawing mills are reporting better business.
Those who are familiar with the copper industries
do not look for any great advance in copper prices
this year. Copper consumption will slowly increase
and al-sorb the stocks on hand, and, concurrently
with such in creased consumption, increases in copper
prices will be looked for. It wil l probably be a year
or more before the demand for copper threatens to
run ahead of the supply. Until then extraordinary
advances in prices are not expected.
The Calumet & Hecla Mine is the largest and
most profitable copper mine in the United States,
and those who are pessimistically regarding the outlook for copper may learn much by perusing the
company's annual report which has just been issued.
In addition to owning the great Calumet & Hecla
Mine, the company has very extensive investments
in other companies' stocks. At the recent annual
meeting of the company, President Agassiz informed
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the stockholders that the directors have erected a power line to the Lake Superior Water Works and
have installed an electrically driven centrifugal pump
of a capacity of 3,000,000 gallons daily, and are now
sending water from these works to the mill boilers
at Torch Lake. To regulate the flow a tank of a
capacity of 750,000 gallons has been built near the
mills. The regrinding mill building has been finished, and during the past year twenty-four of the
Chilean mills were installed; they are now- running
satisfactorily. The company is extracting four
pounds of copper from a ton of tailing, treated at a
cost of about Sc. per pound. At present the production of the mill is about 1,000,000 pounds per year.
In addition to instituting the above-mentioned improvements, which were made to obtain the copper
from material previously thrown aside as a waste
product, the directors continue to show their conl}.dence in the value of copper mining, in addition, of
course, to their optimism regarding the copper outlook, by investing the company's surplus in new
copper-mining stocks. Notwithstanding the fact
that the company now has a very large amount of
capital invested in about twenty producing copper
mines whose present production aggregates 50,000,000
pounds of copper per annum, President Agassiz in
his last annual address to the stockholders made
the following statements:
"We are organizing the White Pine Copper Co.
to develop the lands which carry the Nonesuch lode,
to be conveyed to that company by the Keweenaw
Association and others. We shall own about half
the shares of this company at a cost of $100,000
spent in exploration and on condition of advancing
the money needed for its development. Acting under the authority given at the annual meeting of
the stockholders on August 16, 1905, your directors
have, at a' co~t of $8,592,130, in notes and cash, purchased 25,000 shares of Laurium ivfining Co., 10,316
shares of Seneca Mining Co., 25,507 shares of Isle
Royale Copper Co .. 9.600 shares of Osceola Consolidated Mining Co., 19.400 shares of Tamarack Mining
Co., 24,796 shares of Ahmeek Mininp: Company."
The confidence in the copper outlook thus expressed by the Calumet & Hecla directors is shared
by copper authorities throughout the world.
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In the numerous pessimistic articles recently published anent Copper-Metal, 1 note an extraordinary
omission. None of the writers refer to the advancing trend of commodity prices. Commodities have
advanced almost 50% in the last ten years. A decade
ago 75 cents was the nominal price of wheat, 40 cents
the nominal price of corn, and so on through the list.
There is every reason to give copper a new price
also, but not one of the writers has done so.
The General Situation,
The one redeeming feature in the general situation
when regarded from a discounted stock market point
of view is that there is still room for further expansion of general business. Railroad earnings, while
satisfactory, are still below the 1907 records. Twentyfive roads reporting to The Wall Street Journal
show total gross for the last week in July 9.43%
greater than in 1908, but are about 7% less than in
1907; for the month of July 7.7% over 1908 and
13.09% less than in 1907. Anxiety is expressed by
those close to the car supply over the imminence
of a car famine during the coming fall. Orders
for new equipment continue to come in from various
roads, but their rolling stock is far from being up
to the par in point of quantity and condition.
Everything in the news regarding the iron and
steel trade is distinctly favorable. The output of
anthracite and coke pig iron during July was
2,101,579 tons, the largest since October, 1907, which
was 2,236,000 tons. In the face of this big production many of the steel companies have used up their
panic-time accumulations and are in the market for
fresh supplies. Basic pig iron for immediate delivery is becoming a scarce article in the eastern
markets. Contracts for many thousand tons of
structural steel have recently been awarded to Pittsburg concerns. The U. S. Steel Corporation has
opened its books for 1910 delivery of rails and has
already written up orders for 200,000 tons. Some
of the finishing mills are reported one to two months
behind.
The fact that our imports for the months of June
and July were heavily in excess over exports has
been made the subject of a great deal of comment
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in and out of the public prints. The true explanation
of this state of affairs will unquestionably be found
in the anxiety of importers to anticipate any adverse features of the tariff bill. This theory is
apparently proven by the turn in our favor which
has been made since the tariff bill became a law.
Boston reports a big movement of wool at prices
practically 50 % higher than a year ago. Cotton
goods trade is in good shape.
Crop and harvest reports are generally satisfactory, although some fear is expressed over the possibility of the extreme heat in portions of the corn
belt causing a deterioration in that crop.
The money market is quiet, with an undertone
of firmness caused by some little demand from the
interior, further shipments to the Argentine and
engagements of $3,000,000 gold for shipment to
Japan during S~ptember. Canada has begun to call
for small amounts for crop-moving purpose&. The
prospective demand from that section as well as
from the western states for the same purpose is
still an unsolved problem.

The Technical Situation.
The technical situation has been greatly improved
by the sharp breaks which have occurred during
the week. The stop-loss orders which I have frequently called attention to are reduced to a minimum and many weak long accounts have been eliminated. The short interest has increased materially,
but this selling is of a day-to-day character and
will be quickly retired on an advance.
While the technique has improved as stated above,
it is not the kind of improvement which will endure.
The situation is very different from a cleaning up
shake-out which would incapacitate the -w eaker operators and leave the market in the hands of str ong
interests. The stop-loss orders were mostly placed
to protect profits, and these people will go in again
and place more stop orders. There is much public
speculative money in sight and a growing public
interest. Jf stocks advance to approximately the
forme r high levels the technical situation will probably be weaker than at any time in two years. We
must therefore look upon this betterment as of a
temporary character.
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Conclusion.
When we try to map out the probable movements
of a market far in advance, we necessarily enter the
field of guesswork. The movements are so dependent upon future developments that cut-and-dried
rules will not apply. lf it were possible to lay down,
with any degree of accuracy, a plot of price changes
for, say, six months, vigilance and examinat1011
would no longer be necessary and market letters
would have no raison d'etre.
This preamble means that I am going to do a
little guessing and I would like to have it understood that the opinion (or guess) which follows is
subject to immediate change.
I think we may look for a very decided rally in
this market before the real reaction occurs. The
technical situation, as outlined above, the fact that
distribution is not yet completed, and evidences of
support on the sharp breaks, lead to the belief that
before the big show begins there will be another
upturn. We do not need to enter the psychological
phase of the matter very deeply to understand that
such a recovery would greatly impress the public.
They have been somewhat suspicious of the market
on this last advance. The suspicions would evaporate if the market turned upward, and let no man
deceive himself by thinking that the makers of markets do not understand and work on all these mental
characteristics of the lambs. ,There is a stage of the
market where the questions of values and conditions
dwarf all other considerations into insignificance.
There is another stage where the question of the
receptivity of the public is all important. We are
in the stage last named now.
I do not advise anyone to buy stocks because of
the probability of a rally. It is bad trading to try
to gain the ultimate dollar. A possible five-point
profit, as compared with a possible twenty-point
loss, is not safe nor alluring. The best, in fact the
only thing, to do now is to act as a spectator until
the situation is clearer. If stocks advance as -suggested, belated holders should dispose of what they
have and sell short. If the advance does not occur
it will not be long before we can resume our bullish
position with the greatest confidence and at a lower
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level. There is no use in trying to rob the· market,
Let the other fellow make the dangerous dollars,
lf the market follows out the program which 1 have
in my minu and rallies to a pomt where the technical situation again grows rotten, I intend definitely
recommending a bnei campaign on the short side
for the first time since 19U7. 1 am not sure that
this will occur at all, but it probably will.
ln recent letters 1 have not dwelt at any length on
the question of Mr. Harriman's health. This is because I considered it unnecessary to occupy space in
a market letter with matters which are thoroughly
threshed out _in newspapers. I am informed, however, that he ts a very sick man and my information
is of such a character that it leaves me no room
for doubt. If the circumstances were ordinary I
should not feel that Mr. Harriman's removal would
severely affect the stock market, but the regime
which he has established is more in the nature of
an absolute monarchy than a corporation controlled
by directors or stockholders. The autocracy is unprecedented, and when we reflect that the Harriman
lines have made more money out of the speculations
of an individual than from natural and reasonable
accretion, we may easily realize that his death might
have a very serious effect marketwise.
The Wild Man of Boston burst forth into song
again this week. He has been telling the people
to do the wrong thing at the wrong time so long
that they pay very little attention to him. No one
with ordinary horse sense could read his advertisement without detecting the fact that he had something to sell. He will tell you what it is later. The
man should be ignored.
I have given considerable space in this letter to a
discussion of the copper metal situation. This is
because I believe the copper stocks will be leaders
in the next advance.
The money situation has been discussed in former
letters. This witl be our next bugbear. It may not
prove serious, but it will have a decided effect on
quotations.
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August 28, 1909.
The little spasm in the stock market during the
latter half of the week was generally attributed to
the failing health of Mr. Harriman. It is preposterous to assume that one man was ever legitimately
in a position to greatly affect the real values of our
securities through his personality. I employ the
word "legitimately" advisedly. With all due allowances for the executive ability of this or any other
individual, there is no position which cannot be adequately filled. The actual advances in the value of
the so-called Harriman properties are due primarily
to territorial growth and development, and there are
many other railroad systems which have done as
much as Union Pacific or Southern Pacific under
the less sensational jurisdiction of other men.
It is probable that Mr. Harriman's utterances were
more effective in precipitating a decline than was
his physical condition. A coterie of enthusiastic
speculators have given ear to the most faritastic
stories of increased dividends, where increases were
not warranted, and distributions where there was
nothing to distribute. The word "segregation''. has
been one of the most delicious morsels which the
imaginative people have rolled under their tongues,
and only two years ago a great d~cline in the stock was.
excused by fears that segregation would be legally
enforced. It is the same way with projected bond
issues. In a bear period they are bear factors; in a
bull period they are bull factors, even if the purposes
for which money is required are exactly similar.
The real menace to the Harriman stocks lies in
too much speculation; too much expansion, or, to
coin a word, too much Napoleonism. According to
newspaper reports, Mr. Harriman emphasized the
statement that he was in no way interested in speculation. If that isn't the devil quoting scripture I
don't know what is. The natural accretion is admitted; the great ability of the individual as a
railroad manager is admitted; but the speculative
element has also been present for several years in a
most pronounced degree. And we are going to hear
more about changes of capitalistic form, etc., before
long.
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Mr. Harriman cannot be specitically criticised for
any of the stories which have been circulated about
his properties. He did not promulgate the numerous
canards; he did not state that every holder of one
share of Union Pacific was to receive an automobile.
and a diamond pin. His culpability lies in the silence
which gives assent. A prompt and vigorous denial
of all these extravagant expectations would have
saved a lot of trouble.
While there is no exact analogy between the
present situation and that which obtained in 1906-7,
it is interesting to note how sharp and wide the
swings in a stock like Union Pacific may be in a
speculative period. I have therefore prepared a
chart (Vol. II.) showing the movements of this
stock for a number of months preceding and following the unexpected increase in dividend rates in 1906.
I have not carried the lines of the chart into the real
panic period of 1907, as we are not going to have
another panic just yet and the comparison would
possibly be misleading as well as unfair.

The General Situation.
Each day brings fresh evidence of the wonderful
recuperative powers of this country. This is particularly marked when compared with conditions on the
other side, where the recovery, while gradual, is so
jar behind that our improvement seems but little
short of phenomenal. In England the retarding
influence appears to be the uncertainty over the
budget, which is particularly annoying to capitalists
and manufacturers. In Germany and France there is
some dissatisfaction shown over the working of our
new tariff bill and some agitation in the latter country for retaliatory measures. Foreign crops, however, are abundant and money plentiful, and there
is no reason to believe that there are any permanently serious obstacles to a complete revival. In
the meantime some of these deterrent factors are
working to the advantage of this country, where an
outlet is provided for the employment of money
lying idle in Europe.
Our own money market continues easy and the
supply is plentiful. Acting Secretary of the Treasury
Norton has added his testimony in favor of the
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Chart Showing Daily Market Movements of Union Pacific £or Months of July to December, 1906; and January and February,
1907.
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belief that the interior will not need to call upoe
this center for any large amounts for moving the
crops. Apparently in contradiction of these views
is the statement of President Reynolds, of the Continental National Bank of Chicago, that his bank
has reduced its commercial paper loans from $22,000,000 to $17,000,000 and that these loans will be
reduced several millions more and that bonds will
then be sold to obtain the cash needed this fall.
Our crops are turning out well and are already
stimulating all lines of business in the farming sections, where preparations now being made foreshadow record-breaking activities during the coming
fall and winter. Cash wheat in Minneapolis suffered a perpendicular drop of 25 cents per bushel
early in the week. This is a good thing in more
than one direction. The price of wheat has been
abnormally high. The millers could make no money
and the export demand has undoubtedly been adversely affected by the situation which has prevailed.
The demand for cars with which to move the
crops has begun to be felt in the steel trade because
of the difficulty in securing cars to transport steel
from the mills to the equipment plants.
Equipment .and steel rail orders continue to flow
in from the railroads, the inquiry for the latter item
being particularly heavy. It is expected that 500,000
tons will be needed in the near future. According
to the Journal of Commerce rolling stock to the
amount of between $150,000,000 and $175,000,000 has
been ordered since January 1. The strike in the
car works at l'vicKees Rocks has developed considerable rioting and some bloodshed this week and has
been made the subject of a special inquiry by the
Federal Department of Justice.
The news from the iron and steel centers includes
such items as an advance of SO cents per ton in the
price of Bessemer iron in Pittsburg; an unsatisfied
eastern demand for basic iron; labor shortage in
the Connellsville region; orders booked by both the
Steel Corporation and independents are sufficient to
keep plants running full capacity for the balance
of the year; big contracts for armor plate awarded
by the United States Government, and forecasts of
record ore shipments for August by the Steel Cor277

. poration. A great many extensions to the plants
1 111 the Pittsburg district are under way. The l{e' P.ublic Iron & Steel Company's annual report, cons'idering the pei;iod of depression which it covers, is
very gratifying.
The woolen trade is in good shape and cotton
t:ade, partitularly in the South, very active. Construction of new mills and extensions of old mills
in that section are reported every day.
A revival in the glass trade in Pennsylvania is
reported and many of the long idle plants are expected to be in operation before the end of September.
Gross earnings of 25 railroads for the first week
of August are 11.41 % over s;ime period a year ago
and are within 01.76% of those two years ago.
Building permit s in New York City for the year
to date are nearly double those of a year ago and
are slightly ahead of 1906.

The Technical Situation.
The technical situation again assumes two divisions; first the day-to-day conditions; second, the
more important underlying location of securities.
The elimination of stop-loss orders and weak long
accounts, and an increase in the short interest, improve the shifting technique, but lying below this is
the fact that the public buying of stocks, under
existing money conditions, has been quite large. If
the class of operators last named are to be forced out
of their holdings, our declines must go much further
than anything that has been experienced so far, and
every break of a few points financially strengthens
the bears and weakens the bulls. The decline from the
extreme top on the average is, at the close of business Friday (August 27), only 3.49 points. In a
period which was similar to the present one in
every important characteristic ( 1905), stocks declined
almost 13 points on the average in a little over one
month (April 14, 127.01; May 22, 114.52). The time
of year is not the same, but we cannot play seasons.
After two years of advancing prices a clean-up is inevitable. After the decline mentioned in 1905 began
a great advance which carried all stocks to new high
levels. The belated industrials were the leaders, as
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they will be in our next advance. The period of
decline in 1905 was full of rallies of two or three
points, which means six or seven points in certain
stocks. These rallies will come now, but they will
be followed by further declines.
The technical situation is of a character to bring
about temporary recoveries, but they will not endure.

Conclusion.

In recent letters I have offered the opinion that
the safest position was that of an observer. I
modified this somewhat in the daily letter of August
25, stating that "stocks might now be sold on rallies
if proper margins were provided." . As no considerable rally has occurred since the date of that letter,
I have not considered it necessary to telegraph. No
matter how a telegram is worded, it is widely construed as imperative advice to do something at once,
and this results in confusion as to my meaning. We
will have plenty of rallies to sell on, and, while we
may pick up a fair profit by selling short, the next
real campaign is going to be on the buying side.
If people will only get it into their heads that a
brief period of nonparticipation is sometimes desirable and healthful, and that the stages of the market
are occasionally . very perplexing., there would be
more profit for them at the end of a year. The man
who is patient in a market like this has all the best
of the bargain. If a big rally occurs he can sell short ;
if it does not occur he can wait a little while and
start a brand new campaign on the long side under
the most favorable and auspicious circumstances. On
the whole, I should prefer the latter method of
procedure. I feel very confident as to what is going
to happen later on and where it is going to happen.
Our fundamental conditions are all right, but they
have been overworked, and our stock prices have
in the last month or two been made more by manipulation and hot air than by natural movements based
on values.
.
While I feel that the principal decline is going
to be in the rails, it is certain that industrials will
drop sympathetically, and I cannot a s yet recommend purchases in any quarter. There is some
good accumulation on a scale down in such stocks
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as Amalgamated Copper, Smelters, American Car &
Foundry, American Locomotive and the other equipments, but these buyers do not care if the market
goes ten points lower and their buying does not
indicate any immediate improvement in prices.
There is ·another point. The man who wants to
sell short and not take too many chances has his
best opportunity in the moderate-priced rails, such
as Chesapeake & Ohio, Chicago & Alton, Colorado
Souti).ern, etc. Practically all the stocks in this group
show well statistically, but have advanced to prices
which cover their values and are not subject to such
violent manipulation as the speculative leaders. In a
general decline they will show fair profits without
so much danger of a twist. It is true that the getrich-quick bears will pay little attention to this group
of stocks because they can get "action" in the highpriced rails, but the high-priced rails can also get
"action" on the get-rich-quick bears. Later on it
may be all right to sell the leaders, but, unless very
strong margins are provided, they should be avoided
for the present. I will reiterate that in speaking
of rallies of two or three points, I do not mean
that if Union Pacific goes up two or three points
it is a sale-I refer always to averages. I have not
as yet found it expedient to telegraph recommending
short sales for the reasons given; but, if it should
appear at any time that the market should be sold
at once without waiting for further rallies, I will
not hesitate to use the wires. Meanwhile, if the
statistical prices given at the bottom of daily and
weekly letters show average advances of two or
three points, stocks should be sold. I do not think
they will much exceed that, under present conditions.
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Chart Showing Market Movements for August, 1909.
(Thomas Gibson's Figures.)

I

11/1.

L.---

/

---........ / ' 1----......... I---

1..----Ill

11

//0
/09
6S
IOI

•

:.~I

If"'

~. , ,.

/ 01 63

.

i .

-'-' ....

\

-I'.

'
... ... ·.
.. .
.

·- .. .

i , / --- --- ',
..._

••• •-

\

/

I
-7 -

\

~/

~

,

.. . 'v
.. .. ... ... .. ..
...
:
·. ... .. ..

-8-4,·... 1
-'-'"•"·····
······.....

9S

....

;-

-

8•

l
;

..__I\

\r----._ V -------

" - ---I'

. -·

.. .

['\

\

--- -- -"

-

< 81 /11 ••
;:,

.!.!:

,.',._/

~ 12 91

.·2

' /

""

I

8~

:i

J

IJ

.r

6,

7

/Q

,,

, ,_,_

/J

,,,..

1,

17

,,

/ 9

JLd

2./

2J

:1"1-

,,..

2~

,. "' ~,

3o

.,,

Solid line shows movements of 23 Active Rails. Broken line, 18 Active Industrials. Dotted line, the combined daily
average of both. The figures at bottom of each vertical line represent the days of the month.

September 4, 1909.
Except for the Government Cotton Report, the
week in the stock market was devoid of any important feature. Late in the week the manipulators
grew more aggressive than at any time since the
decline, devoting attention chiefly to the stocks in
which a short interest was found. It happens that
the shortage is largely concentrated in high-priced
rails, and, as this class of securities has been much
in the public eye of late, the manipulators had a great
advantage-the assistance of a short interest in the
very stocks which would naturally be chosen for a
demonstration.
The Cotton Report, although a very poor one, was
not given serious consideration by speculators, but
there are some PDints about it which are well
worthy of attention.
In the letter of September 2 it was pointed out
that a small crop at high prices could not be considered as the equivalent of a large crop at low
prices, even if the value in dollars is the same. The
small crop at high prices means that labor tn harvesting, ginning, and spinning is curtailed; that the
distribution of the proceeds of the crop is not
equalized, and that the purchasing power of communities, as well as the money received by carriers
for transporting the crop to market, is reduced.
A small crop means not only higher prices to
domestic consumers but also a cutting down of the
exportable surplus. It is the exportable su rplus only
to which high prices may be advantageously applied.
High prices in our own borders represents merely
swapping dollars. Domestic requirements are steadily expanding. From a crop of over 11,000,000 bales
in 1898, we could spare 7,674,000 bales for export.
From a crop of about the same size in 1906. we could
spare only 6,753,534, yet we sold the 7,674,000 bales
at an average price of 6.22 cents and the 6,753,534
bales at 11.29. Even under the restraining influence
of low prices in the earlier period, a·n d the incentive of high prices in the later period, we could not
spare as much cotton by almost 1,000,000 bales. If
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we are to keep up our exports of cotton, the production must increase steadily to keep pace with our
growth of population. Twenty years ago a good
crop of cotton was about 7,000,000 bales; to-day it
is about 12,500,000 bales. To put the matter in
another form, if our crop of cotton was to remam
from year to year at the present figure (12,500,000
bales), it would only be a question of time until it
would all be needed for domestic consumption, and
we would have nothing at all to export.
Looking at the question of money received for
cotton exports, there is, so far as is now indicated,
nothing very alluring in the present situation. The
indicated crop is about 10,500,000 bales. Out of this
we cannot export much, if any, over 6,00Cl,000 bales,
even when stocks on hand are considered. At 12
cents this would bring us from exports $360,000,000;
at 13 cents, $390,000,000. In 1907 we received for our
exportable surplus $471,000,000; in 1908, $437,000,000.
With a trade balance of between $400,000,000 and
$500,000,000 against us, these figures are not pleasant
to contemplate. It will not do to look to our cereal
crops for a cure for this deficiency. The value of
our wheat exports in 1908 was less than $100,000,000,
of corn only $34,000,000, and of flour about $64,000,000. Oats· cut no figure at all. Hog products
and glucose, which may be called corn, will run
about $125,00,000. The whole thing does not cover
the money received from cotton, and it is doubtful
if we will be able to ship as much wheat this year
as last, as we have no remainders from the previous
crop.
In offering these statements I have no desire to
howl calamity. These are simply facts , with a bearing on the future of stock prices, which should be
given due consideration. Personally, these thin gs
do not even make me bearish on the stock market,
but they act as a restraining influence.
The recent methods of exploiting all that is good,
and brushing aside all that is evil, are perilous. The
danger to tpe sto ck market, fr om the lo ng distance
point of view, lies more in overestimating our prosperity and getting too confident, than in anything
else.
In reply to a letter asking an opinion as to the
outlook for copper metal, I have the following com-
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munication. The writer is well versed in the copper
trade and its prospects:
''Notwithstanding the heavy decrease in copper exports for the month of August, the metal market,
both here and abroad, is maintaining a steady tone.
Most of the transactions recently have been made on
the offer price, rather than on the bid, which indicates that the producing interests are satisfied with
the market position, Estimates of the domestic consumption for August vary from 75,000,000 to 100,000,000 pounds, and to this increa ed domestic consumption is attributable in part the smaller exports.
There is a plethora of bullish news on steel and
iron. Record activity is being accompanied by
higher prices, both for the raw material and manufactured products. The outlook for steel is for even
greater activity, based on the prospective demand
for new construction in all lines, as well as for
renewals by the railroads. In copper metal, the liquidation has been even more severe than that in
steel, the metal having declined more than fifty per
cent. from the high record prices of the last boom
period. So far, the rally has been merely nominal.
The reason for this is that record-breaking production began at a time of slack demand and caused
an accumulation of surplus supplies.
The low grade steam shovel mines have injected
a new element into the situation. The cost of production by these new mines is variously stated from
6½ cents to 8½ cents per pound, while with the old
deep level mines, outside of a few where the silver
and gold recovered is very large, the cost ranges
from 10 cents to 12 cents per pound. Thus, at the
present level of prices, the steam shovel mines can
well afford to sell their copper, and no effort lo0king
toward the restriction of the output has been succes tul for this reason.
That the point has now been reached when such
effort is no longer necessary was shown by the last
report of the Copper Producers' As ociation, showing a decrease in world's stocks of 10,929',595 pounds
for the month of July, in consequence of largely
increased domestic consumption.
Production for the month of July was 118,277,603
pound~, an increase of 1,710,110 pounds over June,
but slightly under the May production. The fac" ·
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that the last three months' production has been practically at the same level, would indicate that under
present conditions and price level the limit of production had been reached. It would take a decided
rise in the price of the metal to render profitable
the working of many mines which are now nonproducers.
Granting then that production is unlikely immediately to increase, the course of the metal market
will be decided by the nature of the demand. As •
with_· steel, prosperity means an increased use of
the metal for construction; but copper is in a position to benefit particularly by demands for new construction. Naturally, with increased building, such
as is starting in all sections of the country, copper
will be used largely for electrical purposes; but the
principal field where tremendous quantities of the
metal are likely to be needed is in the construction
of electrical railways and in the electrification of
steam roads. The success of the New Haven suburban electrification is demonstrated, and many other
railroads are now electrically equipping their terminals and suburban service. It seems only a question of time whe·n trunk lines will be electrically
equipped for passenger service. This means the
consumption of copper beyond anything yet reached,
not only in this country but abroad.
Domestic stocks of copper have shown a steady
decrease since May, as may be seen by the following table:
Changes.
by Months.
Pounds.
August 1
122,596,607
Dec. 32;261,454
July 1 ..
154,858,061 . Dec. ·14,990,080
Dec. 13,349,932
JutJe 1 ..
169,848,141
May 1 ..
183,198,073
Inc.
918,171
On August 1, stocks had declined to about the
level of January 1. As the stocks now stana, they
are practically no more than one month's production, or a fair working balance of the metal. Following is a table of export deliveries and domestic
deliveries for the past seven months:
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July,. ••
June .•••
May ••••
April .•.•
March ••
February ..
January .•••

Export
Deliveries.
(pounds)
75,018,974
70,966,457
70,542,753
65,110,111
59,191,043
30,968,496
38,449,797

Domestic
Deliveries.
(pounds)
75,520,0~3
60,591,116
61,163,325
47,546,010
48,871,964
43,578,118
51,862,624

Total.
(pounds)
150,539,057
131,557,573
131,706,078
112,656,121
108,063,007
74,546,614
90,362,421

From the foregoing table it will be seen that
both domestic and export deliveries have increased
st eadily since February, reaching the highest level
in July. As the exports for August have shown a
considerable falling off, while the domestic deliveries are reported to have increased, it is a fair assumption that total deliveries for August will be
approximately 140,000,000 pounds. Assuming that
production in August was at about the same rate as
in July, a further reduction in domestic stocks may
be looked for of, say, 20,000,000 pounds.
The bearing of this on copper securities is evident.
Stocks of the metal are working so small that they
are no longer a menace to the market. The stability of the demand for the metal, and its probable
growth, indicates that any increase in production
will be readily absorbed at advancing prices. There
has as yet been no broad speculation in copper securities, and it is advisable to accumulate those of
the better class in anticipation of the expected improvement in the price of the metal."

The General Situation.
There is practically no change in business conditions throughout the country except by way of betterment. Dun's record of failures as a barometer of
the situation compares very favorably with a year
ago.
Copper metal figures so far obtainable still show
a disparity between production and consumption,
but matters in this department. have been in a bad
way for so long that any decided change will undoubtedly be favorable to the holders of the metal.
As it is, there is a gradual increase in consumption
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and it should be kept in mind that manufacturers'
stocks are very low.
No let down is reported in the iron and steel industry. Mills everywhere are running very closely
to full capacity, which in a great many instances exceeds the capacity of 1907. The production is therefore greater than 1907 records by from 1 to 3%.
Ore sales are extremely heavy. One of the big steel
companies has received an order for 300,000 car axles
from the Pressed Steel Car Co., which indicates the
extent of the ·contribution by the railroads to prosperity.
The increase in the loans reported by New York
banks during a period of liquidation in the stock
market, has aroused a great deal of speculation as
to the reasons therefor. A variety of theories are
advanced by various writers. Some of them attribute
it to shifting of stock market loans from London to
this center. Others contend that it represents the
passing of stocks from weak to strong hands and
vice versa. Expansion of business is also mentioned
as a probable cause. From the character of the
correspondence coming into this office the demand
for business purposes seems more likely to be the
overshadowing reasor. These reports show that
high class commercial paper held by Eastern banks is
being freely offered to bankers throughout the West.
It is a well-known fact that for some time past our
imports of raw materials and manufactured goods
have been remarkably heavy. In addition to the
trade balance against us, there is the cost of manufacturing these raw imports, which calls for large
amounts of money. The test of the ability of the
West to finance movement of the crop of grain will
come when the corn begins to flow toward the market centers. During September receipts of old corn
from first hands may be heavy on account of the
light movement during July and the bright prospects
for the new crop. The $10,000,000 Treasury deficit
for August is by no means a negligible factor. Taking into consideration all the factors in the money
situation we have reason to be thankful that liquidation has been present in the stock market rather
than cause for wonderment at the spectacle of increasing loans during such liquidation.
Preparations are being made in New England to
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take advantage of the new higher duty on knitted
gloves which enables manufacturers to compete with
Germany.
The leather business is in excellent shape, judging by the report made this week by the big leather
combine.
Harvesting returns are sufficiently large to offset
· the unduly pessimistic tone of some of the reports
that came to hand during the week. The St. Paul's
crop report is a distinctly favorable document. · Kansas corn, undeniably, is damaged to Some extent,
but we will raise a big crop of it notwithstanding the
drouth. The cotton crop report issued by the Government shows a further deterioration for August.
11,000,000 bales is now considered a high estimate.
Railroad gross earn;ngs for the second week of
August is a r ecord breaker, 11.6% over 1908, and
6.7% over 1907 same week. Some shortage of cars
is reported from the South.

The Technical Situation.
The technical situation is mixed at present. In
Union Pacific and Reading there is a pretty big
shortage, and it is of a rather vulnerable character.
By the advice of many brokers and other advisors,
public buying is largely concentrated in the industrials and low-priced rails. No matter how correct
this position may prove ultimately, it operates temporarily in favor of the high-priced stocks, and
against the low-priced issues. Under cover of the
strength in the easily advanced leaders and the
proclivity of the speculative public to buy low-priced
issues, liquidation in the latter class is facilitated.
If the assumption that liquidation is desirable is
correct, the bulls have an ideal technical situation
to help them out. Such a condition, however, is
transitory and could be quickly reversed by the elimination of the short interest.
United States Steel is also in a peculiar position
technically. There is a very considerable short interes't in this stock, which has been growing larger
on the last two or three points of advance. On the
other hand, tips to buy the stock have been widely
circulated in a most emphatic manner during the
week, and much buying of a questionable character
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has occurred. From my investigations of this trading, I consider the selling of a better character than
the buying, and also find some large blocks of the
stock coming out on hard spots. This latter is no:
short stock but genuine liquidation.

Conclusion.

l~I

Iii
11111

.. Ii

Th(,re is no occasion to change the recently expressed views as to the immediate future of prices.
The market 'is not a safe purchase at this level and
attempts to manufacture a bull campaign, under present conditions, will end in disaster. Later on, and
from a somewhat lower range of prices, it is my
opinion that a decided upward movement will occur,
in which industrial stocks will be the leaders. A
market which, after an advance of two years, without a single material reaction, proceeds to ride
rough-shod over such unfavorable factors as the
bad cotton report, the probabilities of higher money
rates, and the contraction of available speculative
funds, which, in short, ignores all adverse factors,
present or prospective, and is based on manipulation and promises, is a dangerous one. If we are
to correctly conserve the factor of safety, such a
market should be avoided. It will not be Jong until
another opportunity will be offered and we can reenter the lists with some assurance that we are on
solid ground.
There is one little stock which has been a listed
joke for many years, which I think we can pick up
at any time now to hold for a long pull and a large
profit. I refer to Chicago Great Western. This
property is over-capitalized and its form of capitalization is grotesque, but one of the principal bars to
progress has been Mr. Stickney. This gentleman
has been persona non grata in Wall Street and in
banking circles for a long time. Mr. Felton, on the
other hand, is renowned for his ability in rejuvenating debilitated railroad corporations, and, with
the Morgan interests behind him, we may look for
better things, much better things, for Chicago Great
Western.
The annual report of the American Locomotive
Company is bad, but no one expected it to be otherwise. The report covers a period of stagnation and
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does not differ much from the reports of other equipment corporations during the same period. The
stock will eventually sell much higher.
United States Steel I do not like. The statistical
position is excellent, but the stock is high enough,
even for a 4 per cent. stock, if that rate is declared
later on. Many tips are circulated now, presumably
from high quarters. None of this gratuitous information was in evidence when the stock was forty,
thirty, or even ten points lower, although the future
probabilities were well known to the promulgators
of the present good news. Steel common may go
a few points higher, but there is plenty of the stock
for sale by people close to the inside. I think Steel
can be purchased cheaper later on.
In some of the industrial stocks, such as Amalgamated Copper, American Locomotive, American Car
& Foundry, and other leading equipments, it is safe
provided the method is correctly understood and
religiously adhered to. The essential basis of the
scale order is that a decline is desirable and that
if the anticipated decline does not appear, or does
enough to make purchases on the scale order plan,
not go so far as expected, we will not be left altogether. The plan, to be successfully carried out,
requires patience and ample marginal provisions.
Pressed Steel Car preferred is very cheap at this
level. The decline occasioned by labor troubles will
be rapidly recovered, and the dividends are not
menaced.
On advances of two or three points on the average, I consider it best to di spose of any belated
holdings, or even to sell short the rails or Steel
common. I do not think such advances will hold.
We must have a clean-up before the real bull market
begins.
·
A chart showing market movements of stocks for
the month of.August will be found in Vol. II.
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September 11, 1909,
The news of Mr. Harriman's death, which was
withheld until after the close of the stock market
on Thursday, was followed by a very shrewd bit
of manipulation. It is only recently that the active
interests in the market have realized that London
could be used as a powerful lever for supporting or
dei,ressing prices. In reality the London market
for Americans is a very small affair compared with
our home market, but the very fact that it is small
permits of very cheap manipulation. Prices can be
forced up or down in that market on one-tenth of
the purchases or sales necessary to effect a corresponding movement on the New York Stock Exchange. The sentimental effect, however, is measured in a different way. The first news the active
operator scans, long before the opening of our
market, is the London list, and on this he bases
his initial operations. There are many decided advantages to be gained by opening our market materially higher or lower over night. The public
operators lose their opportunities to either buy or
sell in an ordinary range of prices. When it is
desirable to make a higher level without being
compelled to take a lot of stock on the way up,
it is a very simple matter to bid prices up in London
and open our market higher.
Another thing which affected stocks favorably on
Friday and Saturday was the fact that Union Pacific
was heavily purchased for two different factions who
wish to secure voting privileges. A great deal of
stock was also borrowed for this purpose. The annual me et11111: occurs on October 1~. but the books
close at 3 P. M. Monday, September 13, and no stock
can be registered after that date. The advance in
Union Pacific was therefore of an artificial character,
but, as the matter was not understood, other stocks
moved upward in sympathy. As to how far competitive buying will carry a certain stock, it may be
said that there is absolutely no way to gauge an
advance occasioned by such buying. Neither values
nor the technical position of shares are considered
in such a m ove ment. I do not think, personally,
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that any runaway market will ensue, and, after the
desired lines are accumulated, the market will decline .rapidly.
Mr. Harriman's illness and death have so absorbed attention this week that the evidences of
unfavorable changes in money and crop conditions
have received only perfunctory consideration. This
method of arriving at conclusions is very dangerous.
Granting that Mr. Harriman was an important man
in the railroad world, and that his death may be
temporarily detrimental to certain properties, the
trend of the general market will be much more
affected by money and the crops than by the
elimination of an individual.
The decline of ten points in the condition of
corn is disappointing. The indicated crop is now
only 2,648,845,000 bushels.
In 1908 we made
2,668,65 f,000 bushels; in 1907, 2,592,320,000 bushels;
in 1906, 2,927,416,000; in 1905, 2,707,994,000, and in
1904, 2,467,481,000. The indicated crop for 1909 is
therefore below the average of the preceding five
years. This :a not as it should be. Crops should
gradually increase with population. Ten years ago
2,000,000,000 bushels was a big crop of corn, and
twenty years ago an average crop was about 1,600,000,000 bushels.
It is rather amusing to note the contorted logic
with which the stubborn bull element greets these
crop disappointments. When cotton, our great
"money" crop, was shown to be in the lowest condition on record, they stated that this deficiency
would be overcome by large cereal crops. When
the government report cut off about 300,000,000
bushels of corn, they dismissed this disappointment
by pointing to the big wheat crop. 'I'wo morning
papers stated that despite the deficiency in corn,
general crops would be the largest on record. This
statement was carelessly made and is unimportant
because untrue. The year 1906, as compared with
indications for 1909, is as follows:
Wheat.
Corn.
Oats.
Cotton.
1906 .. 735,261,000 2,927,416,000 964,904,000 13,510,982
1909* . 714,302,000 2,648,845,000 1,008,321,000 10,500,000

* Indicated.
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But even if the statement that our present crops
were to exceed all former productions was correct,
it must be remembered that stock prices were
helped upward in anticipation of a fair cotton crop
and a bumper yield of corn, and that wherever a
stock, or a group of stocks, aiscounts good things
which do not come to pass, that portion of the
rise which was due to such erroneous discounting
represents inflation. It will be understood that in
pointing out these things I have no desire to look
at the future through blue spectacles, but in this
game nothing is any good except the truth, and
we must look dispassionately on every development
affecting securities whether or not they are distasteful.
It would be idle to assume that with 21,000,000
bushels less wheat; almost 300,000,000 bushels less
corn, and 2,000,000 bales less cotton than in 1906, we
can duplicate the general business boom or railroad
tonnage of that year. Forty-four million bushels
more oats will not go far to offset the shortaire in
other lines.
In a former letter I have referred to the fallacy
of expecting higher prices to cure the evils of
reduced crops. Certainly higher prices will not
make up to the railroads for the loss of traffic.
· There is, of course, a possibility that our cotton
and corn will. turn out better than is now anticipated. My own expert, who has never, so far,
deceived us by over-estimates, thinks the government corn estimate too low. Let us hope so, but,
meanwhile, we cannot bank on that.
In the last weekly letter I recommended the purchase of Chicago Great Western for a long pull.
Numerous inquiries have been received asking what
issue was referred to and requesting full information. A special letter will be issued on this stock
September 16. Pending this letter I will state that
the common issue was referred to, and, further, that
common issues are always referred to in these advices unless otherwise specified.
There is also some confusion about the common
stock, which app-:ar s on the tape in two different
forms. The stock to purchase is the issue selling
around $11, "first assessment paid." This is the
new stock. The common stock quoted around $4
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is the "non-assenting" stock, on which no a ssessment has been paid and which is worthless, so far
a s any legal rights in the new organization are
concerned.

The General Situation.
The steady increase in tonnage hauled by railroads is good evidence of general revival in business. Movement of merchandise is growing rapidly
and there 1s renewed talk of a possible car shortage
this Fall.
While railroad earnings in the gross are very
large and indicate a healthy expansion in all lines
of business, and net earnings are encouraging, there
i!> a fly in the ointment. A pamphlet issued by the
chairman of the Trunk Line Association serves to
emphasize what has been more or less vaguely
known by the general public for some time, i. e.:
that railway earnings have been steadily decreasing in purchasing power for a number of years, due
to advanced cost of labor, fuel, replacements of
rolling stock and maintenance of way, higher taxes
and increased expenses incurred in complying with
and litigation under regulatory statutes. Even the
money which they borrow costs them more each
year. Freight and passenger rates, on the other
hand, have actually declined. There is, of course,
nothing new in all this, but notice is taken of it
for the purpose of keeping fresh in the mind what
has been repeatedly said in these letters with
reference to the relative earning power of railroads
and industrials under existing conditions.
The demand for money for crop-moving and
other purposes in the South, Southwest and West
manifested itself this week in heavy withdrawals
of currency at this center and at Chicago and St.
Louis. The Canadian banks are also beginning to
draw against grain bills. The official crop reports,
particularly on corn, are somewhat disappointing,
but taking all the crops together the outlook is
very promising. If we had a little more cotton to
export and if the foreign grain crop prospects were
not so brilliant we might expect to cancel some of
our. obligatio_ns abroad and be in position to call
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for gold from _that source. But as it is we can
hardly expect Europe to do much for us in that
direction. Besides, the latest reports from England
and the Continent indicate that a business revival
there may soon be in full swing, which will, of
course, create a demand for a great ·deal of money.
The manufacturing situation in Germany, particularly in the textiles, shows signs of improvement.
The Turkish and Japanese governments are al so
expected ·to be in the market for large amounts of
money in the near future. It is safe to say that, but
for the recent liquidation in the stock market and
the subsequent apathy of commission house customers, call rates during the past week would have
advanced very materially. Inflation of stock prices
and a business boom cannot exist at the same
time without a consequent raising of rates.
All of the steel companies continue to show
large expansion in earnings and have in most cases
recovered the greater part of the loss of business
during the depression. August production of pig
iron is a record breaker, being 1.591.991 gross
tons, against 1,514,521 in October, 1907. Iron ore
shipments 7,139,199 tons, largest since 1890. Some
of the independent · companies have, on account of
the pressure of orders, advanced prices of steel
bars to $1.50. Big rail orders for 1910 delivery are
reported as pending.
The strike in the Pressed Steel Car shops at
McKee's Rocks has been settled to the mutual satisfaction of all concerned. Railroad orders for cars
and other equipments continue to come in at a
liberal rate.
New York building operations for August are
69.9% greater than a year ago.
The unfavorable aspect of the Copper Producers'
report, which shows an increase in stocks of the
metal in this country of 12,600,000 pounds over July,
is mitigated to some extent by the report of Westinghouse showing August sales 60% greater than
same month in 1908 and 5% over the month previous.
Reports from London are to the effect that, while
the demand for cooper metal is not large, it is
widespread and indicates a general rather than a
special inquiry.
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The Technical Situation.
There is no improvement in the technical situation this week. On Friday, September 3, ·there
was a great deal of short covering over the threeday holiday, and prices were so much lower Tuesday morning that no opportunity was presented
for replacing commitments. The long interest went
over the holidays almost intact. There is nothing
new about this. A bull will stick to his guns as
long as his pocketbook holds out, while a bear is
the biggest coward on earth.
·
The rise on Friday and Saturday materially reduced the outstanding short interest in most stocks.
A large shortage was found in Reading, but has
been greatly reduced in the last two days.
The idea so frequently expressed during the week
that weak long account-" have been largely eliminated is, in my opinion, not correct. The decline
has not gone far enough to clean out this element.
There has also been a good deal of buying by those
who have been waiting for a reaction.
I consider the technical situation weaker than
last week.

Conclusion.
In the daily letter of September 8 it was suggested that Mr. Harriman's death would be followed by powerful support. The support came even
before our market opened on Friday, as outlined
in the first paragraph of this letter. It was also
suggested that advances caused by such support
would be followed by gradual liquidation of the
stocks so purchased, and that this would check the
advances. I see no reason to change this view. It
is probable that for some time to come stocks will
be a sale on the rallies. The demonstrations which
are made by the "Gods of the Machine," when
they find it necessary to come to the aid of the
market, seldom endure. This is particularly true
when stocks are at a high level.
In the high-priced stocks St. Paul appears to be
in the weakest statistical position. The corporation
is almost out of money and will have to sell something before lonR'.
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The Harriman properties are a good deal of a
problem now. The generally accepted theory as to
Mr. Harriman's sudden return is that he was apprised of plans of some dangerous stock-jobbing
m the properties and hurried home to protect his
interests. Mr. Harriman has been subject to considerable criticism because of his speculative
methods, and, unquestionably, he was inclined to
go very far at times. Mr. Hill probably referred
to this when he remarked yesterday that "If Mr.
Harriman had lived he might in time have settled
down." But it is generally admitted that what
Mr. Harriman did was, according to his lights, in
the interest of the properties he controlled and
his stockholders. We have probably more to fear
from his successors than we had from him. If
the schemes for segregation, or increase of capitalization, which he came home to thwart, are now
carried out, I would be very skeptical about the
future course of prices of the issues over which he
was dictator.
When the fluctuations, due to Mr. Harriman's
death and the ensuing manipulation, have subsided,
we may expect that other important factors, which
have been temporarily submerged, will receive due
consideration.
I am satisfied that the most powerful interests
in the street are now concerned in making a market
which will permit of further liquidation of railroad
securities and United States Steel. It is impossible to guess within a point or two of how far such
interests will find it possible or necessary to go,
but we may reasonably assume that the advance in
the general list will not be material. Certain leaders
may be rushed up, as has been the case for some
time, but the advances will meet selling orders and
will be followed by sharp declines.
When the next safe bull market starts it will be
in the industrial issues. These issues, with the
exception of United States Steel, art neglected at
present because there is no necessity for creating a
selling level. Advise selling railroad stocks on the
rallies for the present. The market is a big one and
fluctuations will be broad. It is therefore wise to
provide ample margins on short commitments.
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September 18, 1909.
Since I abandoned the long side of the stock market
on August 13 I have received numerous inquiries as
to whether my present attitude represented a protracted
change or merely a temporary reversal. Questions of
this character cannot be answered fully in the limits
of a· personal communication, but the following statements will probably make my position clear.
I do not find any reason to believe that the bull
market, which •began in November, 1907, has as yet
reached a culmination, but, on the other hand, I do
not find sufficient warrant for a further great rise
in prices unless we have evidence of further prospective
expansion in business in the year 1910, and meanwhile there is great danger of a serious reaction
before the market really ends its career.
The advances which have occurred in railroad
stocks since the panic of 1907 have, in many instances, carried securities to new high record
prices. There are exceptions. For example, the
Gould stocks are depressed, but the real leaders have reached prices above those which
obtained in the banner year 1906. This is not true of
the industrials. In many cases industrial stocks are
far below the highest records, although their prospects
are now better than at any time in history. It is always
the case that industrials do not show up well, as compared with rails, until the tail end of a bull market.
This group of stocks should gain steadily on the rails
in comparative prices as they become recognized and
seasoned. A few years ago it was 1igured that where
a railroad stock paid 6 per cent. on money invested,
an industrial should pay 10 per cent. Later this was
reduced to a comparison of 6 and 8 per cent., and it
will not be long until the hiatus will be eliminated
entirely in many good industrials.
This partially explains the present favoring of industrials instead of rails. The following table will
show how the leaders of the two groups stand at present
in relation to the record prices made in 1906-7. I have
left out such railroad shares as Great Northern, Northern Pacific, New York Central and St. Paul, as the
present showing is a false one, owing to increased
capitalization. For example, the highest point for St.
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Paul in 1906 would show as 199¾ , but 52 points
was subtracted from this price, with no market
decline, on account of rights for new capital stock.
The present price is therefore ab ove the highest
level previously reached.
RAILROAD STOCKS.
-Highest- -CloseStock.
1906 or 1907. Sept. 16.
Atchison . . . .
110¾
120¼
B. & 0 . . . . .
125¼
118¼
C. & 0. . . . .
.. . .
65¾
83¾
C. & A. . . . . . .
38
69¾
Colo. & Southern
40¼
52
D. & R. G. . . . .
. . ..
51¼
47¼
Erie.. .. .. .. . . .. . .
50¼
35
Kansas City South ern . .
37¼
48
L. & N.
.. .. ..
156¾
154¾
M., K. & T . .. .. .. .. .. ..
44¾
41 ¼
Mo. Pacific . . . . . . . . . .
106¾
72¾
0. & w . .. .. ..
..
57¼
48¾
N. & W . .. .. .. .. .. ..
97¾
94¾
Penn .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
147¾
145¼
Reading . . . . . . . . . . . .
164
167¼
Rock Island
. . . . . . . . . . . . 32¾
40
South ern Pacific . . . . . .
97¾
129¼
Union Pacific . . . . . . . .
195¼
206¼
INDUSTRIAL STOCKS.
-Highest- -CloseStock.
1906 or 1907. Sept. 16.
Amal. Copper . . . . ... . . . .
121¼
83¼
Am. Car & Foundry . . . . . .
47¾
69¼
Am. Locomotive . . . . . . . .
78¾
61 •
Am. Smelting & Refining. . . .
174
99¾
Am. Sugar. . . . . . . .
157
133
Am. Wool . . . .
48
39¾
Anacond.t. . . . . . . . . . . .
75 ¾
48¾
Con. Gas . . . . . .
181¼
147¼
Distill ers . . . . . .
78
38
Nat. Lead .. .. .. .. .. ..
95¼
91
Pressed Steel Car . .
64¼
50¼
Railway Steel Spring . . . .
62¾
51
U. S. Realty . . . . . . . . . .
99¾
84¼
U. S. Steel . . . . . . . . . . . .
50¼
83¼
There is nothing unprecedented in the fact
that our good railroad stocks are making new
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high records.
They have done thi s in the past
and will do so in the future. I have always been
very insistent about consulti ng the future in
formulating our speculative ideas, as prices of securities always, ride far ahead of actual developments; but there is danger in over-discounting the
future. The bulls on the market now point to the
tremendous business which will appear in 1910. Perhaps all these hopes will be realized-I sincerely hope
they will, but the mere assumptions foun ded on hope
will not do. We cannot by any method of calculation
. deduce the crops of 1910, and -crops are the all important thing. There has never been an instance of a
bull stock market with poor crops. As the matte r now
stands our indicated crops for 1909 are far below those
of 1906 (21,000,000 bushels less wheat ; almost 300,000,000 bushels less corn, and 2,000,000 bales less cotton ).
Our exports and imports for the first eight m onths
of 1909, as compared with 1906, do not make a favorable showing, as will be seen by the following table:
MERCHANDISE IMPORTS AND EXPORTS BY
MONTHS.
IMPORTS.

January . . . . . . . . . .
February . . . .
March .... . ... . .
April . . . . . . . . . . .
May .. . . .. . . ... .
June . . .... .. . . . .
July ..
August . . . . .. . .

1906.
$106,522,000
104,233,000
113,597,000
107,318,000
104,909,000
100,730.000
102,592;000
105,697,000
$845,598,000 ·

1909.
$103,576,000
118,654,000
132,874,000
122,167,000
116,056,000
124.694,000
112,290,000
116,023,936
$946,334,9315

EXPORTS.

January . . . . . .
February .. . .
March . . . . .. . .
April . . . . . . . .
May . .. . . .
June . . . .. .
July ..
August . .' ..

1906.
$170,603,000
141,766,000
145.511.000
144,380.000
130.548.000
125.034.000
t t t.69~.ooo
129.801.000
$1,099.336.000
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1909.
$156,713.000
126,052.000
139,291.000
125,174.000
123,357.000
117,535.000
109,452.000
110.123.679
$1 ,007,697,679

In the first eight months in the year 1906 the trade
balance was in our favor about $250,000,000. For the
corresponding period of 1909 it is in our favor about
$60,000,000, and the last three months look decidedly
unfavorable. Some people wiJI argue that o·ur lar~e imports now represent equities and indicates a revival of
business. This, is in a measure, true, but they also
indicate the necessity of filling of a gap occasioned by
the depletion of 1907-08. During our depression we sold
everything salable at low prices and refrained from
buying. We are now stocking up at higher prices. There
is also some attempt to explain our large imports by
tariff influences, but when we look at the imports
for· August and reflect that the tariff bill was signed
August 5 this argument appears a little shaky.
We are very heavily in debt to Europe, and we
have not sufficient exportable goods in sight to
fill the hole, especially if we are to borrow more
money abroad, which does not Appear improbable. It
must be said, however, on the other side, that money
rates are far below 1906. In August, 1906, call money
reached 12 per cent., and 60-day time money 6¼ per
cent., but this was due to the full employment of
money in business ; and if our business is to do all
that is anticipated we may expect harder money ·rates
soon-in fact they are already appearing. A few months
ago time money was about 2¾ per cent., and income
yield on dividend-paying stocks was about 4½ per cent.
This showed a decided advantage, but this advantage
is eliminated when stocks yield the same as the cost
of money.. Money over the end of the year is now commanding 4 to 4¼ per cent., which is higher than the
average yield on stocks.

It must tie acfmittecf, ~owever, t!-iat ttie culmination
of a bull market does not always appear when the
income yield crosses the line of money. The artificial
speculative equation is to be considered. In 1906 stocks
advanced in the flush of prosperity and confidence, until
the average income return was only 3.25 per cent. on
our leading dividend-paying rails. as compared with
about 4 per cent. on the same stocks now. This would
represent a possible average advance of 10 to 15 points
above present prices if the same thing occurs now.
But even arlmitting all things to be equal in the two
periods (which, by the way, I do not admit), our ru~e
is empirical, for looking back into earlier periods, it 1s
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Chart Showing Market Movements of 27 Rails in 1908,ll ;

Investment Yield and a

Comparison with the Culmination Level of 1906.
"This chart is issued as a supplement to Thomas Gibson's Weekly Market Letter
of September 18, 1909.
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The upper line represents principal swings in actual average prices of the 27
stocks. The broken line shows the average percentage investment yield at different
stages of the bull market. Heavy continuous line, average dividend paid. Dotted
line, the culmination t>f railroad common stocks in 1906:·_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___,_ __

found that the culmination in 1881 was from an income
yield of 5¼ per cent., and the culmination of 1891
from a yield of 4½ per cent. We have not sufficient
data on which to base a precedent.
There is another point which has more value from a
standpoint of precedent, and that is, that all actual
culminations in the past have taken place during a
period of high money, with time loans around 6 per
cent., or higher. This was the case in 1881, 1890, 1902
and 1906. How soon such money rates will be established is an open question, but they are not yet in sight.
In figuring on a possible further advance, before a
final culmination, we must also reflect that the last
ten points of such a movement were of a frothy char- ·
acter and that such advances crumbled away rapidly.
It is unfortunately the case that the greatest amount
of public interest and public participation ·is always
present during this final upheaval. The enthusiasts will
say that we should also consider now the probability
of increased dividends, which will raise our rate of
income return, but to this I will reply that the very
reason we overleaped ourselves in 1906 was because of
many fantastic hopes of that kind which were never
realized. We had some good dividend increases in
1906---we may have some in 1909 or 1910, but, as compared with the rumors and promises, the ratio will not
be one in ten.
In order to clearly illustrate the recent movement of
stock prices and income yield, the chart which accompanies this letter has been prepared.
To revert to the industrials, as compared with rails.
The same influences which have brought railroad stocks
up to the present levels must affect industrials favorably and they should catch up with the procession. If
we ~re as prosperous as we think we are, and if ou r
roseate dreams of the future are not subjected to a
rude awakening-, there is no reason why industrials
should take a back seat. In fact, there are many reasons
why they should get into the front row. In 1908 I _frequently predicted increases in railroad net earnmgs
because of reduced operating expenses. and this has
come to pass. Many railroad corporations have lately
exhibited increased net earnings, with decreased gross.
This was due to the fact that expenses were cut to
the bone. The efficiency of labor was raised because
the corporations had their pick of the employe~s. Not
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only were legi timate economies effected, but maintenance was in many instances starved. We have reached
the approximate end of that sort of thing. No careful
observer can look over our very recent railroad showings without realizing that from now on net cannot
rise in proportion to gross, as it has in the last two
years. We have reached the top of the hill. The industrial stocks will benefit by this, as they will be called
upon to produce equipment, rails, etc. This applies to
almost every form of manufacturing. The railroads
must spend large sums at advancing prices, and the
manufacturers will benefit accordingly.
I have frequently referred in these advices to the
fact that one group of stocks could . advance while
the other ,remained dormant, or even declined, but a
good many people do not appear to be convinced.
This is probably due to the fact that on a day of
advancing prices the entire market usually goes higher,
and vice versa. The spread occurs in the proportion
of such advances or declines. To dismiss this argument once and for all, I give belc,w the figures showing
daily movements of railroad and industrial stocks (Wall
Street Journal's averages) for the last two months of
the year 1905. The period mentioned, as measured
by prospects and conditions, corresponds very accurately with the present year.
--12Ind.-1905.
Nov. 1 . .. .... 84.14 Adv. .37
" 2 ....... 83.92 Dec. .22
" 3 ..... .. 83.78 Dec. .14
" 4 ....... 82.93 Dec. .85
" 6... . ... 83.32, Adv. .39
" 8 . . .. . .. 82.17 Dec. 1.15
" 9 ....... 81.56 Dec. .61
" 10 . . . .... 82.57 Adv. 1.01
.32
" 11 . ..... . 82.25 Dec.
" 13 . . . .. . . 80.83 Dec. 1.42
"14 ....... 81.67 Adv. .84
" 15 ...... . 82.77 Adv. 1.10
.30
" 16 . . . .... 82.47 Dec.
" 17 ....... 84.19 Adv. 1.72
" 18 ....... 84.53 Adv. .34
"20 ..... . . 85.22 Adv. .69
"21 ...... . 85.84 Adv. .62
"22 ..... .. 86.11 Adv. .27
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-20
132.37
132.23
-132.47
131.45
131.99
130.51
129.00
129.83
128.91
127.91
129.34
130.08
129.37
130.69
130.95
131.97
132.13
131.98

Rails.Adv. .04
Dec. .14
Adv. 24
Dec. 1.02
Adv. .54
Dec. 1.48
Dec. 1.51
Adv. .83
Dec. .92
Dec. 1.00
Adv. 1.43
Adv. .74
Dec. .71
Adv. 1.32
Adv . .26
Adv. 1.02
Adv. .16
Dec. .15

1905.
"
"
"
"
"
"

--12Ind.--

23. . . . . • . 85.93
24. . . . . . . 85.81
25. . . . . . . 86.94
27 . . . . . . . 89.43
28. . . . . . . 89.77
29. . . . . . . 89.89

Dec. 1.... .. .
"
"

2 . . . ... .
4 .......

" 5... . ...

" 6. ... ...
" 7. . . . . . .
" 8 . . . .. . .
" 9. . .. . . .

" 11. . . . . . .
"
"
"
"
"
"
"

12.. ... ..
13 . . . . . . .
14 . . . . . . .
15 . . . . . ..
16. .. . . . .
18... . .. .
1~ . . . . . . .

" 20. . . . . . .
"
"
"
"

21. . . . . . .
22. . . . . . .
23. . . . . . .
26 . .. .. ..

89.62
89.50
89.56
90.82
90.91
92.37
93.20
92.84
93.59
95.13
95.68
95.47
96.0S
96.09
95.71
95.64
94.61
94.20
94.43
95.05
95.84

--20 Rails. - -

Dec. .18
Dec. .12
Adv. 1.13
Adv. 2.49
Adv. .34
Adv. .22

132.00
131.26
131.65
132.26
131.63
131.34

Adv.
Dec.
Adv.
Adv.
Dec.
Dec.

.02
.74
.39
.61
.63
.29

Dec.
Dec.
Adv.
Adv.
Adv.
Adv.
Adv.
Dec.
Adv.
Adv.
Adv.
Dec.
Adv.
Adv.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Adv.
Adv.
Adv.

130.00
129.93
129.65
130.81
130.64
130.98
131.04
131.23
131.95
132.03
132.81
132.33
132.08
131.90
131.28
131.71
131.93
132.26
133.05
133.14
133.17

Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Adv.
Dec.
Adv.
Adv.
Adv.
Adv.
Adv.
Adv.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Adv.
Adv.
Adv.
Adv.
Adv.
Adv.

1.34
.07
.28
1.16
.17
.34
.06
.29
.62

.27
.12
.06
1.26
.09
1.46
.83
.36
.75
1.72
.55
.21
.58
.04
.38
.07
1.03
.41
.23
.62
.79

.06
.78
.58
.15
.18
.62
.43
.22
.33
.79
.09
.03

Admitting the possibility of a further rise in railroad
stocks before the final climax, there is no use in speculating for a soda-water advance of a possible ten points
in this group, when we can operate on much safer and
m o re promising ground in the industrial s. I cannot
pretend in a s ingle letter to set forth fully all my
reasons for so steadily favoring one class of stocks,
and only the salient points a·re touched on above. I
am convinced, however, that our next genuine bull
market will be in the industrials.

The General Situation.
The expansion in general business continues to progress at a satisfactory rate. Iron and steel, as has
been the case for some time, is the leader; all the
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reports from the centers of that industry being rema•r kably optimistic. Sales of pig iron first half of September are estimated at 330,000 to 350,000 tons, the
greater part of the demand coming from steel makers.
Inquiry for foundry iron is also brisk. Finished steel
for immediate delivery is commanding a premium, and
it is believed that the Steel Corporation may have to
enter the open market for steel-making iron. The inquiries for 1910 shipment are very large.
Additional railroad equipment orders came to hand
during the week. The Baltimore & Ohio's orders within
the month total $10,000,000. Steel rail purchases
for the week foot up nearly 250,000 tons. The American
Locomotive Company is now operating about 50 per
cent. of capacity. This branch of the equipment group
suffered more severely during the depression and has
only just begun to feel the effects of the revival. The
~trike against the Standard Steel Car Company at McKee's Rocks has broken out again with renewed . violence. The foreign-born laborers charge that the company has not kept their pledges to them in the matter
of discharging strikebreakers.
The copper metal market is suffering from a surplus
piled lip during the period of depression when production was not curtailed to correspond with the lessened
demand. Competent observers believe that this situation will not last long. An interesting side light is
thrown on the question of overproduction of copper
metal by the Wall Street Journal's figures, to which
attention was called early in the week. Using pig iron
as a barometer, these figures show the present ratio
of copper metal to pig iron production to be 2 per cent.,
as against 3 per cent. during 1908, or a trifle under
the average ratio for a number of years.
The only drawback to the textile business appears
to be the high price of cotton. The Oriental trade
shows improvement. The value of cotton cloths exported to China for the first six months of this year
is about $8,000,000, which is very close to the combined
total for the entire years of 1907 and 1908. Although
these figures are far below those of 1906, when the
total was $30,000,000 for the twelve months, they indicate a marked revival in business with that part o·f the
world. Reports from Texas say that the shortage in
yield of cotton has a depressing effect upon general
business in that section, and as a result a much smaller
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amount of capital will find employment there this fall
and winter.
The question of higher money rates is absorbing a
great deal of attention, principally beca.use of the precarious position of the reserves in the New York banks
and the hardening of call money. Some effort is
being made to belittle the importance of the situation on
the theory that, if rates advance to 4 per cent. or
above, the whole country and Europe will flood this
center with funds. This reasoning is illogical because
the facts are that it was the withdrawal by the country
at large for crop-moving and expanding business uses
which has created the tightness here. And, moreover,
our exportable surplus of cotton and the small foreign
demand for our wheat, taken in conjunction with the
huge sums known to have been already borrowed abroad,
do not justify the belief that Europe, with her own
prospective revival to take care of, will be in any hurry
ta send over any more money at low rates. The report
of the national banks of New York City to the
comptroller shows that since February, 1908, loans
and discounts have increased $19,000,000, as against
a cash decrease of about $35,000,000, and deposits
have shrunk $27,000,000. When the moving-picture
men desire to depict a mountain scene in a flat
country they hunt up a gravel pit and make their
negatives from the bottom up. Something of this
sort may be the case with those who are trying to
find comfort in the present money situation.

The Technical Situation.
An examination of the technical situation, as represented by the books of houses handling semi-professional operations, shows a very quick switch in conditions. There has been a great deal of short selling, all
concentrated in five stocks-Union Pacific, Reading, St.
Paul, Amalgamated Copper and United States Steel.
In my investigations I found two houses in which the
short selling of these stocks more than balanced the
total long commitments, making a net short interest.
This selling is also of a weak character, being margined
only as required by brokers. Aside from the shortage
in Amalgamated and Steel, very little interest was
shown in the industrial issues. Most of the long accounts are in low-priced rails. The weakness of the
short accounts suggests some further p9ssible action
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against this element, but it would not take much of an
advance ta wipe out this class now, and once this
leverage is removed, the market will crumble very
quickly.
In St. Paul there is a large short interest confined
to two large operators. I am in!ormed that these individuals are being "gunned for," and that the bull crowd
have a card up their sleeve, which will be played early
next week and which will cause the shorts in this stock
to retire precipitately. I cannot vouch for the truth
-0f this story. The stock is in the weakest statistical
position of any of the high-priced rails, but no one
<:an tell what may happen in a twist of this kind.
The technical situation is stronger th:m for some
time, but the strength is artificial, and conditions can
change in a day.

Conclusion.
There is nothing in the present market to warrant
purchases of stocks. Technical conditions and manipulation may carry prices up a few points on the average,
but no one has any business buying on such a basis.
The buyers of securities at this level are in the lamb
class and will meet with disaster before long. I have
already expressed the opinion that we cannot figure as
yet on a final culmination of the bull market, which
has been in progress for almost two years, but there is
decided danger of a serious reaction before the culmination appears. The greatest danger is in the rails. Purchases of railroad stocks now mean a possible advance
of a few points, and a possible decline of ten or twenty
points. Such industrials as Amalgamated Capper, American Locomotive, American Car & Foundry, Pressed
Steel Car and Railway Steel Spring, are not so hazardous, but even these issues should be purchased only on
good reactions, or on a scale down. The numerous
tips and newspaper comments, and the general atmosphere of enthusiasm, lead people to believe that at
present we are in the midst of a big bull market,
while in r eality prices are lower than a month ago,
except fo two or three stocks which are used for
advertising purposes.
The next genuine bull market will be in industrial
stocks, and if we keep our heads, an opportunity will ·
soon be offered to begin a campaign in that group,
which will be safe and profitable.
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SEPTEMBER 25, 1909.
The week has brought several disappointments
to the bull forces. A report was widely circulated
late last week that an important announcement of
some kind was to be made at the annual meeting
of the St. Paul directors; that Jersey Central
and Reading both had good news in store, and
that Pennsylvania would certainly increase its dividend to 7 per cent. None of these things came to
pass, but the bull is a long-suffering critter and new
promises are accepted to cover old disappointments.
It is remarkable that since the failure to list Steel
in Paris some months ago, not one rumor of segregations, extra distributions, or important increases
has been fulfilled in the railroad group. It is also
rather remarkable that almost all the stories and
promises refer to railroad stocks, and that the industrials are left to shift for themselves.
It is more reasonable, however, to look for advances in the dividend rates of industrials than for
increases in the railroad group. In the period of
curtailment following the panic of 1907, the average
dividend on 27 leading rails fell from 6.10 per cent.
to 5.90 per cent., and is now back to 6.10 per cent.
In the same period the rate on 19 dividend-paying
industrials fell from 5.25 to 4.75 and is now about 5
per cent., only half of the loss having been regained.
There are a number of leading industrials which
will increase dividends before long if business continues good. Amalgamated . Copper, which paid 7
per cent. in 1907, now pays only 2 per cent. ; American Locomotive, paying 5 per cent. in 1907, pays
nothing ; Smelters, which paid 7½ per cent. in 1907,
now pays 4 per cent.; Steel common pays 3 per cent.
as against 2 per cent. in 1907, and 4 per cent. is
promised-but look at the price of the stock! There
is no reason why many leading industrials should
not advance dividends in the next six months, but
as yet this prospect has not been used as a bull
lever.
The figures for 27 rails and 19 industrials, referred
to above, show that rails have fully regained the
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dividend capacity of 1907, while industrials have
regained only SO per cent. This, in itself, is interesting and suggestive, but fundamental conditions
indicate that not only should the net earning power
of industrials equal that of the rails, but should
surpass it. In the depression of 1908 the railroads
found some consolation in the fact that operating
expenses could be greatly reduced, while the product they sold (transportation) remained at the
same price. The producing corporations, however,
were compelled to reduce the prices of the mate~ rials they had for sale. We are now entering on a
period where railroads will see their operating
expenses rise with no con siderable advance in traffic
rates, while the industrial corporations will enter a
period of prosperity and higher prices for commodities. It might be contended that the railroads
had an opportunity to fill their needs for material
and equipment at low prices during the depression,
but the fact remains that they did not do so. Purchases for equipment in 1907-8 fell to SO per cent.
of the average for a number of years. A good many
orders have ·been p\aced recently, but the gap is
still large. It appears that for the last two or three
months every nerve has been strained by railroad
corporations to make a good showing in net. Of
course, there's a reason. The reason is that large
blocks of railroad issues bought at very low prices
are for sale, and it takes time and hard work to
dispose of these stocks to advantage. If the large
holders were to attempt to dispose of holdings in a
few weeks the market would crumble, but by means
of rumors, promises and manipulation, the load can
be gradually shifted. A great deal of it has been
shifted already. Another thing, the outsiders will
not buy stocks so freely in a declining market as in
a strong market-therefore the market is "supported." Every little dip which is followed by a recovery
instills new confidence. The people who follow the
rule of buying only on reactions are also considered
in final manipulative tactics. One of the big manipulators used to say that when he bid a stock up to
75 and found he could not sell out at 70 he would
bid it up to 90 and sell it at 80. It is the point of
view. Steel common would have looked ridiculously
high at 75 a few months ago; now it would appear
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like a bargain at 80, for no better reason than that
it had declined five points.
An era of distribution, such as we are now encountering, is a patience-trying process, and people
get nervous. At or near the top of a market there
is always a long period of backing and filling. On
August 2 the average price of 41 rails and industrials was 97.12. At the close of business on September 24 the average price was 96.70. There have
been some opportunities in that period, provided a
man could pick out the stocks which were to be
handled next, but, as the market movements have
been confined to a half dozen securities, with bewildering transitions from one leader to another, it
has been a better market for a gambler than for a
speculator. If you can guess where the ball is going
to drop-you win.
The last stock to be taken up as a bull card is St.
Paul. There is a good reason for this. The stock
is not worth its present selling price, but the public
pays little attention to values in a market like this.
The principal point is that St. Paul is rather closely
held and can be easily moved. This is evidenced by
the total sales of the last ten days, as compared
with the volume of operations in the other leaders.
It requires comparatively little muscle and money to
move a dormant stock, and St. Paul is a name to
conjure with, even when the stock is dull. There is
also a comparatively large short interest in the
shares-and that helps the boosting process. It is
an ideal spot for cheap manipulation. During the
last ten days the sales of Union Pacific have totaled
over 700,000 shares, .Reading (full shares) over 890,000 shares, while St. Paul totaled only about 350,000
shares.
Upon the publication of the last annual report a
number of people discovered that the St. Paul showing was not a good one and sold the stock. The
answer of the manipulative interests was to boost
the shares up. Such a reply is always considered
a forcible one by the rank and file of operators, but
to the careful trader such a rise means nothing but
an opportunity to sell to advantage. The manipulators can administer a rebuke of this kind to the
five-point bear, but there is a limit to their possi309

bilities, and they only help the operators who have
sufficient nerve and money to back their judgment.
For some time past I have insisted that the money
market should be scrutinized carefully. We already
have some evidence of a tightening up in money, but
there is still a great deal to consider.
Respecting the money market in general, a hardening in rates is to be expected later in the season,
because:
1. The paramount demands of the crop-moving
business have not by any means been fully
met.
2. Upon the whole, the interior banks are not particularly strong in reserves, the activity of
ordinary business having absorbed a substantial part of their surplus cash.
Looking ahead farther than we are in the habit
of doing, foreign banks are already beginning to
raise their discount rates, and we shall have to pay
higher for such accommodations as we may contemplate obtaining abroad upon finance bills to shift our
own loans, in part, when conditions require.
The local situation in New York may be somewhat relieved temporarily by the influx of cash during the Hudson-Fulton festival, which is to bring a
multitude of spenders to the city; but this will merely
serve to ease the pressure for a short time.
No material addition to the currency supply is
to be expected from the national bank3 through the
note-issuing powers; and it is scarcely probable that
such an addition is to be provided under the AldrichVreeland law, since the banks have not organized to
avail themselves of the facilities at any point except
Washington.
Hence the usual alternatives of contracting and
shifting of loans, or the importation of gold, must
be relied upon. The indications are that the shifting process has already been very largely employed,
and the next bank statement will doubtless show a
continuation thereof; for the rates for call money
have not advanced in the week, although held
quite firmly, and the evidence supplied by the stockmarket operations indicates no contraction of loans.
It is too early to assert that money on call will not
go above 6 per cent. before the clost: of the year;
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that it will reach that figure is decidedly probable
at this writing, and this may occur in October, rather
than in November. The recent activity in the stock
market shows that there is a desire to mark up certain specialties to as high a point as possible, before
the turn of tht! tide.
The conditions in the money market are such that
a reliance upon the statement of the situation of the
clearing-house banks alone is not safe, at junctures
such as this. The facility with which the trust companies and other banks can be utilized to influence
the general status must not be overlooked. With
net deposits nearly as large as those of the associated banks, and with reserves showing a larger
margin of loanable means, the institutions outside
the clearing house constitute a factor of the highest
importance to the observer, rendered the more so
by the fact that they are required to hold only 15
per cent. cash reserves against deposits. The statements of condition of banks and trust companies,
if combined, practically reflect the aggregate monetary situation.
The statements issued on the 18th instant furnish
much food for discussion, but their import was appreciated by only a few. The following table illustrates
the position concisely, the amounts being stated in
millions of dollars, and the changes from the previous week's status is also shown.
AVERAGE STATEMENTS REPRESENUTING AVERAGES
OF DAILY CONDITIONS.
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1,355.4 -25.9 346.4 -5.5 1,327.6 -20.7 25.4
Clearing banks
Others and trust
1,210.0 -\-12.4 154. 5 -0.2 1,225.2
panies
5.2 17.8

+

-- - - - - - - -- - - ..... .. .. 2,565.4 - 13.5 500.9 -5.7 2,552.8 -15 .5 ....

Totals
Actual , Sept. 18, clearing banks only .... 1.344.4 -28.6 348.2 +1.8 1,315.2 -30.6 25.9

The statement bears evidence of the partial transfer of accounts from banks to trust companies,
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which, in view of the relatively strong position of he
latter, was the logical course to pursue. The actual
position of the clearing banks at the close of the
week showed greater reserve strength, but also indicated a continuation of the policy of liquidation by
transfers and shifts.
•
When including the statement of the non-clearing
state banks and trust comp .nies, the figures representing net deposits should be used; this is the item
which excludes the deposits which the companies
have in the clearing-house banks, which are, of
course, already accounted for. Thus on the 18th
instant, the gross deposits were stated at $1,364,003,200, a decrease of $13,461,700 in the week; this,
in the face of a substantial increase in loans, was
remarkable; but the net d~posits of $1,209,999,100,
an increase of $12,449,700 in the week, is the proper
sum to be used in comparisons. Having this in
mind, it is evident that the trust companies withdrew very largely from the local banks acting as
their reserve depositories, accounting in part for the
decreased deposits in the banks.
The fact that President Taft has taken a more
decided stand in regard to control' of corporations
has caused some uneasiness in the Street this week.
The matter has not as yet assumed a serious aspect,
but we may hear more from that quarter. It appears
that a great many people have gained the idea that
the railroads were to have their own way, right
or wrong, during Mr. Taft's incumbency. These
people are apt to get sadly left. I have confidence
in the President's intention to do justice to corporations, but justice does not mean license.

The General Situation.
While, generally speaking, the situation with reference to business as a whole is still satisfactory, there
are some adverse factors, chief among which is the
money market. As a consequence of a too rapid rise
in the already high-priced securities dealt in on the .
Stock Exchange and the call for funds by the interior, the reserves in this center are very near the
prescribed limit, so near in fact, that some rather
bald attempts have been made to bolster up the
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pos1t1on. Loans were transferred to Europe and to
other convenient receptacles at home, but the only
perceptible effect, after the first day or two of the
week, has been a renewal of the hardening tendency
against New York in London and Chicago. Evidently the bankers in the financial district fully appreciate the situation as they have called loans pretty
freely during the week. This action, by· the way,
is a more reassuring method of curing the local
money-market ills than that pursued last week. Some
such action is vitally necessary for the ultimate
good of the stock market in the future as well as
for the benefit of general business. There is danger
also of overdoing a good thing in aslcing Europe
to carry too much of our st.ock market load, particularly in the view of our already heavy borrowings, and prospects of reviving business over there.
London expects to ship $5,000,000 gold to Egypt
and Brazil at the end of the week. Berlin on Monday reported the Reichsbank rate had been raised
from 3½ to 4 per cent.
The market for iron and iron products has been
extremely active with price advances all along the
line. The leading authorities seem to think the pace
is too rapid and that prices have reached a level
that is rather too high. The Iron Trade Review calls
attention to the fact that many furnaces are holding
back "large tonnages of pig iron in anticipation· of
still higher prices, while their production is steadily
increasing. If this policy on the part of the pig
iron producers is adhered to it may lead to importations, as that commodity is near an export basis
now, and, it is reported that some contracts have
already been made. It is to be hoped that iron will
not be added to the factors already operating against
our trade balances.
The Standard Steel Car Co. has bought an additional 20 acres of ground on which to extend its
plant. Several new blast furnaces have been reported
blown in. Railroad equipment orders show no abatement.
One of the things needed to complete that part
of the cycle representing the transition fr om extreme dullness to healthy activity in all lines of
endeavor is a more pronounced consumptive demand
for copper metal. Signs are beginning to appear
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which indicate that consumers may from now on
become more active buyers. Moderate-sized sales
for October, November and December delivery have
been made during the week, and the Amalgamated
Co. reports that its surplus stocks have all been
disposed of. Fair-sized sales have been made around
13¼ cents, and, although the metal is still in a poor
statistical position, there appears to be a better tone
both here and abroad.
The Russian crop outlook is very brilliant and
competition from that source in the world's markets
promises to become a very pronounced factor if the
estimates now being made are realized. Seventy-two
governments estimated 75,350,000 quarters (8 bushels) vs. 70,950,000 quarters in 1908 and 63,622,000
quarters in 1907. The Russian farmer has only recently awakened to the possibilities of modern invention and the big landed proprietor is we!I
equipped with the latest farm appliances. Incidentally this promised Russian activity in the European
grain markets will not help our trade balance
position.
The cotton crop has undoubtedly been curtailed
by the terrific storm in the Gulf States, but to what
extent is not yet known. Some demand for cotton
goods by the Philippine Islands is noted this week.

The Technical Situation.
There is no appreciable change in the technical
situation this week. The short interest is still rather
large in high-priced rails, but the bears appear to be
more strongly intrenched than the public long interest. Margins on short contracts are more liberal
and holdings are more concentrated. That is to say,
the short commitments are in large blocks with
ample margins, while long commitments are scattered, and, in many cases, weakly margined or protected by stop orders. There is a considerable decrease of the shortage in United States Steel common and some increase in St. Paul. Comparatively
little public trading is found in Reading on either
side.
In the industrial issues the long interest is growing,
but is of a better character than in the rails. This
buying is mostly for the long pull or on a scale down.
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Conclusion.
Do not find anything in the situation to warrant
purchases of stocks as yet. Some of the industrials,
such as Amalgamated Copper, American Car &
Foundry and American Locomotive, are all right to
take on the scaling method, but it is probable that
even these can be purchased at a lower level by
waiting. At least they can be purchased around the
present level later on, with more assurance of safety.
There are too many factors at present which may
turn out unfavorably. Think short sales of St. Paul,
Reading and Missouri Pacific are all right on the
bulges, but in selling the two stocks first named we
should remember that they are subject to violent
movements, and that shoe-string margins will not
do. Steel common is also a short sale. The stock
comes out freely on the hard spots.
There is some good buying of Republic Iron &
Steel. Think the stock may be confidently taken
on a close scale down for a turn.
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OCTOBER 2, 1909.
The market during the week has continued in a
narrow range, with business confined largely to professional operations. There is very little commissionhouse business. The public appears to have either exhausted its buying power, or, what is more likely,
have decided that the market is not a safe or attractive
affair at this level. The old theory that unlimited
outside buying will take place on activity at ,h igh prices
does not work out as weJJ as it used to. The public
has, in fact, reached a much better understanding than
formerly, and when a stock is openly manipulated and
widely to'Uted as a good thing, they are unreasonable
enough to examine conditions, annual reports, etc., instead of swaJlowing the promises or statements without
question. This new regime of looking gift horses in
the mouth makes the path of the manipulators a •rocky
one. Of course, the improvement on the part of outsiders is only comparative. There are still many people
who are willing to buy at the top after two years of
advancing prices, but not nearly so many as a few
years ago.
With so little public buying it is rather puzzling
to place the buying and selling- · which is apparently
represented by a day like Wednesday, September 29,
on which date 1,500,000 shares of stocks were handled
with no change in the average level of prices. In my
opinion the large transactions on that and other recent
dates have been of a decidedly rr..anipulative character.
This is indicated in several ways. The picking up of
stocks which are most in the public eye and emphasizing their movements to the exclusion of the general
list, is one thing which arouses distrust. It is quite
certain that we are not in a period of accumulation.
When accumulation is desirable it is naturally the case
that stocks would be depressed whenever possible. There
have been several opportunities recently to drive stocks
down very sharply, but whenever a decline has appeared
imminent every effort has been made to keep prices up
and to keep the pot boiling. For two weeks past the
general average of prices has remained in a range of two
points, support appearing on weakness and stocks freely
handed out on the hard spots. This is one of the invariable signs o'f a distributive market. It is, in such
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periods, considered highly essential that no one should

be frightened, a general selling movement would be a
catastrophe, as it would take a long time to restore the
entente cordial. The process of distribution takes time.
That a great deal of distribution has occurred recently
I am satisfied; but it has progressed slowly because of
the apathy of the public. Semi-professionals, who simply
endeavor to follow the trend regardless of values or conditions, are doing some buying in the hope of a big final
demonstration, and Europe is probably the best customer
of all.
Another feature of the present market is the attempt
to use as leaders stocks which are in the weakest statistical position. These efforts, it is true have met with
little response, but the fact remains that the efforts have
been made. St. Paul, with its vague promises to do something, is one example of this. Whatever action might
be taken by this corporation . it could not add a dollar
to its actual value, and only the most credulous can be
deceived by any form of financing or change of capitalization which may occur. Such things, however, are played
up as b4ll factors at a time like this.
The efforts to b.oom Reading are even more unwarranted. There is nothing in either the annual or monthly
report to justify the present price of this stock, let
alone a further advance. The report for the month of
August, 1909, has been referred to in a recent daily
letter as a very unsatisfactory showing. The annual
report for the year ended June 30, 1909, is also di1,appointing. "Bradstreet's" in their issue of September 25
present a brief analysis of this report. As the exhibit
is lucid and correct, it is reproduced herewith by permission.
Some of the most cherished illusions which
the speculative stock market -had been entertaining during the course of the present bull campaign in Wall street related to the Reading
and affiliated properties. As already noted in
these columns, it was widely believed that increased dividends or a distribution of considerable advantage to the stockholders was in prospect. These matters were put to t,he test, however, this week, when the annual report of the
Reading Company made its appearance, and
when the directors of its controlled companv,
the Central of New Jersey, failed to declare
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more than the regular 2 per cent. quarterly
dividend on that stock. With the support which
the market is receiving from large manipulative interests, and with increased participation
by the public, as elements on the bull side of
the account, the quick break in Reading from
its top price of 173~ did not, however, ,have
as much effect on the position of the general
list as might have been expected, even though
it was accompanied by a heavy decline in the
quotations for Lehigh Valley, a stock which
had also been the object of extravagant bull
operations in sympathy with the movement in
Reading shares.
The earnings of the Reading and its two
subsidiaries, the Philadelphia & Reading
Railway and the Philadelphia Coal & Iron
Company, for the year, compare with those
of the preceding year as follows:
RAILWAY COMPANY.
Receipts. • •
Oper. expenses

1908-09.
.$40,267,261
• 23,825,678

1907-08.
Changes.
$42,664,595 -$2,397,833
25,458,296 - 1,632,617

Net earnings .$16,441,582 $17,206.290 Add. & betterments 1,805,722
937,659

+

$764.717
868,063

$14,635,860 $16,268,639 -$1,632,779
Charges and taxes. 10,076,314
9,923,000
153,314

+

Surplus.

,

•

• $4,559,5411

$6,345,639

-$1,786,094

COAL AND IRON COMPANY.
Receipts •
Expenses.

1908-09.
. $34,702,694
. 32.045,868

1907-08.
Changes .
$38,014,420 43.221 , 726
34,304,802 - 2,258,933

. $2,746.825

$3,709,617

-

$962,792

New work at collieries .
1,172.204
Interest.
035 .003
Depletion fund
465,767

1,286.010
1,584.485
514 ,349

-

113.806
649.482
48,582

Net

earnings

-

Charges and taxes
Surplus .

-

2.572.975

3.884,845

17~ ~5•1
106.876

824.771
117.248

-

-

150,921
10,371

$66,973

$207,523

-

$140.550
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lll!;ADING COMPANY.
Income
Expenses.

1908--09.
• $9,076,153
33,972

Net earnlni:s . $9,042,180
Charges and taxes 4,626,786
Surplus.

• $4,415,395

Surplus 3 cos. • $9,041,014

1907-08.
Cbanges .
$7,502,233 +$1,48a,819
97,19U
63,218
$7,495,143
4,599,553

+1,647,037
+
27,231

$2,895,589 +$1,519,805
$9,448,752

-

$406,838

THREE COMPANIES COMBINED.
1908-09.
Net Income.
• $0,041,915
Gen. mort. s. f.
472,669

1907-08.
$9,448,752
544,695

Cbanges.
$406,837
72,026

Bal. for divs. . $8,500,246
Divs. firs t and second pfd. 4% .
2,800,000

$8,904,057

$334,811

Bal. for common $5. 769.246
Com. div. 4%.
2,800,000

$6.104.057
2,800,000

Surplus

• $2,969,246

2,800,000

$3,304,057

-

$334,Sil

-

$334,811

Not only was the showing itself destructive
of the hopes of an immediate increase in the
dividend rate upon the $70,000,000 of the Reading common stock, but it was entirely devoid of
any indication of sensational developments
about to transpire. It might be mentioned that
among the reasons given for the above advance in Lehigh Valley was the suggestion that
the Reading was acquiring large holdings in
thaf company, which was apparently disproved by the fact that the list of securities
owned shows only some $1,000,000 of Lehigh
Valley stock in the Reading treasury.
As will be seen, the earnings of the parent
and subsidiary companies both fall considerably
below those of 1907-08. In the case of the railroad the falling off in gross and net represented the effects of business depression, and it
mig,ht be mentioned that coal traffic alone decreased by $879,045. In fa<'t, the Coal & Iron
Company's output of anthracite decreased 1,140,847 tons, and the receipts from coal sales were
$3,258,204 less. The significant feature o·f the
report, however. is that after the payment of
the 4 per cent. dividends on ooth classes of the
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preferred stocks, there is shown in the final
results a balance for the common of only
$5,769,246, equal to 8¼ per cent. upon the
common stock, compared with a surplus of over
$6,000,000 the year before, which was equal to
nearly 8¼ per cent. on the common. It would
not seem, therefore, to afford much encouragement for an increase in the present 4 per cent.
rate on the stock, though, of course, in this
period of expanding trade, with a probability
that the Reading properties will share in the
benefit, a moderate augmentation in the
amount distributed annually among the
stockholders might be favorably considered
by the management.
As to the failure af the coal-producing corporation
to make decent showings, the following paragraph, taken
from the fifty-fifth annual report of the Lehigh Valley
Company, is illuminating:
"The cost of producing coal," mys the report, "is each
year showing a serious increase, owing to the gradual
exhaustion of the thicker and more ·cheaply mined
veins near the surface, making it necessary to work
thinner veins at greater depths and longer distances
from the openings. This increases the cost of the
underground operations and of pumping and ventilating,
which latter are continual items of expense, as great
when the mines are idle as when in operation."
United States Steel common is the real leader at
present and has a more potent influence than any other
security. The stock is in such powerful hands and is
so conspicuous in its movements that any attempt to
gauge its market movements is resolved ta guesswork.
I think the stock is as high as the condition of the
corporation or the future prospects warrant. On October 7 I will produce an analytical exhibit of this corporation's affairs which will give a succinct idea of what has
happened in the past and what may be expected in the
future. When I persistently recommended purchases
of Steel around 30 and 40 dollars a share, I found my
advice very unpopular. By the same token I now find
words of caution equally distasteful. This means that
people who would not touch the stock at 40 will cheerfully buy it at more than double that price. I hardly
think the value of the property has doubled with the
price of the stock. This may bring forth the statement
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that there was no good reason why Steel should have
sold as low as 40 a few months ago; to which I will
reply that I found it just as difficult to convince people
that Steel was a bargain at 40 as I now find it to convince them that it is not a bargain at 90.

The General Situation.
Money is still the disturbing factor in the general
situation, although considerable efiort is being made to
belittle its importance. Call rates worked up to
4¼% on Thursday and Friday, partially in consequence of big dividend and interest payments. The
contention that money is plentiful outside of New
York is not borne out by the Comptroller's figures
as of September 1, which show that since June 23
National Bank loans have increased nearly $100,000,000, and cash reserves have decreased nearly $32,000,000. Additional evidence in this direction is at
hand in the form of correspondence with western
banking interests that prime paper in amounts
from $5,000 to $25,000 each and bearing firstclass names, is being industriously hawked about among
the smaller western lenders at 5 per cent. and very little
being taken. Many of these notes come from merchants
and manufacturers in the East who are marked AAAl.
From this it would appear that eastern money, particularly in New York, is being unduly diverted from legitimate business channels for speculative purposes. A
continuation of this policy will eventually work harm
to our industrial prosperity. The call from the interior
for funds is -steadily insistent, as is evidenced by
operations with the Sub-Treasury and the shipment of
$1,400,000 to Canada. There are indications that some
of the loans recently shifted to outside and foreign
lenders are being transferred back to local banks.
Whether this is being done voluntarily or by request
is hard to tell, but it is worth noting that this operation was accompanied by some calling of loans. Incidentally it should be noted that Russia took the weekly
consignment of gold from South Africa amounting to
£1,000,000, resulting in an advance in bar gold at
London of ¼d. £500,000 was also shipped from London to South America. $1,000,000 gold was also
taken for shipment to Japan via San Francisco,
making a total of $19,000,000 in the recent past.
1
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The National City Bank in its monthly circular made
these Japanese shipments the subject of particular
remark and suggests Government action to prever.t
the arbitrary exportation of the metal.
It is not at all unlikely that the artificial rush of
coffee ~rom Brazil ma:y bring about a resumption of
gold shipments from this country to South America for
European account. Late cables from London say that
there is an active demand for gold from all the agricultural exporting countries. There is only a very remote
possibility that the provisions of the Aldrich law will
be utilized at this juncture to bolster up our banking
position. In the first place the amendment was designed
primarily to meet an emergency like that of 1907, when
frightened depositors were withdrawing their money.
Only an acute money stringency would justify its application. · An artificial stringency caused by the competition for funds between speculative and general busine,s
interests would not be sufficient justification, and it is
highly improbable that banking interests and the authorities in Washington would care ta brave public opinion
in such a cause. In the second place the big lenders
of money would only suffer from any •considerable issue
of such currency. Rates have been too low for a long
time now to bring in reasonable returns on money, and
they would welcome a return to normal times when
money can be profitably employed at rates that are fair
to all.
T,here is no improvement to br. noted in the position
af our export trade upon which we must depend very
largely for additional credit in the foreign money market. Food stuffs and general merchandise are not going
forward in anything like the volume· of a year ago
which was a li~ht year, and there is no guarantee that
at prevailing high prices our new crop af cotton will
find a ready demand abroad, besides, the various farmers' unions in the South are urging growers to hold for
still -h igher prices. Private advices from Texas and
Oklahoma say that the top or second picking will be
small. The already poor prospects in Alabama and
Louisiana have been lessened by the recent hurricane.
The domestic demand for textiles is increasing, and
although prices of raw materials have stiffened,
manufacturers report that retailers are willing to
buy. The reported corner in cotton yarns by
western speculative interests has been denied.
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The developments since last week in the iron and
steel business are toward higher prices, sheets, tin
plates and pig iron have all been marked up another
notch, although the chairman of the Steel Corporation
insists that there is no desire on the part of his company to boost them. Imports of iron in quantity are
still being discussed; in fact something like 40,000 tons
of old melting iron have been bought on the other side,
according to trade authorities. ~ome of it is to come
from Germany and some from England. There is a
remarkably heavy demand for steel rails for 1910 delivery. Indications now are that railroads will need between 4 and 4½ million tons for next year. Orders
during Septe"mber total 700,000 tons, and since January 1,
2,400,000 tons.
There is not much change in the copper metal market;
prices, if anything, are a shade firmer around 13¼c.,
sales being effected at that figure. One round lot of
1,000,000 pounds is reported as having been taken by a
western electrical concern. The statistical position is
still unfavorable, but does not grow any worse, which
is encouraging and lends color to the statement by those
in close touch with the situation both here and abroad,
that the world's consumption has overtaken its production. One encouraging feature is that the consumers'
stocks of metal are still very low all over the world.
In fact, it appears that the accumulation of copper
metal is all out in sight where everybody can see it.
Copper exports for September were a little over
20,000,000 pounds. The generally accepted estimates
rang ed from 10 to 15 million pounds.

The Technical Situation.
The technical situation is weakened by the action of
the market during the last few days. It is true there
has been no general advance worthy of note, but demonstrations of strength in a few quarters where a short
interest was concentrated has cut down the short interest considerably. The bears have shown a good deal of
discrimination in choosing such stocks as St. Paul and
Reading for short sales. Their position is a correct
one and eventually it wilt be justified. But, on the
other hand, the very concentration of a shortage in
such quarters helps the manipuhtors temporarily.
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The technical situation is not strong and a sudden
burst of strength in the general list would send all but
the strongest and most decided bears scurrying. After
a further reduction of the shortage it would be much
more difficult to bid prices up manipulatively than it
has been for the past month.

Conclusion.
I do not think the present market is a safe purchase
in any quarter. A genuine bull market is not started
from such a level as this after two years of almost
unbroken advance, nor do the large inter.ests insist on
holding prices up and letting loc~e floods of optimistic
talk if they desire to buy. You <:annot imagine a man
trying to advance the price of anything he wants to
purchase, nor •can I. And where was this Utopian talk
a year ago, when we could really buy stocks to advantage. The head of the Steel Corporation a few days
ago burst forth into song about the excellent prospects
of the steel and iron business. Not long ago the same
individual gave us a broken-hearted talk when prices
of steel products were cut. His cheerful utterances
occur after the stock has doubled in price. Of
course, he does not now openly advise purchases,
nor did he, in the gloomy days, advise sales; but the
inference is there. The time to buy Steel stocks
was when he was dejected. Whether or not the
reverse will prove true is still an open question,
but I think it will. Perhaps not yet-but soon.
I have always given the greatest consideration to
future prospects in gauging stock prices, but I fear a
good many people are now carrying their fond hopes
into the dreaming stages. T,he ~tock market has not
only discounted all that is apparent, but all that can be
reasonably assumed in perspective. We hear a great
deal of talk .now about the tremendous business which
is to be done in 1910. The possibility of 'a disappointment in any direction is simply pushed aside. Is it not
possible that we are asuming too much, and is it not
possible that if our hopes are fulfilled, we will find
that there is not sufficient money to carry on simultane•
ously a ~reat business boom and a great speculative
boom? We could not do it two years ago.
The history of stock movements shows that security
prices invariably follow the crops. Is it wise, in figur-
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ing on the boom business of 1910 to assume great, or
even good, crops, before the seed is in the ground?
I do not mean to offer any baleful prognostications for the coming year, but merely to suggest
caution in taking too much for granted.
Without attempting to read the submerged possibilitie~ of the year 1910, there is another danger in the
situation now-I refer to the danger of a sudden and
severe reaction in stack prices caused by the overstimulation which is indulged in during a manipulative
phase of the market. The public shows no great tendency to take on stocks during the advances, but a
good proportion of them will buy on a five-paint reaction no matter how high a level that reaction may come
from. People who will not buy Steel to-day at 90 would
take it at 85, and so on through the list. Thi~ being the
case, it is .only necessary to boost prices beyond the
objective selling point to facilitate distribution.
For two years we have witnessed a resumption
of the upward trend after each moderate reaction,
and a good many traders deceive themselves into
thinking this will go on forever. But let the reaction extend to an average of ten or fifteen points,
which would not be at all unusual, and sentiment
would change in a most decided way. Such a decline
would be accompanied by a lot of hard-luck stories and
much pessimistic talk. T,his happened in 1905 right in
the midst of our business revival, and it has happened
in every other dull period. The advances of a month
are canceled in a day or two. Pushing prices up from
a high level is too much like rolling a stone up hill.
Take away the motive power behind it for an instant
and it rolls down.
After a close inspection of the conditions which now
prevail in the stock market, I am inclined to take a
more decided stand than heretofore. In my opinion
we are nearing a ·culmination which is going to cause
a good deal of grief. We don't want to get caught in
it. There is no way of measuring the exact possibilities
or desires of the important manipulators who have stocks
for sale. Just what they can do I do not know, nor
do they know themselves. My position is taken because I do not think there is any valid reason for a
further advance in the prices of stocks at present, and
from that position I do not propose to be budged by
anything short of a change in fundamentals and clearer
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future prospects. There is nothing stubborn in this
attitude, it is much easier and pleasanter to take the
bull side, but the bull side is a dangerous side now
The hazards of the game are great enough at any
time without inviting disaster by pursuing a good
thing too far.
For two years I have advised pur,chases of stocks
because they were cheap and because basic conditions
warranted advances. To advise purchases now is simply
to enter the gambling field in hope of participatin~ in
an artificial era of speculation which has for its obiect
the unloading of stocks bought at low prices in 1907.
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Chart Showing Market Movements for September, tgog.
(Thomas Gibson's Figures.)
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OCTOBER 9, 1909.
The fact that the market would not take stocks when
the real goods were offered for sale was pretty well
established thi~ week. On Tuesday morning Steel
common, the acknowledged leader, dropped 3¼
points in a few minutes on sales of only 39,100 shares.
When this stock was thrown on the market there was
actually no bidding whatever until the decline was
precipitately checked. After a stock has been advanced
steadily to a high price by means of manipulation or
general misunderstanding as to its merits, the people
who have done the manipulating and inspired the misunderstanding often "feel the market" to see if the absorptive power is great enough to permit of profitable
distribution. I cannot vouch for this being the case in
the movement mentioned above, but that is what it
looked like, and, if so, there was certainly no market
there. The old rule, when it was found that purchasers
were not receptive, was to bid up the price again and
renew the efforts to stimulate enthusiasm. In my
opinion a lot of the old gray rats of the Street are
making a mistake in thinking t.hey can do as much by
this method as in past years. A large percentage of
the speculative public is unwilling to fall into the trap.
It is of course very disgusting to see a lot of people
with their pockets full of money standing around and
asking pertinent questions, instead of blindly transferring their capital to the men who have divine rights,
but they will do it nowadays. The manipulators hate
to give up the antiquated methods, but it looks as if
they would have to find something new. There are
lambs, of course, but not so many. The public escapes
disaster to a much greater degree than formerly. Ask
any "bucket shop" man about it. He will tell you that
the "business" is no good any more. This is, of
course, to the detriment of the manipulators, but decidedly beneficial to the public and the legitimate
brokerage houses.
The manipulators, however, have ·recently succeeded
in one thing, and that is, giving the false impression
of a bull stock market when no bull market is in
progress. This matter has been commented on before,
but it grows more interesting as the market progresses.
The extensive advertising of one or two leaders does
the work.
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The average low point for 41 rails and industrials
in 1907 was 56.84 on November 21. On January 2,
1909, the average for the same stocks was 87.89, an
advance in a \ittle over a year of 31.05 points. From
January 2, 1909, to August 2, 1909, the stocks made
an average advance from 87.89 to 97.12, or 9.23
points. At the close of business October 7 the
average was 97.18. It will be observed therefore
that the real bull market occurred in 1908 and
that for the last two months the market has
barely held its own.
The peculiar feature is
that there has really been more excitement, more
tips, and more good news in the last two months than
during any period af the advance. The original re,covery was of an orderly character. The influx of
news and optimism began early in August, and, by
the advertising and whooping up of 1:wo or three leaders, an impression of great bull activity was imparted.
To make the recent movement more specific I give
below a table showing the highest prices reached by
active stocks in 1909, the date of the high price and
the present market. This will show how a few conspicuous stocks have concealed the liquidation and recessions in many others. The table includes all the 41
active rails and industrials used in my barometrical
figures.
HIGHEST IN 1909 ON ALL STOC1KS EMPLOYED IN BARO·
METER AND MARKET AT CLOSE OCTOBER 7.
Highest
Date ot
Close
Oct. 7.
RallsPrice.
High Price
Atchison, Top. & Santa Fe... 125¼
Oct. 2
122M
Baltimore & Ohio • • . • • • • . . . 122¼
July 29
117¼
186¾
Canadian Pacific.............. 189¼
Oct. 5
Chesapeake & Ohio .. . .... ,..
89¼
Oct. 1
88a
Chic., Milwaukee & St. P... 165¼
Sept. 18
159
Chicago & Northwestern..... 198¼
Aug. 18
190
Colorado & Southern........
68¼
Jan. 8
53¼
Denver & Rio Grande. . . . . . . .
54
Apr. 20
46¼
Erie common .. . . . . . . . • .. . . .
39
June 7
34¼
151¾
Illinois Central.. . . . . . . . . . • . . 162¼
Aug. 12
Louisville & Nashville........ 162¼
Aug. 12
153¼
Missouri, Kansas & Texas. . . .
44.li_
Jan. 22
42~
Missouri Pacific . . • . . • . . . • . .
77~
Aug. 5
69
New York Central ...•...• , • 147¾
Aug. 18
139 ~
Norfolk & Western .. ".......
96~
Aug. 7
96
Northern Pacific • . • • . . . . • • . . 159¼
Aug. 13
155¼
Pennsylvania ..•••••.•••. , . • . 151¼
Sept. 29
148¼
Reading .. .. • .. • • • . . . • . • • .. • 173a
Sept. 21
165~
Rock Island .. . . . • . . . .. . . . . ..
42
Aug. 12
37¥\
Southern Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
Aug. 16
131~
Southern Railway ........... , .
34
Aug. II
30¼
206
Union Pacific . .. . .. .. .. . . . . • 219
Aug. 16
Wabash . . . . .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .
24~
June 15
19~
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IndustrialsAmal(!'amated Copper ...... ••
American Car & Foundry .....
American Locomotive ••......
American Smelting •..... . ...
American Sugar . . ....... . ... .
Anaconda (par $25) , •..••••
Colorado Fuel & Iron., .. ,,,
Consolidated Gas ........••. ,
Corn Products common ...... .
Distillers' Securities .••... • ...
General Electric ...... , , , , , , ,
National Lead ......... ...•.•
People's Gas .•.........••.. .
Pressed Steel Car ... . . . .. ... .
Re1;>ublic Iron & Steel , .. , , , ,
Umted States Realty •.......
U. S. Steel common . ....... .
U. S. Steel pfd ............. .

Date ot
IDgh Price
Aug, 12
Oct. 7
Aug. 4
Aug,. 12
Sept. 24
May 8

t{t :

!iay
Aug.
Aug.
Aug.
Aug.
Sent.
Sept.
Oct.
Oct.

25

12

13
16
3
29
17
4
4

For some time I have suggeste:i great caution as to
developments in money. While there is nothing very
unusual or very bad in the situation yet, the most sinister phase of the matter is that- things are occurring
which the press and banking orac,es have insisted would
not come ta pass. If the matter does not become any
more serious than it has so far, we can rest easy. But
there is danger. And that danger must be accorded
consideration whether it materializes or not. It appears
certain to the close observer that efforts have been
made to bolster up appearances by doctoring bank statements, howling about the Aldrich Bill, and hinting at
the possibility of drawing large sums from Europe. I
do not believe London intends to help us finance a
stock market boom, after twa years of advancing prices
and with the trade balance already heavily against us.
Also, London has troubles of her own.
The monetary situation in Europe is at present giving
bankers much concern. The directors of the Bank of
England were compelled during the week to ,raise the
bank rate to 3 per cent., and the directors of the
Reichsbank have had to take similar action and a·dvance their rate to 4 per cent. In September money
is usua1ly drawn away from London by the country
banks. A large demand for gold arises in Scotland in
October. These demands continue until the end of the
year. According to the latest advices from London,
these local demands are now stroni;rly operative. The
Bank of England lost over £2,000,000 to the couT.1try
banks during September.
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At the present time there is also a large demand on
the Bank of England for gold :or foreign shipments.
During the past week gold shii;ments were made to
Russia, Egypt, Turkey, Japan and South America. Between now and December 30 this foreign demand for
gold is likely to increase largely. Heavy demands are
expected from Russia, Egypt anJ South America particularly.
This somewhat extraordinary foreign demand for gold
is due to improvement in trade prospects. Russian
wheat harvests have been good, and with the large exports of grain to foreign countries, have created a
strong demand for remittances to that country. Egypt
and India have both had good cotton crops, and the
Australian wool clip has been heavy and of the finest
quality. These bountiful crops are fostering the growth
of much optimism in the countries affected, and this
is leading to increased business activities, which are, in
turn, augmenting the demand for gold. A large proportion of the gold is obtained . by purchase in the open
market in London. A result of these conditions is,
consequently, a likelihood of an increase in the demand
for gold in London for foreign account, during the remainder of the year. Such increasing demand must
result in further advances in discount rates. In the
event of the United States needing additional gold, it
is probable that the European banks will all be compelled to change their discount rates considerably.
English bankers are already considering the possibility of America entering the London market
for gold. They recognize that it would be difficult to supply all the gold demanded, and are
endeavoring to get the Bank of France to undertake the supply of gold to Russia in the event of
the United States caJling on L ondon for gold.
The gold reserves of the Bank of France at
present are stronger than they were at this period
last year, and that bank, if the directors so decided,
could meet the Russian gold_demand.
The Bank of England's fast weekly return compares as follows:
This Week.

Circulation. . .. £'29,727,000
Public deposits..
6,997,000
Private deposits. 45,256.000
Govt. securities . . 17,707,000
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Last Week.

£ '29,708.000
8,834,000
42,721,000
15,231,000

Last Year.

£'29,428.000
4,335.000
46,598.000
16,630,000

This Week.

Last Week.

Last Year.

Other secunt1es. 28,582,000
Reserve.
23,635,000
Prop. of reserve to
liabilities ......
45.21%·
Bullion. ........ 35,224,000
Bank rate .......
3o/o

28,640,000
25,976,000

26,029,000
25,959,000

50.36'}"o
37,545,000
2.½'}"o

50.93%
36,749,000
2.½'}"o

The proportion of reserve to liabilities shown in the
Bank of England's return compares as follows:
Year.

1909. . . .. .. . . . ...... .. ..
1908. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1907.... . . . . . .. ... . ... ..
1906..... .. ....... . .....
1905. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1904...... . .. . .... . ... ..
1903..... ..... ... ...... .
1902 . . .. .... . . .. ...... ..
1901...... . .. . ..........

Per Cent.

45.21
50.93
46.51
37.47
41.47
54.90
44.02
43.38
47.12

Bank Rate
Per Cent.

3

2.½

4.½
5
4

3
4
4
J

The financial situation in Germany is very unsettled
at present. There is a large treasury deficit which must
be met by the issue of fresh government loans. It is
believed in Berlin that the supplementary estimates for
1909, which will be presented to the Reichstag, with the
budget for 1910, will be $125,000,000 instead of $70,000,000, as was officially estimated in August.
The German Government is plunging heavily into expenditures for military and naval armaments, while
the increased tariff is resulting in diminishing revenue returns.
The Reichsbank is now under the strain of too persistent demand-that of the Interior Treasury and that
of stock speculators on the Bourse. Stock speculations
during the past few months, have assumed unusually
large proportions on the German, Austrian and
Hungarian exchanges.
The Berlin Stock Exchange has not witnessed such activity as exists at present since the Autumn of 1905. The
speculative public has become imbued with the
idea that Germany is about to start upon a new
era of unexampled prosperity, and has exhibited an
almost insatiable eagerness to buy home industrial
stocks. Conservative bankers are warning their clients
331

about the dangers of this wild speculation in the face
of the bad banking outlook.
The Stock Exchange in Vienna has been excited by
a conflict between the banking interests for the control
of the Rima-Muranyi Iron Works. This company has
_ been organized as a trust to control the . iron and steel
industries of the Austrian Empire and its stock has
been advanced from 200 to 7"20 crowns per share. The
frenzied operations on the Bourse recently caused the
Austrian Government to issue a warning to the directors of the Bourse against the danger of a continuation of the wild speculation indulged in during the past
two weeks.
The outlook for gold producticn continues good. The
yield of the world's mines this year, it is estimated,
will exceed that of 1908. The extraordinary demands
for gold for new commercial and national enterprises,
however, will take all the new gold and will severely
strain the gold reserves of the European banks.
Consequently, all indications point to continued
advances in discount rates and higher money by
the end ' of the year.

The General Situation.
The generally good business situation was further
modified this week by another access of strength in call
loans, which wo·rked up to 6% and carried time loans
correspondingly higher. Less is being said in regard to
relief through the issue of Aldrich-Vreeland currency
and more stress is being laid on the prospects of a rush
of funds from the interior whenever rates at this center
rise to attractive figures. In this connection it would
be well to take notice of the Comptroller's report on the
condition of National Banks as of September 1st, in
which both Chicago and St. Louis, two very important
reserve points, are shown to be fractionally below the
required reserve. Since that time, Chicago's shipments
of currency have been 10% larger than a year ago
and St. Louis has shipped large quantities to the cotton
belt. Therefore, it is highly improbable that either of
these centers has added much if anything to its
reserves, and it is reasonable to suppose that neither
can be depended upon except for temporary, day-to-day
relief. Commercial and industrial expansion and the
crops demand more money every day and it is un332

profitable for Wall Street to enter into active competition for funds at the present moment. Some observers
expect also that higher rates here, together with our
exports of cotton, will bring imports of gold from the
other side. Cotton is going out 1ather freely, but it is
the usual first rush somewhat accelerated, as regards
the shipper, by the relatively high price. London is
having all she can do just now to hold her own with
Russia, Egypt, South America and the Continent calling
for gold. £300,000 went to Egypt on Monday and
Russia bought in the open market all of the £600,000
South African gold. T,he Turkish loan which is to be
financed by British capitalists in the near future calls
for $35,000,000.
The editor of the London
Statist, now visiting this country, says that the Bank
of England has not an unlimited supply of gold and intimates that it will be desirable for the United States
to keep its requirements within reasonable compass in
order that the international money markets may not be
disturbed. Some of the close students of the condition
of the U. S. Treasury maintain that a bond issue of at
least $50,000,000 is inevitable at no distant time. This
is a complication which the treasury officials are straining every nerve to ward off as long as possible. It
is very evident that New York bankers fully appreciate the whole situation and they are doing the sensible
thing in calling loans on Stock Exchange collateral and
curtailing new loans by raising rates.
In addition to the adverse influences in the money
market the general situation received a further setback
through the medium of an extremely unfavorable Government report on the cotton crop. Using the condition
filrures . 58.8 as a basis the trade generally estimate t~e
crop at around 11,000,000 bales. In a measure cotton 1s
one of our most important crops, not alone as affecting
the domestic situation, but also in its relation to foreign
exchange, in which capacity it is one of our best producers. The argument is advanced that, as the crop is
short, it will bring a proportionately higher price abroad
and consequently the credit created in Europe would be
the same. The fallacy of this scrt of reasoning lies in
the fact that a period of abnormally high prices always
carries with it the necessity for economy on the part
of a large percentage of buyers. And, furthermore,
Europe is not entirely dependent upon this country for
its supplies. If the judgment of European spinners
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can be taken at par there is a large visible and invisible
supply of cotton notwithstanding America's shortage.
Its utility as a freight producer is also greatly curtailed; in this light the short crop cannot be regarded
as a bullish argument on cotton carrying railroads.
Considered in a broad economic sense, a short crop is
never desirable as it represents just as much expenditure for labor as a large one, and, while the producer
may receive as many dollars for his reduced crop as he
would ordinarily for a large one, the consumer does
not receive the same value for his money. And, in the
end, the producer will find that J-is dollars will not buy
normal quantities of other things, because, in a more
or less general way, prices for the various commodities
have a habit of following the same general trend. The
ideal condition of affairs is when everyone receives fair
prices for his products.
Iron and steel conditions are little changed. Pig
iron production is exceeding all records, but the rapid
rise in prices serves to check the buying in some
degree. Iron pipe interests have ,aised prices $4 a ton
and have arranged to import 20,000 tons of English
iron. Estimates of the Steel Corporation's earnings for
the quarter run as high as $42,000,000.
The demand for electrical equipment in Europe is increasing and the outlook for copper metal is improving.
There is very little change in the domestic market.
Prices a trifle easier. The big electrical companies are
running about 80% of capacity.
Actual car shortage is reportec! on several roads and
others are preparing to husband their supply in anticipation thereof. Loaded car reports are record breakers.
Some of the annual reports of railroad earnings show
that net increases have been made largely at the expense of maintenance. Severai of the August reports
show a tendency toward greater expenditures in this
direction. Unless operating expenses can be ke~t down
and gross earnings greatly increased net gams will
soon begin to show smaller percentages in comparison.
The Government report on corn is a disappointment, but is more than offset by the larger yield
of wheat because of the more ready demand for it
by foreigners when the price is right. Yield of oats
is well up to expectations.
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The Technical Situation.
I do not find any great improvement in the technical
situation this week. Some of the weaker accounts in
Steel common have been shaken out, but there are plenty
of them left. The decline in other stocks has not been
great enough to dislodge the ten-point element. The
short interest has increased somewhat on the rallies,
following the initial weakness, but the sellers appear
to be of a good class and are making ample marginal
provisions. There is a decided feeling on the part of
many operators that the Morgan interests have obligated themselves to put Steel to par and that they will
keep the alleged promises. Personally I think these
interests have obligated themselves to nothing. They
never do-at least not directly.
As is always the case in a movement of this kind, a
good many people bought Steel well above 90 and are
now waiting for a chance to get out even. I know of
a number of such cases. This will make it more difficult to advance prices manipulatively, as this stock will
have to be removed on the way up.
Do not consider the technical situation strong.

Conclusion.
After the little dip which occurred this week a good
many letters and telegrams were received asking if, in
my opinion, the break had gone far enough. As a
general reply to these inquiries I will state that I do
not consider the decline, so far as it ,has progressed, as
anything more than trifling. If it were not for the fact
that steady liquidation occurs whenever the market
grows hard I should consider :he reaction as merely a
phase of the market and would attach no significance to
it. A two-point average decline is nothing. If our
money affairs turn out badly the decline will be severe
-ten, or possibly fifteen, points. There is no way to
gauge it a priori. We must watch the developments and
decide on the prospects and conditions from day to
day. I cannot now see any hope for an immediate improvement which would eliminate the danger and, on
the other hand, there are many things which might
occur to complicate matters. I do not consider it safe
to buy anything at present. The scale order applied to
such industrials as Amalgamated Copper, the equipments, Republic Iron & Steel and other industrials
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mentioned from time to time will turn out all right, if
the operator enters on such tr,ding methods with a
full realization that the scale order means purchases
in anticipation of a probable decline. Those who wish
to sell short have their best opportunities in stocks
which are in a weak statistical position such as St. Paul
and Reading or in stocks which have been bulled to
death, such as United States Steel common.
The next impo-rtant and sound movement will be the
advance which will occur after the possibility of money
troubles has been eliminated and after the manipulation
has ceased. That time may not l::e long in coming and
in anticipation of such a period I am making comprehensive examinations of all the leading securities and
will be in a position to state what is best to buy as soon
as the time appears when it is advisable to buy anything.
For the present would confine operations to either the
scale order as suggested or sales on rallies.
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OCTOBER 16, 1909.
In looking at the fundamental conditions whi~h invariably make or break prices of securities, there are
three prominent factors which must now be given careful consideration. All three of these factors must be
examined, not only as to present conditions, but as to
future prospects. In fact, a true perspective is vastly
more important than a recognition of what is under our
noses.
The three factors referred to are our recent and forthcoming security is~ues, our business conditions and prospects, and our money affairs.
We have issued during the first nine months of 19()()
about a billion and a quarter of new securities. Some
of these issues, particularly the bonds, have been rather
sluggish and show no signs of activity. The mere volume
is not unprecedented and could no doubt be absorbed
in a reasonable time. The trouble is that the need
for more money is imperative in many quarters and
we must, before long, offer many new securities if
corporations are to be adequately provided with
funds. A great many projected borrowings have
been held back recently, for the very simple reason
that no market could be found for them. Money is
no longer a drug.
In my opinion this necessity for increased capital and
the consequent increase of fixed .:harges should not be
shoved aside li$htly. It is fashionable just now to point
to a new bond issue, or any other form of borrowing as
a bull factor. But this is a delusion in many cases. The
industrial corporations have borrowed more heavily during the year than at any time in history, but they have
pretty well covered their needs. There are few railroads
which could not ,use more money now, and in this
quarter we may look for many new attempts to raise
funds. The economies of the last two years have been
in some ways beneficial, but we also find some very bad
flaws in maintenance, and these gaps must be filled. It
is almost certain that from now c.,n net earnings will not
increase in proportion to gross, as they have been doing
for a year. They wili probably do just the reverse.
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If the world was loaded with money seeking investment, and if our debit balance was small, we might
reasonably expect to finance these new issues easily, but
in this regard we are called upon to view a decidedly
unpromising situation. We would better find a market
for what we have for sale now, before figuring
out a• market for what we will have for sale later.
It is all right to make unsupported statements
about how easy money will be later on, but
there is such a thing as dangerous optimism. I
do not believe England will give us any more money
rig.ht away to finance a speculative stock market boarn.
If the boom is checked, or if a decline occurs which will
make our stocks more attractive we may look for some
assistance a1J.road.
As regards business conditions, they are unquestionably
good, but in assuming a further expansion are we not
taking too much for granted? It is practically impossible to find any observer who would admit that we
might by any possibility be disappointed in an unprecedented business in 1910. T,he man who s,uggests such
a possibility now is more likely to be greeted with a
smile of derision than with respectful attention. And
for the sake of a clear understanding as to my position
I wish to say, parenthetically, that I do not take the
opposite side of the question and predict a bad year in
1910. One assumption would probably be as unwarranted as the other. The word "possibility" is italicized
advisedly.
The tendency to look for an unusual period of prosperity next year seems to be based largely upon the
rapidity with which we have recovered from the disturbance of 1907. It might be reasonably argued that
the very fact of a complete rehabilitation in an unprecedentedly short time suggests a possible lull, or, as the
psychologists call it, a plateau. Much of our manufacturing activity at preent is occasioned by restocking
operations. Shelves were allowed to go bare in 1908.
Small dealers would not buy anything even at panic
prices. When the shelves are refilled the demand will
no·t be so insistent or abnormal. Some of my correspondents in the manufacturing and wholesale line are
already referring to signs of some cessation in demand
for general merchandise.
In examining the course of :,reneral business in the
after-panic years, I find that the lulls in bu siness have
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always occurred in the third year following panic periods. Sometimes this lull was not very pronounced,
but it is always there. The only way to measure general business activity is by scrutinizing the bank clearings. There is a good deal of uniformity about the
process, so measured. The panic year itself is usually
one of heavy business. Securities are declining, but
this merely represents the anteriority of stock prices.
In the year following a panic, business falls off and
stock prices advance (anteriority again). In the second
year fol19wing a panic general business improves with
a whoop and stock prices participate to some extent in
the improvement. In the fourth year there is a let-down
in the bank clearings, or, to say the least, the rntio of
improvement is not sustained and the stock market does
not show very well in that third year. For example,
1884 was a panic year, and stock prices advanced in
1885 and 1886, but declined in 1887. 1893 was a panic
year and stock prices recovered in 1894 and 1895, but
declined in 1896. 1903 was a panic year and stock prices
advanced in 1904 and 1905, but lo~t ground in 1906. 1907
was a panic year and stock prices advanced in 1908 and
1909. What is to follow remains to be seen. These instances are not all-sufficient, but I may state that I have
gone back as far as published statistics will permit and
find no variations to the rule that the third year after a
panic shows a modification of activity and a termination
of the upward movement in security prices.
It must be added, however, that these deductions
refer to railroad securities particularly. Industrials are
a new thing. In my opinion we should make a most
marked discrimination between the two groups. The
reasons far looking with more favor on industrials than
on rails Ji.ave already been offered in these advices but
will be further discussed hereafter.
In order to show, by the barometer mentioned, the
fluctuations of general business, as referred to above,
the following table is included. It is necessary to
examine this table very caref.ully, in order to get at the
true relevancy of the figures. Constantly increasing
population must be allowed for. Mere increase of clearings is of no importance. The ratio is what is to be
considered. Also we must look at the temporary lulls
or reversals as well as the annual totals.
339

TABLE SHOWING B ANK CLEARINGS IN RECENT PANIC YEARS AND THREE YEARS
N EXT FOLLOWING PANICS. (ooo omitted.)
January.

<,>
~

0

1884 ... . ..... . . . ................ . . . ... . . .. $4,618,809
1885 ... . . .. ·.. . .•..... .. ......... .. .. . ... .• 3,307,561
1886 ... . ... . ... . ... . . .. ... . •....... .. . . .. . 4,143,139
1887 . .. . . . ... . . . ...... . . . ... . .. ... . . ...... 4,370,8 22
1893 .... . . ... ,,,,. · · · · · ,, · · · · · • • · • • • • · · , ,. 5,9S0,8 t I
I 894 . . . .. ... .. ..•. , .... , . , , , • · · , , · , , , · · . , , 4,060,598
1895 ..... . . . ,,, · · · • • • · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 4,407,442
1896 .... ....•....... •. .......... . .. . . . .... 4,627,143
1903 ,,,, ,, ,,,,,, , ,, , , ·, , , • • · • • • · • · · · • · •,, , Il,088,982
1904 . ... . . . .. · · · ,, · · · · · · · · · · · · · · • · · · · · · · · · 9,451,278
1905 . .. , . . ,,, ,, , .,,,,,,, , ,, • · • ,,, · · •·· , ,, , I I,845,618
1906 . . .. ... . ... ............. .. .... . ..... .. 16,333,604
1907 . .. .. ... . . ... ... .• ..• .. .. .. . .. ...•.. .. 15,054,655
1908 .. , .......... , .... .. • · · .. · .. · · " · .. · •. 11,359,308
1909 . . .. .. .. .•. . .. .. . .. . .......•. . .... . ... 14,035,198

Feb ruary.
$4,019,5 75
2,769,678
3,848,019
3,695,294
5,082,244
3,2 10,442

3,411,146

4, 115,468
8,468,707
7,7 27, 105
10,648,351
12,477,037
11,823,958
8,756,701
11 ,244,250

March.

April.

$3,964,101
2,983,904

$4,056,296

4,172,610

3,610,313
4,513,01 7
4,951 ,286
3,728,423
4,259,820

4,335,761
5,416,802
3,760,337
4,038,238
4,145 , 161
9,582,278
8,397,388
12,915,789

2,897,129

4 ,302,196

9,581,868

13,007,090

8,324,005
12 ,732 ,343
12,902,156

14,657,900
9,777,937
12,606,397

12,661,631
9,764,491
13,664,720

May,

June.

$4,528,437
2,993,941

$3,402,428
2,970,494

3 ,610,281

4,014,o80

4,299,625
5,280,981
3,900,473
4,864,658
4 ,240,261
9,I18,534

4,541,691
4,552,750
J ,608 ,05 I
4,403,915
4,305 ,283

8 ,229,870

8,072,01 I
10,812,576
12,249,457
11,159,390
9,825,771
14,134,647

12,057, 137
13 ,237,374
12,406,704
10,858,707
12,889,301

9,422,481

TABLE SHOWING BANK CLEARINGS IN RECENT PANIC YEARS AND THREE YEARS NEXT
FOLLOWING PANICS. (0)0 omitted.)-Continued.
July.

c,,

~

1884 .... .. . . .. . . • . . . . . . .. ...... . 3,199,031
1885 •• . •. . .. .. •. . ... ..• • . ...• . • . 3,471,361
1886 . • . ... .. . . . . ,,,,,. , · ,, , · ·, , • 3,798,494
1887 .... . ...... .• ..• •.. .•... .. .. 4,023 ,906
1893 • •.. ... • . • •. .. . .. • ... .• .• ••• 4, 158,802
1894 • ..... . •. . . ..... • .•......... 3,521 ,963
1895 •• .. .. .... .•. .•• . . . . .... .. .. 4,570,095
1896 .. . • • .... •.. ... . .. , . .. •... · • 4,376,999
1903. • . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9,767,845
1904 . . ... .. . .. .. . ..... , , .. ,., . .. 8,674,171
1905 •. • •• ... . .• . . •.. • •... . ... •·· .10,863,858
1906 .. ...... . ............ .' . ... .. u,648,370
1907 •. . . • ..... •.•• ••. . .• • •·• .•..• 12,372,028
1908 • • • • •• .•.. • •.. • ........ . . . .. JI,071,981
1909 • • •• . . .. .•. . •.••. . . •. . .... .. 13,450,296

August.

September.

$2,983,593
.2,984,252
3,649,962
3,843,054
3,369,972
3,570,771
4,147,053
3,562,582

$3,022,390

7, 921,228
8,020,043

10,899,923
13,143,574
u,558,715
10,248,695
13,494,088

3,112, 022

3,859,825
4,076,793
3,342,946
3,530,780
4,181,359
3,712,583
7,673,660
8,857,077
10,882,JI I
12,513,065
10,573,022
11,112,581

13,523,716

October.
$3,495,942
4,444,948
4,693,214
4,537,992
4,042,828
4,295,232
5,244,71 l
4,606,633
9,176,664
u,526,692
12,620,274

14,550,027
13,804,896
12,136,130

November.
$3,101,538
4,451,210

4,640,871
4,527,384
4,102,749

4,178,876
4,740,739
4,619,206
8,169,919
12,520,895
13,145,761
13,656,039
9,679,735
12,976,376

December.

Year.

$3,512,860 $43,905,007
4,539,260 41,015,767
5,152,448 49,193,261
4,285,762 51,051,818
4,078,631 54,330,808
4,320,283 45,686,235
5,079,299 53,348,481
4,720,4II 51,333,931
9,295,356 109,267,527
12,820,472 112, 621,012

14,449,027
14,285,466
9,428,094
14,383,443

143,872,974
160,019,717
145,175,733
132,272,067
u9,152,606

It will be understood that in calling attention to these
adverse factors I wish to point cut possible danger, not
to predict any form of disaster. The danger lies, as it
always has, in the past, in inflation and the over-estimating of probabilities and values. I have always been
as particular about avoiding danger as about searching
for opportunities. The missing of an opportunity here
and there is not a serious matter. The stock market
is always with us and other chances will come. But if
we persist in trying to force the luck by purchasing
stocks for no better reason than manipulation may
force prices beyond values, we are eliminating from
our methods everything that is intelligent in speculation and the end is merely a question of time.
When we find large interests indulging in optimistic
utterances after two years of advancing stock prices,
when the subsidized press enlarges upon all that is
favorable and belittles all that is unfavorable, when
money is shifted around to make bank statements appear favorable, when, in short, every effort is made to
induce public and foreign purchases of securities, we
may, without the slightest hesitation, arrive at the conclusion that important people who ·hold securities purchased at low prices in a period when the outsiders
could not, or would not, buy, are now exercising all the
wiles of the game to make a market on which to sell.

The General Situation.
Money continues the dominating infl-uence in the general situation, and, while some of the strain has been
removed by calling of loans and liquidation in the stock
market, it is still the most important factor to be
reckoned with. One significant fact in connection with
the local money market is that, while call rates have
remained stationary, time rates have crept up to within
a fraction of the call level. The reason for this is not
hard to find. Commission houses in Wall Street have
for many months made use of the low call rates and
neglected the higher priced time money. Now that
this is no longer profitable, they are turning their attention the other way. Even if it were temporarily
profitable, there is no assurance of its permanency and
conservative brokers prefer to pay four or five per cent.
for time loans when there is the chance that call loans
may be run up on them at any moment. Money rates
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in the West and Southwest exhibit a degree of firmness
which makes it very plain that all the available funds in
those sections are needed for crop moving and general
business purposes. Whatever help this money market
may expect from the interior will naturally be of a
day-to-day character. The prospects of assistance from
abroad are even more remote than last week and talk
of gold imports has almost ceased. The truth of the
matter is that we have borrowed up to the limit in
London, Berlin has its own speculative craze to attend
to, and Paris is too cautious to get very far from shore
with regard to her reserves. No better evidence is
needed than the recent Tise in the German rate and the
advance on Thursday by the Bank of England to four
per cent. and the purchase of gold in the open market
by Paris in competition with England and Russia. Not
much dependence can be placed on exports of our farm
products, particularly as regards wheat. In the first
place the price of wheat is too high to admit of a free
movement to the other side. In the second place Russia
will have a big surplus which will operate against the
foreign exchange possibilities of our wheat crop. Our
s-u rplus grain will no doubt be absorbed but the movement will be retarded and thereby delay the approach
of a period of easier money. What the i:esult will be
of a refusal to extend our immense loans in London
upon maturity, is problematical . only in the severity of
the strain which will then come on our market. It is
to be hoped that our bankers will be in shape to take
care of them.
Tihe cotton crop received a further setback this week
from the effects of storms and premature frosts. The
reports appear somewhat exaggerated but it is quite
certain that a great deal of damage has resulted. Accidents to this crop are two-fold in their effect upon
business conditions. In addition to the injurious effects
upon the domestic situation there is also the matter of
foreign credits, the making of which is in a great
measure dependent upon the volume of cotto·n exports.
While foreigners are taking our cotton at the present
high prices, there is no assurance that they will do so
at still higher prices for the reason that they are not
wholly dependent upon us for supplies . Curtailment
of spinners' operations is one of the evils that is
likely to follow in the train of high prices consequent
upon the crop shortage.
343

Notwithstanding the poor statistical position of copper metal large producers and selling agencies are not
offering electrolytic below 13¼. The Copper Producers
Association reports an increase in stocks of nearly
16,000,000 pounds. The demand, abroad, however,
shows signs of improvement and returned travelers say
that many European cities which have been slow to appreciate the utility of electricity are awaking to its
possibilities and are installing it wherever practicable.
The situation in co·p per metal is susceptible to quick
changes and the transition from superabundance to
scarcity can be accomplished in an incredibly short time,
stocks figuratively and actually melting away practically over night.
In the iron and steel trade appearances denote that
prices, particularly for pig iron, have about reached the
apex. The demand is still there but the edge is taken
off by the fact that it is now profitable to import iron
from the other side. Some fair sized lots have already
been negotiated in England and Germany and further
advances in this country would do much toward stimulating importations. Rail orders aggregate about 100,000
tons and inquiries are in the market for something like
1_5,000 cars.
THE TECHNICAL SITUATION.
The technical situation, under present conditions, is
subject to very sharp reversals, which, of course,
means big swings up or down in the leaders.
The technical situation is much weaker than at the
end of last week. Timid bears have been chased out
and considerable public buying has been inspired by the
moderate recoveries in prices. A great deal of this
outside buying is carried on the "two-point stop" principle. This adds to the vulnerability of the market from
day to day. The weakest class of buying is in the
public favorites, United States Steel common, Reading,
Union Pacific, and other stocks which have been assiduously exploited of late. It is also true, however, that
when the market weakens, the bear element pitch on
these same stocks as short sales. The reason· for
this is, of course, that the present speculative element wants "action," and operates in the wildest
movers.
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Conclusion.
I do not consider the present market a safe purchase
in any quarter at present. We are passing through a
period of ups and downs, with prices up one week and
down the next. For three months this switching back
and forth has gone on with no change in the general
level of security prices. One of the most significant
features of this long drawn out dead level is that stocks
which show weakness, statistically, are given more
prominence than stocks which show genuine improvement in their reports. Reading, St. Paul, Chesapeake
& Ohio, and United States Steel common, are instances of this. Of course the present statistical showing of Steel common is good enough, but it has already been shown how unstable this security is.
It cannot be classed as an investment in any sense
of the word. St. Paul and Reading show absolutely
no warrant for higher prices, when compared with
other railroad common stocks.
Find no reason to change my views. Think stocks
a much better sale on rallies than a purchase on the
declines. We may have a continuation of the period
of wide fluctuations for a time, but this is merely a
phase of an active manipulative market, and unless there
is a great improvement in money prospects, the next
important movement will be to a lower level.
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OCTOBER 23, 1909.
The stock market during the week has been a
rather tame affair. While there has been plenty
of verbosity, mostly of a bull character, the only
important development was a further perpendicular
rise in the discount rate of the Bank of England
to 5 per cent. Such an advance has been called an
impossibility by many writers. They might have
saved their faces by employing the word "improbability." But anyhow, the 5 per cent. rate is here,
and, personally, I have no hesitation .in pronouncing
a further advance probable, or, at least, possible.
For several months I have insisted that money
conditions should be scrutinized as the all-important factor affecting security prices, and, at ·the risk
of being accused of undue reiteration, I will continue
the subject until the danger is past.
The extraordinary increases in loans and bank currency that are being shown in the weekly statements of the national banks, are beginning to alarm
conservative bankers who study the official banking
returns. The returns show that loans have increased
$100,000,000 since last June. In the same period individual deposits increased $111,000,000. Since September, 1908, loans have been augmented $378,000,000
and deposits $462,000,000. While the loans and deposits have thus been increasing, comparative statistics show that the banks have lost nearly $28,000,000 in specie since September, 1908. If business
throughout the country continues to increase, and
conditions indicate that it will undoubtedly steadily
improve, for some time to come, bankers must make
provisions for financing such improvements. The
completion of harvesting and the marketing of the
crops will tend to relieve the banking position somewhat. But this will not be sufficient to reduce financial conditions to a healthy state. Effective assistance will be given when the various state banking
authorities have been induced to bestir themselves
and see that the provisions of the banking laws have
been properly attended to, and take action to stop
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such palpable manipulation and "window-dressing,"
as, for instance, has been exhibited by the New Y6rk
bank stateI)l~nts in the past few weeks. Little reliance can be placed in anticipated remedial currency
measures being enacted when Congress meets.
Congress will not make any important changes in
the various currencies.
Further loans must be
placed abroad, and, as has been suggested in these
advices before, either advances on the securities
must be called in by the banks, or general business expansion must be curtailed. The country's
ba11king facilities are inadequate to the task of
financing a speculative and general business boom
simultaneously and meeting the requirements of the
United States Treasury.
If banking conditions
continue under strain much longer serious commercial disturbances must follow.
The strain on our banking resources is being
closely watched by European financial authorities
and many of their criticisms of our present monetary outlook are far from complimentary. An American demand for gold during the remainder of the
year would seriously interfere with European financial affairs, and tend to advance discount rates to
higher figures than local conditions warranted. Such
a rise in discounts would, of course, retard business
improvement. American bankers have been large
borrowers on bills in London during the past three
months. Settlement of such loans will doubtless
be made to a large extent by cotton, wheat and
copper shipments now going forward.
The drain on the gold reserve of the Bank of
England continues, notwithstanding the advance of
the bank's discount rate to 5 per cent. Gold is being
withdrawn on account of country and Scotch banks,
and for export to Russia, Japan, Egypt, Turkey,
Brazil and Argentina.
Bank discount rates and open market rates in the
chief European cities, as of the dates given, were
as follows :
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Oct. 21,
1909.

~s

s:

::il!l

Oct. 2,
1909.

,J;i

..14,j

A ..

::;l !l

Sept. 25,
1909.
.>I.

~~

..
5Pl

~.;

JPl 5Pl JPl [Pl P.Pl
0
0"'
0"'
Paris .•..
Berlin . . . .
Hamburg ..
Frankfort . .
Amsterdam.
Brussels ..
Vienna .•..
St. Petersb'g
Madrid . • •
Copenhagen

3
3
S
4½
S
4½
S
4
3
2
3
2½
4 ¼ 3¼
S Norn.
5
4¼
4½ 4

Sept. 18,
1909.

.,

~!

.>I

::;l !l

JPl ePl
0"'

Set. 11,
909.

1!i
P.Pl

,J;i

..

::;i.;

eP1
0"'

2
3
l¾
2½ 3
1~ 3
3½ 4
3~ 3½ 3¼ 3½ 2¼
3½ 4
3~ 3½ 3¼ 3½ 2¼
3½ 4
3¼ 3½ 3¼ 3½ 2¼
2½ 1¼ 4½ 1½ 2½ 1½ 2½ l½
3
2
3
2
3
2¼ 3
l¼
4
3¼ 4
3~ 4
3~ 4
3½
5 Norn. 5 Norn. 5 Norn. 5 Norn.
3
3
4½
4½ 3½ 4½ 3½
4½
4½ 4
4½ 4
4½ 3½ 4½ 3½
3
4
4
4

The discount rates tabulated show that the demand for money was general throughout Europe
last month and is still increasing. When the directors of the Bank of England met on October 21 to
consider the outlook for the money market, they
considered it so unpromising that they decided to
immediately raise the bank's rate from 4 per cent.,
which they fixed on October 14, to 5 per cent. By
this action they hoped to relieve the drain on their
gold reserves.
During the first three-quarters of the present year
new companies offered stock for subscription in
London amounting to about £150,000,000. The low
interest rates that prevailed early in the year were
responsible, in a large measure, for promoting such
a large development in corporate activity. The new
companies absorbed a large proportion of the available money, but, owing to the hardening of discounts, the lot of the company promoter will become more difficult from now on than it was earlier
in the year. The following table indicates the large
demands for capital made by incorporators during
the past nine months, as compared with other
periods in the previous four years.
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NEW BRITISH CAPITAL APPLICATIONS.
First quarter
Second quarte r
Third quarter ..
Fourth quarter ..

..

Total ..

..

....

1905.
£67,301,200
36,915,500
22,854,100
40,116',600

1906.
£30,264,800
55,059,800
10,835,80)
24,012,800

1907.
£49,428,6)0
40,304,600
15,631,400
18,265,400

£167,187,400

£120,173,200

£123,630,000

1908.
£45,287,900
64,385,600
31,541,800
50,988,400

1909.
£64,238,400
56,835,20)
27,694,400

£192,203,7)0

£148,768,000

First quarter
Second quarter
Third quarter
Fourth quarter •.

.. .. ..
.. ..

Total

.. .. ..

.. ..

It will be seen by . an inspection of this table
that the greatest demand on the market was made
in the first two quarters of the year. Although it
is probable that fewer capital applications for new
companies will be made in London in the next few
months, large sums of money will be required to
finance the operations of many of the companies
formed this year. A falling off in the activities of
company J>romoters relieves the money market
somewhat, but what is gained in this way may be
lost by immoderate activities of existing companies.
The banks, however, can more easily cope with the
latter class of activities.
The British government has not been an active
factor in the London money market this year. In
the first nine months government borrowings
amounted to only £3,840,000, and municipal borrowings totaled only £5,000,000. The treasury proposes during the next few weeks to issue a number
of treasury bills to take up obligations shortly
falling due. Such issues threaten to disturb the
money market and will doubtless depress consols
and strain the bank reserve.
The Bank of England's weekly return of October
21 , 1909, compares as follows:
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This Week.
Circulation ............ £29,037,000
Public deposits • . . • . . . .
6,382,000
Private deposits • . . . . • • 44,482,000
Government securities... 16,791,000
Other securities........ 25,481,000
Reserves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22,322,GIIOo
Proportion of reserve to
liabilities • . • . . • . . . .
47.60%
Bullion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33,221,000
Bank rate .. .. .. .. .. ..
s%

Last Week.
£29,315,000
5,573,000
46,444,000

Last Year.
£28,893,000

17,711,000
29,053,000
22,949,000

161030,000
26,108,000
26,194,000

44-09%

51.70%
36,450,000

34,126,000

4%

4,530,000

46,084,000

2¾%

The proportion of reserve to liabilities shown in
the Bank's return compares as follows:
Year.
Per Cent. Bank Rate.
1909
47.60
5 %
1908
51.70
2¼%
1907
47.21
4¼%
1906
36.64
6 %
40.17
1905
4 %
1904
53.88
3 %
49.64
1903
4 %
1902
45.79
4 %
48.31
1901
3 %
There does not appear any factor in the English
financial horizon at present tending to reduce discount rates. Everything points to still higher rates.
Business in France continues to improve satisfactorily. The reports from the iron and steel mills
in the central districts exhibit good orders; but
iron masters express themselves as dissatisfied with
the comparatively low prices they have to quote.
The returns of the Bank of France show that
gold is being steadily withdrawn on account of
Russia.
The last weekly statement of the Bank of France
shows the following changes, compared with the
previous weekly statement:
Francs.
Gold holdings increased . . . . . . . . . .
425,000
Silver holdings decreased . . . .
2,225,000
Notes in circulation decreased
9,475,000
General deposits increased. .
875,000
Bills discounted increased . . . .
23,225,000
Treasury advances increased . .
19,475,000
The detailed statement compares as follows:
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1908.
1907.
1909.
Francs.
Francs.
Francs.
Gold ....... 3,520,350,000 3,262,421,398 2,770,019,255
940,602,506
888,596,036
Silver
894,575,000
Circulation .5,167,503,600 4,976,944,830 4,887,922,595
577,656,584
440,059,926
Gen. dep . .. 550,432,900
727,211,091 1,129,946,220
Bills dis ..... 660,435,000
142,946,145
233,774,302
Treas. ad . . . 118,438,800
The most important items at this date in years
prior to 1907 were as follows:
Circulation-,
Gold,
Silver,
Francs.
Francs.
Francs.
1906 ....... 2,825,145,964 1,040,978,402 4,683,505,865
1905 ....... 2,923,749,758 1,094,061,393 4,514,463,350
1904 ....... 2,612,502,605 1,102,463,015 4,321,149,065
1903 .. ..... 2,434,493,186 1,108,142,022 4,331,366,240
The advance in the Reichsbank's discount rate to
5 per cent. on October 10 was due chiefly to the
Russian demand for gold. But Herr Havenstein,
the president of the bank, states that the directors
distrusted the speculative activities on the stock
exchanges in Germany, and, the strain that was
put on the money market by the immense volume
of new stock and bond issues that have been placed
in Germany lately. The directors desired the advance in the bank's rate, he said, to be interpreted
as a warning to the German financial world to
curtail excessive demands for credits.
An examination of financial conditions in the
leading cities of Europe shows that discount rates
are steadily advancing. There have been large
issues of stocks and bonds, The stock exchanges
everywhere have experienced great activity. Now
that business is rapidly reviving there is a larger
demand for money than prevailed earlier in the
year. In order to meet the demands of the various
governments and to finance sound business enterprises, the European banks are forced to withdraw
support from the stock exchanges and from company promoters. This will require further advances
in discount rates. Consequently we must expect
such advances until the end of the year.
The bulls are now pinning their hopes on an extremely favorable showing by the United States
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Steel Corporation at the meeting to be held October
26. They predict that great earnings will be shown
for the quarter and that unfilled orders on hand will
be unprecedented.· Of course, earnings and unfilled
orders will be unprecedented. The price of the
stock is unprecedented. If this tremendous advance
in the security prices has not been discounting heavily increased business, what in Heaven's name has
it been discounting? The idea of boosting up a
certain stock in anticipation of improved business
and then boosting it again when that improvement
is registered, is simply a case of double-discounting.
United States- Steel common has in its price fully
covered the present and prospective improvement
in the business of the corporation. I fear it has
done more.
THE GENERAL SITUATION.

It is alleged that corporation moneys on deposit
in New York banks are being drawn upon for use
in the loan market, and out-of-town banks are said
to be doing the same thing resulting in a comparatively easier call rate. If this be a fact it is
easy to see how our bank statement was made to
show such big reductions in loans during the past
few weeks. But it is difficult to understand how
the general money situation is improved thereby.
True, the position of the New York banker is
strengthened, but we are deprived of our barometer,
or, at least, it is made to reflect very inaccurately
the actual conditions throughout the country. This
is a more or less dangerous condition of affairs
for the reason that the responsibility for maintaining the proper relations between speculative operations and money conditions is taken from a wellorganized body of men and placed in the hands of
a relatively unorganized class of lenders.
A situation in banking circles has arisen, which,
if true, as related by the Washington correspondent
of the Journal of Commerce, may profoundly affect
money matters in general. According to this dispatch the Comptroller of Currency will shortly take
drastic action against national banks who ha'le
been overloaning. They are to be given fair warning and opportunity to adjust this portion of their
business to meet the requirements of the law. Fail352

ure to comply with the law will bring upon them
the extreme penalty-forfeiture of charter. About
1,000 institutions are said to be affected.
A general curtailment of spinners' operations is
threatened on account of the high 1>rice of raw
material. Holders of cotton say that this is more
or less a bluff, but spinners assert that either the
price of manufactured goods must be advanced or
that raw material must come down in order to assure them a reasonable profit. One New England
concern has begun the movement by a week's shutdown. Cotton exports continue to exceed those of
a year ago, but the outflow of other farm products
are a long way behind.
There appears to be no letdown in the iron and
steel trade. On the contrary, the published reports
say that the pace is as rapid as ever, with orders
far in excess of capacity, and a marked scarcity of
raw materials. Prices for pig iron, however, are
so near the import point that some small purchases
abroad have been made and others are under advisement in case of a further rise on this side. It will
prove beneficial to the general business of the
country if the threat of importations results in checking the wild advance in iron. There is also an
acute scarcity of steel billets. Railroad equipment
and rail orders are liberal in volume, but some
of the Mexican inquiries for rails have not yet
resulted in real business.
About the only important development affectiµg
copper metal is the news of the meeting of large
copper mining interests in tliis city early in the •
week. Unconfirmed reports say the object of the
meeting was for the purpose of controlling the production of the metal. Such a combination would
undoubtedly benefit the producers, but an agreement
of this sort. including all of the important mines
is out of the question on account of the state laws
on the subject, which must be observed by the
owners of the Lake Superior group.
THE TECHNICAL SITUATION.
The technical situation is not strong. In a recent
daily letter I referred to the concealment of long
accounts because of the increasing tendency on the
part of outsiders to finance their marginal commit-
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ments through local banks. The individual operator gets his bank to buy certain securities for him.
The bank, of course, effects the transaction through
a brokerage house and takes up the securities,
loaning the unpaid balance at a certain rate of
interest. This naturally creates an impression that
stocks are being "absorbed." Nothing of the sort
is true. The stocks carried in local banks as collateral are as certainly carried on margin as if
they were bought through any stock exchange house.
In the last analysis the matter resolves itself into
the questiop of how far the banks are entering the
brokerage business.
There is ·another facet to the technical situation,
and that is, the concealment of liquidation. Frequently a man who wishes to dispose of stocks
employs a bear to sell them for him; and borrows the stocks, thus giving an appearance of
short selling. This method was freely resorted to
in 1907 and was referred to in the letters written
in that -¥ear. I mention this because there is a
shrewd suspicion in the minds of a few observers
that something of that kind is going on in the
stock market just now. A gentlemen who was
conspicuous in our stock market two or three years
ago, who has a reputation as a tremendous gambler,
and who always attracts a weak following, is supposed to be selling stocks short in large quantities
now. When he made his advent a few days ago a
number of people (myself included) jumped at the
conclusion that he was here to initiate a bear campaign. From what I can learn and surmise, he is
merely selling stocks for other and more important
people; I can best explain the efficiency of this
method by referring to an incident which occurred
several years ago.
During the Leiter wheat campaign it became
desirable, or, to speak by the book, it became necessary to sell some wheat without exciting any
suspicion that Mr. Leiter or his associates were
selling. In order to cover their tracks they employed a man who had been busted a few years
before, through his inordinate gambling, to sell for
them. No one could have sold so much wheat without breaking the price seriously, as did this man.
His selling looked like a bull card because the real
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bulls (for whom he was selling) would presumably
punish him. Also he had a weak following of people who sold on the breaks and bought in on the
rallies. That helped some.
The present situation is no different. It is a
matter of stock market tactics. Whether they employ Mr. Cudahy of Chicago or Mr. Gates of Te:i_cas
is neither here nor there. I would not feel hkc
indulging in a suspicion about this short selling if it
was not being so generously and gratuitously advertised to men who write on financial topics.
Conclusion.
I find no reason to alter or modify the views recently expressed in these advices. There is danger
of a decided decline in our general level of security
prices, and most particularly in the railroad stocks.
Even if this decline does not occur the mere fact
that there is danger of such a decline should be
sufficient to influence c·o nservative men to refrain
from operations until the danger is past. Personally I find advice to keep off the long side a rather
expensive attitude. People tell me they want to
know what to do, rather than what not to do, but
a little reflection will show that the negative advice
is as necessary at times as the positive advice.
In referring particularly to danger in railroad
stocks, it is interesting to note that several careful
students have simultaneously arrived at the conclusion that rails are a sale and industrials a purchase. Mr. Byron W . Holt in a recent letter offers
the orediction that the high prices for railroad stocks
which were established in August will not be again
reached for many years and, furthermore, predicts
that industrial stocks are about as certain to advance as railroad stocks are to decline. These are
bold statements, but they are not rash and are
founded on sound logic and reasoning. There are
many industrial issues which I would advise purchasing now if it were not for the fact that all
securities, good and bad, will fall sympathetically,
in case we have a sharp decline. In my opinion
we will soon be able to buy certain industrial issues
advantageously and with a reasonable assurance of
good pro"fits, but it is better to wait a bit.
Such stocks as Reading, St. Paul a-~d United
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States Steel may be sold short on the bulges by
those who do not care to await the time for purchases of the industrial issues.
In the face of the reckless bull talk and advice
which has become so prevalent of late, it is refreshing to note the following quotations from an
editorial in the "Wall Street Journal" of October 19:
"In view of this increased activity with
demand greater than the immediate ability
to supplyJ the thought arises, are our people
so soon to forget the lessons of adversity?
Are they again to renew the mistakes which
led up to the recent panic and of those which
went before? Are we again to run into extravagances miscalculations and excesses and,
for the time being, absorb too great a proportion of liquid capital into fixed forms of
investment?
"The American public has always had a
tendency to become indifferent to danger and
contemptuous of experience, confident of its
ability to overcome every obstacle and extricate itself from every unfavorable situation. But in the midst of remarkable prosperity, is it not time to reason together that
lessons so disastrously learned in the past
may not be lightly forgotten?
"The railroads feel the need of new capital
in order to handle the demands of traffic now
pressing upon them, but bank credits in too
great a proportion must not be converted
into new railroads, track, equipment and terminals. When the pressing needs, the natural aftermath of any prolonged business depression, are supplied, demand is bound to
relax again to normal proportions with the
consequence that real requirements will be
overestimated.
"As soon as business began to revive
after the check of 1903, the same old blunders
of extravagance, excesses and miscalculations
were made, so that only four years later, the
country again found itself in the throes of
another financial panic and industrial depression.
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"The lessons then forgotten have had to be
relearned, but the panic of 1907 would be
worth all it cost if it had the effect of impressing upon us the need of conservatism in
business expansion. Yet scarcely two years
have elapsed and we again see evidences of
the old. indifference with an eagerness to grasp
an immediate profit and ignore counsels of
moderation.
"By all means let production keep pace with
the rapid growth of the_ country until it is
seen that financial credits are approaching
overextension. But now, when the country's
business is rapidly advancing, is the time for
a wise fore cast of future needs and possibilities. Let us recall the lessons so dearly
learned in the past and fix them firmly in
our memories, lest we forget."

357

OCTOBER 30, 1909.
While the advice given on October 28 to abandon the
short side temporarily was founded largely on developments of a technical and manipulative character, I also
find that some very large Jines of industrial stocks have
recently been accumulated by interests who usually succeed in their stock market campaigns. Personally I have
felt very kindly toward the industrials as a group right
along, but have been deterred from recommending purchases in any quarter for fear of a quick decline in rails,
which would affect even the most promising securities
sympathetically. The buying mentioned is so good in
such stocks as Amalgamated Copper, Smelters, American
Car and Foundry and other industrials, and the prospects
of continued improvement so certain that it is possible
the decline in this class of securities will not go much
further. There is, in fact, a strong probability that we
are now about to witness much the same kind of movement as occurred in the latter part of 1905, in which
period industrials advanced on an average of about 13
points, while rails made no advance whatever. It is the
opinion of many good judges ti-lat the disparity will be
even more pronounced than in 1905 as the same influences are present in a greater degree now.
The chief influence affecting the two groups is, of
course, the -continued upward trend of all commodity
prices. There is no cessation of this tendency except
in the way of fluctuations now and then. This is due,
in the opinion of most economists, to the increasing gold
supply, and as yet there is no sign of any let up in that
quarter.
The depression of 1908, which carried commodity
prices downward sharply, gave to the raikoads an advantage and operated agains~ the producing corporati?~s.
According to Bradstreet's mdex numbers commod1tt7s
reached 9.0409 in July, 1907, and dropped to 7.7'2Zl m
June, 1908. On Octo?er 1, 1909, the. figu~e was. 8.7480.
The following table gives the fluctuations m detail.
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TABLE SHlOWING FLUCTUATIONS IN COMMODITY VALUES FOR 1907, 1908, 1909.

1909
January 1. ... .... . ...... ... 8.2631
F ebruary 1. .. ... .. .. .. . ... . 8.3022
March 1 .. .. .. . . ... ......... 8.2167
April 1. . . ... .. . . .. . . ....... 8.3157
May 1. .. .... ....... .. ...... 8.3016
June 1 . .. ... . .. . ... .. . ... . .. 8.3960
July 1... .... ... .. ...... . ... 8.4573
August 1. . .. . ........ . ..... 8.5039
September 1 .. . ... . .. . ... ... . 8.5906
October 1. . .. .. .. ........ ... 8.7480
November 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
December 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Average year . . ... .... .. .... 8.4095

1908
8.2949
8.1289
7.9862
8.0650
7.9629
7.7227
7.8224
7.9328
7.9051
8.0139
8.0674
8.2133
8.0094

1907
8.9172
8.9953
9.1293
8.9640
8.9356
8.9901
9.0409
8.9304
8.8297
8.8506
8.7468
8.5246
8.9045

Since the low point established in July, 1896, (5.7019)
commodities have risen over 50 per cent. In the last ten
years they have risen from 6.8020 in 1899 to 8.7480 in
1909, or about 30 per cent.
This upward trend is hurting the railroads because
of the increase in price of all commodities, induding
labor, with0ut corresponding advances in transportation
rates, and is helping the producing industrials because
the commodities sold move upward homogeneously with
increased cost of production.
The varying effect of this factor on different classes
of securities has already been fully discussed in these
advices, but will bear frequ ent repetition and continued
scrutiny. The matter is covered in detail in a recently
published compilation of mine "The Gold Supply," and
I will be glad to send a copy of this work without charge
to such clients as do not already possess one.
The •railroads are also facing another spasm of paternalism, which will not greatly affect the industrials.
Railroad stocks have also been boomed and talked about
and manipulated much more than ,have the industrials.
It is almost certain that dividend increases and improved
showings will be more prevalent in the industrials than in
the rails from now on.
I am preparing a rather elabo-rate special letter showing the relative merits of industrial securities which will
be ready in th e course of a week or two. Pending this
document I will state that the copper and equipment
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stocks appear to be in the most favorable position just
now. In spite of the pessimistic talk about copper metal,
I consider it almost certain that the metal will soon pa,rticipate in our prosperity prices. This metal is about the
only commodity which has had no material advance.
The advance will occur later and will be anticipated in
the prices of securities based on the copper industry.
In the last five years the leading industrial corporations have shown average dividends on the common
securities as set forth in the following table: ·
Dividends Paid
For Five Years
Average 9'<>
Amalgamated Copper ................. .
4.45
American Car & Foundry ........ . . .
1.60
American Cotton Oil . .... . ... . ....... .
2.60
American Locomotive ....... . ......... .
2.25
American Smelting & Refining ........ .
5.80
American Sugar ...................... .
7.00
Distillers Securities .. . ................ .
3.60
National Lead ...................... . . .
2.30
Pressed Steel Car .................... .
0.60
Railway Steel Spring . ....... . ........ .
3.40
U. S. Cast Iron Pipe & Fdy ........... .
1.80
U. S. Realty & Imp ................... .
2.20
U. S. Steel ........ . ................. .
1.65
Va.-Carolina 'Chemical ............... .
0.60
This table conveys no information except as to actual
average distribution in a five-year period. In the final
compilation I will show average net applicable to common stock, appropriations out of earnings for improvements and betterments, etc.
There is no s_ign of improvement in the money situation as yet. We must still keep a watchful eye on this
factor. The currency movement in New York this Fall
has been extraordinary. An outward flow of money to the
country in accordance with old usage started some weeks
ago; but in the past two weeks, owing to the hardening
of discount rates, cash shipments from New York have
been ou.rtailed. Since the beginning of August the New
York banks have lost over $16,506,000 to the interior,
as compared with $13,078,000 in the same period in
1908, $54,523,000 in 1907, $65,320,000 in 1906, and
$45,191,000 in 1905.
Reports from Minneapolis state that abnormal condi360

tions exist in the Twin Cities money market. Mer-chandise shipments are going forward slowly this Fall,
and there is, consequently, little car congestion. This
is enabling farmers to get their grain shipments through
easily. Tihe grain movements at many centers are much
smaller than usual at this date. In Minneapolis the
shipments are about 25% below what they were last
year. It is estimated that the net decrease at Minneapolis and Duluth is about 24%. These decreases are
not due to poor crops. As a matter of fact, the grain
crop is heavier than last year. The primary cause is
the holding back of the crop by the farmers for higher
prices. In consequence of these conditions, the local
banks are not feeling any great strain on their accommodation. The money rate at Minneapolis is quoted
at 5¼%- This holding back of grain shipments will
most probably prolong the period of demand for crop
moving money.
·
The money rate in Philadelphia is between 5¼ and
5¼%·. The demand for money is so keen that some of
the large banks have been compelled to call loans, and
to abstain from the further discounting of commercial
paper. It is estimated that the factories and commercial concerns in and around Philadelphia are now operating at about 85% of capacity.
·
The reserves in some of the large Philadelphia banks
have been below 25% lately, and the aggregate surplus
of all the banks is only $5,637,500. as compared with
$15,000,000 at this time last year. It is not surprising
that Philadelphia bankers confronted with these conditions are taking precautions to meet the increasing demands that are likely to be made on their resources
during the remainder of the year.
Reports from bankers in Ohicago, Pittsburgh, Buffalo
and Boston are similar to those in Philadelphia. Business is reviving appreciably and merchants are pressing
for increased banking accommodations.
The relation between the money rates and the cash
reserves of banks is very close. Discounts are usually
high when reserves are low and vice versa. This is
because bank credit is an element in the fund available
for investment in bills. When reserves decrease bankers
are inclined to contract bill discounting. In reducing
bill discounting operations they •usually refuse to take
finance bills before they refuse to discount ordinary bills
of exchange. Finance bills differ from bills of exchange
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in that they are based on securities and credits as against
produce. As soon as any strain appears to be put on
credit, bill discounters, naturally, get nervous and discourage forther discounting. That is why we are now
hearing so much about American finance bills in London.
While the New York stock market was advancing
many of our large brokerage houses and Stock Exchange
traders issued finance bills drawn against American
Stock Exchange seourities instead of commodities. These
bills were mostly discounted in London. The total amount
of bills thus discounted was very large. The ,rapid advance in stock values early in August disconcerted European bankers and they began to refuse to discount
American finance bills based on such securities, and most
particularly, bills based on stocks like United States Steel,
Reading, St. Paul and Union Pacific. When old bills required renewing other methods of finance had to be resorted to. Some ,recourse was had to commodity bills.
But such bills could not be drawn as freely as was desired. Exports are not satisfactory. Grain shipments to
England and to the Continent are going forward largely
from Russia, India, Egypt and Australasia. Large cotton
shipments are being made from Egypt and India. These
were all drawn against. Our exports did not commence
until discount rates began to advance. Discounting, consequently, then became difficult.
These circumstances ,have led to a lot of misapprehension in regard to the tinancial outlook. The sudden rise
in European discount rates, the confused condition of
foreign exchange, the holding back of grain shipments
by farmers, the growing demand for credit in the industrial centers, these forces are all operating with varying
degrees of intensity just now, and promise to becloud
commercial affairs to a further extent during the next
few weeks. Our loans abroad at present are estimated
at $400,000,000 and instead of reducing them, there is a
desire to obtain more credit to keep up speculative
activities. This is in itself a bad policy, but what can
be said of it when, as just now, the local bank statements exhibit excessive loans, reduced reserves, and abnormal circulation, while the customs returns show reduced exports and increased imports?
We continue to misuse our credits in the face of danger as light-heartedly as we squander our gold. From
figures supplied by the Monetary Commission to the
Economist, London, it appears that American- bankers
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are more wasteful of gold than any of the European
bankers. From the Commissioners' figures, we learn
that in the period 1878-1908 the gold in the American
T,r easury increased from $130,000,000 to $1,010,000,000.
In the same period the gold in the Bank of England
increased from $110,000,000 to $180,000,000 only. The increases in the four leading commercial countries in that
period were as follows:
1908.

1878.

United States ...... $130,000,000
England ......... , I 10,000,000
France . . . . . . . . . . . . I 90,000,000
Germany . . . . . . . . . . 50,000,000

$ I 10 I 0,000,000
180,000,000

590 , 000,000
190 , 000,000

-l-$880,000,000
70,000,000
400,000,000
140,000,000

+

-1-1-

The banking value of a stock of gold is the use that
can be made of it. Success or failure in the economy of
gold is the best test of banking efficiency. During the
panic of 1907 the American gold reserve amounted to
about $920,000,000 as compared with $195,000,000 in England. And yet the United States called on the Bank of
England for assistance, which was freely given. The
~ank with its comparatively small gold reserve helped
this country out of a very bad position and at the same
time carried on its ordinary routine work ,u ninterruptedly. The Commission hopes to make much of this
chapter in financial history in its plea for an American
central bank of issue. It will, however, be of greater
service as an illustration of the value of the sound conservative financial practices of London bankers, and it
should induce us to call a halt whenever we see danger
signals in the financial sky. All our critics tell us of
our proneness to overspeculation. When our speculative
activities are forcibly brought up with a jerk we attempt
to seek for all manner of excuses to explain the causes
of the setback, rather than profit by the turn in events
and correct our mistaken practices.
The European financial outlook is still disturbed.
During the past week the directors of the Banks of
England and France and of the Reichsbank held their
ordinary meetings and did not find it necessary to make
any further changes in their discount rates. The Bank
of England's statement was as follows:
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Total reserve decreased .................... . £340,000
Circulation decreased ................... . ... .
188,000
Bullion decreased ............... ..... ...... .
536,051
Other securities increased ................... . 1,425,000
Other deposits increased ........ ... ......... .
332,000
Public deposits increased ................... .
736,000
Nott>S reserve decreased .................... .
482,000
Government securities unchanged.
The detailed weekly return compares as follows :
Present. Week ago. Year ago.
Circulation. . . .... £28,849,000 £29,037,000 £28,559,000
Public deposits. . . . 7,118,000
6,382,000
7,650,000
Private deposits. . . . 40,814,000 44,482,000 41,295,000
Govt. securities. . . . 16,791,000 16,791,000 14,730,000
Other securities. . . . 26,905,000 25,481,000 25,655,000
Reserve........... . 21,973,000 22,322,000 26,267,000
Proportion of reserve to !iabil. . . .
45.80%,
47.60%
53.62%
Bullion. . . . . . . . . . . 32,685,000 33,221,000 36,188,000
Bank rate..........
5%
5%
2½%
The proportion of reserve to liabilities compares as
follows:
Year.
Bank rate.
Year.
Bank rate.

1909 ....... .45.80o/d
5%
1908 ........ 53.62% 2½%
1907 ........ 39.91% 5½%
1906 ........ 36.61%
6%
1905 ........ 38.50o/d
4%

1904 ..... . ·.. 52.15%
1903 ....... .47.30%
1902 ........ 46.59%
1901. ..... . .45.62o/o
1900 ....... .42.31 %

3%
4%

4%
4% ·
4%

The showing in this return is a poor one. The reduction in private deposits is noticeable. The statement
shows that the joint stock banks are still drawing heavily
on the Bank of England. Gold demands for foreign .
shipment are still in evidence. Reports from India state
that Indian banks are likely to enter the London market
for gold shortly. The India Council is offering much
smaller numbers of its bills than merchants demand.
The demand is over 230 lacs per week and the Council
is only issuing 30 lacs. Owing to the large crops in
Australasia and the fine wool crop, the local gold production will be largely absorbed in Australia. India
cannot ,count on getting much gold from tlhat part of
the world. But the Council will endeavor not to embarrass the Bank of England by calling for gold at an
inopportune time.
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The weekly statement of the Bank of France shows the
followin g changes :
Francs.
Notes in circulation increased ............. . 12,650,000
Treasury deposits increased .. .. .. .......... . 35,900,000
General deposits increased .... .. .. .. . .. .. . . . 147,625,000
Gold in ,h and decreased . ......... .. . . ... . .. . 4,775,000
Silver in hand increased . .. .. ... .. ..... .... . 2,600,000
Bills discounted increased ................. . 168,725,000
Advances decreased ..... . ... ... ... ....... . . 9,350,000
The detailed statement compares as follows:
1909
1908
1907
Francs.
Francs.
Francs.
Gold. . . ... . .. . 3,621,300,000 3,295,122,245 2,785,715,853
937,622,287
Silver. . . . . . . . . 902,125,000
889,740,865
Circulation. . . . 5,141,054,400 4,905,015,555 5,053,176,215
549,574,219
582,653,389
Gen. dep. . . . . . . 704,767,500
813,243,858 1,497,017,982
Bills dis. . . . . . . 810,358,500
253,148,487
223,292,570
Treas. ad. . . . . . 205,797,300
The Bank of Germany's present position is as follows:
Marks.
Increase.
Gold on hand . .... . . . . ...... .... . .......... 27,843,000
Gold and silver. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,833,000
Notes of circulation ... ... .... . .... ... . . .. . *134,723,000
Treasury bills .. .......................... .. *58,049,000
Deposits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . *13,953,000
Loans. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . *44,248,000
Discounts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .g7,544,000
*Decrease.
The important returns compare with those of one or .
two years ago as follows, in marks :
1907
1909
1908
768,500,000
Gold and silver. 677,453,000 1,069,380,000
Loans and dis .. 1,139,681,000 1,038,200,000 1,350,700,000
Circulation. . . .1,724,131,000 1,640,780,000 1,596,560,000
The cash holdings in 1906 were 721,900,000 marks; in
1905, 787,360,000; in 1904, 829,660,000; in 1903, 879,820,000.
A general review of the European financial outlook
indicates a disturbed condition with a tendency to higher
discount rates.
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The General Situation.
While, temporarily the money market has taken on an
appearance of ease, particularly in t,he call loan department, the question of the money supply and interest
rates is still the greatest factor in the general situation.
Considerable sums have left this center during the week
bound for Canada and South America. The demand
from Canada is in response to the necessity for moving
grain before the close of navigation and consequent rise
in insurance rates. The movement to Brazil on account
of heavy shipments of coffee to forestall the "sur-tax,"
was augmented by large shipments of crude rubber which
is selling at record prices. In both instances the gold
was shipped for the account of London where in the past
few weeks very extraordinary measures have been take:1
to retrieve the position of the Bank of England. N ecessity for a further rise in its discount rate this week was
avoided principally because the advance made last week
enabled it to secure all of the South African gold, although the English bank statement shows a loss in
bullion and a further drop in reserves of about 2
points.
Criticism of the recent rapid rise in the
discount rate may have influenced the English banking
authoritie"s in their decision to delay a further advance.
The fortnightly carry-over rate for American securities
in London, however, was quite sharply put up to 6%
and resulted in a further transfer of loans back to this
country. The consequent return of our securities should
have a marked bearing on the loan item of our local
bank statement in the near future, but just how far the
effect will be noticeable in the foreign exchange market
is problematical on account of the uncertainty _regarding
the exchange making possibilities of cotton and grain exports. Cotton is going abroad ir: quantity about 15%
greater than a year ago and at prices greatly in excess of
last year, though just how much higher it is impossible
to determine. It is altogether likely that much of this
cotton was contracted for several months ago at figures
much lower than prevailing prices. The movement toward curtailment of spinning operations, which is becoming world wide and which is only opposed by those
who were fortunate in stocking up around 10 cents, will,
if continued, adverselv affect the export business. There
is nothing to guarantee that either the volume or value
of cotton exports will be maintained at the present
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levels. At best the short cotton crop, which may not
reach the 11,000,000 bale mark, according to some private
estimates, when considered as an exchange factor, is but
slightly more powerful than last year, and, when considered from the domestic manufacturers' point of view,
is a positive menace. Interests controlling several million
spindles have signified a willingne: s to cut down the ou•put. Russian and Canadian competition tends to keep
down the clearances of wheat.
Correspondence coming to this office from out of
town bankers, particularly from the Middle West, indicates an insistent demand for money from all
sections to be used in manufacturing enterprises.
Manufacturers' paper bearing 5 and 5¾ % interest in
amounts ranging from $5,000 to $25,000, much of it
originating in the East, is freely offered, and in
many cases the announcement is made that the
paper will be split up into $2,500 lots. If business
men are paying 5¾% for acco·mmodation on notes
expiring in February, March, April and May, as
indicated by these reports, there is no good reason
to suppose that funds for stock market operations
of any great magnitude will be furnished except at
correspoudingly high rates.
The physical condition of some of the roads in the
Northwest are just now coming in for some criticism.
Considerable deterioration is said to have resulted from
cutting expenditures for maintenance. The question
which most naturally arises in this connection is-how
far have other roads gone in this direction? President
McCrea of the Pennsylvania system is quoted as saying
that the railroads of the United States will need $500,000,000 for the next two or three years to furnish rolling stock, track and bridge materials of which they are
in urgent need.
In confirmation of these great needs of the railroads,
the equipment companies report orders running far into
1910 and trade papers report immense rail orders for
the account of several of the big systems. It should be
kept in mind, however, that should the railroads, at any
time before the fulfillment of these orders, see the
necessity for a return to their policy of retrenchment,
their first action would be to cancel the unfilled orders.
Neither should the fact be lost sight of that the railroads
are the best customers on the books of the steel companies. Steel and iron production is going on at a record
pace and the demand is just as insistent as ever with
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prices stationary at the high levels. The demand for
structural steel has fallen o'ff somewhat but this is to be
expected on account of the near approach of cold
weather.
Copper metal market continues quiet and without
especial feature. Consumers take all the offerings at 13
cents but show no immediate intention of bidding up.
On the other hand producers show great reluctancy in
making contracts over the end of the year. Foreign
melters show more disposition to buy the metal in this
market. The big electric companies report new orders
are equal to 85% of the best times in their history.
Cables from Berlin make note of a business revival
which is in its initial stages, but promise~ rapid improvement provided nothing happens to the money market. This is not far from an accurate description of our
own business future.
THE TECHNICAL SITUATION.
The technical situation is not particularly strong,
considering the market as a whole. There is a concentrated short interest in Reading, St. Paul, Union
Pacific and Steel, which are the correct stocks to
sell short if we sell anything at all. Nevertheless,
the short interest, correct or incorrect, is largest in
these securities. There is also a fairly good short
interest in Baltimore & Ohio, which is again as it
should be. If Baltimore & Ohio had kept up maintenance during the last two years, as it should have
been kept up, they would have earned about 4 per
cent. on the common stock and could reasonably
pay about 2 per cent. instead of 6 per cent.
To
put the matter in another form, if Baltimore & Ohio
is worth 115, Atchison is comparatively worth over
200. But, from the technical viewpoint alone, values
do not count.
Even with a weakened technique, manipulation is
sometimes potent enough to overcome such weakness. That is the situation at present.
There is not much of a short interest in the industrials (except United States Steel). The ordinary
short seller wants to sell the highest-priced thing
he can find and this element has not pitched on the
modest and retiring industrials. These stocks advance more upon their merits than upon drives
against the shorts.
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Chart Showing Market Movements !or October, 1909.
(Thomas Gibson' s Figures.)
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CONCLUSION.
Under present conditions it is better to confine
operations to purchases of industrials on moderate
recessions. In speaking of industrials I do not want
to include United States Steel Common. This stock
has fully discounted the rapid advance in its business affairs and is more of a menace than a help to
the market.
As stated in yesterday's letter, there is probably
some reasonably sure profit in selling certain high. priced rails, such as Reading, St. Paul and Union
Pacific short, and offsetting such commitments with
purchases of industrials such as Amalgamated,
American Car & Foundry, or American Smelters.
This straddling is not a popular form of trading,
but is a very good one if our deductions are sound.
If, for example, we sell a hundred full shares of
Reading and buy its equivalent in Amalgamated
(which would be about 200 Amalgamated), it looks
pretty certain to me that a good profit will soon
accrue, regardless of the general trend of the market.
Values sometimes assert themselves slowly
and grudgingly, but they always assert themselves
in time, and the two stocks mentioned will work
much closer together in price.
Some of my clients appear surprised at the sucf'den
change in position of October 28. In fact, some
of them call it inconsistent. I have never seen more
mistakes made in speculation from a single cause
than from this same "consistency," which, as it is
ordinarily applied to speculation, is a synonym for
stubbornness. So far as that goes, however, there is
nothing inconsistent in such a reversal. I might
find it expedent to again reverse my position at any
time if such a reversal appeared warranted.
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NOVEMBER 6, 1909.
During the years of 1907 and 1908 I repeatedly
referred to the unusual similarity of conditions
affecting the market in those years as compared
with the years 1903 and 1904. It was suggested
that, as conditions were parallel, we might expect
parallel results. There was no attempt at "chart
playing" in this; it was simply measuring the probable future by the past. It would never do to base
our ideas on price records alone," but everything
being reasonably equal, so far as influences affecting prices are concerned, it is safe to assume that
everything will be reasonably equal in the price
movements themselves.
From this theory I have gained considerable
assistance in forecasting the movements of 19071908 and so far in 1909. The influences and prospects continued the same in 1909 as those of 1905,
so I pursued the comparison. It goes without
saying that a watchful eye was kept on conditions
and. that numerous minor variations occurred, but
the similarity was, as a whole, astounding. The
chart which is presented in this letter I have produced before, but now bring it up to date in order
to show the continu_e d parallel.
A change in conditions must occur sometime,
probably before long; but it is not yet in sight.
With such a change in conditions, we will most
certainly witness a divergence in comparative stock
market movements, but so long as the influences
which made security prices in 1905 are present, we
may look for like movements in the stock market.
It will be noted that in the last three or four
months of 1905 railroad stocks had reached their
approximate high level. This was not true of the
industrial issues. While the rails were fluctuating
around the top the industrials advanced almost 13
points on the average. There was a reason: Following the depression of 1903-4 the railroads made
good showings at the expense of maintenance, and,
incidentally, at the expense of the manufacturing
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Comparative Market Movements of 20 Railroad Stocks, 1903-4-5 and 1907-8-9.
(Wall Street J ournal's D aily Averages.)
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corporations. Later, they were compelled to buy
rails and equipments, and money flowed from the
railroad corporations to the industrial corporations.
That is just what is going on now. We have only
to consult the barometrical figures published with
these advices to see how insidiously and how rapidly
this fiscal alteration is affecting prices in the two
groups.
Laying aside the broader comparisons with the
latter part of 1905, which are more or less obvious,
we naturally turn to the most important immediate
factor, i. e., money. Let us examine the money
conditions which were prevalent during this advance in the industrial stocks in order to see if
such stocks can advance because of specific influences, regardless of high rates for funds. Note:See table on page 373, which shows Bank reserves
and money rates from July 1st to Dec. 30th, 1905.
During the last three months of 1905 leading
stocks acted as follows:
RAILROADS.
Range in
October.

Stock.
Atchison . . .
Baltimore & Ohio • . .
C., :M. & St. Paul .
Chicago & N. W.
Erie . • . . • • . .
Great N orthem . . .
Illinios Central . . . . .
Louisville & Nash ville .
Missouri Pacific . • . .
New York Central . .
Northern Pacific • . .
Pennsylvania . . .
Reading . . . .
Southern Pacific •
Union Pacific . .

90¼- 87~

114§i-110

183 -178
224½-214¼

.

so¼- 56¼

.

.
.
.

327½-314
183 -177
156¾-149¾
1 0 6Y,a-102~

154}4-147¾
2 1 2 ½-201

,45a-142~
129 -119~
72 67¾
135 ~-130~

INDUSTRIALS.
Range in
October.
86½- 81~
43¼- 36M
43)4- 40~

Stock.
Amalpmated Copl'_er • .
American Car & Foundry
American Locomotive • .
American Smelters .
American Sugar. .
Corn Products . .
National Lead. . . .
Pressed Steel Car . . .
Railway Steel Spring . .
Tennessee Coal & Iron . .
United States Steel • . .

139~-1 25¾!

144~-138)4
16¼- 12~

52¼-

45~

IP'= !i½

9,.g_ 84¼
39~- 37
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I have given the range for th.e months above,
which does not show the initial and final prices:
The average prices (Wall Street Journal's figures)
were as follows:
Rails
Industrials.

Oct .. 2.

Oct. 31.

Dec. 1.

Dec. 30.

131.99

132.33

130.00

133.26

82.17

83.77

89.62

96.20

Quite a difference in the three months?
In my opinion the copper stocks will be leaders in
the advance in the industrials, with the equipments
a close second. Messrs. Hayden, Stone & Company
have recently issued a compilation showing the
relative position of these stocks as to production,
cost of production and earnings on 13-cent copper.
I have extended their table in order to show what a
rapid increase occurs in earnings when the .commodity advances. It will be noted that while Amalgamated would earn 5.82 per cent. on 13-cent copper,
it would earn 9.15 on 15-cent copper, as cost of
production would not rise with the selling price. I
think we may reasonably expect 17-cent copper
before long, and that this price will be made stable
by a trade agreement. I know this statement will
be called over-optimistic by some people. When,
in 1907, I insisted that copper metal, then selling
at 25 cents, would sell below 15 cents, the statement
was designated as pessimistic, but it looks now
as if I was too conservative. We have seen the
end of 25-cent copper for a long time, -also the end
of 13-cent copper. Note:-See page 374.
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TABLE SHOWING MONEY RATES IN LATTER PART OF 1905.
- - - C a l l Rates.---

Reserves.
Week Ending•. ..•..••••• 26.2%
J'\~Y 81..•• ••..
. ... .• ....•.• • .. 25.9%
15 . • .. • •.... . ..•... • 25.6%
22 . . .. . .... • .. •• ..•• 26.6%
29 .. . • . • ..•. . •....•. 26.2%
Aug. 5 . • ..... . .. _...... . . 26.2%
"
12 . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . 26.0o/o
19" .• .... ... ... .. . .. . 27.1%
26 . . . ........... •• . • 25.7%
w Sept. 2 .... . ... . ... .. .. • • 25.7%
~
9 . . ... . ...... .. .. .. 25.4%
i:.,
16 .•... . ... . .. . . • . , . 25.4%
23 . . .... . ..... • •.... 25.4%
30. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25.4%
Oct. 7 ... • .... . . . . . ....• 25.7%
14 • ....... ••. .....• • 25.4%
" - - 2-h .. -.--a, •• . •. •• . ••• • 26.0%
28 .. . ... .... . ....•.. 26.2%
Nov. 4 .. .. • • . .. . .. ..• • . . 26.lo/o
11. . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25.2%
18 . . . . .. . .... .• •.... 24.7%
25 ... . . . . . . . . • . . . . . • 25. 3%
Dec. 2 ........... ••• ••.. 25.9%
9 . ... • •......• • •.. • 25.2%
16 . ......•......•• • • 24.8%
23 •..... • • •• • • •••... 26.4%
30 ..•.••••• ••• •••••• 25.4%

.
.
.
.
.

High.
6
3½
3

2½
2¼
2
2½
2

3
3
3½
3
4½
7

8
6½
6
4½
6½
15
25
6½
12
27
15
16
125

Low. Average
1¾
2¾
2
2
~~
1¾
2
1¾
2

rn

1½
1¾
1½
2

2½

2
4
2
3½
3 .
3

4
4½
4
4

3
4
3
4
6

2¼
1¼
2
2

2¼

2¾
32~•
5
7

5¼

·--4·¾····
3¾
5
8
15

5½

5
10
8

8

40

--Time Rates.- 60 to 90
Six
Days.
Months.
2¾@3
3½@3¾
3
3½@3~
3
3½@3 ~
3¼ @4
2~@3 ij
2 ,@3 ' •
3~@4
2¾@3 ¼
3 •®4
3 @3 ¼
4
4
2~@3 ij
4
2ra®3 ' •
4 @4¼
3 ·®3½
4 ¼ @4½
3~@4
3 •®4 ¼
4~ @4½
4 @4 ¼
4 ,@4½
4½
4~@4½
4 ,@s
4½@4¾
5 @5½
4½@4¾
-5 @5 ¼
4½ @4¾
@5
4½@4~
44~, @5
4½@4 •
5¾@6
5 @5¼
6
5½@6
5½@6
5 @5¼
5¼ @5¾
4¾@5
6 @7
5½@6
6 @7
5½@6
.6 @7
5½@6
6 @6½
5½

Foreign Rates.
Bk. E. Berlin
Rate.
Rate.
3
2½
3
2½
3
2½
3
2½
3
2½
3
2½
3
2½
3
2½
3
2½
3
2½
3
3
4
3
3
4
4
4
4
5
4
5
4
5
4
5
4
5
4
5½
4
5½
4
5½
4
4

4

4
4

5½
5½

6
6
6

TABLE SHOWING COMPARATIVE POSITION OF LEADING COPPER COMPANIES.
•
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~
o

o

z

Amalgamated • . . . . . 1,538,879
Anaconda • . . . . .
1,200,000
Butte Coalition . . .. 1,000,000
w Calumet & A ri zona..
200,000
' l Calumet & H ecla . . .
100,000
-I>- Copper Range . . . . .
384,188
Granby • . . .
135,000
Greene-Cananea . . . . 2,500,000
Mohawk . . . . . . . . 100,000
Nevada Consolidated . 1,600,000
North Butte . . . . . . 400,000
Old Dominion . .
300,000
Osceola . . • . . .
. 100,000
Quincy • . . . . . . . .
uo,ooo
Shannon . . . . . . . . 300,000
Superior & Pittsburg . 1,500,000
Tennessee.. . . . • • • 200,000
Utah Consolidated . . . 300,000
Utah Copper . . . . . . 735,000
Wolverine . . . . • • . .
60,000
Average, 20 companies. 638,153
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220,000,000
90,000,000
35,000,000
28,000,000
85,000,000
33,500,000
25,000,000
45,000,000
12,000,000
60,000,000
45,000,000
33,000,000
29,000,000
21,500,000
18,000,000
25,000 ,000
15,000,000
15,000,000
60,000,000
10,000,000
45,250,000
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9½
IO
IO
9
8½
9½
10
10½
10½
7

9
10½
10¼
10½
u½
9½
10½
9
8

7½

9. 54

~e~

;cnu

$5.00
2.25
1.05
5.60
36.25
3.05
5.56
0.45
3.00
2.25
4.50
2.75
7.97
4.89
0.90
0.58
1.87
2.00
4.08
9.17
5. I6

t~~
5.82
4-66
3.70
5.60
5.41
3.77
5.70
3.87
5.00
8.9(i
7.63
5.24
5.08
5.56
5.67
3.46
5.19
4.57
8.24
6.II
5.46

c::

o

Clo~
1-o

~2:!~

g,

;mu

$6.43
3.00
1.40
7.00
44-75
3.92
7.40
0.63
4.20
2.62
5.62
3.85
10.87
6.84
1.50
0.75
2.62
2.50
4.90
10.83
6.58

.,;....
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u r0•c:
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7.49
6.22
4.93
7.00
6.68
4.85
7.59
5.42
7.00
10.43
9.53
7.33
6.92
7.77
9.45
4.48
7.28
5.71
9.90
7.22
7.16

t
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·a~ g.
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$7.86
3.75
1.75
8.40
53.25
4.79
9.25
0.81
5.40
3.00
6.75
4-95
13.77
8.79
2.10
0.92
3.37
3.00
5.72
12.50
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il<

9. 15
7.77
6.17
8.40
7.95
5.92
9.49
6.97
9.00
II.94
11.44
9.43
8.76
9.99
13.23
5.49
9.36
6.86
II.56
8.33
8.86

85,i
48¼
28¾
100
670
80,i
97½
II¾
60

;zs¼

59
52½
157
88
15?,i
16¾
36
43~
49~
150
93.80

Of course, this table cannot be taken literally.
Book values must be consulted. Amalgamated owns,
at a fair estimate, $75,000,000 of coal and timber
lands, also the largest department store in the
Northwest. It is probably in the best position of
any of the copper stocks.
The special letter covering industrial issues will
be published November 10. This should give us a
good basis for further investigations.
The fact that it is shown by precedent that
certain stocks can advance during periods of money
stringency does not by any means relieve us from
the necessity of continually scrutinizing other factors. I forget the name of the philosopher who
remarked that "Eternal vigilance is the price of
liberty," but he must have been thinking of the
stock market.
The recent advances in money rates in the principal financial centers in Europe surprised many
investors and caused a large number of investment changes to be made. The banks called loans
freely and refused to renew weak commercial notes.
This resulted in a large liquidation of securities.
The new money rates were suddenly imposed at a
a time when increased attention was being given
to stock exchange investments and when new political problems were arising in Europe. It is, consequently, not surprising that many financial authorities hold politics responsible, in a measure, for what
they regard as unwelcome changes in monetary
affairs. As we are soon likely to hear much about
the influence of European political questions on
our money market, it may be useful to rapidly
review the main features of the general political
outlook in Europe for the immediate future.
The most prominent political question in Europe
at present, and one that is likely to have a more
important effect on American securities than any
other, is the British budget and its treatment in
the House of Lords. There has been a pronounced
tendency in England for more than a decade for
the people to break away from conservatism and
remodel their judicial and parliamentary practices.
Power has gradually been taken away from the
Lords Spiritual and Temporal and given to Parliament and the Courts. This has been very beneficial
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to the people. The success of the changes made
has quickened the desire for the removal of remaining anomalies. One great question is the abolition
of many of the privileges of the hereditary nobles
and the institution of an elective assembly in place
of the House of Lords. The present Liberal Government has come in conflict with the House of
Lords on many occasions, but its present contest
with that body is so keen that the King has
thought it advisable to take the very unusual course
of calling the leaders of both houses together with
a view of compromising on the budget question.
He apparently fears that, as the Lords are not
responsible to constituents, as me~bers of Parliament are, but gain their political power solely by
favor of the Crown, by their stubbornness they are
likely to not only lose much of their own power
but endanger the sovereignty also. The King wishes
that the dynastic dangers should be clearly brought
to their notice.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer proposes to
raise money for next year's revenue purposes in
such a way as to maintain the free trade principles
that have proved so exceedingly beneficial to the
Empire. The Conservatives, in opposition, maintain
that fiscal reform in the nature of protective duties
will enable the government to raise revenue in a
manner preferable to the Chancellor's proposals.
The House of Lords is conservative and, consequently, accepts the views of the opposition leaders
and so opposes the government's budget scheme.
The government proclaims that the throwing out
of the budget by the Lords would in effect be an
attack on the constitution. Such an attack would
have to be strenuously defended before the people
at the coming general elections. In the approaching political crisis in England, then, we can discern·
two important issues, on the one hand free trade
and protection and on the other hand two co-ordinate houses versus a supreme House of Commons·.
These are momentous questions, and the leading
writers in the London press are urging the Lords
to pass the budget without opposition to enable
the people to cool down and give time for reflection , rather than force a fi ght now and bring about
reforms quicker than is desirable. It would appear
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that this reasonable counsel will ultimately prevail
and that some form of compromise will be
arrived at.
The Chancellor's bill proposes new taxes on any
unearned increment, which · may in future accrue to
owners of land. The taxes are: 1. A general increment tax payable when the owner actually
realizes the unearned increment by selling or letting
the land. 2. A reversion duty that will tax the
large landlords when long building leases run out.
3. An undeveloped land duty that will tax land which
is not at present rated at its proper market value.
4. A mineral right duty on tolls and r_oyalties received by owners of mines who do not them~elves
operate them.
The bill proposes also to remodel liquor licenses
and imposes a higher scale of duties on them. The
death duties are to be raised on estates above
£5,000 in value by a graduating scale. A general
income tax, with an additional super-tax on incomes
above £5,000 per annum, is likewise to be imposed.
These are the principal proposals in the bill. They
are objectionable to the nobility, who will, of course,
generally come under the high schedules of taxation.
Unbiased observers, who studied the bill in detail,
and the leading financial journals consider the
Chancellor's proposals excellent. It will evidently
be far preferable for the Chancellor's proposals to
be enforced than for the fiscal policy of Englan:i
to be suddenly reversed. The British Empire is
now very prosperous. This prosperity woul_d be
largely endangered by a protective tariff and international trade would be seriously disturbed for
many years. It does not appear possible that British
electors next year will vote to reverse the fiscal
policv that has proved so advantageous to the
country.
The government of M. Briand in France is doing
remarkably well. The French people are very
prosperous and have immense sav-i ngs ready for
investment. They are anxious for the governmeut
to pursue a peaceful foreign policy. The only disturbing feature in French politics is an agitation
in certain sections of the press for the limitation
of Spain's operations in Morocco'. This is not
likely to become very serious.
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In Austria and Germany the government3 arc
struggling with treasury deficits and strong general movements for political reform. The Austrian
press is severely criticising the visit of the Czar
of Russia to Italy. But this visit promises to be
very beneficial to international politics. No Russian
ruler has visited Italy in the past two centuries. The
houses of the Romanoffs and Savoys have been long
estranged. But the present Czar is a friend of both
the King and Queen of Italy, and several years
ago decided to end the traditional coolness between
the ruling families and visit Italy. His visit was
very successful and he has promised the Italian
people to revisit them with the Czarina shortly.
The importance of this rapprochement lies in its
bearing on two aspects of Pan-Germanism. Both
the Prussians and Austrians are looking for national
expansion. The Prussian has his thoughts fixed
on development of sea power and foreign conquest;
the Austrian on land expansion. The Austrian's.
most ardent desire is the regaining of Italy. But
the recent development in Italy and the wise foreign
policies of the Italian government have made this
desire impracticable. Austrian politicians are now
turning their attention to expansion in the Balkans.
Although Prussia, Austria and Italy are members
of the triple alliance, their political ideals differ
greatly. Russian interests in the Balkans are as
great as Austria's, consequently the rapprochement
of Italy and Russia will strengthen Russia's control
of the Balkan situation. The beneficial effects of
this rapprochement will strongly help in preserving
the world's peace.
German financial conditions are not sound. There
is a large and growing treasury deficit and Germany
is largely indebted to foreign countries. France
and England are her principal creditors. They
have not called loans yet, but should financial developments in London or Paris necessitate the
withdrawal cif loans, the German money markets
would be greatly depressed. No necessity for such
action is at present apparent. The chief disturbing
factors in the German financial outlook at the moment are the impending government loans and the
increasing power of the Socialists in the Reichstag.
Although we may hear much of some, or all, the
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political questions discussed above in the next few
weeks, we need not expect any of them to adversely
affect our financial affairs.
Russia has had exceedingly good harvests and
has strongly impressed European investors by its
financial policies. This will lead to the investment
in the near future of large amounts of French,
English and German capital and insure a sound
foreign policy.
Throu_ghout Europe bankers report the large
hoarding of money by the people and the restoration of commercial confidence. This is being reflected by increased investments on the stock
exchanges and by new company promotions. The
general outlook is for a good commercial development and a surprisingly good ·a nderstanding between the nations during the next two or three
years. Any serious international questions that may
arise will be equita.bly settled by arbitration.
But little improvement is shown in the returns
of the European financial institutions during the
week. The Bank of England's return compares as
follows:
This Week.
Circulation . . . . . . £29,187,000
Public deposits. . .
6,449,000
Private deposits .
40,775,000
Government securities
16,386,000
Other securities . . .
27,079,000
Reserve . . . . . . . 21,460,000
Proportion of reserve t<.,
liabilties. . . . . •
45.42%
Bullion.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Bank rate

.

.

.

.

•

32,510,000

so/o

Last Week.

Last Year.

£28,849,000

£28,986,000
6,353,000

7,I 18,000

40,814,000
16,791,000
26,905,000

42,363,000
14,730,000

21,972,000

25,330,000

45.80%

52.00%
35,679,000
2½%

32,685,000

so/o

26,359,000

These figures show continued weakness. The
best that can be said for the last return is that the
bank is just about holding its own through the
action of its presen• discount rate. The demand
for foreign gold continues. Unless the outlook
improves in the next week or two the directors
will be forced to again advance the bank rate, so
as to enable the bank to be in a position to meet
its obligations at the end of the year.
The weekly return of the Bank of France shows
the following changes: Notes in circulation increased 274,325,000 francs, treasury · deposits decreased 24,525,000 francs, general deposits decreased
114,000,000 francs, gold on hand decreased 19,525,379

000 francs, silver on hand decreased 5,225,000
francs, bills discounted increased 246,650,000 francs,
and advances decreased 14,575,000 francs.
This report shows that the bank has started to
lose gold extensively. The reduction this week
in the gold supply has been caused by demands
on account of Russia and Germany.
According to the cables of the Wall Street Summary the last weekly statement of the Bank of
Germany shows the following changes : Cash on
hand decreased 47,654,000 marks, loans increased
34,017,000 marks, discounts increased 92,870,000
marks, treasury bills decreased 2,001,000 marks,
notes in circulation increased 87,972,000 marks, deposits increased 28,909,000 marks, gold on hand
decreased 42,770,000 marks.
·
·
The bank's rate of discount remains unchanged
at S oer cent.
This is one of the weakest statements the bank
has made for some time, and it is very probable that
the directors will fina it necessary to increase the
bank rate.
THE GENERAL SITUATION.
Changes affecting the situation in general are
slight. Money in the call loan department has
ranged between 3½ and S per cent., with most
of the loans around 4 per cent. The Bank of England secured $4,000,000 South African gold in the
open market which obviated the necessity of a
further rise in its discount rate and also enabled
it to send $1,250,000 to South America, where the
coffee crop is being rushed to market at a rate
unequaled since the record crop of 1906-07. There
are several influences at work which may affect our
financial position •unless ad·roitly handled. One
of them is the absorption of "rights" which have
been issued in large quantities by two big railroad
systems. Another of them is the considerable
amount of securities pointed this way from Europe.
Also, as is well known, several big railroads only
await a favorable opportunity to put out bond issues
to cover their needs for equipment and other improvements.
The rise in the cotton market is not a bullish
argument from any viewpoint. It is bound to reduce
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our foreign trade balance if persisted in, and has
already deranged the operations of home manufacturers to the extent that several more spinners
have agreed to curtail the output. The effort to
increase the price of finished cotton products is
hampered by the pressure on the market of the
lower-bought yarns and until they have been absorbed the outlook is not bright.
Two interesting reports were issued by the Department of Commerce and Agriculture this week.
One shows the excess of exports of foodstuffs and
manufacturers' materials over imports from January 1 to September 30 was only $92,000,000, as
against $492,000,000 during the same period in 1908.
The other shows a falling off of 40 per .cent. in
exports of wheat and flour for the five crop years
ending with 1908-9, as compared with the previous
five crop years, in spite of steadily increasing production. These two items are important in their
bearing on our foreign trade balance, and it is
obvious that railroa_ds reaching the seaboard must
suffer from the reduced volume of grain freights.
The bright side of the picture shows record operations in the steel and iron mills, with few orders
being accepted for 1909 delivery; heavy railroad
equipment and rail orders; bank clearings 29.5 per
cent. over 1908 and 7.6 per cent. over the busy year
of 1906; enormous freight traffic and brighter outlook for the copper business. Between 30,000,000
and 50,000,000 pounds of copper meta\ has been
sold at a slight concession in the past few days.
There is , some resemblance in this dip in price
to the declaration of the open market for steel and
may mean that decks are being cleared for the
long deferred activity' in copper circles.
THE TECHNICAL SITUATION.
The purely technical situation is stronger in the
rails than in the industrials. The short interest is
much heavier in the high-priced railroad stocks
than in the industrials. In fact, there is a considerable long interest in the latter group. The
spreading apart of the two groups is not due to
technical conditions, but to recognition of comparative merit. This may bring about some tem381

porary reversals, but the technical situation is not
of so much importance now as if everybody was
arrayed on the same side of both classes of securities. Declines in industrials brought about by the
selling of weak industrial holdings should be considered an opportunity to buy, and advances in
rails brought about by the retirement of weak short
accounts an opportunity to sell or dispose of
holdings.
CONCLUSION.
Find no reason to change views recently expressed in these advices. Would buy Amalgamated
Copper, American Smelters, American Car & Foundry, American Locomotive, Pressed Steel Car,
Railway Steel Spring and other good industrials
on every little reaction, and sell such stocks as
Union Pacific, St. Paul and Reading on all advances.
There is a tendency to go too far afield in the
industrial issues at present. As is always the case,
a number of people want to get away from the
standards and indulge in get-rich-quick securities.
I have recently had a number of inquiries about
Vulcan Detinning and "Pay-as-you-enter" Cars. I
would not recommend these securities on general
principles. I do not believe in advertised securities,
and there are plenty of seasoned stocks to trade in.
As is customary, a chart showing market movements of stocks for the previous month follows :
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NOVEMBER 13, 1909.
The events of the week affecting stock prices were
the Government report showing an indicated crop
of 2,767,000,000 bushels of corn; the Copper Producers' Association report, showing an increase in
production of the metal, but a still greater increase
in consumption, both local and foreign, and some
improvement in the foreign money situation. All
these items were, of course, of a favorable nature.
Marketwise, the most interesting feature is the
continued buying of industrial issues by good people and the equally good selling of rails and United
States Steel on the advances. This discrimination
in the buying and selling, of course, works to hold
rails down, while indust'r ials advance. For example, Amalgamated Copper and Steel common
were eight points apart on October 1 and are now
at about the same price. This does not necessarily
suggest any favorable developments in copper, or
any unfavorable developments in steel. What it
does represent is the anteriority of stock prices.
The Ste~! stocks moved up in anticipation of a great
improvement in the steel business. When the improvement materialized it had been fully discounted
in security prices. Amalgamated Copper has been
advancing in anticipation of an improve ment in
that metal, which has not yet arrived. By the time
copper metal gets to 16 or 17 cents Amalgamated
will probably be at its pinnacle.
There is nothing particularly remarkable in the
fact that Amalgamated is gradually gaining on
Steel. Amalgamated has for years averaged to sell
far above Steel common, to earn more money on
capitalization and to pay more dividends. The
average price of Amalgamated for five years prior
to 1909 was 82, and the average price of Steel common 34. Admitting excellent management in the
affairs of Steel and a very bad bit of management
in Amalgamatep, the hiatus is extreme. The bad
break I refer to was the attempt to hold copper
metal at 25 cents. On the natural advance which
occurred in the metal the corporation would have
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made millions in the natural order of things, but
instead of that they "held the umbrella" over
other corporations and eventually relinquished their
untenable position at a loss. Mr. Rogers was ambitious and by that sin fell the angels. It is not
probable that the same error will be made again.
The price of copper metal is subject to very wide
fluctuations. The changes are not frequent, but
when the swing begins price changes are sharp and
rapid. This may be illustrated by a table.
AVERAGE P~ICE , ELECTROLYTIC COPPER BY
· MONTHS SINCE 1900.
Ave. for
Jan. Feb. Mch. At,'. Ma~. June.
1900
16.25 16.25 16.25 1 .97 16. 5 16.25
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909

1900 ••
1901 • •
1902 ••
1903 ..
1904 .•
1905 . •
1906 • ,
1907 ..
1908 ; .
1909 .•

July.

16.62
11.55
12.26
12.67
15.15
18.53
24.52
13.69
13.89

16.62
12.50
12.88
12.41
15.20
17.91
25.00
12.92
12.94

16.62
12.21
14.51
12.64
15.20
18.34
25.27
12. 70
12.38

16.62
11.97
14.89
13.18
15.18
18.50
24.53
12.74
12.56

Aug.

Sept.

Oct.

Nov

16.25 16.37 16.50 16.62 16.62
16.60 16.60 16.50 16.50 16.50
11.90 11. 54 11.60 11.59 11.41
13.70 13.37 13.60 13.26 13.15
12.67 12.63 12.70 13.14 14.42
15.11 15.87 16.22 16.50 16.84
1_8.25 18.47 19.18 21.39 22.06
21.18 18.42 15.70 13.22 13.37
12.71 13. 50 13.38 13.33 14.15
12.8~ 13,00 12.87

16.62
12.11
14.64
12.65
15.00
18.53
22.69
12.69
13.21

16.62
11.99
14.97
13.08
15.00
18.55
24.16
12. 62
12.89

Ave. for
Dec. Year.

16.62
14.80
11.47
12.29
14.89
18. 59
22.96
13. 18
14.13

16.47
16.43
11.82
13.63
13.09
15.82
19.39
20.10
13.21

The statement that Amalgamated has averaged
higher than Steel, etc., may
also be illustrated by
1
a few statistics.
HIGH AND LOW BY YEARS, FOR FIVE YEARS; AVERAGE EARNINGS FOR COMMON, AND AVERAGE ' DIVIDENDS PA-ID.
Amalgamated . . .
United States Steel .

Amalgamated . , .
United States Steel

•
.

1904.
82¾-43¼
33¼· 8¾

1907.
121¾ -42
50¾-21 ¾
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1905.
111!4-70
43~-30

1908.
88¾-45¼
58¼-26¾

1906,
118¼-92%
50¼-38¾

-CommonEarn- Diviings. dends.
5.50
5.02

4.45
1.65

To get .at the whole truth we must, of course,
look to figures showing money expended for improvements, betterments, new property, etc., which
I have not yet completed, but I think, pro rata,
Amalgamated has diverted more than the Steel
Corporation has.
The phenomena of high discount rates ruling
throughout the United States and Europe, in ~he
face of increasing prosperity, are greatly puzzhng
investors and engendering pessimistic tendencies.
The Wall Street Journal of yesterday, in discussing
the outlook for money, makes the following observations:
"Wall Street is at present distressed over the
money situation. Why, it asks, should operations be checked and business restricted, just
when the country is emerging from a period
of depression, and is preparing itself for prosperous times? Why should we be confronted
all of a sudden with a scarcity of money, when
it was only a short while ago that the country
in general, and the banks in particular, were
complaining of a surfeit of idle capital? Has
there been, after all, such an enormous industrial expansion in the pa$t few months as to
use up the country's supply of credits?
"These are questions that must occur to
anyone who has been closely interested in the
developments in money during the past few
days. It seems hard that expansion should
apparently meet with a halt by reason of the
lack of money facilities, when every business
man feels that fundamentally conditions are
sound, and that the country is ripe for a period
of great prosperity. What perhaps adds to the
difficulty of finding a solution to the present
problem is the fact that conditions are not
confined to this country alone, but happen to
be world-wide. There is comfort in this, however, as it goes to prove at the very outset
that the result is not due primarily to any technical defects in our own monetary system.
That there are certain defects that contribute
to bring about a stringent state of the money
market at this time it must be · admitted, but
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these are not the main factors in the present
circumstances.
"Aside from considerations of the general
harvest requirements, the truth is that expansion is by no means meeting with a check at
the present time from any considerations of
money. As a matter of fact, money is just now
in the very crucible, as it we'r e, of trade activity, and that accounts for its apparent scarcity.
Wall Street is not the industry itself of the
country, however much it may be the barometer of it. However much securities may warrant high er values, when those higher values
are only in process of being made, it is not
always possible to anticipate the elevation to a
higher price level. Discounting of the future
under such conditions is possible only up to a
certain point, when money is still not fully
employed. But the time comes sooner or later
when capital is all utilized to bring about that
very result which has been discounted beforehand. It becomes then a physical impossibility to anticipate any further what may truly
merit still higher values ultimately.
"There is only one course open, and that
is to await the profit returns on that invested
capital."
These observations clearly describe some of the
more apparent causes of the disturbances in the
money markets. In recent letters I discussed the
more important factors contributing to the present
tigntness in the world's money markets. On account, however, of the depressing influence of the
money market on stock values during the past
week, it may prove of interest if the factors at present influencing money rates are briefly reverted to.
In accordance with the periodic law, obeyed by
all physical and psychical changes, the ebb and flow
of commercial and financial affairs appear in recurrent cycles of inflation and depression. Periods
of inflation are accompanied by in'creased metal
production. The increased gold production promotes
credit inflation and its consequent demoralizing
concomitants. We are now in a period of inflation.
There has been an almost uninterrupted period of
prosperity since 1896. The intervening panics did
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not lead to general commercial demoralization and
the business world rapidly recovered from them.
There was a practical recovery from the panic of
1907 in the United States in a little over a year.
The wonderful recuperative power thus shown was
due chiefly to the confidence of bankers in respect
to their ability to quickly recover their necessary
gold reserves on account of the large annual production of the world's mines. When the banks recovered from the panic and subsequent commercial
depression, they were compelled to find uses for
their surplus funds. This was done by offering their
use at cheap rates. In Europe promoters were
assisted in forming large banking and industrial
companies and promoting new industries. In the
United States stock speculation on an unusually
large scale was indulged in. These operations during the past eighteen months absorbed a large portion of the bankers' surplus funds. In the meanwhile trade steadily improved. As a result of the
favorable climatic conditions experienced, the harvests in the United States, Russia, Australasia, India,
Brazil, Argentina and Egypt have been excellent.
For two years in succession the Nile floods in Egypt
have been exceptionally good and have resulted in
bountiful crops of all kinds. There has been a
demand for gold in these countries for crop-mov' ing purposes during the past three months. Large
amounts of gold have been shipped from England
and the United States also, to Brazil in settlement
of trade balances. The !=rop-moving demands for
money are still strongly operative and in the United
States the period of demand is liable to be prolonged
this year by the policy of the farmers . in holding
back some of the cotton and grain crops for higher
prices. It will thus be seen that after the surplus
banking funds were absorbed to a large extent by
company promoters and investors' operations, large
calls were made on the world's bankers for money
for crop-moving accommodation. This accommodation has been generously extended without causing
much disturbance in stock exchanire values by
liquidation. Bankers have endeavored to finance,
or protect, stock investors' operations and to move
the harvests simultaneously.
Had we been in the cycle of depression and de-
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creasing gold production the gold reserves of the
banks would have long remained under strain, and
recovery from the panic would have been exceedingly slow.
In addition to the factors contributing to high
money rates mentioned above, there is another which
steadily tends to promote the rise in value of money
in certain countries. It results from bad banking
practices and defective currency.
In France, Germany, Spain and other parts of the
European Continent, very little use is made of
checks and similar credit transfer agents that are
so well developed in Anglo-Saxon countries. Bankers
are compelled, in consequence of this, to keep on
• hand unusually large gold reserves, and circulation
is irregular and subject to rapid fluctuations. Bankers in the United States are compelled by the defect_ive currency laws to keep in circulation more.
paper money than trade conditions warrant, and
send their redundant currency to the large cities
where it tends to induce over-soeculation during
slack seasons. After a period of such speculation
the farmer calls for banking accommodation for
crop-moving, and bankers, wishing to keep business
both with the city speculator and the farmer, endeavors to d,aw gold from Europe. When European
bankers are desirous of retaining their gold reserve
they advance their money rates. When such conditions prevail American bankers are forced to call
loans or rapidly advance local rates. We have
lately noticed _all these factors in operation.
Notwithstanding the high rates for money and the
interruption of Stock Exchange activities, trade
conditions in all parts of the United States are
satisfactory, and the outlook for 1910 is for a period
of unequaled business activity. At no previous
period has wealth been accumulated as rapidly as at
present. The business transactions of the country
are well indicated by bank clearings. In many cities
they are reaching record figures. In New York
City they are approaching extraordinary proportions. According to Bradstreet's statistics the bank
clearings from 122 cities in the United States for
October and the ten months, 1909-1908, were as
follows:
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- - - October. - - 1909.
1908.
$880,296,874
$765,318,411
11,053,619,466
8,041,977,655
457,349,576
4)0,021,123
1,619,244,720
1,427,923,438
474,170,329
406,789,620
673,967,059
537,129,721
540,879,962
404,419,621

Clearing Houses.
New England States
Middle States . . .
Western States . .
Northwestern States . . . . .
Far Western States . . . .
Southwestern States . . . . .
Southern States . . . .
Total . . . . . . . .

Clearing Houses.
New England States
Middle States . • .
Western States . . . .
Northwestern States .
Far Western States .
Southwestern States .
Southern State~ . . . .
Total

$15,699,527,986

$11,983,579,589

- - - Ten Months. - - 1909.
1908.
$7,850,456,149
$6,743,709,446
93,338,061,352
69,470,654,391
4,316,154,011
3,797,862,318
14,473,905,668
12,519,826,162
4,119,938,222
3,42~,236,712
5,501,899,944
4,557,274,279
4,095,746,714
3,427,823,651

.
.
.
.

$133,696,162,060

$103,937,386,959

For the ten months of 1909 the total clearances
at all cities amounted to $133,696,162,060, a gain of
28.6 per cent. over the corresponding period in 1908.
The New York banks contributed to this large sum
$84,618,422,860, which i's an increase of 36.8 per cent.
over the ten months ended October, 1908. The statistics for almost every city indicate that bank clearances this year are larger than for corresponding
periods in the past three years.
Such clear records of business improvement as
are furnished by American clearing house statistics
are not available in Europe, but those financial statistics which are available in Europe all indicate
that European banks have been doing remarkably
large businesses this year. The deposits and current accounts in English banks for the ten months
of 1909, as compared with a similar period in 1908,
are as follows:
Discounts
Advances.
Deposits.

1908.
£53,300,000
238,700,000
920,000,000

1909.
£57,900,000
248,700,000
940,000,000

Inc. or Dec.

+ £4,600,000
+ 10,000,000
+ 20,000,000

The statistics for the English Joint Stock Banks
for this year are as follows:
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Capital.
Reserves
Market value
Deposits .
Cash . .
.
Loans .. ..

1908.
£79,897,000
48,452,000
240,294,000
880,363,000
262,602,000
574,171,000

1909.
£80,307,000
48,243,000
241,332,000
904,352,000
278,281,000
569,172,000

Inc. or Dec.
+ £410,000
209,000
+ 1,038,000
+13,989,000
+ 15,679,000
- 4,999,000

The remarkable increa ses in cash and deposits are
very noticeable in the above table and indicate the
mobility of English banking transactions during the
past ten months. Another noticeable feature in the
table is the large advance in the market value of the
bank stocks. This is being brought about by the
growing popularity of banking stock investments,
owing to the prosperity of the large banks . .
The statistics of the various stock exchanges of
America and Europe show advances corresponding
in many respects to those shown by oanking concerns. Commercial statistics likewise bear evidence
of the fact that busin ess confidence has largely been
restored under the influences of the large gold production and bountiful harvests.
The banking reports from Europe during the
week showed an improvement, as compared with
those of the previous week. The Bank of England's
return compares- as follows:
This Week. Last Week. Last Year.
Circulation . . . £28,809,000 £29,187,000 £28,798,000
Public deposits .
5,853,000
6,449,000
6,068,000
Private deposits. 93,174,000 40,775,000 41,737,000
Govt. securities. 16,157,000 16,386,000 14,730,000
Other securities. 23,729,000 27,079,000 25,416,000
Reserve.
22,844,000 21,460,000 25,370,000
Prop.res . to liab.
50.71 %
45.42%
53.03%
Bullion . . . . 33,514,000 32,510,000 35,532,000
Bank rate. .
· 5%
5%
2¾%
This return indicates that the bank has improved
its position by reducing its loans in a drastic manner. The item termed "Other Securities" shows a
decrease of £3,350,000. The increase of £1,000,000
in the bullion account shows that the 5 per cent.
rate has had some effect on the market. The good
showing in the gold reserve was made with the
assistance of the Bank of France, which transferred
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gold to the Bank of England under a special agreement. If the Bank of England is able to keep its
gold reserves above £21,000,000 durit1g the remainder of the year the other European banks will be
able to tide over the year without meeting with
any very serious difficulty.
The Bank of Germany's return indicates the following changes:
Marks.
Cash in hand, increased
5,600,000
Loans, decreased . . . . . . .
26,427,000
Discounts, decreased . . . . . . .
57,312,000
Treasury bills, decreased . . . . . . .
25,666,000
Notes in circulation, decreased .
56,272,000
Deposits, decreased. . . . .
35,506,000
Gold in hand, increased . . .
7,591,000
The chief items compare as follows, in marks :
1909.
1908.
1907.
Gold & silv.er. 714,345,000 1,072,260,000 670,440,000
Loans and discounts . . . 1,100,968,000 932,080,000 1,385,640,000•
Circulation . . 1,680,220,000 1,609,100,000 1,562,340,0001
This statement is much more satisfactory than the·
one issued in the previous week. The increases in
gold reserves and cash are noticeable. The decreases in loans and treasury bills will be a benefit
in assisting in further improving the bank position
in the next few weeks. The Berlin money market
during the week was relieved by a cable from the
Chilian government to the Deutsche Bank stating its
willjngness to renew a large loan deposited by the
government with the bank.
The return of the Bank of France, issued on
November 11, likewise showed improvement. The
gold reserves increased 425,000 francs, and bullion
increased 1,300,000 francs. The principal items in
the return showed the following changes :
Francs.
Notes in circulation
Dec. 216,425,000
Treasury deposits .
Dec. 17,375,000
General deposits. .
Inc. 17,325,000
Gold in hand. . . .
Inc.
425,000
Silver in hand . . . ·
Inc.
1,300,000
Bills discounted . .
Dec. 285,175,000
Advances . . . . . .
Inc. 11,850,000
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On November 11 the Bank of Bengal raised its
rate from 4 per cent. to 5 per cent., and the National
Bank of Switzerland increased its rate to 4 per cent.
In a recent daily letter I referred to the showing
of the last bank statement and suggested that the
Morgan and Rockefeller banks were loaning more
freely to their friends than were other institutions.
This, in my opinion, r eflects confidence in the immediate future of the stock market. Following this
statement I wrote to Mr. David Ochs on the subject
and his reply appears to verify the view. As his
opinions are worthy of consideration, I reproduce
his answer in full:
"In response to your request to point out in the
bank statement of November 6 any further change
to the situation than those generally noticed, I
shall have to state:
"It need hardly be mentioned that a better view
of the situation is obtained than formerly, since
the average statement for the week is now accompanied by a report of actual condition at eud of
week (up to and includinR" Thursdav's business) and
by the statement of the non-clearing banks and trust
companies.
"It is generally noticed, when it occurs, that the
bank statement is much out of line with known
movements in the items of money or of loans. In
such cases the statement is met with doubts as to its
correctness or with · outright denunciation that it
had been doctored for concealing real condition.
This cannot be proved and thus may be unjust.
The cause of discrepancy with known movements of
'money' may have arisen from the fact that the
expectations are based on shipments and receipts of
currency reported of certain banks only, which are
usually the largest shippers or receivers of currency
-while, perchance, some other institutions or concerns may have participated with a considerable
sum in the aggregate.
"It is -possible, also, but most unlikely, that some
individual or concern or pool may withdraw some
large amount of money from banks and hoard it to
affect the bank statement and do the reverse after
having attained the purpose. The opprobrium when
this would be discovered is, however, so great, and
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it will so rarely be risked, that such action may be
dismissed from usual calculation.
" As to unaccountable changes iri the item of 'loans'
-and therefore of deposits-they may have been
caused by foreign or domestic transfers of credits
or loans. It is well nigh impossible to trace all of
such transactions and therefore may not be confirmed by the bank statement.
"The shifting of 'foreign' loans and credits can
be best estimated by active brokers in foreign exchange, rather than by the bankers in general. In
some cases, however, big transactions in exchange
may be made direct between banking concerns-or
may be offset by some other trade in the !ame
banking house. In such events even the widest
awake broker will go astray in his estimates, unless
he has acquired after many years the rare faculty
of intuitively estimating the volume of transactions
from movements in national and international commerce. Even then his estimate of foreign loan and
credit transfers cannot be of positive nature.
"As to the shifting of 'domestic' loans, there have
recently been repeated reports that loans were made
here, direct from out-of-town banks. No proof
thereof has been presented, and in a general way it
may be stated that for such loans the funds must
either have been already on deposit here, or would
have to be sent here and that the loan would thus
have to be treated as a transaction of the bank here.
After thus taking it for granted that the bank statement is u sually quite correct in all its items, attention may be called to specifications in the 'average'
statement, which gives the reports of the banks in
detail. The averages last week differed very little
from 'actual.'
"Thus we find that while in the aggregate the
loans of the banks being 1,247 millions, exceed their
deposits by 5½ million dollars, yet that the excess
of loans over deposits in our three largest banks
runs up to about 44 millions-and likewise in seven
other banks the excess is about 25 millions. Thus
all the other banks in the Clearing House continue
in the position of having still over 63 million deposits above their outstanding loans.
"Here are the respective figures in detail of banks
having any large excess of loans:
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Loans.
National 01ty Bank .
$188, Olli,000
Bank ot Commerce .
1411, 006,000
First National Bank .
108,1104,000
Amer. Ex. Nat. Bank .
29,692,000
Bank ot Manhattan Co.
86,000,000
8,9119,000
Gallatin • • • • • . .
Importers & Traders .
25,689,000
Mercantile National . .
18,771,000
Jl'ank ot New York . .
18,978,000
Chemical National Bank
27,802,000

Deposits.
$180,294,000
121, 731l,OOO
90,122,000
22,744,00I)
81,100,000
6, 728,00I)
22,807,000
10,491,000
16,8114,000
26,083,000

ot

Loans.
$7,721,000
28,276,000
18,882,WO
6,949,000
4,900,000
2,281,000
2,882,000
8,280,000
2,619,000
1,769,000
$69,009,000

"Whenever the banks in the aggregate have shown
an excess of loans and deposits it has been an unfavorable sign. In the present case the excess is
relatively .small-in the aggregate-as the capital
and surplus of the Clearing House banks now reach
the sum of 304 million dollars. Excess of loans of
all banks together is therefore only 1¾%"The three largest banks, however, show also the
relatively largest excess of loans .over deposits$44,379,000, or 35 per cent. of their 124 millions of
aggregate capital and surplus. It is evident, therefore, that the magnates in control of those banks
must be very confident indeed that the expansion of
loans by those banks will prove to have been perfectly safe and satisfactory. These magnates, and
the interests combined with them, represent the
greatest financial power in this country. The responsibility is, nevertheless, a great one."
THE GENERAL SITUATION.
One of the weak spots in the general situationthe copper metal market-shows indications of getting into line with other branches of trade. There _
have been some rather heavy purchases made in this
market during the week for London account, which,
taken in conjunction with the Producers' report,
showing a big increase in deliveries both for domestic and export account during October, and the fact
that the big electric companies' sale s are nearly as
large as in the record month of May, 1907, has
caused a very perceptible brightening of the outlook.
The movement toward a closer understanding between the important mining interests is progressing
and will undoubtedly induce freer buying by conrnmers who have hitherto shown a di sposition to buy
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only in small lots at a concession in price. The
Producers' report shows that, while production for
October, as compared with September, increased
6,634,000 pounds, consumption increased 20,473,000
pounds. The importance of these figures lies in the
fact that 14,254,000 pounds of this increase was made
in the domestic deliveries.
Whatever tendency toward slackening in the pace
of iron and steel orders there may be is due to cautiousness on the part of the various companies who
are not willing to book many long-time orders at
these prices and are unable to accept any more shorttime orders. The mills are working at full capacity
and wages in many instances are being restored to
pre-panic levels. Chicago mills have received orders
during the week for 100,000 tons of steel rails and
eastern mills have inquiries for about 100,000 tons
of structural steel. The business in bars is on an
enormous scale. Estimates of the unfilled orders on
the books of the various steel companies run as high
as 10,000,000 tons.
The labor question is attracting some attention at
the moment. A great many union agreements expire
next month and some agitation may be expected.
Employees of railroads east of Chicago have already
put their demands in shape for presentation at a
' conference which is scheduled for the first week of
December. Officials of the companies say the time
is not opportune for any advance in wages, and, as
it is understood that the eastern men are backed up
by the employees of western roads, a great deal cf
friction may result before matters are amicably adjusted.
The near approach of the convening of Congress
and the President's message to that body causes
some apprehension in railroad circles. It is pointed
out that a great many measures aimed at the railroads which were to be brought before both the
National and State Legislatures were suppressed at
the time of the panic in order to help a return of
confidence. The fear now is that some of these
bills will again come to the fore.
The resumption of the advance in the cotton market after the quick break in prices early in the week
has resulted in a further disturbance of the cotton
goods market, leaving buyers and sellers wider apart
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than before. The threat to curtail cotton-spinning
operations, which has been extended to the German
spinners, loses some of its effect on the price of the
staple by reason of the demand for mixing with
woolen yarns which has assumed enormous proportions. Reliable advices from knitting interests say
that this mixing of cotton and wool is going on at the
rate of 40 per cent. cotton and 60 per cent. wool and
that the resultant yarn is costing $1, where a year
ago all wool yarns cost $1.03, and also that the bulk
of the business is being done in mixed goods.
The money situation, from a local standpoint, was
somewhat weakened this week on account of a belated demand for funds by the interior and a resumption of heavy gold shipments to Brazil for the account of London. Call rates ran up to 6 per cent.,
but at the crucial moment large sums were offered
which instantly relieved the tension. The greatest
cause for apprehension lies in the fact that a considerable amount of money which should be used in
moving crops is now tied up in holding them back.
Therefore, at a time when the return flow of money
to this center should be nearly due to begin, the demand appears to be increasing. The world's position, however, is much improved. The Bank of
England secured substantial quantities of gold in
the open market and a large sum from Paris. The
Bank of France shows a willingness to release gold
when needed, and according to the German bank
statement that center is in much better shape. The
British budget, which has advanced to the first reading in the House of Lords, will come up for a second reading and debate on November 22. At the
rate which the Bank of England is fortifying her
position there should be little difficulty in financing
the British government's requirements pending the
final passage of the bill.
On the whole, the money position and the general situati on have been materially strengthened by
the week's developments.
THE TECHNICAL SITUATION.
The technical situation is a mixed affair. The
short interest has been somewhat reduced in the
general list during the week, not because of any
demonstrations against the bears, but because of the
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dullness. The bear is a rather impatient critter and
it profits are not forthcoming at once he is inclined
to quit.
The short interest is largest in Union Pacific,
St. Paul, Reading and United .:,tates Steel. These
are the stocks which are in reality the best short
sales, and I do not think the concentration of the
professional shortage will cause any material advance.
The Hill stocks appear to be in a weak technical
position. There is very little short selling of Great
Northern <1nd Northern Pacific and continued selling which must be liquidation. The stocks are apparently left to their own devices and do not look
very promising. Of course, it is a matter of common knowledge that these two issues are closely
held, but that fact makes the weakness more significant.
There is a moderate shortage in Amalgamated,
but it is of a day-to-day character and 1s quickly
retired. There is also a weak floating long interest
in the stock. In the equipments and smelters there
is comparatively no short interest. The stocks advance or hold their own on merit alone.
It may appear that in recommending sales of the
stocks which appear strongest, technically, and purchases of those 'which appear weakest, · technically,
I am adopting a peculiar plan. But the technical
situation is not a very important thing just now.
The advice has been to sell certain stocks on the
rallies and buy others on the declines. Under present conditions we are helped by anything that will
produce reasonable rallies or declines in the stocks
to be purchased or sold. The movements merely
represent opportunities. There are times when the
technique of the market, as indicated by wholesale
public participation, on one side or the other, is of
considerable import:i,nce; at present it is powerless
to produce wide swings.
CONCLUSION.
In last week's letter I referred to the advance in
industrials as compared with rails in the last three
months of 1905. The figures showed that in that
period rails advanced from r3r.99 on October 2 to
133.26 on December 30, and industrials from 82.17
on October 2 to 96.20 on December 30. It is well
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to bear in mind, however, that this misproportio.}l
was not effected without a number of intermediate
fluctuations. There were reversals of the general
trend of the market, as well as reversals of the
spreading apart process. This may be observed by a
scrutiny in detail of the movements for the last
three months of 1905.
12
20
12
20
1905.
Industrials. Rails. 1905.
Industrials. Rails.
Oct. 2 .... .. 82.17 131.99 N c, v.16 . . . . . . 82.47 129.37
"
3 . . . . . . 82.62 132.42
" 17 ...... 84.19 130.69
4 .. .. . . 82.38 131.47
" 18 ...... 84.53 130.95
5 ...... 82.78 131.40
" 20 .. ... . 85.22 131.97
6 . . . . . . 82.55 131.53
" 21. .... . 85.84 132.13
7. . . . . . 82.02 130.92
" 22 ...... 86.11 131.98
9 . ..... 81.65 130.35
" 23 ..... . 85.93 132.00
" 10 .. . . . . 82.02 131.26
" 24 ...... 85.81 131.26
" 11. . .... 80.83 130.04
" 25 . .. ... 86.94 131.6:i
" 12 .. .... 80.96 130.10
" 27 .. .... 89.43 132.26
" 13 . .. . . . 81.54 131.01
" 28 .. .... 89.77 131.63
" 14 .. .... 81.47 130.73
" 29 ...... 89.89 131.34
" 16 ... .. . ·31,43 130.80 Dre. 1. . . . . . 89.62 130.00
" 17. . . . . . 81.43 130.49
2 ...... 89.50 129.93
" 18 .. .... 80.96 130.13 I "
4 ...... 89.56 129.65
" 19 . ... . . 81.41 130.51
5 . .. .. . 90.82 130.81
" 20 .. ... , 82.27 131.82
6 ...... 90.91 130.64
" 21. . . . . . 82.83 132.62
7 ..... . 92.37 130.98
" 23.. .. .. 82.86 132.65 I "
3 .. . ... 93.20 131.04
" 24 . . . . . 82.84 132.61
9 . ..... 92.84 131.33
" 25 . . . . . . 82.66 132.49
" 11 ... ... 93.59 131.95
" 26 .. ... . 82.08 131.95
" 12 ...... 95.13 132.03
" 27 .. . . .. 81.97 131.36
" 13 .... •.• 95.68 132.81
" 28 ...... 81.51 130.70
" 14 ...... 95.47 132.23
" 30 ...... 82.33 131.25
" 15 ...... 96.05 132.08
" 31. . . . . . 83.77 132.33
" 16 .. .... 96.{)() 131.90
Nov. 1. .. . . . 84.14 132.37
" 18 .... .. 95.71 131.28
"
2 .. .... 83.92 132.23
" 19 .... .. 95.64 131.71
3. . . . . . 83.78 132.47
" 20 ... ... 94.61 131.93
4 .. ... . 82.93 131.45
" 21. .. .. . 94.20 132.26
6 .. ... . 83.32 131.99
" 22 .. .... 94.43 133.05
8 . . . ... 82.17 130.51
" 23 ..... . 95.05 133.14
9. . . . . . 81.56 129.00
" 26 ...... 95.84 133.17
" 10 . ..... 82.57 129.83
" 27 .... .. 94.04 131.08
" 11 .. .... 83.25 129.91
" 28 .. ... 95.37 132.30
" 13 ...... 80.83 127.91
" 29 .. .... 96.56 133.54
" 14 . ... .. 81.67 129.34
" 30 .. .... 96.20 133.26
" 15 .. .... 82.77 130.08
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Find no reason to alter recent recommendations.
Would buy the industrials on moderate declines and
sell Steel common and the high-priced rails on raJ.:.
lies. In the industrials, I consider Amalgamated
Copper, American Smelters, American Car &
Foundry and Pressed Steel Car most favorable for
immediate movements. American Can, common and
preferred issues, are being absorbed by good interests and look like going higher. The activity in
Interborough-Metropolitan I have little confidence
in. The action is of a highly speculative character
and is so much advertised as to arouse suspicion as
to the real motives.
If the improvement in foreign money conditions
proves temporary it may be necessary to again step
aside for a time, but I hardly think even a little
further disturbance will seriously affect the industrial issues mentioned. The potency of this factor
is, of course, a matter for continued study and
comment.
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NOVEMBER 20, 1909.
The week has produced little of importance in the
way of news. The gossip anent the copper combine
has continued, but there is no authentic information
as to just what form the proposed combination will
assume. ln the daily letter of November 15 I suggested that a decided improvement in the metal
situation itself would be more certain and more important than any form of coalescence. We find that
the metal is doing better and therefore need not be
disappointed if the plans for unification are delayed.
There has never been a time when a security or
group of securities advanced materially without the
initial · movements being accredited to some form of
deal, combination, corner, or in fact to anything
except the basic cause. It seems quite certain that,
in the case of Amalgamated and other copper securities, some form of co-operation is contemplated and
will be effected, but the restoration of the metal
itself is of primary importance.
The proposed merger of the telephone and telegraph corporations is also still in the tentative
stages, but here we have a proposition which will
result in mutual benefit to the stockholders of
these ·companies and to the public. Without any
advance in either telegraph or telephone tolls the
corporation, under a community of interests, can
make more money and give the public better service. During the competitive regime much has
gone to waste. It costs money to build wires
and the interest on such funds alone is a tremendous item. Parallel wires have been left idle
in almost every mile of the competing territory,
while other wires were crowded to the limit - of
their capacity. A telephone wire can be converted into a telegraph wire by the mere throwing of a switch and we must figure that the
busiest telephone wires are comparatively idle at
night, while commercial telegraph wires do a large
percentage of their business at night. The great
business houses, which find it necessary to offer
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quotations on fruits, cereals or whatever, find it
expedient to send their messages "night rate" and
also most of the press despatches are handled
between 6 P. M. and 1 A. M.
Mr. James J. Hill, fresh from a heart-to-heart
talk with President Taft, expresses the opinion
that no drastic legislation will be forthcoming during the next session of Congress. This is the
most important feature of the interview, but as
Mr. Hill expresses some very good ideas and is
not unduly verbose, the matter is produced in full
by permission of the Chicago "American." Mr.
Hill said:
"Not only America, but Europe, is afflicted with
the germ of recklessness. The country gives the
word. It provides the lesson. Our national legislature sets the pace.
"We are spending millions on top of millions
for the army, for the navy when we need neither.
For Congress to appropriate the several hundred
millions annually, as it does, for the guns of the
ships is encouragement for the individual to talk
about warfare when there isn't any war cloud apparent anywhere.
"Grant said, 'Let us have peace.' But as Napoleon desired for his time · and for his reign,
this country seems to wish war. And why and
for what? What reason have we to combat, except commercially, any foreign power? And yet,
speaking soberly, I will say that we must do something quickly toward regaining our trade with
other countries.
"Germany, England and France are advancing
and pre-empting territory that naturally belongs
to us. We can recover that trade only by encouraging shipping industries, by more marked
methods of inviting trade, by systems of reciprocity,
by competition, the latter, after all, being the real
keynote of commerce.
"Were I in control of the finances of this government I should spend more for the development
of the farm and less for the fineness of firearms.
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I should have agricultural stations situated in all
parts of the nation, where one might come to be
taught how to grow two blades of grass where
but one grew before.
"Think of the congestion in the cities. How
long can this nation survive under present conditions? We have few producers, a multitude of consumers. I have forgotten the figures, but somewhere I have read that 70 per cent. of the people
live in city houses, steam-heated flats, in homes
unsuited for health, unequipped for the sturdiness
necessary for the development of our manhood.
"I should like to see the government spend
millions in the encouragement of men and women
going to the country-there to live as God intended
they should live-to raise children, produce grain,
meat and milk.
"We must get out of the notion that we are living
for the present. It is a bad system of society that
prompts the well-being of to-day, caring nothing for
to-morrow, for those who·come after. And for America, this is the nation that leads, or should lead,
in thought, in education, in the arts and sciences,
just as we try to lead, and, in some instances do
lead, in commerce.
"Millions 'upon millions of acres lie undisturbed in
the West, in the South, and even in the East. You
have poverty stricken people in your great cities,
children who are denied the privileges of education,
mothers who must go through life with ' tear-stained
eyes, husbands and fathers with burdens they can
ill afford to carry. And why? Because of their nonproductiveness.
"This country, as a government, ultimately must
go backward unless we induce the people to go to
the farms-out in the country where health may
be obtained, where a man may make a living, where
the boys and girls may go hop-footing it over hill
and valley, gaining strength with every step.
"The desire seems to be for the young to get to
the city. That desire must be circumvented, dissipated by some sort of method. We must make
the country life as attractive to the young as the city
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is. We must teach them that where the city affords
a dollar, the rural communities will contribute two
dollars. And that is true unless one is a genius.
"You -ask about the prosperity of the nation.
It was never better. Crops have been good, mortgages have been wiped away by the millions, new
fields have been opened, new cities built, new railroads constructed, others planned. Peace reigns. I
can see no black spot anywhere. There will be no
Central Bank; the country will not stand for it.
There is to be no drastic legislation in the forthcoming Congress that I can hear anything about.
"Let Congress and the various State legislatures
take a more catholic view of the railroad situation.
Let them remember that the railroad investor has
his money at stake, that he has contributed something toward the development of the country, that
he is neither a thief nor a robber, as some would
have his countrymen believe, and then we will have
a more homogeneous nation, less trouble, more flour
and bacon sides in our pantries, fewer suicides,
greater bank accounts in our savings Institutions,
better morals.
"We must learn to be less extravagant; we must
be taught to understand that, at the rate our people
are living, destruction to the whole moral fabric
of the nation is inevitable,"
So far as the danger from hostile legislation is
concerned, we may look at the matter from two
primary viewpoints. The man who figures that we
are in the same danger from such agitation now as
we were in 1907 is working from false premises.
If Mr. Roosevelt had been responsible for the panic
of 1907 we might well be exercised over the possibility of his successor producing a like amount of
mischief-but Mr. Roosevelt had only a small part
to play in that panic-it was occasioned by extravagance and too much prosperity, which latter term
is a synonym for inflation. Mr. Roosevelt was too
noisy at times, but he had neither the power to
create a world-wide panic nor the ability to prevent it.
The other viewpoint is of a moral as well as a fiscal
character. If certain corporations are breaking the
laws the pest thing we can do is to curb them, and
no man has any right to criticise such action, Noth4-03

ing can be of greater advantage to stockholders
as a class than clean, honest administration and if
such probity is not voluntary it must be e~forced.
Take the case of the American Sugar Company. If
the allegations are true I would not advise anyone
to buy the stock with counterfeit money. Such
methods never endure. No wonder they did .not
want to issue reports to their stockholders. Their
competitors would examine the amount of the product handled and the amount of profit secured and
become very active in finding out how they did it.
Notwithstanding the improved reports issued by
the leading European banks during the past week,
there is still a ·large amount of nervous tension in
European financial circles that is indicative of an
alert sense of the possibility of danger ahead in the
money markets. Merchants who are called to pay
higher discounts are asking bankers, "Why is so
much fuss being made over a little gold?" They are
also asking why the directors of the Bank of England continue to maintain their high discount rate.
Few who ask such questions are aware, apparently,
that the immense banking credit of England is practically based on the gold reserves of the Bank of
England. The great joint stock banks alone, that
largely trade-on their credit with the Bank of England,
are under obligation to pay off over £900,000,000 in
gold. Their own gold reserves are comparatively
small. Anticipating the world-wide demand for gold,
which has lately been experienced, and the unusual
political complications in Europe, the directors of
the Bank of England decided to take time by the
forelock and build up their gold reserves. When
they rapidly raised their money rate, they were
severely criticised by financial men who were
taken
by surprise.
They are
now
being
criticised for not acting earlier.
The directors of the Bank of France, foreseeing the money
tightness, took action much earlier In the year to
secure an ample gold reserve. In acting earlier they
were able to get their gold without changing their
· discount rate. The strong position or the French
banks, resulting from their timely action in building
up the French gold reserves, is clearly shown by
the following table, which gives the gold reserves
of the principal countries of Europe:
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United Kingdom.
France. . • • •
Germany_ . • .
Austro-Hungary.
Russia. · . . . •
Belgium -• • • .
Netherlands • • •
Italy. • . . •
Switzerland . •
Spain • . • •
Denmark ••
Sweden .
Norway .
Total

.

Oct., 1909.
$157,336,818
703,791,180
179,654,760
278,837,640
573,431,400
30,501,360
51,151,500
207,337,320
24,455,520
78,076,480
19,965,880
21,281,940
5,898,660

Oct., 1908.
$176,789,017
64,) ,572,300
267,426,360
236,730,600
516,982,220
29,801,520
37,671,920
201,568,500
22,725,360
75,564.540
19,683,000
20,664,720
8,650,800

Oct., 1907.
$154,244,1'4
520,250,709
170,525,497
222,626,880
461,111,940
26,355,780
35,555,760
218,311,200
25,660,8 1)0
76,107,600
19,401,120
19,148,40)
7,931,520

• • $2,381,720,458 $2,254,830,857 $1,957,221,370

The gold reserves in the United States in the
same periods amounted to:
Oct., 1908.
Oct., 1907.
Oct., 1909.
U. S. Treasury • $1,648,714,131 $1,649,358,744 $1,482,969,710
610,060,562
574,459,086
In circulation . • • 598,773,175
150,303,527
125,114,859
Coin in nat. ba'!ks.
147,832,909
Total

.

• $2,395,320,214 $2,409,722,833 $2,182,543,655

It will be seen from the above figures that about
two-thirds of the gold in Europe is held by the
banks of France, Germany and Austria. The French
banks hold over three times the amount of gold that
the German banks possess, and the Austrian banks
hold nearly twice as much gold as those of Germany. The position of the United States reserve is
unique. The total reserves in this country are
greater than those of all the leading European countries combined.
Although there is keen competition for the world's
annual gold production among the ·nations, the flow
of gold is generally along well defined channels, as
the following table will show:

France . . . .
Germany • • • •
United States . •
Great Britain. .
Argentina . • . .
Egypt • . . .
Switzerland • .
Italy . . • • •
Holland . • . •

GOLD IMPORTS.
Average Yearly *For 5 Years Production in
Net Imports.
End. With
1907.
$75,800,300
1905
$502,400
47,251,800
1905
66,600
26,622,70)
1908
90,435,700
18,597,300
1907
29,200
16,698,400
1905
103,000
14,011,100
1905
None
13,574,700
19)5
None
12,383,000
1905
39,600
4,417,400
1905
None

• The latest five-year period for which returns are available.
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In comparison with the previous five-year imports,
the figures in the above table representing the
United States, Argentina, French and Egyptian imports show the largest increases. Argentina is
being rapidly developed by European capitalists and
has enjoyed several good harvests. The same may
be said of Brazil, which is starting to import gold
in large quantities. During the present year many
million dollars' worth of gold have been shipped to
Argentina and Brazil on European account from the
United States. During the past week nearly $5,000,000 worth of gold were shipped to South America by
New York banks. The most noticeable feature of
the table is the position taken by the United States.
This country is one of the largest producers of gold
in the world and at the same time it is also one of
the largest importers. England's position is singular.
She imports less gold than the United States and
yet her bankers are generally able to supply gold
to whatever country needs it mostly, and furthermore, more than three-fourths of the ·world's gold
production is obtained in English countries or as the
result of the operations of English capitalists. English bankers are able to do business with a far
smaller gold reserve than bankers in any other country owing to the high value of what is termed the
psychological factor in bankers' credit, but financial
critics are of the opinion that England's gold reserves are always kept too low. It is largely owing
to the knowledge of this lowness of reserves that
European bankers keep such a watchful eye on the
weekly returns of the Bank of England, and on
English discount" prices. After complaining of the
low gold reserves kept in English banks and the
large amount of nervous tension caused thereby, a
writer in the current number of the "Investor's
Review" makes the following pregnant remarks:
"The most conspicuous sin of the age is abuse of
credit. Credit doubtless helps to evolve wealth.
Rightly availed of, it makes for material advancement; also ,abused, it hides the destruction of
wealth, and it is its function as a cloak of waste and
losses irrecoverable that lies at the root of the nervousness about the sufficiency of gold, the one and
only debt liquidator in credit markets. Can you
imagine where these markets would be did they all
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want gold at once, millions upon millions of it, without having the means of procuring it? It may be
that this supposition is an impossible one, but it will
be bad enough for us all if only one big money
market ever approaches that position of helplessness
when it has pledged or sold all its available assets
and still lacks gold."
While the struggle for gold is progressing, it is
interesting to notice that the prices of commodities
continue to creep up. Bradstreet's Index Number
for November 1 indicates that prices now approach
the best records ever attained, which were witnessed
during the first seven months of 1907. The
index number for November 1, 1909, shows a gain
of 10.5 per cent. over November 1, 1908. Since 1896
the index number has varied as follows: July, 1896,
5.7; March 1, 1907, 9.1; November 1, 1908, 8.06; October 1, 1909, 8.7, and November 1, 1909, it stood
at 8.9. The high index number of the present month
furnishes another warning of troubles ahead in
financial and commercial circles.
The rise in prices is not confined to the United
States. It is world-wide. A correspondent, writing
from Vienna October 26, complaining of the bad
money outlook in Austria, referred to the high prices
prevailing in that country as follows: "There is a
general outcry of the Vienna population against
the steady rise in prices of almost all the necessaries of life. Within three years the price of milk
has been raised twice without the excuse of fodder
or cattle being more expensive than they were. Meat
has long been so dear that it is out of the question as daily food for the indigent classes, who have
to satisfy the hunger of their children with numerous variations of Mehlspeise, or pastry, for which
the Vienna cuisine is remarkable. Eggs, flour, milk,
potatoes, peas, beans and lentils have all risen in
price in the course of a year, and the most economical housewife has to spend one-fifth more on
her cookery than she spent a year ago. Wages
have not risen in proportion and bitter want is the
result." Similar phenomena are observable in India,
China, Japan and Australasia. There must be a
readjustment to meet this insidious appreciation;
but it will not be consummated without world-wide
distress and commercial and political disorders.
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No single section of a community is responsible
for the rise in prices, although trusts and large
commercial houses are often blamed. All they
really do is to take advantage of circumstances and
fortify their positions so as to retain their profits.
The various governments do the same, and are even
more extravagant. M. Yves Guyot, in a recent lecture in Paris, clearly pointed out that the more wovernment taxes increase, the more they impoverish
a nation, cripple it and tend to paralyze its energies
and make it impotent whenever any great crisis
arises. The more a government taxes a people, the
less will that people be able to develop its resources.
We see in Germany at present the bad influences
of heavy taxtion in engendering discontent, retarding national development, and hampering bank accounts. One of the great difficulties the directors
of the Reichsbank have to contend with is the
financing of the government's treasury bills at the
present time when their gold reserves are low and
there is a keen demand for commercial credit. The
German government is indebted to the Reichsbank
over $75,000,000, and the general impression in Berlin financial circles is that the bank must continue to
finance the government until next spring. This will
very seriously hadicap German commerce and the
drain on the bank's reserves will continue to menace
the positions of the banks of other European
capitals.
The attempts to compromise the English budget
question have failed. Lord Lansdowne, leader of
the Conservative part_y in the House of Lords, has
given formal notice that he will move on Monday
next to have the budget referred to the people. This
will result in many political complications and will
seriously disturb British commercial and financial
affairs. One serious feature of the contest between
the Commons and the House of Lords will be the
strain that will be put upon the Bank of England
by the treasury bills that must be floated until the
budget question is finally settled.
Budget crises are arising in France and Germany
also, and these must have baleful effects upon international commercial and financial conditions. Over
$40,000,000 additional taxation is carried in the pending French budget.
The additional taxation will

408

be strongly opposed by the Socialists, but the government will remain firm in its proposals and contend that the pending schemes for workmen's pensions and other popular measures will inyolve a new
expenditure which must be met by taxation and
not by loans.
The increase in the German budget of 1910 over
that ·of the present year is about 6,800,000 marks.
The principal increases are in expenditure on the
army and navy.
The returns of the · European banks published this
week all show a continued improvement. The Bank
of England return compares as follows:
This Week.
Circulation . • . . . . £28,431,000
Public deposits . •
6,320,000
Private deposits. . .
40,228,000
Government securities
16,007,0)0
Other securities. .
22,906,000
Reserve. . . . . . . 25,363,000
PBruo p • o f_ re_s. t_o li abi liti_es_.
54.45%
1Ii10 0
36,655,000
Bank rate . . . • . .
5%
0

0

Last Week.
£28,809,0)0
5,853,000
39,174,J00
16,157,000
23,729,000
22,844,000
50.71 %
33,514,000
5%

Last Year.
£28,103,000
8,996,000
40,018,000
14,730,000
26,184,000
25,848,)00
52.67%
35,614,000

2½%

The checks cleared by the London banks for the
week aggregate £289,390,000, contrasted with £255,700,000 last week, £254,790,000 last" year and £256,961,000 in 1907.
The gold reserve, it will be noticed, compares
favorably with the corresponding period last year,
while the proportion of reserve to liabilities shows
a good improvement, but it must be borne in mind
that political and other circumstances call for much
improved conditions.
The weekly statement of the Imperial Bank of
Germany shows the following changes: Gold on
hand increased 30,582,000 marks, gold and silver on
hand increased 36,177,000 marks, notes in circulation
decreased 69,225,000 marks, treasury bills decreased
21,865,000 marks, deposits increased 72,017,000
marks, loans increased 6,935,000 marks, and discounts decreased 28,313,000 marks.
The increases in the gold reserves and deposits
are satisfactory. One of the weakest features in
German banking is the ertormous amount of paper in
circulation. The decrease of over 69,000,000 marks'
worth of this paper during the week indicates that
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the d·irectors of the bank are aware of the importance of retiring as much of note issue as possible
at this time.
The weekly statement of the Bank of France
shows the following changes: Gold on hand decreased 26,650,000 francs, silver on hand increased
4,850,000 francs, notes in circulation decreased 54,650,000 francs, general deposits increased 38,100,000
francs, bills discounted increased 42,525,000 francs,
treasury advances increased 21,650,000 francs. ·
The loss of gold disclosed by this return is due '
to the meeting of demands from London and Berlin. The other items are not so strong as might
be wished.
THE GENERAL SITUATION.
One fault to be found with conditions in the
business world as affecting the general situation is
the rising tendency and generally high level of
prices for raw materials. This is particularly true
as regards the cotton and woolen goods trade and
the difficulty encountered in adjusting the differences between cost and selling prices or cotton
yarns and cloths has not yet been overcome. The
world-wide agitation looking toward curtailment by
spinners has not been abated. although as yet it
has had but little influence on the price or the staple.
English spinners have decided to work only 40
hours per week for the next three m9nths. In
China the market for finished cotton goods is reported as very slow on account of the high prices.
Reports from the South in regard to the "top
crop" of cotton are discouraging, due principally to
the near approach of frost. A considerable percentage of the cotton figuring in the exports, it is
alleged, is for the account of bull speculators, and
that money has been borrowed on it in Europe.
The significance of this, if true, in its bearing on
the stock market is in direct proportion to its influence upon our trade balance which at the present
time is not in a healthy condition. In this connection some interest attaches to the criticism of the
New York "Evening Post" in regard to the government's method of valuing cotton on the day of export. Obviously this method is misleading, because,
as pointed o.ut by the "Post," cotton is not exported
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· on the day it is bought. On the contrary, it is
quite likely that a great proportion of it was bought
some months ago for future delivery and at prices
materially lower than those ruling on the days of
export.
Our exports of merchandise, as indicated by the
report of the Department of Commerce and Labor
for the month of October, are gaining in the race
with imports, due almost entirely to the increase
in volume and valuation of cotton, shipments of
which are placed at $88,882,350, a record never before reached. Other commodities do not make such
a good showing. In fact,- a great many of them
show a decreasing tendency. Even if exports of
cotton reach the $500,000,000 mark for the calendar
year, which seems probable if the October pace is
maintained, there will still be a big decrease in our
trade balance as compared with 1908. The figures
for tea months show that the excess of exports over
imports was only $164,029,791, which is short of
last year's excess by $338,183,818.
The unfavorable position of our trade balance is
manifesting itself in further shipments of gold to
South America for the account of London, where
extraordinary precautions are being taken to
strengthen the reserves pending the settlement of
the budget question, which now appears to be deadlocked in Parliament and which will have to be
decided by means of a general election. Until the
British government's immediate needs are known
and supplied we may expect to be called upon to
settle a great deal of London's debit balances in
South America arid Canada. The coffee movement,
however, has undoubtedly reached its height, but
financing of the Argentine grain movement has
only begun. An enormous amount of ~old has been
sent to South America since the begmning of the
movement of money toward that section, and London should be able to shift debits and credits in
Argentine and Brazil so that the drain from America
will be materially lessened. Also, high interest rates
may make it profitable for Argentine bankers to
allow balances to remain in London. The Bank of
England secured all the new gold arrivals this week,
which materially assisted the rise in the percentage
of reserves to 54.45. Locally the money market is
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apparently easy, with call money ranging from 4
to 5 per cent. The announcement that the Missouri
Pacific will issue $175,000,000 new bonds is not
likely to have any immediate effect in money affairs
for the reason that nearly $100,000,000 of it is for
refunding purposes. It is understood that Kuhn,
Loeb & Co. will underwrite the $29,000,000 which it
is planned to at once offer stockholders.
Reverting to the subject of high prices for manufacturers' materials, an advance in steel for use in
car and locomotive works, to go into effect on
December 1, is noted . in the trade reports. This
advance may or may not affect the earnings of the
equipment companies, but one thing is certainthe cost to the railroads will be greater. The effect
of the announcement has been to hurry the closing
up of some large orders which have been pending.
The Pennsylvania Railroad is reported to have
ordered 10,000 steel freight cars, the bulk of which
will be supplied by the Pressed Steel Car Company.
The "Iron Age" says one builder of steel cars has
orders for 30,000 cars on books, enough to keep
its largest plant busy an entire year.
There is a perceptible lull in the pig-iron market,
but the steel mills are working up to the liJt>it. Rail
purchases for 1910 approximate 1,500,000 ton.. In
some quarters steel bars have been advanced $2' per
ton. Tin plate products have also been advanced $1
to $3 a ton for the various grades. The American
Steel & Wire Company has appropriated $3,000,000
for the erection of a new wire plant in Alabama.
Conferences are still going on among copper
producers. Apparently the only •hitch is in regard
to the capitalization and basis of exchange of
securities with the various concerns involved. M)eanwhile the copper metal market has crept up ¼ cent
a pound. Some sales of electro were made at 13¼
cents. The talk of consolidation should stimulate
inquiry on the part of hitherto apathetic consumers,
but, aside from this, there are indications that the
metal is on rock bottom.
THE TECHNICAL SITUATION.
The technical situation continues strongest in the
high-priced rails. In Reading, Union Pacific and
St. Paul there is a considerable shortage of a rather
412

weak-kneed character. There is also an outstanding
short interest of a more important kind in the same
stocks. The weaker element will run to cover on
the bulges, but I do not believe this will help the
manipulators much, as the stronger bears will increase sales on the advances.
In the equipment stocks the technical situation is
not strong. There is only a very moderate short
interest in this group, but the buying continues
good enough to prevent any great decline. We must
depend upon absorption and recognition of merit
in the eg •.Iipments, rather than on the technical
situation
There is a fair shortage in Steel common, but
the stock bulls very hard and is for sale on the
advances.
The short interest in Amalgamated Copper has
been considerably reduced on the advance. The
buying, however, is very good and the stock accumulated ten or fifteen points lower by good interests has not been marketed and is apparently firmly
held for higher prices.
CONCLUSION.
In my opinion the copper stocks will be the leaders
for the present. Amalgamated is the best of this
group, and we can probably do better in this stock
than by seeking an advantage in other coppers.
Later on there will no doubt be reason to change
to other copper securities, but not yet.
The equipments will be taken up later on and
advanced sharply. At present, however, the market
in these shares is principally one of accumulation.
American Car & Foundry, American Locomotive,
Pressed Steel Car and Railway Steel Spring should
be taken on the soft spots. Consolidated Gas is
being purchased by good people right along. Think
the stock will go higher.
There is continued good buying of American Can,
both preferred and common. This buying looks
like long pull accumulation.
American Smelting & Refining is well taken. This
buying also looks like accumulation rather than
manipulation.
The high-priced rails and Steel common are
for sale on every advance and all the manipulation
is in these stocks.

-H3

The advance in Reading is attributed to numerous causes, no two alike. The talk ranges from an
advance in the dividend rate to the cutting of a
melon by Jersey Central. There is no possible way
to verify any of the stori~s, but a frightened short
interest appears to be more effective than anything
else. There is nothing in the statistical showing of
the Reading C:ompany to warrant its present price,
even if some kind of distribution is effected. As
has been frequently pointed out, however, the stock
habitually moves over a wider range than any other
active security, and sales should be made only with
heavy margins.
It is still a good plan to work both ways in the
market, keeping on the long side of industrials and
selling high-priced rails and Steel on the advances.
There is one thing I would like to impress on
the readers of these advices again. With stocks selling at the present high level and with the possibility of complications appearing at any time which
may change the entire complexion of affairs, it is
always possible that the advices may be reversed
peremptorily. I am presenting the prospects as I
find them now, but if there is warrant for a change
of position I do not intend to hesitate. "Consistency," so called, is the prolific mother of many
evils in speculative ventures of any character. It
would be idle to continually scrutinize and examine
the situation as to its bearing on security prices
unless we were at all times ready to modify or
reverse our views. An attempt to adhere to a certain position when a change is justified is nothing
but an exhibition of the common stubbornness which
stifles reason and upsets calculation.
Several clients have suggested that charts of the
movements in rails as compared with industrials, and
the fluctuations of copper metal, would be more
graphic than the tables recently published. I have
therefore arranged the two comparisons in that
form.
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NOVEMBER 27, 1909.
The market during the week has bee,; irregular
and unsettled. The principal disturbing factor was
the Standard Oil decision, which appeared unexpectedly near the close of the session Saturday.
No one cares particularly about Standard Oil and
its troubles, but the fear of far-reaching legislation against other so-called trusts, present and prospective, gave the speculative element a nervous
shock and brought about some weak-kneed liquidation and some short selling. The decline in prices,
however, has been very moderate, amounting to
less than one point on the average for the week.
Such a recession might appear at any time without any special incentive. It speaks well for the
market that the selling has been absorbed without
any serious decline.
Just how the Standard Oil decision tentatively
affects other securities is, a debatable question. No
two authorities appear to have the same views. I
have already produced several opinions offered by
prominent critics, but they do not cover the question thoroughly. This investigation will be pursued
and another special letter will cover the ground more
thoroughly as soon as valuable opinions are obtained. The matter may be agitated for a time and
cause some irregularity in security prices, but as
the final decision will be deferred for at least a year
and probably for two or three years, it will soon be
forgotten as a market factor.
We have several precedents which demonstrate
the ineffectiveness of decisions of this character. In
the Northern Securities case, for example, the law
was promptly obeyed and after the enforced segregation, individual securities affected sold at much
higher prices than any previously established. Also
the merger is as effective today as it ever was before the Northern Securities decision. There appears to always be a way to get around such laws.
It is almost certain that, even if the Standard Oil
decision is upheld in the Supreme Court and no
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modification is made in the Sherman law, the corporation will find some way to retain their hold
on the oil trade. In this statement I do not speak
from the ethical or moral standpoint, but from the
standpoint _of precedent and probability.
A good many economists are beginning to figure
that combinations of a reasonable nature are really
beneficial. Of course, there is a fine distinction between what is reasonable and what is unreasonable.
The merger of the telephone and telegraph companies, for example, would be a distinct public benefit, as under such a combination economies could
be affected which would permit of better st>rvice to
the public with no advance in the tolls, and better
dividends for the stockholders. And this question
of benefits to stockholders must be more seriously
considered by the corporation~baiters. When we
jump on Mr. Morgan or Mr. Rockefeller or any
other magnate with both feet, we must reflect that
we are incidentally jumping on thousands of people
who are trying to invest their money at home. The
total amount of money invested in our various corporations by our own peo~le is tremendous and is
growing from year to year. We are still sending
huge sums abroad in the form of interests and dividends to help foreigners pay for our cotton, wheat
and other commodities. Of course, that is, to a
certain extent, inevitable, but there is room for im- ·
provement. There is also much room for improvement in our methods of shipping in foreign bottoms, the extravagance of our tourists, and in
other directions, but that is another story.
Anything that makes for instability of dividends
and security prices is an unmixed evil, so far as
investors are concerned. Give us the assurance of
a certain return on a certain security of any kind
and wild speculation in that issue ceases. Nothing
can so effectively produce such stability as a fixed
and reasonable price for whatever is produced; a
price which changes only with the cost of production or the price of money. The United States Steel
Corporation started off on this plan and abandoned
it. I fear the abandonment was for the purpose
of furthering speculation in the shares. How can
an investor feel satisfied to put his money into a
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stock which pays four per cent. one year and nothing the next? And the worst part of it is, the
credulous public will buy when the four per cent.
dividend is paid and sell when the dividends arc
eliminated. The man who bought United States
Steel when it first paid 4%, bought at the top, and
the man who sold when dividends were discontinued, sold at the bottom.
In the case of the proposed copper merger, which
has for its object the fixing of a firm price for copper metal, I do not think such action would be detrimental to either consumers or the stockholders,
provided always that the price is a fair one. Fifteen
cents a pound is a fair price for the metal and it
would be better to keep it around that price and
regulate production than to witness the wild fluctuations of the last. tP.n years, with copper · at 12
cents one year and 25 cents the next. Mr. Rogers'
attempt to hold copper at an exhorbitant price was
abortive; such methods cannot succeed, but I do
not believe the largest consumers would object to
a nominal price which would permit of intelligent
specifications and future provisions. The stockholder in Amalgamated could figure on about 6
per cent. on the stock from year to year and the
price of the stock would move in a comparatively
narrow range around par. If the plans for the
merger are abandoned, the prices of the stock
and of the metal will probably go much higher than
under the proposed arrangement, also they will go
much lower. Enormous profits will accrue one
year, nothing the next.
The railroads have harder times ahead than have
the industrial corporations. Every petty politician
from Maine to California must have his fling at
them. If the politicians are not obsessed of their
own prejudices, or handicapped by their own lack
of understanding, they are egged on by their constituents. Nobody loves a railroad. The steadily
advancing prices of materials and labor; the irrcrease in the cost of maintenance and the conducting transportation are not considered sufficient warrant for an advance in traffic rates. If the rates arc
moderately advanced the labor agitators howl for
more money. The railroads are between the devil
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and the deep sea. I feel sorry for the railroad corporations. I feel so sorry that I like to see my
friends sell them short at this level.
Reading has been the feature of the railroad
group this week. If there is a reason for its activity
and advancing trend I am unable to fathom it. The
assumed 12 per cent. dividend on Jersey Central,
the continuance of which is in no way assured, adds
less than one per cent. to the Reading common
stock, and even that is a distribution rather than a
gain. The most enthusiastic believers in the stock
suggest an 8 per cent. dividend for Reading in the
near future. From their reports this appears incredible, but if, for the sake of argument, we grant
such an increase, the stock is high enough . Union
Pacific on a 10 per cent. basis yields 5 per cent. at
$200 a share. Reading on an 8 per cent. basts would
yield 4.70 per cent. at $170 a share, and they have
not paid 8 per cent. yet and may never do so. The
talk is, of course, of "concealed assets"; why concealed? If such concealment actually exists it is
for the purpose of manipulating a stock which has
always been the football of the Street.
If the
"divine rights" management will conceal what is
good in order to advance the shares they will conceal what is bad in order to depress them. Personally, if I were a partner or a stockholder in any
concern I would as bitterly resent the hiding of
assets as the hiding of discrepancies. In either case
the thing is a deception.
The high discount rates prevailing in the leading
financial centers in Europe have, in a measure,
proved effective. It is true that the directors of
· the Bank of England still view the outlook for the
immediate futur e with apprehension, but bankers in
England, generally, believe that the year will be
tided over without any further serious monetary
stringency. The present discount rate of the Bank
of England has not attracted gold to England. It
has, however, been effective in enabling the directors of the Bank to secure the gold offering in the
London market, and by special arrangements with
the Bank of France some gold has been obtained
from that institution to replace gold withdrawn from
the Bank of England in fulfilment of old obliga418

tions. The proportion of the bank's reserves to
liabilities amounts to 55.93 per cent. This is about
ten points above the nine-year average of 44.94 per
cent. The position of the bank's finances thus
shown is very abnormal and reflects the present
abnormal conditions existing in European financial
circles.
It appears probable that Brazil and Argentina
will continue to draw gold from London during the
remainder of the year. Gold is returning from the
agricultural centers in Egypt to Cairo, and it is possible that the Egyptian demand for gold will soon
abate. But the India Council is increasing its issues
of bills and the Indian demand for gold promises to
steadily increase. Turkey is also about to enter the
market for gold in large amounts.
The demand for gold by the country banks in
England and Scotland during December is estimated at about £3,500,000. The foreign demand for
gold will amount to about the same figures; consequently, the directors of the Bank of England have
to be prepared to meet a demand for between
£6,000,000 and £7,000,000 worth of gold before the
first of next year. The gold offered in London
during the same period will amount to about
£5,500,000. If the bank can obtain this gold its
resources will not be seriously disturbed. There is
little doubt about the bank being able to secure the
gold if the joint stock banks will assist the Bank of
England. Lately they have not shown any disposition to do so. Notwithstanding the fact that
it is to the advantage of English banking generally
for the Bank of England's reserve to be adequate
for all the demands made on it, the joint stock
banks have been singularly amiss in the position
they have taken relative to the Bank of England
during the last few weeks. The managers of the
joint stock banks in meeting the criticism of certain financial writers assert that it is not the English banks that are underbidding the Bank of England in the gold market, but certain foreign banks
with London agencies. The directors of the Bank
of England reply to this to the effect that if foreign banks are so acting it is surely to the interests
of English banking that every assistance be given
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to the Bank of England to enable it to secure the
gold offering in London.
Although the strictly financial outlook in Europe
is at present much brighter than it was several
weeks ago there are still evidences of a severe
nervous tension in financial circles. The governments of the principal European countries will assemble shortly, and owing to the large increases
proposed in the budgets of all of them it is impossible to foresee the scares that may follow some
of the budget debates.
The great constitutional crises in England will
also continue to create disturbances in the world's
financial centers for some time to come, and must
be taken into consideration before fresh speculative
commitments are engaged in. During the week
some very able debaters in the House of Lords
stated their views on the English budget. Lords
Rosebery, Balfour of Burleigh, Cromer and Ashbourne spoke from the viewpoints of the conservatives. Lord Rosebery asserted that the Lords have
a perfect right to reject a financial bill, but owing
to prevailing circumstances the rejection of the
present bill would endanger the stability of the
Upper House. Lord Rosebery spoke with his usual
eloquence and his arguments disturbed a number of
the Peers. This will result in a prolongation of
the debate, and a vote will probably not be taken
until early next week.
Lord Ashbourne expressed the opinion that there
is no authority on constitutional history that disputed the rights of the House of Lords in acting in
accordance with their discretion in rejecting or
accepting the budget. The present budget is distinguished from those of former years by the fact
that it contains matter of broader scope and provides for revenues to meet expenditures that were
formerly met in other ways. He declared that the
government has taken an unconstitutional position
in tacking on to the bill measures for the taxation
of undeveloped land. He also accused the government of an unconstitutional act in respect to the
liquor taxation proposals. There were indications
throughout the country of widespread unrest on account of the government's proposals. Consols have
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dropped, prices fallen, and untold millions of capital
have been driven abroad, he said, and concluded his
address by asking, "What is the value of a House
of Lords if it is afraid to act when the time for
action arrives?"
Lord Balfour, after attacking the budget, warned
the members that they were walking into a trap set
by their opponents, and that the step advocated by
Lord Lansdowne was false alike to the interests
of the country and to those of the House of Lords.
He admitted that while the Peers had never in so
many words surrendered their right of interference,
usage had established that the House of Commons
was supreme in matters of finance.
Lord Balfour said a referendum was impossible
as a matter of practice, and that there never was a
time in the history of the country when a strong
and conservative second Chamber was more necessary, and he considered it impolitic to mix the
question of the defense of that Chamber with the
taxation of food.
"If you win a. victory," he declared, "it will be
only a temporary one; if you lose, you have prejudiced the position, power, prestige and usefulness
of the House of Lords, which I believe every one
of you honors and desires to serve as heartily as I
do myself."
The Bishops have not been prominent in the debate. This may be explained by the statement of
the Archbishop of Canterbury to the effect that as
the budget dispute is purely a party matter the
Church has no interest in it, but the Bishop of
Hereford made a notable address in the House on
Thursday and his remarks may be taken to indicate
the feeling of the middle classes in England respecting the conflict between the two Houses. The
Bishop stated that while he respected the Archbishop of Canterbury's desire that the Bishops abstain from voting on the measure, he claimed the
right to exercise independent judgment. If the
Bishops had any function to perform it was to
speak for the multitudinous poor; therefore, he supported the budget, which was a social welfare
budget based on sound finance. He was convinced, he declared, that the country's answer
421

to an appeal to the ballot would be in clear
English that never again shall the fundamental liberties of the people be endangered by a privileged
class. He wished that the budget might be passed
as a protection against the rapidly growing spirit
of revolt among the democracy, which might become dangerous.
The position assumed by the government was
indicated by the speech of the Lord Chancellor,
which was one of the most effective addresses delivered in the House of Lords in recent years. It
appears most probable that Lord Lansdowne's resolution against the adoption of the budget will go to
a division and will be carried by a large majority.
A general election will follow, and in the meantime
the government must be financed by the Bank of
England.
The weekly statement of the Bank of England
shows the following changes :
Total reserve, increased . . . . . . £1,138,000
Circulation, increased . . . .
63,000
Bullion, increased . . . . . .
1,200,996
Other securities, increased
1,278,000
Other deposits, increased..
202,000
Public deposits, increased . .
600,000
Notes reserve, increased . .
1,127,000
Government securities, decreased. 1,595,000
The proportion of the Bank's reserve to liability
this week is 55.93 per cent.; last week it was 54.45
per cent.
Although the reserves were increased by £1,138,000, other items in the statement show the effects
of Treasury and India Council financing. The
item "other securities" indicates that stock exchange activities are not assisting in the maintenance of the Bank's position.
The Bank of France's report for the present week
shows the following changes:
Francs.
Notes in circulation, decreased
49,750,000
Treasury deposits, increased
46,750,000
General deposits, decreased .
39,075,000
Gold in hand, decreased ..
10,725,000
Silver in hand, increased ..
1,475,000
Bills discounted, decreased.
32,625,000
Advances, decreased ..
12,075,000
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The main features of this report arc sound. The
decrease in gold was due to the gold borrowed by
London banks under special agreements.
The weekly statement of the Imperial Bank of
Germany shows the following changes:
Cash in hand, increased ..
Loans, decreased . . . . . . . .
Discounts, decreased . . . .
Treasury bills, decreased ..
Notes in circulation, decreased
Deposits, increased . . . . . . . .
Gold in hand, increased . . . .

Marks.
56,647,000
14,088,000
46,869,000
48,511,000
89,499,000
48,259,000
45,524,000

This statement is in every way satisfactory, and
shows that financial affairs in Berlin are improving,.
notwithstanding the large commercial failures lately
reported in that city.
,J
THE GENERAL SITUATION.
The let-down in the iron and steel business isalmost wholly confined to the pig iron market.
where the d.emand is quiet, but prices are well maintained. There is heavy buying of finished and semifinished materials. The tin plate mills are doing a
record business with a pronounced tendency toward
advancing prices, which are cheerfully acceded to
by the purchasers. The American Sheet & Tin
Plate Company's South Sharon plant will be reopened on January 1, after two years of idleness.
Steel rail orders continue to pour in at a rate
that would be astonishing if the needs of the railroads in this direction were not so well known.
The same is true of railway equipment supplies, in
which there appears no abatement in the volume of
orders. The Standard Steel Car Co. has advanced the wages of its 3,000 men 10 per cent.,
which brings them to within 10 per cent. of the
scale paid in the boom period of 1907. Wire products are in good demand.
Only a slight softening has taken place in the
copper metal mark.et. Prices during the greater
part of the week held firmly around 13tc. for electrolytic, even when the discussion was rife in specu423

lative circles regarding the possibility of the abandonment of merger plans as a result of the Standard
Oil decision. This speaks well for the legitimate
position of the metal and goes far toward refuting
the prevalent idea that the firmness of the metal
market was a corollary of the merger talk and not
founded on a sound basis of supply and demand.
It is estimated that sales during the past three
weeks for 60 and 90 days' delivery have aggregated
300,000,000 pounds. Very likely a good proportion
of these sales were speculative, hut it is fair to assume that the actual deliveries will be large enough
to favorably affect prices. Present indications point
to about 60,000,000 pounds export business for the
month of November.
Woolen mills are running at about 80 per cent. of
their capacity, which is the nearest approach to
maximum capacity that has even been seen. The
cotton mills, however, are not so active, and operators are disposed to curtail on most any pretext,
the holiday affording an excuse in several instances
for a three days' shut-down. Trade journals report
the export business in cotton goods as being very
quiet on account of high prices, and that English,
Italian and German goods are being pushed ahead
of American goods in the Indian and Red Sea markets. A strike is on among the shirtwaist operatives in Manhattan, involving 40,000 girls.
Cotton crop estimates, pending the government
report on December 10, range from 10,150,000 to
11,231,000 bales. Bradstreet makes the value of the
eleven staple crops of the United States nearly
$400,000,000 more than 1908. Foreign crop prospects
are quite generally encouraging, although the Argentine crop of wheat is threatened with a plague of
locusts. Notwithstanding this we continue to ship
gold in large quantities to that quarter. Exports of
gold since January 1 total $96,400,000, of which
$45,150,000 went to South America.
The local money market has been very quiet, with
call rates ruling between 4 and 5 per cent., although
some money was loaned at the extreme low price
_ of 2½ per cent. New York and Chicago exchange
has turned to the advantage of this center. Observers of money matters find it hard to reconcile
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this circumstance with known conditions in the
country tributary to Chicago. In the Southwest,
particularly, the holding of grain by farmers has
resulted in an abnormal demand for loans, for the
purpose of carrying the grain, which, on account
of high prices, requires a great deal more money
per bushel, and also for the purpose of tinancing
country merchants who have been disappointed in
the volume of rural trade. Farmers are not spending their money as freely as might have been expected. Foreign developments in relation tc money
matters are practically unchanged, except, perhaps,
a slightly more favorable prospect in regard to the
British budget.
Railroad earnings run well over the same periods
in 1908 and approach within reaching distance of the
last boom figures.
The switchmen employed by the Monon, Atchison,
Rock Island, Great Northern, Northern Pacific,
Frisco, Union Pacific, and St. Paul roads are in conference with heads of the various systems with regard to a new wage scale. Developments in this
connection, as reported from Chicago, should be
carefully watched.
THE TECHNICAL SITUATION.
The technical situation is greatly improved by
the little shakeout this week. Many poorly margined public accounts have been eliminated, and a
substantial short interest has been created. In
stocks where practically no short interest is found
at any time we find the improvement through the
driving out of weak holders and the passing of
stocks from weak to strong hands. The Standard
Oil surprise found Amalgamated Copper without a
material short interest and with a good many shortmargined long accounts. The position of the stock
is now much better. In Reading a large short interest exists, and has existed for some time. It
has been the bear favorite on its poor statistical
showing. While the selling is justified and will
come out all right, the technical situation in the
stock is still strong. United States Steel shows a
fair shortage, but the long interest is so extended
that it may be called technically weak. In the
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equipments there is practically no short interest
and quite a bit of public buying on inadequate margins. These issues, however, are well taken by
strong interests on the declines, and stock does not
come out freely on the advances.
While the technical situation is, as stated, greatly
improved as compared with last week, it is still
mixed, ltnd shifts very quickly.
CONCLUSION.
The market is still in good hands and the buying of industrials on the declines and liquidation of
rails on the advances shows no abatement. A year
ago we could buy almost anything, rails or industrials, with pretty good assurance of a profit. That
is all changed now and discrimination, not only as to
the groups, but as to individual stocks in each group,
priced rails have already reached the highest points
which will be established for a Jong time to come.
It is highly probable that the rails as a group have
reached top. Some certain securities may be advanced beyond the former high levels, but the average will not, in my opinion, be reached again. The
industrials are in an entirely different position. Not
only will certain stocks advance materially, but the
average of all will probably exceed any figures
established since the panic of 1907.
Under these conditions it is obviously the safest
and best plan to continue for the present the policy
of working on both sides of the market, selling the
rails on the advances and buying the industrials on
the declines. The get-rich-quick speculators do not
like this plan, but it makes money very rapidly and
with a minimum of risk under the conditions which
obtain at present. In August of this year rails averaged 112.97, and industrials 85.77. At the close of
business November 26, rails were 108.49, and industrials 84.57. A little reflection will show what
good opportunities have been offered the man
who sold the rails when they advanced · and purchased industrials on the declines.
It will, of
course, be necessary to make frequent changes in
the stocks traded if conditions change, or if an advance or decline in the securities chosen discounts
the expected movement.
426

Chart Showing Market Movements for

November, 1909.

(Thomas Gibson's Figures.)
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Solid line shows movements of 23 Active Rails. Broken line, 18 Active Industrials. Dotted line, the combined daily
average of both. The figures at the bottom of each vertical line represent the days of the month.

For the present recommend purchases of Amalgamated Copper, American Smelters, American Car
& Foundry, American Locomotive, Pressed Steel
Car, Railway Steel Spring, U. S. Rubber and American Can on the dips, and sales of Union Pacific,
Baltimore & Ohio, New York Central, St. Paul and
Reading on the recoveries. Reading is a very wide
mover and should not be touched except on ve ry
heavy margins • .
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DECEMBER 4, 1909.
Aside from the rejection of the budget by the
English House of Lords there has been no important
development affecting security prices this week. The
echoes of the Standard Oil decision have not died
out entirely and there has been some apprehension
of an early adverse decision in the American Tobacco case now pending in the Supreme Court which
would be considered analogous with the final decision in the Standard Oil case. Deckle-edge Lawson
of Boston has managed to frighten a number of
credulous people with his widely distributed literature, but the cloven hoof is too apparent in his fulminations. We may, however, learn something from
his letters. For example, as he vigorously recommends anything bearing the Guggenheim stamp
and even more vigorously damns Amalgamated, we
may surmise that the row he had with the Guggenheims over the sensational exploitation of Yukon
has been patched up. We may also surmise, as he
does not mention Smelters as a Guggenheim property, that they have lost control of that concern.
There has been some quiet talk to this effect for
some time but it was not provable. The omission
is very significant.
In regard to the Tobacco Case, I am informed that
no decision need be expected before March or April.
It is impossible to confirm such information as this.
Supreme Court decisions usually com!;! as surprises
and the date of their appearances cannot be fixed
absolutely.
The convening of Congress early next week has
also acted as a restraining influence. In my opinion we shal! not find anything serious in the President's recommendations nor in the proposed legislation during the short session.
The Switchmen's Strike in the Northwest is so
far a local disturbance but may be the forerunner
of other labor troubles . There is a widespread
spirit of unrest among workers. To some extent
this is justified. Labor organizations are frequently
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unreasonable in their demands but when we examine
the steadily increased cost of living we must, in
all fairness, admit the necessity of increased remuneration. Personally, I do not believe we shall have
much trouble with the laboring classes so long as
they gain enough to live well and lay aside a little
something in the savings bank. Under such circumstances the unreasonable demands would be quickly
checked. The price of mess pork in November, 1909,
was $26.00 a barrel as compared with about $16.00
in 1908; lard 14 cents a pound as compare,! with gt
cents in 1908; good butter 33 cents as compared with
30 cents; sugar 4¼ cents as compared with 3.93; raw
coffee 8½ cents as compared with 6½ cents; cotton
sheetings 9! cents a yard as compared with 8½ cents
and so following. All these things are necessit.ies
and wages must advance with the cost of necessities.
If this advance in commodities was in the nature
of a fluctuation it would not be so serious, but the
tendency has been upward for years. Wages have
risen, it is true, but not so rapidly as prices, and the
worker is poorer today than he was ten years ago.
From the railroads' point of view the great trouble
lies in the fact that ignorant, inspired or prejudiced
legislators cannot, or will not, recognize the simple
facts stated above. It will soon become imperative
that a railroad corporation be permitted to advance
the price of transportation to meet this economic
change. But take the case of a farmer who receives
almost double the price for his corn and wheat he
did ten years ago. Try to advance freight or passenger rates and listen to him sing! I hold no brief
for the railroads, but they certainly are getting the
worst of it.
I have recently referred to the tendency of railroad stocks to decline more rapidly or to advance
more grudgingly than industrial issues. The barometrical figures show this distinctly but the detailed movements of the speculative leaders are
even more illuminating. I have accordingly tabulated the action of ten leading rails and ten leading industrials since August 14, the day on which
the general high average of stock prices was established. On that date I abandoned the long side of
the :5tock market, later on recommending purchases
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of industrials on declines and sales of rails on advances. The movements have worked out as follows:
TABLE SHOWING MOVEMENTS OF TEN
LEADING RAILROAD STOCKS FROM
AUG. 14 TO DEC. 1, 1909:

RAILS
Stock

Closing
Price
Aug. 14

Closing
Price
Dec. 1

Adv.

Dec.

Atchison . . . . .
n8i
¼
n9¼
Balto. & Ohio . .
n8t
us¼
3½
C. M. & St. Paul
160
155
s
Gt .•Northern .
1561
141! ·
14i
L. & N . . . .
160!
IOI
1soa
N. Y. Central
127
17i
144i
Northern Pac.
157½
14i
143
Reading . . .
164¼
170
st
Southern Pac.
1281
8i
137½
Union Pac . . .
181
217!
1991
Average net decline ten Rails since August 14
8.737 points.
TABLE SHOWING MOVEMENTS OF TEN
LEADING INDUSTRIAL STOCKS FROM
AUG. 14 TO DEC. 1, 1909 :

INDUSTRIALS
Stock

Closing
Price
Aug. 14

Closing
Price
Dec. 1

Adv.

Dec.

Amal. Copper .
86¼
I
87¼
Am. Car & Fdy.
72¼
67
51
60¼
6
Am. Loco.
66¼
Am. Smelters
102¼
97¼
Central Leather .
40
45i
s!
148¼
If
Consolidated Gas .
146½
i
51¼
Pressed Steel Car . 51¼
50
Railway Steel Spring 50
51¼
U. S. Rubber . . . 51¼
88
91
U. S. Steel .... 781
Average net advance IO Industrials 1.20 points.

s•
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This table shows that considering the active se<:urities in groups the rails and industrials have been
-steadily working in opposite directions. The tables
also show some marked variations in both groups
but this cannot be given too much consideration
as the movements of a few days might change all
this. For example, on October r United States
Steel Common was selling i points above Amalgamated Coppl.'r; on November 20 Amalgamated was
-selling 5 points above United States Steel and on
December r they were about the same price. The
fluctuations have also presented many opportunities
to buy industrials on declines or sell rails on advances. There have of course been opportunities
to buy some rails on declines and sell some industrials on advances, but the advantage has all been
the other way. The great trouble with ordinary
-Operators is that they actually reverse the reasonable
process and sell on declines, or buy on advances.
This is largely due to fright. The influence of the
ticker is insidious and forcible. A break of two or
three points occurs and a lot of people rush to sell,
-0r vice versa. They appear to forget that such
fluctuations are perennial and that without them we
would have no opportuniti~s-no stock market. It
requires some courage, of course, to buy when the
market is crumbling, or to sell when it is advancing,
but courage is a vital necessity in this business. We
hear people commenting every day to the effect that
the market "looks weak" or "looks strong," which
usually means nothing. The market always looks
weak when it is going down and strong when it
is going up. In most cases it is never so weak as
when it "looks" the strongest or so strong as when
it "looks" the weakest.
There may be periods when it is advis~.ble to "go
with the market," but this is not one of them. The
-011ly logical thing to do now is to do the buying on
breaks and the selling on advances and turn a deaf
car to the absurd canards which accompany every
rise or fall, specific or general. The everlasting desire to look for "tips" instead of reasoning and
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analysis, as the road to profits, is per01c10us in the
extreme. Careful analyses seldom fail. By such
methods the decline of 1907 was anticipated with
confidence and accuracy, as was the subsequent advance. The difference between attempting to operate blindly on the tips and operating intelligently
on fundamental and basic facts and prospects, is the
difference between profit and loss.
Another thing that impresses me forcibly,
through a diversified corresµondence, is the inability
to realize the fact that reversals in a market represent the best form of opportunities. I recall one
case in 1907 where a client had about ten thousand
dollars to invest. He was practically ign orant as to
what constituted a stock market. I advised him to
buy Atchison around 80 in such amounts as would
permit of averaging and provide ample protection.
He bought Atchison at 80. The money scare occurred and he bought again at 75 and still again at
70. He sold his holdings later above 100 and it
dawned on him that he had made about four times
as much because of the decline as he would have
made on a direct advance. I regret to relate that the
object lesson did not stick and that the gentleman
in question later tried to pile up a magnificent fortune on a five point margin and is now busted.
I refer to these suicidal errors because it is found
that on every little movement in the market a number of people get into trouble. I am willing to again
go on record with the opinion that, properly handled, there is no reason why speculation should ever
result in a losing year. Improperly handled it will
bring continuous losses. And I would like to add
frankly that if any man is looking to this service
for guidance as to daily or even weekly changes in
stock prices he might as well drop out. The object
of these advices is to make money for clients, not to
. run a tipping bureau. To the older subscribers who
understand the methods employed and know how
they have resulted, no such stat.e ment is necessary,
but a number of people expect unreasonable things
and I am not prepared to supply them.
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The House of Lords declined to adopt the budget
by a vote of 350 to 75. Thereupon the House of
Commons on December 2, by a vote of 349 to 134,
passed the resolution of Premier Asquith to the
effect that in rejecting the Government's Budget Bill
the House of Lords committed a breach of the Constitution and usurped the rights of the House of
Commons. The Premier has advised the King to
-dissolve Parliament and the King has consented to
do so. The great conflict that has been brewing
between the two branches of the British Government during the past fifty years has thus been
brought to a head. The quarrel is to be submitted
to the arbitrament of the British electors at general
elections that are expected to take place about January 17. The result .of this combat will be very far
reaching and will not be confined to British politics
and finance but will be world-wide in their effects.
In consequence of · their prospective effects on
American financial affairs in the near future I deem
it advisable to review the causes of the conflict as
briefly as possible and indicate the probable outcome.
History has repeatedly shown that bicameral
legislatures yield the most satisfactory forms of
Government, provided a good balance of powers is.
maintained between the legislative or constructive
chamber and the critical or reviewing chamber.
There always is, however, a tendency for each
chamber to increase its own powers. The history
of the evolution of the British Parliament shows
that on memorable occasions fierce contests for
p·o wer have been waged between the Houses of Commons and Lords. As a rule these contests have resulted in victory for the Commons. The Lords at
present is composed of more than 6oo members.
All these, except 26 Bishops, 16 Irish and 26 Scotch
Peers, vote by right of birth. The Bishops are appointed for life by the Crown and the Scotch and
Irish representative Peers, while nominally elected
by the votes of the Peers, are also practically appointed· by the Crown. The House is very aristocratic and conservative and throughout its history
has fought against any curtailment of aristocratic
privileges and democratic betterment. Many will
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remember that the Lords opposed the Reform Bill
in 1832 as strongly as they this week opposed the
budget and were badly beaten at the ensuing election that gave the Commons increased power. The
Asquith Government that has guided England for
several years, is strongly democratic an<l popular.
After the last general elections it set about the task
of equalizing the systems of taxation and improving
the efficiency of the people. Its promotion of public education in State Schools, as opposed to denominational schools, employers' liability acts for
accidents to employees, old age pensions, limitation
of the working hours of the laboring people and
similar measures have strongly antagonized the Conservatives. Lately the breach between the Lords
and Conservatives and the Government was widened
by the budget, or Finance Bill, covering expenditures proposed for 1910. A summary of this bill was
given in the letter of November 6. In this measure
the Government proposed to raise increased revenue by means of income and liquor taxes, by supertaxes on incomes over £5,000 per annum, and by
land taxes and taxes on the unearned increment in
land values. The Conservative Party in the Commons was unable to make its opposition felt and,
although its leader, Arthur Balfour, less than two
years ago admitted that "The House of Lords is
still further limited by the fact that it cannot touch
money bills, which, if it could deal with, could
ibring the whole executive machinery of the country
to a standstill," lately plotted with the Lords and
advised the rejection of the budget. The Lords
were told by the Conservative Leaders that they
must challenge "the intolerant and usurping executive which had outlived its mandate and lost its
popularity but still clung to office in defiance of the
popular will." The Lords adopted this advice and
the result is that the budget has been rejected by
an overwhelming majority.
The Conservatives, in recent years, have favored
a protective policy and the Lords when objecting
to the land and income taxes contended that revenue would be better obtained by discriminative customs dues. It is probable therefore that Free Trade
and Protection will figure among the side issues
at the coming elections.
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There appears little doubt as to the outcome of
the struggle. The Lords appear to be hopelessly in
the wrong. The Government has the support of
the Labor Party and the people generally. It is
probable that Mr. Asquith will be returned to power
and that the Constitution of the House of Lords will
be amended. It seems likely that the number of
members in the Lords will be reduced considerably
and they will be elected to the House by the votes
of all the Peers of the Kingdom.
The chief duty of the House of Lords is to provide that time be given for mature reflection on
matters of importance. It cannot radicaliy change
a bill sent from the Commons but it should take
care that questions of issue are placed plainly before the people. The Lords, by the custom of the
Constitution, have no power whatever to originate,
amend or reject a bill for the raising or spending of
money. The constitutional relations of the two
Houses, according to Professor Dicey, is as follows:
"If there is a difference of opinion between the
Houses of Lords and Commons, the Lords ought at
some point give way ; and should the Peers not
yield, and the Commons continue to enjoy the confidence of the electors, it becomes the duty of the
Crown, or of its responsible advisers, to cre·a te
enough new Peers to override the opposition in the
House of Lords and so restore harmony between
the two branches of the legislature."
As the Lords have taken an unconstitutional
course in thwarting the wishes of the Commons,
they are placed in a difficult position before the
people. In the debates in the House of Lords the
chief speakers spoke of the socialistic tendencies
in England and objected to the budget on the
grounds that it was introducing socialistic taxation
principles. Lord Rothschild took this view and in
speaking of the supertax on incomes said that it
attempted to set up a new kind of holy inquisition
into people's affairs and asserted that it is difficult to
obtain money for the best British ente'r prises, although masses of capital are available for foreign
investments.
Samuel Montagu, Lord Swaythling, head of the
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banking firm of Samuel Montagu & Co., and other
bankers strongly opposed Lord Rothschild. They
showed that the latest statistics did• not indicate any
special tendencies of capital to abandon English
enterprises in favor of foreign ones. They believe
that the passing of the budget will not in any noticeable manner change English financial customs.
The disturbance, if any, would undoubtedly be less
than if the proposals of the Conservatives to impose
a customs tariff were carried out.
It was very noticeable in the debates in both
houses that every constitutional lawyer of note who
spoke from either the Government or opposition
benches unhesitatingly declared the position of the
Lords to be wrong and unconstitutional. Sir Frederic Pollock, the greatest living authority on English Law, also declares the action of the Commons
is correct and fully agrees with the contentions of
the Lord Chancellor, and Lords James of Hereford,
Morley and Rosebery.
·
The most serious aspect of the conflict, as far as
it affects American financial interests in the immediate future, is the dis organization of the European money markets through the failure of English taxation with the consequent result of the necessity of the Government meeting its needs by
loans. Taxes will of course be collected, but the
money cannot be used. The Bank of England must
finance the Government until a budget can be
passed by the new Parliament. The throwing out
of the budget may entail a loss of about £51,000,000 and it is probable that as much as this must
be borrowed by the Government in the London market. The knowledge of this possibility should compel us to follow closely the developments of the
conflict.
The Government's revenues fo·r the fiscal year
ending March 31 next, according to the Treasury's
estimates under the terms of the budget, the fate
of which is now in the balance, would be £151,578,000, in round numbers $758,000,000, of which about
$371,000,000 has so far been collected. In detail the
estimated receipts for the current year, assuming
the adoption of the budg et, compare as follows with
the actual receipts for th e previous fiscal year :
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Actual
Receipts.

Revised
Estimates.

1908-09.

Customs . .
• £29,200,000
Excise . • .
33,650,000
Estate duties.
18,370,000
Stamps • . . . . . •
7,770,000
Land tax & house duty
2,630,000
Income tax . . . . .

Post Office, &c, •
Crown lands . . .
Suez Canal shares
Miscellaneous • .
Total • . . •
Receipts to date .

33 ,930,000
22,300,000

Increase
or
Changes.

£.28,100,000

- £ 1,100,000

37,450,000

+3,800,000
+4,380,000
+ 730,000

22 , 750,000

8,500, 000
3,250,000
37, 100,000

+

620,000

+ 3,170,000
+ 300,000

530,000

22,600,000
530,00 0

1,171,000

1,166,000

5,000

2,027,000

1,394,000

633,000

£151,578,000 £162,840,000 +£11,262,000
74,224,182
76,067,602 +
1,843,420·

Leaving to be
collected . . . . • £77,353,818

£86,772,3 98 +

£9,418,580

The taxes already collected, which will now be affected since the preliminary budget resolutions are declared void, are the whole of the tea duty, estimated
at about £6,000,000 for the year, the whole of the
income tax, the increased tobacco and spirit duties,
the petrol duty, the additions to death duties,
and the new stamp duties. The new and increased
taxes are estimated to yield for the year a net
amount of $56,500,000, the income tax $170,ooo,ooo and the tea duties :i,30,000,000, a total of
$256,500,000 as the amount of taxes which may be
lost to the Government by the rejection of the budget. If the taxes already collected under the preliminary budget resolutions are not recoverable
from the government, the estimated loss i~ reduced
to $187,500,000, made up of tea duties $15,000,000,
new and increased taxes from December 1 to March
31, $22,500,000 and income tax $150,000,000, most of
this tax being collected during the last half of the
fiscal year. If the present budget is rejected by tht!
electors a new one must be framed . It is probable
that if the substitute budget takes the form of a
tariff reform measure final action on it can hardly
be taken until the Fall of 1910. If it does not take,
this form it is likely that it will still be well along
toward the close of this fiscal year, ending March 31
next, before the newly enacted budget can be
brought into force.
While the budget was under discussion in Parliament, there was a notable meeting of the Irish institute of bankers in Dublin at which taxation prob-

!ems were discussed. Sir R. H. Palgrave stated that
in his opinion taxes may affect capital in three
ways: (1) by preventing accumulation of capital
through the demand upon the tax paper and through
discouraging thrift; (2) by imposing a heavy charge
on capital by death duties and (3) by taxing the unearned increment of land. Professor Bastable opposed Professor Palgrave's remarks on death duties
and the taxation of the "unearned increment." He
disputed also the assumption that capital is identical with "the total of amalgamated wealth." He
maintained that only wealth that aids production
can be regarded as capital. He is of the opinion that
all taxation tends to fall on capital even taxation
levied primarily on commodities;. Retrenchment,
he believes, is the only remedy for relieving the
pressure of taxation.
Monetary conditions in Europe were not as satisfactory this week as they were last week. The
stock exchanges reflected the tension prevailing in
financial circles by their irregular movements.
The weekly statement of the Bank of England
shows the following changes:
Total reserve decreased
£726,000
Circulation increased . . . .
471,000
Bullion decreased . . . . . .
255,479
Other securities decreased
681,000
Other deposits increased . .
256,000
Public· deposits decreased
1,597,000
Notes reserve decreased . .
.. .. ..
675,000
Government securities . . . . . . . . . . . . Unchanged
The increase in circulation and the decreases in
reserves are bad features in this statement.
The weekly statement of the Imperial Bank of
Germany shows the following changes:
Marks.
Cash in hand decreased . . . . . . . . . .
64,496,000
Loans increased . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
27,6o1,ooa
Discounts increased . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
28,227,000
Treasury bills increased . .
20,088,000
Notes in circulation increased . .
77,650,000
Deposits decreased . . . . . . . . . . . .
63,001,000
Gold in hand decreased . . . . . . . . . .
40,550,000
This statement is bad all around. There was a
large decrease in reserves and bad increases in loans
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and notes in circulation. The increase in Treasury
bills is ominous. The financial position at Berlin is
undergoing a severe strain at present.
The weekly statement of the Bank of France
shows the following changes:
Francs.
Notes in circulation increased
I II,825,000
Treasury deposits decreased . .
24,375,000
General deposits increased . .
20,100,000
Gold in hand dec reased
20,Soo,000
Silver in hand decreased . . . .
3,000,000
Bills discounted increa se d . . . .
247,075,000
Advances decreased . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,625,000
The remarkable increase in the item, notes in
circulation, clearly reflects financial conditions in
Paris.

THE GEN E RAL SITUATI ON.
There is little change to report in the general
situation. The steel and iron business which has
served as a barometer for so long, cannot be said to
have materially altered its aspect, although in spots
there appears a disposition to slow down, particularly as regards new orders for nearby deliveries.
This is welcomed by the mills and furnaces as it
gives them a chance to catch up. As it i~ their capacity will be taxed for some months. Specifications on old orders for finished materials, however,
are being furnished in great quantities, in order to
take advantage of the prices ruling when the orders
were put in. The lull in pig iron continues, particularly in the Southern markets, although there is a
renewal of the demand for basic and other steel
making grades. Pittsburg despatches indicate that,
at the present increase in the activity of the railroad equipment plants, a shortage of labor is imminent before the turn of the year.
The copper metal market has eased off a little
from top prices of a week ago but remains well
above 13 cents for electro. Exports of copper for
the month of November were a little under the most
enthusiastic estimates, but well up to conservative
expectations, being 23,878 tons against 23,651 tons
during October and 19,146 tons a year ago. The
European visible su pply is reported at 105,740 tons
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compared with 102,950 tons a month ago and 52,000
tons a year ago. Reports from London are to the
effect that an increased demand for the metal may
be expected in the near future. Merger plans are
still in abeyance, latest reports being that the approval or disapproval of the Attorney General will
have a great deal to do with future movements toward an agreement. The railroad tie-up in the
Northwest, if continued for any length of time, may
do more in the way of curtailment of the output of
the mines and smelters than any agreement among
the owners could accomplish in the same length of
time. Supplies of coal in the affected district are
very short.
Cotton spinners are urging agents to take no new
business below the basis of the Cotton market as
it now stands as they are unable to buy the staple
below current quotations and are finding great difficulty in obtaining it at prices that will show any
profit in its manufacture when present prices for
cloths are considered. High prices are also making
new export business difficult.
Exports of foodstuffs and food animals and
crude materials manufactured or partly manufactured, as shown by the Government figures for the
month of October, exceed imports by $73,015,654 as
compared with an excess of $69,944,428 a year ago.
While this shows a gain the figures for 10 months
are not so reassuring. This year so far the excess
is only $165,269,688 as compared with an excess of
exports of $502,213,009 during the same period a
year ago.
Call money reached 6% at one time during the
week, influenced part_icularly by the dividend and
interest disbursements which amounted to about
$95,000,000. Generally speaking money rates were
firm between 4½% and 5% most of the time. No
immediate resumption of the old cheap money conditions can be expected while we are shipping gold
out of the country in quantity and while the banks
are obliged to make so many shifts to keep their
reserve percentages up to the required figure. Canada continues to draw heavily on us, presumably
on account of London where the official discount
rate is unchanged. The rejection of the budget by
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the Peers was expected, and, on account of the
preparations made for it, had no perceptible effect
on the money market, although, as a factor it must
not be lost sight of.
Railroad earnings and traffic reports are very
satisfactory but a period of unrest among employees
is being entered that will not help a situation which
was already becoming noticeably unfavorable on
account of the inflexibility of freight rates, expenditures for maintenance which had been more or less
neglected during panic times, and signs of hostile
legislation this Winter. The tie-up in the Northwest occasioned by the switchmen's strike is complete and it is known that other employees in other
departments are dissatisfied. Roads eastward from
Chicago and those reaching the Atlantic seaboard
are also likely to be faced with the labor probl em
according to persistent rumor.

THE TECHNICAL SITUATION.
The technical situation has been considerably improved by the moderate decline of the last two
weeks. The setback has not been severe enough to
wipe out all the weak accounts but has eliminated
a large percentage of them. The operators who
bought Amalgamated for a quick turn 01; merger
talk have abandoned their position, although it
is not at all certain that the proposed combination
has been given ·up. The floating supply of Amalgamated is not large.
There is a fairly good short interest in Union
Pacific, St. Paul, B. & 0. and other high-priced
rails. The shortage in Reading continues large but
the stock is for sale on every advance. Some slight
recessions have occurred in the equipment group as
there is practically no short interest in these stocks.
They are well taken on the dips.
Taken as a whole we may consider the technical
situation better than for some time.
CONCLUSION.
With basic influences working against railroad
stocks and in favor of industrials, and with the market in a rather disturbed and perplexing stage, it
is better to continue the plan of selling rails on
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the bulges and buying industrials on the breaks.
There is a period in every great movement where
this hybrid form of operation is justified. It will
probably not be long until a more decided stand
can be taken, but for the present the danger growing out of a general advance or decline can be eliminated and fair profits made by following the plan
suggested. In two or three weeks we will know
much better where we stand and what to <lo.
Think Amalgamated Copper, American Smelters,
American Car and Foundry, American Locomotive,
Pressed Steel Car, Railway Steel Spring, American
Can, Central Leather, U. S. Rubber and Consolidated Gas should be bought on every break and
Union Pacific, Northern Pacific, St. Paul, R eading
Chesapeake and Ohio and Steel Common sold . on
every recovery.
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DECEMBER n, 1909.

The stock market during the week has been a rational and quiet affair. As was to be expected, the
President's message was a mild and sensible document with no suggestion of radicalism. The fact that
a discussion of the anti-trust laws and railroad legislation was reserved for a special message to appear
later gave the bears an opportunity to wag their
heads ominously and offer dire predictions of ruin
and devastation in the near future. The forthcoming message, however, will contain nothing inimical
to the business interests of the country or the rights
of stockholders. Some recommendations may appear which will make dishonest corporations sit up
and look around. That is as it should be and is for
the best interests of all concerned. No one is disturbed or apprehensive about the attitude of the administration except that class of observers who
habitually view the situation with a jaundiced eye .
Mr. Deckle-edge Lawson is excited but he is in the
habit of boiling over and receives little attention.
Considering the Trinity; Nevada-Utah; Yukon affairs, it appears remarkable that any attention should
be accorded such emanations, but as Homer is said
to have remarked to Epictetus, "There's one born
every minute."
More important than the recommendations of
President Taft or the politicians is the question of
the rights of labor and possible labor troubles. History, and very recent history, shows us how much
damage may be wrought by widespread discontent
in this quarter. In the last weekly letter I stated
that, in order to look matters squarely in the face,
we must admit that if the price of living is rising,
the laborer must receive more money to Jiye on and
to allow him to put a little by for a rainy day. I
further stated that the railroads were in a bad fix
because they could not advance wages without advancing freight rates. Mr. W. C. Brown, President
of the New York Central, in an inteniew given out
on December 9 refers to this phase of the subject
as follows:
'
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"The labor situation in the East has aot developed far as yet, but so far as it has goae rt
can be stated in a few words. If it is tntc that
there has been an increase in the cost of living
since the general and liberal increases in rail,road wages made in the latter part of 1900 and
early in 1907, then the men arc justified iD asking for some further increase at this time. If •o
such increase in the cost of living has taken
place, then the men cannot expect more
pay. Tht, facts remain to be determined.
"But it cannot be stated too pri>mptly or
emphatically that any increase whatsoever in
wages, no matter how large or small, is impo9sible without a commensurate increase in railroad rates. There isn't a railroad in the country
that can afford to pay its employes more n<>"t,
without getting better rates."
Mr. Brown is, of course, an interested party, but
II.is remarks are reasonable. In his statemeiat that
"the facts remain to be determined" about the in-creased cost of living, there is a good deal of room
for disparity. It depends on how we go about determining these facts, and a fractim of the truth might
~e nry misleading. We might show that nutmewi
and pate de foie gras had declined in price and preserve a dignified silence about pork and beans or
corned beef and cabbage. In choosing our statisticians we may revert to the saying of a cynical
philosopher that "figures won't lie but liars will
figure." However, I am personally convinced that
the price of living is rising and that the railroads
must be given more leeway in their traffic rates.
This is an important question aI\d there is a way
t o get a pretty good line on it. Let us examine the
cost of living as represented by properly balanced
index numbers and the cost of producing transportation under present conditions. Then we may
examine the freight and pa'ssenger rates and see if
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they arc rising in proportion to the cost of production. With these three basic items before us we
may arrive with facility and accuracy at the merits
of the case.
The next step will of course be to
determine where the flaw is and who gets the advantage. The simplest logic teaches us that if you or
I or anybody else produces something which is sold
at a fair margin of profit and the cost of producing
that something increases, we must be allowed to
increase the selling price. Otherwise the profit
dwindles to the vanishing point and our enterprise
finally becomes bankrupt.
I have recently expressed the opinion that the
farmer was the hog at present-that he was making
all the money. This word farmer is a pretty broad
appellation. It means cotton planters, fruit growers, lumber merchants and many other classes.
Also it is possible that I might better employ the
terms "landlord" or "landowner" instead of farmer,
but the farmer is frequently the landowner and we
have to resort to some nice discrimination in this
case.
I will produce a special letter in a few days which
will give us a pretty good idea of the situation.
Such an exhibit must necessarily be of a statistical
character, but I will endeavor to see that the figures
do not lie nor the liars figure.
As the foreign situation has a decided bearing
on our security values it will be fully treated under
a separate caption hereafter.

THE FOREIGN SITUATION.
The reduction of the Bank of England's discount
rate to 4½% on Thursday surprised many bankers.
The conditions of the European money markets last
week led to the belief that the directors of the bank
would be compelled to maintain the 5% rate until
the end of the year. Two circumstances, however,
conspired to improve the Bank's position and cn-
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able the Bank to change its rate. The fears entertained by the directors regarding the outcome of
the political quarrel between the Houses of Parliament over the budget have been allayed. The budget has been practically unanimously approved by
the various church authorities and by the leading
financial and economic authorities. Professor Alfred Marshall, the greatest European auth o rity on
economics, unreservedly praises it and says that it
is truly a social welfare budget. The Bank officials
are in close touch with both financial and political
authorities and during the we ek they learned sufficient about the general feeling throughout Great
Britain regarding the budget to reach the conclusion that the elections will result in the return of
the Asquith government with greatly increased
strength. The danger of the accumulatio n of taxes
with the attendant possibility of the ·necessity for refunding them is thus allayed. Consequently, the
Bank's task in financing the Government until the
elections is greatly simplified. The second circumstance alluded to is the improvement in commercial
confidence which is exhibited by the condition of
the general discount market. Money is now in good
supply at 4% and for long terms even lower. These
rates are still below the Bank's rate and as a result
the Bank loses a large amount of discount business.
The Bank is owned by a private corporation and must
earn dividends for its shareholders. This cannot be
done if its discount business is reduced for any length
of time. The directors, consequently, in justice to the
Bank's shareholders, are compelled to reduce the
Bank's discount rate to conform with the general
market rate as soon as ever they believe all danger to the Bank's reserves is removed.
The reduction in the Bank's rate indicates that its
reserves are now ample to meet all demands for gold
shipments and disbursements between the present
date and the end of January when money is expected to become comparatively plentiful. The out-
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look for financial affairs, which during the past nine
weeks was unusually bad, is thus brightening.
Everything points to the return of the Asquith
government with a large majority. The British
people appear to recognize that the budget, rejected
by the House of Lords, is really what economists
and sociologists have declared to be a social
welfare budget.
It was planned and drawn
up in consonance with the best teachings of
modern financial theories and aimed at drawing revenues from the sources best able to
produce them without dislocating commerce.
The
liquor trade and large landed proprietors who have
long escaped proper taxation were singled out to
contribute a larger amount towards meeting national
expenditures than hitherto. Nevertheless, we should
closely watch the progress of political events in
England. It is always difficult to gauge the public
mind. At present the public appears to be entirely
with the Liberal party. Should, however, the Conservatives regain power, financial conditions in England will become very much disturbed again. If
merchants foresee the possibility of a tariff reform
victory, they would endeavor to rush ali the tea
and colonial produce into England they could arrange to finance. The shippers of such immense
quantities of goods would draw against the shipments and the discounting of the bills in London
would put a very severe strain upon banking, and
influence the advancement of discount rates again.
In a comparative review of the operations of
the world's banks and the recent high discount rates,
the Economist, London, gives some interesting statistics which show the effects of the Bank of England's discount rate upon the world's financial affairs. The following tables rnmmarize banking activities during the months of October and November, 1908 and 1909. They are taken from the Economist :
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DISCOUNTS AND ADVANCES IN 1908.
October
£26,029,000
49,474,000
68,462,000
262,426,000
29,480,000
24,631,000

November
£26,185,000
48,855,000
45,741,000
265,630,000
29,942,000
23,648,000

Inc. or Dec.
+£156,000
--619,000
-22,721,000
+3,204,000
+462,000
-983,000

+0.6
-1.3
-33.2
+1.2
+1.6
-4.0

Total . . . . . . . . . . £460,502,000

£440,001,000

-£20,501,000

-4.5

Bank of England . . . . .
Bank of France . . . . .
Bank of Germany . . . . .
New York Banks . . . . .
Bank of Austria . . . . .
Bank of Belgium . . ....

%

-IS-

~

DISCOUNTS AND ADVANCES IN 1909.

Bank of England . . . .
Bank of France . . . . .
Bank of Germany . . . .
New York Banks. . . . .
Bank of Austria . . . . .
Bank of Belgium . . .
Total . . . . '. . . . . .

October
£28,582,000
46,738,000
75,384,000
261,942,000
25,108,000
25,470,000

November
£22,907,000
53,829,000
53,930,000
245,248,000
25,888,000
24,254,000

Inc. or Dec.
-£5,675,000
+7,091,000
-21,404,000
-16,694,000
+780,000
-1,216,000

-19.8
+l.52
-28.4
--6.4
+3.1
-4.7

£463,224,000

£426,106,000

-£37,118,000

-8,0

%

The most notable contrast in the above tables
is between the figures relating to the transactions
of the Banks of England and France. It will be
n oticed that while in 1908 the Bank of England increased its discounts and advances, the Bank of
France decreased its transactions of that kind. But
during the financial stTain in England this year the operations of the two Banks were reversed. The Bank of
England greatly restricted and the Bank of France
greatly enlarged its discount and loaning business.
It is, perhaps, difficult in accounting for these operations to say how much the Bank of England's high
discount rate contributed to them and how much the
conservative policy of the directors of the Bank of
France is responsible. During October anu November the Bank of France increased its discounts and
advances more than 15% as compared with a reduction in these transactions by the Bank of England
of nearly 20%. During the present month the Bank
of France has still further increased its discount
and loan business. The demand for gold for foreign
shipment thus appeared too great for the directors
of the Bank of France to resist and their traditional
restrictive policy has been set aside with a view of
profiting by the strong position the Bank was kept
in during a critical period in European financial
history.
Another noticeable contrast is supplied by the
German and English bank figures. The operations
of the Reichsbank and Bank of England have been
parallel. The figures show that both banks strenuously reduced their Joan and discount business. The
New York banks followed London practice but the
results do not contrast so strongly as those of the
European banks above referred to. The statistics
relating to the movements of coin and bullion are
rnmmarized in the following tables:
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COIN AND BULLION, 1908
Bank of England . . ..
..
Bank of France.
Banw of Germany . .
New York Banks . .. . . .
Bank of Austria .
Bank of Belgium .
Total ..

.. ..

. .

O ctober
£36,938,000
130,255,000
51,679,000
62,380,000
48,615,000
6,192,000
£336,058,000

%

6,103,000

Inc. or Dec.
-£1,136,000
+ 3,917,000
+2,977,000
-1,962,000
+145,000
-89,000

-3.1
+3.0
+s.s
-3.1
+o.3
-0.l

£339,910,000

+ £3,852,000

+1.1

Inc. or Dec.
+£432,000
-1,811,000
+2,877,000
--4,108,000
--425,000
+70,000

+1.2
-1.2
+6.3
-7.7
-0.8
+1.1

November
£35,802,000
134,172,000
54,655,000
60,418,000

48,700,000

t;
0

COIN AND BU LLION, 1909

Bank of England .
Bank of France .
Bank of Germany
New York Banks .
Bank of Austria .
Bank of Belgium .
Total

October
£34,913,000
144,793,000
45,482,000
53,484,000
57,415,000
6,245,000
£342,332,000

November
£35,345,000
142,982,000
48,359,000
49,376,000
56,990,000
6,315,000
£339,367,000

- £2,965,000

o/o

-0.9

The coin and bullion statistics indicate that in
1908 the Bank of France was gaining gold while the
Bank of England was losing it and this year the
operations were reversed. The parallelism in the
percentage figures shows that gold was merely taken
from the Bank of England and placed in the Bank of
France and when European financial conditions
changed, these operations were reversed.
The
Economist in commenting upon the figures given
in the above tables states that it is evident that the
Bank of England "By raising its discount rate to 5%
has succeeded in moving much of the financial burden across the Channel. Its own loans have fallen
-to some extent naturally and to some extent by
design-while the Bank of rrance, which always
keeps the strings tight longer than any other central bank, has been induced by market forces to
relax, sacrifice some of its gold, and help satisfy
the foreign demand for credit. In international
banking, Paris holds .a n isolated position, while London is sensitive to every movement all the world
over; but in the long run Paris gives way, and
either because the rates abroad are too temptingas in 1909-or because the foreign position is too
delicate to be neglected-as in 1907-the Bank of
France sooner or later will part with gold. The
policy of isolation gives stability in discount rates,
but it excludes French bankers from the large
profits made by London in the work of international
banking."
The weekly statement of the Bank of England
shows the following changes:
Total reserve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Inc. £230,000
Circulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dec.
612,000
Bullion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dec.
381,313
Other securities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dec.
407,000
Other deposits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dec. 2,040,,) 00
Fublic deposits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Inc. 1,862,000
Notes reserve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Inc.
286,000
Government securities .. . ......................... Unchanged

The detailed return compares as follows:
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Yesterday.
Circulation .....••.••• £28,353,000
Public deposits • , . • . • •
7,185,00J
Private deposits • . . • . • 38,646,000
Government securities.. 14,412,000
Other securities • • . . . . • 23,095,000
Reserve . . • . • • . . . . . . . . 26,006,0l 0
Prop. of reserve to liabilities ...•••....•••
56.71%
Bullion ..•.•.........• 37,219,000
Bank rate •.•.......••
4½%

Week Ago,
£28,964,000
5,323,000
40,686,000
14,412,00)
23,503,000
25,775,000

Year Ago.
£28,937,000
7,449,000
40,709,000
14,730,000
27,647,000
23,463,000

55.99%
37,600,000

48.69%
33,764,000

· 2½%

5%

The proportion of reserve to liabilities compares
as follows:
Year.
Per Cent.
1909...................... . ............ 56.71
1908................................... 48.69
1907........ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . 46.95
1906........ . . . ........................ 47.02
1905.......... . ..... . .................. 40.10
1904................................... 45.37
1903................................... 43.70
1902................................... 44.09
1901................................... 45.03
190)........................ . .......... 40.23

Bank Rate.
4½%
2½%
7 %

%
%
%
%
4 %
4 %
4 %

6
4
3
4

The high proportion of reserve to liabilities
shown by this week's statement is unprecedented at
this time of year. It compares with a proportion of
48.69% in 1908, 40.23% in 1900, and an average of
44.57% for the past nine years.
The weekly statement of the Imperial Bank of
Germany shows the following changes:
Cash in hand...............................
Loans . . . • . . . . . . . . . • . . • • . . . • . . • • . . . • • . • . . . •
Discounts • . . . . . . . . . . . • . . • . • . . . • . • . • • . . . . . .
Treasury bills . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . • . • • • • • . . . . . • . •
Notes in circulation., ..•.....•......•. ,.....
Deposits • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . • • . . . . . . . • . . . .
Gold in hand........................ ........

Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Inc.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.

Marks.
18,707,000
13,903,000
46,344,000
15,115,000
32,143,000
25,749,M0
10,618,000

The chief items compare with 1908 and 1907 as
follows in marks:
19J9.
Gold and silver...... 940,617,000
Loans and discounts.1,013,221,000
Circulation ••••.•... 1,566,917,000

1908.
1,062,400,000
887,840,000
1,516,240,000

1907.
781,760,000
1,319,960,000
1,468,56),000

This week's statement is not good, but it is better
than the statement of the previous week. The gold
reserve and cash in hand decreased and there was a
large diminution in discounts, deposits and loans.
The curtailment in the bank's note issue is a good
feature. The increase in Treasury bills indicates
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that the Government is calling on the Bank for assistance. This item will continue to expand weekly, until the budget is passed.
The weekly statement of the Bank of France
shows the following changes:
Notes in circulation ......... , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Treasury deposits . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . .
General deposits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . .
Gold in hand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . .
Silver in h and . .............................
Bills discounted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . .
Advances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . • . . . . . . . • .

Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Inc.
Dec.
Dec.
Inc.

Francs.
39,650,000
29,475,000
51,100,000
625,000
1,000,000
22,475,000
16,375,000

The detailed statement compares as follows:
Francs.
1909.
Gold .........•..•• 3,543,625,0)0
Silver . . . . . . . . . • . . . 894,350,000
Circulation ........ 5,166,606,200
General deposits . . . .
581,157,282
Bills discount ...... 1,016,392,000
Tr. ad, ....•. , • . . . • 177,479,900

Francs.
1908.
3,424,040,501
894,004,641
4,928,415,43)
519,200,302
617,474,108
161,267,161

Francs.
1907.
2,692,396,335
925,305,106
4,805,950,200
476,940,396
1,177,034,084
228,542,682

The conditions disclosed in this week's statement
are satisfactory. The indications are that the demand for gold abroad has been modified and that the
Bank is returning to normal business again.
In the last weekly letter I stated that India is
likely to take a large amount of gold soon. Shipments are now increasing to India from Australia
and last Thursday the Bank of Bengal advanced its
discount rate from S to 6 per cent. This action will
be followed by the other large Indian banks and will,
undoubtedly, stimulate the importation of gold.

THE GENERAL SITUATION.
For the moment, pig iron production appears to
have overtaken consumption, but the manifestation
of this is chiefly confined to the Southern market
where there is a disposition shown to shade prices
a trifle and where the slow movement is resulting
in the piling up of a considerable surplus in producers' yards. Eastern furnace interests, however,
placed orders in Pittsburg for 144,000 tons of coke
for 1910 delivery which resulted in firming up prices
for pig iron in that market. Pig iron production to
Dec. 1st is at the rate of 31,600,000 tons per year.
The November output was 2,547,508 tons against
2,599,541 tons in October, or, figuring by days, an
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increase of 1.061 tons daily. The season's ore shipments from Lake Superior docks were 41,634,000 tons
against 25,427,000 tons during the season of 1908 and
400,000 tons more than 1907. There is great activity in
the wire departments with new orders and specifications the heaviest for any month of the year, excepting the month of May. Contracts have been
made during the week for some 35,000 tons of steel
rails, mostly for the Harriman lines and there are
pending some big orders for bridge materials.
Heavy buying of standard copper in London resulted in a sharp rise early in the week to 13¾ for
electro in New York. Published reports indicate
that negotiations looking toward a merger of copper interests are still on and the general belief is
that progress is being made. It is expected that at
the least some sort of a tacit agreement to curtail
production will be reached. November was one of
the best months ever experienced by the General
Electric and Wes ting house companies in the matter
of business booked. The bulk of the business was
in small contracts but some big ones are pending
which make the prospects for 1910 very bright. The
decrease in stocks of copper of 506,099 pounds on
December 1st as reported by the Copper Producers'
Association was made possible by the big decrease
in production as compared with the decrease in deliveries for home and foreign consumption. Along
with the smaller production there is a gratifying increase in domestic deliveries. The report in detail
shows stocks on hand December 1st, 153,003,527,
decreased 506,099; domestic deliveries 66,857,833, increased 498,216; exports 55,266,595, decreased 994,643;
total deliveries 122,124,468, decreased 496,387; production 121,618,369, decreased 3,039,340.
The National Association of Manufacturers re- ·
ceived 3,000 replies to inquiries regarding industrial
conditions. The situation is shown by these replies
to be in a very healthy state.
The agitation in labor circles continues, and while
it has not been much of a market factor as yet, it
will bear watching. Reports are conflicting regarding the switchmen's strike in the Northwest. The
companies say the men are losing ground, but the
strikers assert that the yards are piling up and very
little freight is being moved. The disaffection in
454

that district has not yet spread to the trainmen who
belong to a separate organization and whose president assures President Taft that no general strike
of trainmen will take place at this time. Their
demands, in fact, cannot be formulated and voted
up on before the early part of January. On the other
hand Government investigators report that the plans
of the various organizations of railroad employees
are of a nature serious enough, if carried out, to call
for Government intervention or arbitration . · The
comforting thought in this, from the railroad point
of view, is that such intervention will hamper the
administration's plans for legislation looking to control of rates. Rumors are still persistent that Eastern roads will soon have to take up the question of
wage demands by the Order of Railway Conductors
and Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen. Telegraph
operators on the Big Four have ordered a referendum
vote to decide upon a strike for 20% increase which
was denied them. Their demands include the telephone
operators. The Illinois Central refused their teleg·
raphers' demands for 10% increase but agrees to arbitration. The news has just leaked out that trainmen and telegraphers on the Michigan Central were
granted a 15 % increase some weeks ago to be effective on October 1st. A riot betw·e en strikers and
strikebreakers in the American Sheet & Tin Plate
mills at Bridgeport, Ohio, was reported early in the
week and State troops were called to the scene, but
at the time of writing the trouble has quieted down
and most of the troops have been recalled. Efforts
are being made to arbitrate the differences. 1,000
boilermakers in the American Locomotive Co.'s
plant at Schenectady have walked out on account
of dissatisfaction over the recently established bonus
system. The shirtwaist strike in Manhattan will
probably be arbitrated. Most of the employers have
granted the demands of their operatives, but about
10,000 girls are still out. Wages at Fall River will
not be reduced. The manufacturers waived their
rights under the agreement. Broadly speaking there
is everywhere a disposition to grant increases where
possible, but with the railroads the policy seems to
he to bring their troubles before the public in general and the politicians in particular in the most
prominent manner-a strike.
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The Government report on the acreage and condition of the growing crop of Winter Wheat is the
best one we have had for years and if the promise
is fulfilled will form the ground work upon which
other bullish stock market factors may be built. The
acreage sown to Winter Wheat is given as 33,483,000.
the largest on record, and compares with 29,884,000
in 1908, 31,069,000 in 1907, 31,665,000 in 1906, and 31,340,000 in 1905. Condition 95.8-the best percentage
at this time in the past five years.
The Census Bureau reports 8,878,277 bales of cotton ginned to December 1st compared with 11,008,661
a year ago. This year's production is estimated
by the Government at 10,080,000 bales exclusive of
!inters. Coincident with these reports new high
levels for the staple were established. Manchester
advices say that notwithstanding recent heavy receipts of American Cotton there is no increase in
consumption of cotton by manufacturers; on the
contrary, notices have been posted at Bolton and
surrounding townships that short time will be
adopted at the mills next week because of the proh ib itive price of cotton. The notice affects 10,000
op eratives.
The excess of principal exports over imports for
October is $73,015,654, nearly twice that of the previous month and a little better than for October,
1908. For 10 munths, however, the excess is onlv
$252,886,575 as compared with $526,885,184 in the first
10 months of 1908.
Building operations are only a trifle better than
last year at this time and show a tapering off from
the earlier tendency toward large increases.
The local money market has been quiet with call
money firm between 4 and 5% most of the time.
Considerable gold has gone to the Argentine and
some large sums were transferred to San Francisco.
London shared the South African arrivals of new
gold with the Continent and on Thursday reduced
the official discount rate to 4½.

THE TECHNICAL SITUATION.
The technical situation has been somewhat weakened during the week. The short interest remains
fairly large, but the public long interest has in-
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creased quite materially. A decided change of sentiment has attracted to the market a good many operators who have been apathetic for a time. There
has been no excited or heavy trading but accounts
are more evenly balanced than was the case last
week.
There is still a considerable short interest in
Reading, St. Paul, Union Pacific, Steel Common and
New York Central. This tends to support these issues but they are all too high as compared with
other securities, and as the stocks named are found
for sale on every advance, it is not thought any
marked or sustained advance will occur.
There is not much in the technical position of
Amalgamated and Smelters to help the advances m
these stocks and practically no short interest in the
equipments. The shares, however, are well bought
on prospective merits.

CONCLUSION.
The character of buying on the declines in such
stocks as Amalgamated Copper, American Smelters,
American Car and Foundry, American Locomotive,
Pressed Steel Car, Railway Steel Spring, United
States Rubber, Central Leather, American Can
(common and preferred) and Consolidated Gas leads
to the opinion that before long these securities will
advance. There are good basic reasons to expect
better prices for the issues named and it is also
highly probable that after the desired line~ are accumulated, the pools will assist nature by bidding
up the issues named.
The selling of Steel Common on every advance
looks like inside liquidation, but the stock is well
advertised and well handled. I think the security
has already seen its approximate high prices and
that it will sell very much lower before long. The
same may be said of all the high-priced rails with
the possible exception of Pennsylvania.
I do not believe this highly manipulative work
which has been going on in the so-called Hawley
stocks can go much further. Following up advances in the medium priced rails is a hazardous
proposition.
While I anticipate a sharp upward movement
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at any time now, I adhere to the opm1on that the
best and safest opportunities are in the industrials
and that on any such sharp advance the rails and
Steel Common may be sold short or present short
lines averaged. Technical conditions may make this
view appear wrong temporarily, but technical conditions are quickly changed and actual values are
bound to assert themselves in time.
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DECEMBER 18, 1909.
The week in the stock market has not _produced
any specific developments of importance. The unrest
in labor circles has been emphasized by a radical
attack on the Steel Corporation and its methods.
There is a great deal to be said on both sides of this
discussion. It is my opinion that no serious outbreak will occur and that the employees of the Steel
Corporation are not so dissatisfied or imposed upon as
the labor agitators would have us believe. However,
this is a personal view and does not necessarily represent actual conditions. Next week I will examine
the comparative wages and conditions of men employed by the Corporation and set forth my findings
in the letter of December 24.
The advance in the Reading dividend to 6 per cent.
is probably the last gun in that campaign. At 6 per
cent. Reading returns about 3½ per cent. on its present price. I do not go much on mere income return in sizing up a stock but in the case of Reading
.it not only yields less than other good rails but its
comparative statistical showing is also unfavorable.
The only way the best friends of the stock can account for its high price is by talking about its "concealed assets." Personally I do not like to buy
securities on these phantom assets. I think some of
the credulous bulls will get bumped in that security
before long.
The increase in the Louisville and Nashville dividend looks much more reasonable and the stock has
good prospects. I do not, however, consider it safe
to buy these high-priced railroad stocks on advances. They may go somewhat higher but it is
quite probable that we can buy them to advantage
later on.
In looking over the different index numbers now
published I find that we have no reliable tables showing the movements of commodity prices. Mr. Byroa
W. Holt, in his last letter calls attention to this fact
and to the fact that the R. G. Dun figures, whicli
were scientifically compiled, were discontinued some
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time ago because employers of labor did not want
them published. Sauerbeck, and one or two other
English economists, prepare correct tables but we
cannot use them very well in our own calculations
as they do not contemplate our duties. Under these
circumstances I have decided to take up the work
where it was dropped by R. G. Dun & Co., and to
compile hereafter a scientific index of commodity
prices. This will greatly aid us in our theories and
calculations.
One of the factors in the present situation which
causes the careful observer to feel uncomfortable
is the increasing ratio of loans to deposits and specie
to loans. In 1907 I was much influenced by this
factor and when the percentage of loans to deposits
rose above 102 per cent. and specie to loans fell to 17
per cent., I threw up both hands and took a bear
position on the stock market in spite of the fine
business conditions and prospects. At present we
are not so badly off. Loans to deposits are up to
about 102 per cent., but specie to loans is above 19
per cent., wqich of course helps the situation. One
of the peculiarities of this condition is that our
three big banks show a marked accentuation of the
evil. In the three banks referred to loans to deposits stand 115.05 per cent. and specie to loans 18.28
per cent. Whether this is a bull or bear reflection
is a debatable question. We may argue that the
Morgan and Rockefeller interests are confident
enough about the future of the market to loan freely
to their friends, or we may impute motives and say
that they are merely making it easy for people to
buy their stocks. We may reasonably assume that
the s·e asonal changes in money will result in some
improvement in these barometrical figures in January, but that may prove very deceptive in that such
an improvement is of a perennial and temporary
character and is in the nature of a fluctuation rather
than a trend.
In order to place clearly before readers the extent
of changes in the percentage referred to, I have
compiled in a table the figures for a series of years.
Note:-See pages 461 and 462.
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TABLE SHOWING PERCENTAGE OF SPECIE TO LOANS FOR YEARS 1882 TO 1909.
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1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909

.
.
.
.
.
•
.
.
.
•
•
•
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

Jan.

Feb.

Harch

April

19.27
18.94
18.97
29.50
26.39
24.54
20.89
19.66
19.37
20.40
21.88
17.36
26.52
15.38
14.81
15.54
17.48
24.29
21.24
20.52
18.95
17.70
17.67
19.05
16.66
16.49
19.45
21.93

20.26
19.47
21.83
35.77
29.22
26.01
23.28
22.30
22.25
22.33
24.31
17.95
30.88
16.63
17.18
15.99
18.00
26.59
23.27
22.11
21.67
19.24
20.62
20.15
18.30
18.03
22.49
20.79

16.62
16.90
22.31
34.33
25.31
23.08
20.46
20.88
19.02
19.40
21.38
15.97
22.20
14.37
13.25
16.94
19.10
25.42
20.95
21.24
20.56
17.95
21.92
19.36
17.56
17.42
23.22
20.92

1la7

18.34
16.28
18.78
34.51
22.42
21.33
16.77
18.43
20.06
18.68
20.80
16.52
22.11
13.42
12.73
17.10
23.75
23.99
20.08
20.22
19.09
17.49
21.85
19.06
16.64
19.48
24.92
20.00

20.86
17.67
16.37
37.58
20.77
21.03
22.07
19.91
19.49
17.76
20.31
16.48
21.51
14.38
12.60
17.26
27.98
24.26
21.00
20.47
19.22
18.31
21.53
20.17
17.53
18.67
25.67
21.57

June

10.58
19.60
15.26
38.33
19.67
19.85
23.77
17.56
19.02
15.47
21.11
16.84
21.51
14.05
12.96
17.44
29.17
27.55
21.27
20.91
19.47
17.12
21.87
18.57
17.42
19.48
25.14
22.35

Jul7

Aug.

Sept.

17.38 17.49 16.33
19.11 19.33 18.40
20.79 25.57 26.16
37.14 37.70 35.19
18.12 18.17 20.71
20.16 20.77 19.88
23.91 23.07 21.13
17.27 17.71 18.79
18.89 20.01
17.78
16.82 17.61
14.67
18.53 18.54 · 16.33
15.22 13.68 16.71
18.86 18.77 18.61
12.16 12.85 12.43
12.99
9.85 11.08
16.98 16.76 16.23
29.96 26.02 22.07
23.19 21.98 22.30
20.59 21.97 21.65
19.09 20.55 19.22
19.00 18.86 17.83
17.36 18.78 18.68
22.26 24.94 24.28
19.17 19.38 18.81
17.26 18.15 17.09
17.91. 18.68 18.41
24.44 25.40 24.63
22.81 21.90 20.73

Oct.

16.02
17.36
26.23
32.38
21.78
21.79
21.46
16.52
23.34
15.81
15.47
21.45
18.43
11.94
12.31
16.15
21.45
20.72
20.00
20.64
17.34
18.34
21.37
18.41
18.25
17.66
22.97
20.28

NOT.

16.38
16.18
26.54
27.52
22.60
21.88
22.83
18.37
19.43
19.93
16.40
24.14
18.72
12.82
14.40
17.80
23.19
20.19
19.94
20.01
19.86
17.71
20.30
18.00
17.83
15.32
22.68
19.75

Dec.

17.08
17.84
30.03
27.05
22.18
19.23
21.10
19.04
17.55
21.49
17.79
25.49
15.32
12.94
16.01
17.48
22.71
21.31
20.74
19.23
18.38
17.18
19.50
17.57
17.33
14.66
21.32

TABLE SHOWING PERCENTAGE OF LOANS TO DEPOSITS FOR YEARS 1882 TO 1909.
J"an.

Feb.

Marcil

April

1882 106.54 103.98 110.36 109.88
1883 104.82 103.04 106.94 110.39
1884 100.44 95.44
96.03 101.08
1885 .87.40
83.14
85.49
85.86'
1886 . 90.18
86.91
90.16
94.34
1887 . 94.15
92.49
95.93
98.12
1888 . 96.98
94.20
97.36
99.15
1889 . 95.90
92.70 94.24
97.46
1890 . 97.54 94.45 100.29
99.11
1891 . 99.72
95.50
98.13
99.30
1892 . 94.04
89.46
91.64
92.60
1893 . 96.93
93.80
98.01
98.79
1894. 80.70
76.01
82.64
81.27
.i:,.. 1895 . 89.27
89.62
91.64
95.95
~ 1896 . 94.74
91.12
95.09
96.50
1897 . 92.55
87.40
86.93
88.31
1898 . 88.91
86.30 88.92
87.32
1899 . 86.33
84.23
85.30 86.73
1900 . 90.50
87.91
90.90
91.89
1901 . 92.44 89.98
90.33
91.76
1902 . 93.88
92.25
91.15
94.05
1903 . 100.25 98.38 100.31 101.72
1904 . 102. 53 97.25
96.14
93.91
1905 . 96.46 92.73
95.41
96.57
1906 . 102.13
99.09 101.15 102.96
1907 . 104.96 102.03 103.00 102.57
1903 .104.83
99.89
98.63
96.47
1909 . 94.94
96.18 96.63
96.67

May

June

J"ul7

104.17
106.26
102.63
82.78
90.23
99.40
95.31
94.83
98.47
99.30
92.92
97.65
80.40
92.06
95.11
87.60
86.52
86.33
90.63
91.53
93.39
100.92
94.69
95.54
101.47
101.81
94.02
95.86

106.62
102.14
106.81
81.35
94.10
98.36
92.91
95.25
97.70
100.63
90.97
96.58
81.25
88.74
95.93
88.02
84.86
83.89 ,,
90.12
90.97
93.49
101.84
94.40
96.94
101.50
101.05
93.81
94.98

105.76 .
101.97
100.78
80.69
94.26
99.05
91.98
94.90
97.65
97.34
92.40
103.95
82.14
91.17
95.41
88.03
82.79
86.93
91.04
92.15
95.02
101.51
93.32
96.13
101.40
103.50
94.01
94.64

Aug.

104.78
100.99
94.69
79.90
95.03
99.44
92.17
95.00
96.53
96.12
92.51
109.33
82.97
88.78
96.87
87.76
85.81
88.69
89.80
91.91
96.00
99.89
90.98
95.75
100.11
102.54
90.98
95.98

Sept.

Oct.

NOT.

Dec.

107.59 109.92 110.12 109.41
103.22 104.50 105.29 102.76
94.22
92.34
87.33
95.02
83.12
85.84
89.56
89.91
97.21
98.00
98.12
97.23
100.13
99.08
98.23 100.25
95.00
94.43
95.99
95.80
95.82
98.87
98.54
98.96
101.73
97.24 100.94 102.53
96.36
99.41 100.83
98.64
95.61
97.52
98.55
99.93
84.05
106.90 98.30
89.91
86.18
83.68
84.87
84.10
89.83
94.47
94.51
93.94
101.30 99.60 100.80 94.10
89.71
. 88.75
92.36
90.89
89.30 90.51
88.29
88.33
91.21
88.78 90.91
92.01
90.42 93.10 93.59 93.00
93.89
93.41
92.58
93.10
98.24 100.02
98.30 100.19
100.70 101.75 103.69 104.63
91.80
92.03
95.30
96.77
97.50 100.06 100.59 101.67
102.08 102.07 103.72 105.00
104.72 105.12 109.27 110.46
95.89
92.96
94.46 94.37
97.90 99.80 101.28

So many inquiries have been received as to precedent concerning the so-called " bull Christmas or
January rise," that I have made a careful examination of this factor, covering each year since 1896.
It is found that at some time during the months of
December and January there has always been a
sharp advance. Even in cases where the two months
show a net decline there has invariably been a decided advance some time between the middle of
December and the middle of January. Even in 190607, when our recent panic was in its incipient stages,
we find a recovery of about three points on the
average, which is quite a movement under such circumstances as existed then. In order to show this
clearly I have produced the accompanying charts.
The composite chart shows the general trend for
a period of thirteen years. Composites are misleading at times. as one year can exert an influence sufficient to cancel the reverse action of a number of
years but in this instance the showing is fairly faithful.
There are, of course, fundamental reasons for this
seasonal trend.
M·oney almost always becomes
easier in January and thi s encourages speculation
and investment. The funds sent to the West for
crop-moving purposes are flowing back and the
January disbursements of dividend s and interest
either seek investment or are available in the loans.
But in the year 1910 we may not find this accustomed ease in money, and our seasonal changes
may suffer accordingly. On this subject the "Wa ll
Street Journal" of December 17, has the following:
- "What is indicated is that there is no cheap
money in sight. We usually count upon easy
rates when the dividend disbursements at the
beginning of the year return to the market. We
have no reason to expect anything of that kind
in 1910. Railroad borrowing is certain to be
heavy to say nothing of the requirements of the
United States Treasury and municipal demands.
The heaviest item will be the railroad demand,
which is likely to be especially importunate from
the possibilities of legislation at Washington .
If the Interstate Commerce Commission is to
be given the power of saying what financing
the railroads shall or shall not do, it is certain
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they will borrow all they can before the management of their own business is taken out of
their hands."
In producing charts of this kind I will reiterate
the statement that while such exhibits are interesting and educational, they are not offered as a basis
for trading. Precedents are frequently shattered
in Wall Street and when we consult them we should
make sure no variations have occurred in basic conditions which will change the trend.

1,
1,

THE FOREIGN SITUATION.
Political affairs in Europe during the week were
quiet and exerted little influence upon the money
market. The banks met -their maturing obligations
without any difficulties, and, as a result of the foresight of the directors in building up reserves with
a view of meeting the anticipated demand for the
end of the year and new year disbursements, it does
not appear probable that discount rates will advance much during the next two or three months.
The present state of the European discount markets
is indicated in the following table:
FOREIGN BANK AND DISCOUNT RATES.
Open
Bank
Market
Rate
Altered.
Market.
%
%
3t to 4
London . .
.4½ Dec. 9, 1909,
.3
Jan. 23. 1908,
2t
Paris . . .
4;
.5
Oct. 11, 1909,
Berlin . . . .
.5
Oct. 11, 1909,
Hamburg . . .
4¾
Oct. 13, 1909,
Amsterdam . .
.3
2¼
Brussels . . .
.3¼ Oct. 9, 1908,
21 to3
May 7, 1908,
Vienna . . .
.4
3¼
.5
Jan. 27, 1908,
4¼
Rome . . . .
5
.5
May 19, 1909.
St. Petersburg
Madrid . . .
.4¼ Aug. 21, 1901,
4¼
Jan. 9,1908,
5
Lisbon . . .
6
Oct. 15, 1909,
5
Stockholm .
.5
Copenhqgen .
.5
Oct. 11, 1909,
5
.5
Nov. 4, 1909,
Calcutta . . . .
4¼
Bombay . . . . . .6
Nov. 25, 1909
5½
The figures in the table show that the recent
extraordinary tightness in the money markets of
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England, Germany and France did not seriously disturb the money markets in other European countries. Bank and discount rates in Europe are but
little above normal, excepting in England and Germany.
German financial affairs arc the weakest in Europe. As the Imperial treasury deficit and taxation
increase, the political outlook becomes more involved
and commercial confidence is more and more
strained. The Socialists and Democrats are preparing to debate every item in the Budget in the Reichstag, while the Pan-Germanists, amongst whom are
the large landed proprietors and many influential
capitalists, arc advocating still greater naval expenditures. These factors, working in conjunction with
a strong tendency of a certain section of the people
to indulge in excessive stock speculation on the
exchanges, promise to seriously disturb German
finance in the next few months. Herr Kempf, Vice.President of the Reichstag, at a recent dinner at
the London Chamber of Commerce, after referring
to financial matters in Germany, expressed the opinion that as commerce and trade are yearly becoming
more international in their aspects, it is essential
for business men in each country to study and keep
informed in regard to political and financial conditions in other countries. But he regretted to notice
that "different Nations, by their economic policy,
have not only raised high walls and barriers of
tariffs, but are even going to enlarge them and make
them nearly insurmountable. This endless screw
must finally become unsupportable and I am personally convinced that the period of high protection
on the Continent is approaching its end, owing to
its exaggeration and inconveniences being more and
more felt." Herr Kempf added that the strongest
German political parties, the social democrats, the
Hansa-Bund and most of the Liberals are strong
free traders. That is why so much opposition is
being shown to the Budget, and the period during
which the Reichsbank must finance the Government
is being prolonged.
Stock speculation is again becoming active in
Austria notwithstanding the involved political outlook. Local railroad stocks are being bid up to
high figures and steel and iron, colliery and brewery
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and industrial shares generally are rapidly advancing
in value. This renewed speculation has been brought
about by some remarkable dividends lately declared
by important industrial corporations. The Smichow
Brewing Company, Prague, has declared a dividend
for the present fiscal year of SO per cent. Other
breweries, particularly the Bohemian breweries, have
also paid largely increased dividends this year. Good
reports are being made by the coal and iron companies. Such reports tend to prolong speculative
optimism.

A knotty problem that may soon affect European
financial affairs adversely, has arisen in the matter
of the re-chartering of the Austro-Hungarian Bank.
Its present charter expires at the end of 1910. The
bank is pleading with the Hungarian and Austrian
Governments for an extension of its charter up to
the end of 1917. The Hungarian Government, however, refuses to agree to the extension unless the
Austrian Government will make a binding arrangement in order to ensure that the bank's payments
are in future made in cash instead of, as hitherto,
-in its own notes. If this is not done the Hungarian
-Government will only consent to a short provisory
extension.

.11
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As the English parliamentary election campaign
proceeds the strong position of the Asquith party
becomes more pronounced. The Government candidates are everywhere well received, but the Conservative candidates are meeting difficulties in offering explanations of the Lords' action and of their
reasons for endeavoring to change the fiscal policy
of Great Britain, while the Government statistics
continue to show that the country is wonderfully
prosperous.
The election prospects have in no way disturbed
the financial outlook during the week and Stock
Exchange operators with Conservative tendencies
have resigned themselves to feeling that they must
endure the Asquith Government for a further period
of four years.
The Bank of England's weekly statement shows
the following changes:
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Total reserve.
Dec. £1,352,000
Circulation. .
Dec.
48,000
Bullion. . . . .
Dec.
1,399,635
Other securities
Inc.
872,000
Other deposits.
Dec.
1,228,000
Public deposits. . . . . . .
Inc.
729,000
Notes reserve. . . . . . . .
Dec.
1,304,000
Government securities . . . .
. . . Unchanged
The detailed weekly return compares as follows:
This Week.

Week ago.

Year ago.

Circulation. . . £27,305,000 £28,353,000 £29,146,000
Public deposits . 7,914,000
7,185,000
7,240,000
Private deposits 37,418,000 38,646,000 41,642,000
Gov't securities. 14,412,000
14,412,000
14,730,000
Other securities 23,968,000
23,095,000
29,542,000
Reserve. . . . . 24,654,000 26,006,000 22,321,000
Proportion of reserve to liab.
54.34%
56.71%
45.62%
Bullion . . . . . 34,820,000 37,219,000 32,831,000
Bank rate . . . .
4½%
4½%
2½%
The proportion of reserve to liabilities compares
as follows:
Year.

Per
Cent.

Bank
Rate.

Year.

Per
Cent.

Bank
Rate.

36.24
54.34
1905.
4%
1909.
4½%
41.36
45.62
1904.
1908.
3%
2½%
1903.
36.90
45.90
1907.
4%
7%
38.54
1906.
6%
This week's statement is weak in comparison with
that made last week and shows a decline in the proportion of the reserves to liability from 56.71 % to
54.34%. The statements during the remainder of
the year will, most probably, show similar or greater
declines. But no alarm should be caused by such
declines. La st month the Bank was compelled to
secure a large amount of gold from the Bank of
France by special contract s which specified that
the gold was to be returned before the first of the
new year. The return of this gold must weaken the
Bank statements in the next oouple of weeks.
The open discount market continues firm with the
highest rates for time money being asked and there
are no indications of cheap money being in sight.
The weekly statement of the Bank of France
shows the following chan g es:
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Franca.

Notes in circulation . . .
. Dec. 28,100,000
Treasury deposits . . . .
. Inc. 17,100,000
General deposits . . . . .
. Dec. 3,000,000
Gold in hand . . . . . .
Dec. 8,250,000
Silver in hand . . . . . . . . . .
. Dec. 1,200,000
Bills discounted . . . . . . . . . . . Dec. 8,750,000
Advances . . . . . . . . . . . .
. Inc. 2,925,000
The detailed statement compares as follows:
1909.
Francs.

1908.
Francs.

1907.
Francs

Gold . . . . . . 3,535,405,000 3,449,632,518 2,693,917,739
Silver . . .
. 893,150,000 891,709,314 927,043,054
Circulation . . 5,128,496,600 4,909,789,075 4,805,710,430
Gen. dep. . . . 578,154,600 552,336,207 490,183,545
Bills dis. . . . .1,108,252,200 628,768,157 1,213,712,950
Treas. adv. . . 195,573,900 164,498,087 254,347,014
The large decrease in gold in hand shown in this
week's statement is due to exports to Germany.
France, in addition to financing German home industries, also finances German colonial and foreign investments extensively.
Any tightness in the Berlin money market has,
consequently, to be attended to by French financiers.
The latest statement of the Reichsbank indicates
that the gold lost from the Bank of France is finding its way to Berlin.
The principal items in the Reichsbank's statement
this week are as follows:
Cash on hand increased 22,076,000 marks; loans increased 14,265,000 marks; discounts increased 13,303,000 marks; treasury bills increased 5,535,000 marks;
notes in circulation decreased 10,614.000 marks; deposits increased 94,081,000 marks; gold on hand decreased 20.502,000 marks.

TH-E GENERAL SITUATION.
The ge neral situation has received at least one
benefit from recent developments. Ever since the beginning of the sensational rise in cotton futures,
the spinning industry has been languishing on account of the increasing difficulties in the way of ob-.
taining supplies at prices which would show a profit
in manufacturing. These difficulties were intensified
by the refusal of yarn buyers to fully recognize the
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fact that the crop was very short. Selling agents,
who act as middlemen between the spinner and the
buyer, adopted a neutral attitude, leaning if anything toward the buyer. The views of both the
selling agents and yarn buyers have been somewhat modified by the Government report and other
private estimates which tend to confirm the ideas of
holders of the staple. Converters and printers have
begun to raise their bids for future delivery and
some bleached goods have been advanced 1 cent.
The unusually large percentage of cotton ginned
to date has been responsible for the reluctancy of
the consumers of yarn to accept the inevitable higher
range of prices. Now that a better understanding
has been reached the path of the spinner should be
more smooth.
Although the domestic situation has been helped
by clearing away the misunderstandings regarding
the size of the cotton crop, it is safe to assume that
our foreign trade relations are not benefitted. We
have already shipped out of the country an immense
amount of cotton at very high prices as compared
with .the same period a year ago, yet it has not maae
impression enough on our foreign trade balance
to anywhere near offset the unfavorable factors.
While world's shipments of wheat since July 1st are
9.5% greater than in the same period last year, exports from the United States are 23.1 % less. Canadian wheat is crowding our wheat to one side. About
one half the clearances from the Atlantic ports since
the Manitoba crop began to move has been Canadian wheat. Our next competition in this line will
come from the Argentine where the prospects are
favorable for a good sized surplus available for export.
In its bearing on the local money situation these
prospective Argentine shipments of wheat may easily
"catch us a-coming and a-going." That is to say,
unless conditions surrounding our foreign trade balance should change materially through absorption
of our securities on a large scale, or otherwise, we
may be called upon to send money to South America to pay for wheat taken by Europe which in years
past was drawn from the United States. In addition
to this our excess of merchandise exports over imports for past 11 months is the lowest for 10 years,
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the total being $218,998,103 as compared with $559,551,015 and $385,378,373 in the same periods of 1908
and 1907 respectively.
All this naturally leads to the subject of gold exports. Foreign Exchange is hovering so near the
point where shipments of the metal are profitable,
that the proposition of our losing more gold has
resolved itself into a question of how much, how
soon, and to where. Undoubtedly we will not be
unduly pressed in the matter, but London already
owes Paris something like $15,000,000 borrowed during the Budget crisis, and although Berlin was allowed to secure the $3,000,000 new South African
gold in the open market this week, negotiations
have been resumed with Paris looking to further shipments to London. The loans already made
by Paris mature some time in January. We may be
called upon by London to pay off some of these
loans by shipments direct to Paris. London cables,
however, report the arrival of a batch of American
securities this week, the first in many weeks. This
factor, if continued for any considerable period in
sufficiently large volume, may result in changing the
complexion of things so that gold shipments may be
eelayed or entirely obviated. There is a vast difference,
however, in the lasting benefits accruing from exports
of securities and shipments of commodities. We
never know how soon the former will be returned,
besides there is the interest and dividends on them
which go out of the country and add to the invisible
trade balance against us. In view of the demands
upon local bankers to meet the January dividend
and interest disbursements it is not likely that gold
in any great quantity will be withdrawn until that
strain is removed. Call rates are about stationary,
the predominating rate ruling between 4 and 5%.
There have been few developments in the iron
and steel trade outside the talk of a ~eneral strike
which is not worrying the big companies. Pig-iron
is still dull with foundry grades in the North following the lead of the South in making some concessions to consumers. There is no let down in
specifications on contracts expiring at the end of the
year. Structural sales are fairly large but the smaller
fabricators find it necessary to make some conces470

sions. Wire products have been advanced $1.00 per
ton.
The copper metal market has been steady under
the influence of the last prodl!.cers report and talk
of further curtailing the output. According to rumor
the services of John Hays Hammond, who, in the
past, has been so successful in directing the ventures of the Guggenheims, has been enlisted in the
merger negotiations, which is now believed to be
progressing very satisfactorily. The world's visible
supply of copper stocks increased 13,796,000 pounds
during November, but if the present rate of domestic consumption and decrease in production can be
maintained this unfavorable factor will quickly disappear.
The unusually heavy December arrivals of immigrants at Ellis Island, and the unprecedented rush
of holiday shopping throughout the country arc
favorable signs of a returned prosperity. Some of
the department stores report sales 40% greater than
in 1907 at this time and fully equal to those of the
record Christmas trade of 1906.
It is now definitely known that Eastern roads
will have to meet demands for increases in wages
ranging from 10 to 30 per cent. The men on 40
roads running eastward out of Chicago have voted
to ask for more pay. Conductors and trainmen
on the Lehigh Valley 'and on some of the New
England roads are putting their demands in shape
for presentation, and freight handlers on the Boston & Maine will ask for increases and a nine-hour
day. The switchmen's strike in the Northwest is
not causing much anxiety, and so far developments
rather favor th e railroads.

THE TECHNICAL SITUATION.
There is no improvement in the technical situation. Sentimental influence has resulted in a decrease in short commitments and an increase in
weak long accounts. This defection may be overcome by sentiment, manipulation and temporary improvement in money conditions, but I do not find
anything in the technique to be very enthusiastic
about. The shortage in high-priced rails is still
considerable and there are no big short lines of industrials . This gives the manipulators in rails a
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shade of advantage from the stock market standr,oint, but such conditions change very quickly.
I do not think industrials can be advanced much
on the short interest. They must depend on their
merits and prospects. However, an orderly advance
based on recognition of values is much more desirable than a soda water bulge based on market conditions.

CONCLUSION.
While present indications point to a rise in prices
before there is any decided decline, I fear that rise
will be founded more on muscle than on merit. This
refers most particularly to railroad securities. The
railroad corporations are going to run into complications ·before long and unless they are permitted
to advance traffic rates as their cost of producing
transportation advances, we are going to find a falling off in net earnings mighty soon. Also an increase in general capitalization and consequently in
fixed charges is bound to occur. The industrials
are in a better p osition. The metal stocks should do
better and most of the other industrials, with the
exception of the traction stocks have fair prospects
for a further advance, but we must at all
times consider the fact that our recovery
from the panic of 1907 has been unprecedentedly rapid;
that we have in a very brief
period recovered all we lost through our
former extravagance and over-confidence; that the
causes which produced the cataclysm are not cured;
and that there are reasons-world-wide reasonsfor exercising caution and discrimination.
·
If the stock market was at a low level I would
feel no hesitancy in recommending purchases of
stocks, but it is not at a low level and it continually
occurs to me that our convalescence from a serious
illness may have been too rapid and that we may
suffer a relapse. When we got into trouble a.
couple of years ago we quit importing diamonds and
wines; we are at it again full tilt, and this is only
a little personal example of how quickly we forget
the lessons of the past, either as a nation or as individuals. It is much the same thing.
As has been stated in recent letters, I personally
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look for hig her stock price s, but that is a stock
market opinion. The position of an advisor who
naturally wants to come as near as possible the
approximate culmination of a big movement, becomes pa rticularly difficult when he finds prices up
in the air ; general conditions and manipulative tactics pointing to further advances and, on the other
hand, secs in prospective many ominous signs. In
the beg inn ing of 1907 I had no hesitation whatever
in recommending short sales all around the room.
In 1908 and up to August, 1909, it was as easy
as rolling off a log to foresee a great recovery, but
just at present I'm a mighty skeered man and I
may add that every conscientious student or advisor
I know is in the same frame of mind.
I trust my friend s will understand that in my
present half-hearted stand I am working to protect
their interests and to arrive at correct conclusions.
We may, I think, pursue our bullish policy for a
time and I shall leave no stone unturned to gauge
the turning point. If the stock market and its
movements could be reduced to an exact science in
which general conditions and stock price movements
were in unison, we would have no trouble, but the
divergence is great. Anyhow, it will not be very
long until the indications are clearer.
Would buy American Smelters, Amalgamated
Copper, Consolidated Gas, the equipment stocks and
other favorably placed industrials on the declines .
and sell high-priced rail s and Steel common on all
advances for the present.

The following 14 charts show the average daily
movements of 20 Railroads and 12 Industrial Stocks
during the months of December and January for
the years from 1896-7 to 1908-09, inclusive. Rails
are shown on the left and Industrials on the right
of each chart. The last chart is a composite of the
preceding charts. The Wall Street Journal's figures
are used.
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DECEMBER 24, 1909.

The stock market this week has been a rather quiet
affair with a ragged appearance. The features of
the week, marketwise, have been a sharp rise in
Consolidated Gas and increased interest in the
metals stocks. Steel common has not shown its
usual vitality and is still for sale on every hard
spot. Manipulation is largely confined to the highpriced railroad issues, but here also liquidation is
detected on the advances. The only good buying
of an investment character in this group i~ in Pennsylvania.
In recent daily letters I have suggested that the
securities founded on the metals might spring into
prominence as market leaders at any time. It looks
now as if such issues as Amalgamated Copper and
Smelters are in a position to lead a speculative upturn. For some time the two stocks mentioned and
others in that class have been accumulated by good
interests wherever offered. My investigations lead
me to believe that the lines have been pretty well
filled up and that we may reasonably anticipate a
decided advance in the near future. Later on I
think the equipment issues will be given a shove
upward, but of course such views are tentative and
might be reversed or modified by adverse developments.
The general market bears the appearance of being
in the distributive stages. This does not mean that
we have reached the top. On the other hand it is
almost always necessary to keep the pot boiling in
order to facilitate distribution. 1906 was a year of
liquidation, but there was something domg every
week and the general level of prices was practically
the same at the beginning and end of the year. Discrimination in purchases and sales made the profits
in 1906 and this will be true of 1910, or at least of
the first half of that year. No matter how frequently the statement is made that stocks do not always
move up or down homogeneously, a good many people will stick to the idea that they do. Let us take
a look at the movements of active stocks during the
last three months and see what has happent>d.
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Table showing movements of active stocks during last quarter of 1909:
Stock.

Olos. 1-'r. Oct. 1. Olos. Pr. Dec.22. Adv.

Amalgamated Copper . . 83i
American Beet Sugar . . 47¾
American Can . . . . . 13
American Car & Foun. . 70
American Locomotive . . 61
American Smelters .
. mot
American Tel. & ' Tel.
. 142½
American Wool .
. 38¼
Anaconda .
. 49
Atchison . . . . .
. 124i
Baltimore & Ohio .
.u8i
Canadian Pacific .
. 188½
Central Leather . .
. 46i
Chesapeake & Ohio .
. 89¼
Chi., Mil. & St. Paul . . 161½
Colorado Fuel & Iron . 45i
Consolidated Gas .
. 146¼
Corn Products
. 22½
Distillers Securities .
. 37¼
Erie . . . • . .
. 33!
General Electric
. 167½
Great Northern . . . . . . 153¾
Illinois Central .
. 152ft
Kansas City Southern . . 451
Mo., hansas & Texas . . . 411
Missouri Pacific .
. 70
National Lead .
. 90½
New York Central
. 136¼
Northern Pacific
. 155i
Norfolk & Western
. 95½
Pennsylvania . . . .
. 149
Pressed Steel Car .
. soi!
Reading . . . . . . .
. 169
Republic Iron & Steel . . 48¼
Rock Island
. 39i
Sloss Sheffield
. 92½
Southern Pacific .
. 133¼
Southern Railway .
. 30¼
Union Pacific .
. 208!
U. S. Realty & Imp .
83
United States Rubber
53½
United States Steel
92
Wabash.
19i
Western Union .
79
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88¼
47¼
13¼
71i
60¼
102i
142¼
37¼
50¾
121¼
n7½
179i!
47

861

157½
soi
159¼
22¾
37½
33i
159½
143¼
147
43½
48i
71½
88¾
1231
1451
99½
136i
52
171i
451
4Si
86!
134¼
Jit
202
81½
53!
9It
21i
77

Dec.

4i

i
¼
It

i

It
¼

!

•Ii
31

ra ·

i

91
2¼
4

Si
13
¼
¼
½
8
rn½
Si
2i
7¾
I½

ii
•71
rn¼

4
1i
2i

•st
21

6¼
s!
11
Ii
6!
It
¼

i

2
2

• New York Central rights having a market value
of $6 is deducted from the decline in price. Pennsylvania rights quoted at 8½ is also subtracted in
the case of that stock.
I have frequently referred to the growing popularity of industrial issues as compared with rails. The
Journal of Commerce in its issue of December 23
clinches this idea by a statistical exhibit. The figures show that in the last year there has been a decrease of 16,752 in the number of railroad stockholders and an incrt:ase of 3,900 in the number of
industrial stockholders. The money is going into
industrials-that's where it belongs.
As the article referred to is very instructive, I will,
by kind permission of the Editor of the Journal of
Commerce, reproduce it in full as a special letter
next week.
If the theory that discrimination is all-important
at present is correct, it is as necessary to find out
what not to buy as what to buy. The ice is thick
enough to skate on for a while, but it is a good
scheme to put up the danger signals on the thin
spots. Urban traction issues appeal to me as the
poorest bargains on the list. They are hampered by
a rigid fixed fare and meanwhile the cost of producing transportation continues to rise. The surface
lines are in the worst fix. Let us look at the affairs
of the Metropolitan Street Railway, which controls
all the surface lines of the Interboro CorpMation.
The Metropolitan Street Railway, as now operated,
consists of three classes of lines, namely, those operated upon guarantees of interest on bonds and rental
of stock, those operated upon fixed rentals without
guarantees of interest on bonds, if any, and those
operated as a result of actual merger, whose stock
has been, since date of merger, represented by stock
of the Metropolitan Street Railway, and whose bonds
have been assumed as underlying bonds of the Metropolitan Street Railway Company. In this latter
division may be classed, for the purpose of convenience, the Thirty-fourth Street Crosstown Road, all
of whose stock is owned by the Metropolitan Street
Railway, although never actually exchanged for Metropolitan Street Railway stock and thus retired.
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The Thirty-fourth Street is now operated under an
agreement with its bondholders whereby the Metropolitan supports the bonds, and therefore to all practical purposes is in the same position as the roads
actually merged.
The roads thus described in general ,Jivide into
the following classes, according to the condition of
operation:
1. Roads operated under guarantee of interest and
rental in a given per cent on their capital ~tock:
Road.

Securities.

Interest and
Rental.

Bleecker St. & Fulton Ferry R. R.
$700,000
First Mortgage Bonds
4'7'0
900,000
Capital Stock
I½o/o
Broadway & 7th Avenue R. R.
$500,000
Second Mortgage Bonds s?'o
7,650,000
1st Consolid'd Mtg. Bonds so/o
2,100,000
Capital Stock
Ioo/o
Central Crosstown Railway.
$250,000
First Mortgage Bonds
6%
Christopher & 10th St. R. R.
$210,000
First Mortgage Bonds
650,000
Capital Stock
42nd St. & Grand St. Ferry R. R.
$748,000
Capital Stock
18%
2. Roads operated at a fixed rental:
Road.

Securities.

Eighth Avenue Railway
$750,000
First Mortgage Bonds
1,000,000
Capital Stock
Ninth Avenue Railway
$800,000
Capital Stock
Sixth Avenue Railway
$2,000,000
Capital Stock
23rd Street Railway
$6oo,ooo
Capital Stock
New York & Harlem Railway
(4th & Madison Surface Lines)

$28,000
13,500
25,000
382,500
210,000
15,000

8,400
52,000
134,640
Rental.

$215,000
64,000
140,000
108,000

400,000
Note as to the above: The Eighth Avenue, the
Sixth Avenue and the Ninth Avenue Railways have
retained their original boards of directors, although
their operation is entirely by the Metropolitan sys-
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tern. The bonds of the Eighth Avenue road bear
6% interest, requiring $45,000, and leaving $175,000
or 17% for the stock. The Ninth Avenue rental
figures to 8%; the Sixth Avenue rental to 7%, and
the 23rd Street rental to 18% on the stocks of those
roads respectively. It is impossible to approximate
a capitalization for the Fourth and Madison Avenue
surface line of the New York and Harlem Railroad,
inasmuch as it has no corporate existence ~eparately
from the railroad itself and is leased for a flat sum
as real estate would be leased.
3. Interest requirements on merged roads:
Road.

Intereet.

8ecurltlea

Broadway Surface Railway
$1,500,000 First Mortgage Bonds
5% $ 75,000
Columbus & Ninth Avenue Railway
150,000
$3,000,000 First Mortgage Bonds
5%
Lexington Avenue & Pavonia Ferry Ry.
250,000
$5,000,000 First Mortgage Bonds
5%
South Ferry Railway
$350,000 First Mortgage Bonds
17,500
5%
Thirty-Fourth St. Crosstown Ry.
$1,000,000 First Mortgage Bonds
5%
50,000
There are also miscellaneous charges of a corporate nature connected with the above rentals amounting to $15,000 a year and $3,500,000 receivers' certificates, on which the interest requirement is $157,500.
We have, therefore, by classes the folh,wing securities and charges for interest and rentals:
Securlth,1.

Charges.

$13,708,000
5,400,000
10,850,000
3,500,000

$ 869,040
527,000
542,500
157,500

$33,458,000
To which add:
Rental on New York & Harlem line
Miscellaneous . . .

$2,096,040

Class I
Class 2
Class 3 . . . . . .
Receivers' Certificates

400,000
15,000
$2,5u,040

Total
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In addition the receivers now estimate
the taxes and other charges of a public
nature remaining in force, as follows:
Taxes:
Other than Special Franchise. $610,000
Special Franchise Taxes.
705,000
Snow Removal.
.
300,000
Paving. . . . . . . . . .
150,000
$1,765,000
Grand Total, all charges in force . . . . $4,276,040
For the purpose of a general comparison of these
charges with the earning capacity of the Metropolitan Street Railway as now operated, the income
account of the Metropolitan Street Railway receivers from August I, 1908, to June 30, 1909, and the
income account of the receivers of the New York
City Railway for the month of July, 1908, the last
month when they had charge of operation, may be
considered. But the comparison is not an exact one,
for the reason that it includes the operation of the
Second Avenue Railroad from June 30th to November 13th, 1908, the operation of the Central Park,
North & East River Railroad from June 30, to
August 6, 1908, and the operation of th.: 28th and
29th Streets Crosstown Railroad from June 30, to
October r, 1908. Bearing in mind that these roads
are all now out of the system and therefore not
included in present charges or receipts, the income
account of the Metropolitan Street Railway as operated by receivers for the year ending June 30, 1909,
shows:
Receipts from Operation. .
$13,194,732.63
Operating Expenses . . ..
9,845,697.84
Operating Income
Other Income

$ 3,349,034.79
208,326.15

Gross Income
Nor were all the charges which the receivers now
estimate against the road met during the year ended
June 30, 1909. The charges for snow removal and
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for paving claims were not included in the report
submitted for that year. It will, therefore, not be
possible to make an absolute comparison between
charges now imposed on the system and its earning capacity, until the end of the current fiscal year,
and if the Madison Avenue Line is taken out of the
system the same difficulty will then arise v, ith reference to that line, as ·now exists in respect of the
Second Avenue, the Central Park, North & East
River, and the 28th and 29th Street Lines.
It is probable therefore, that the best comparison
which can be made at the present time, is obtained
by taking the reports of the receivers of the New
York City and Metropolitan Street Railway as given
above, and adding thereto the reports of the receivers of the Second Avenue and 28th & 29th Street
Lines, and the report of the Central Park, North &
East River Line, now operated by its stockholders,
from the dates when these last mentioned roads
went out of the Metropolitan system, to June 30,
1909. Thereby a result is obtained which covers the
entire Metropolitan system, as it existed before the
receiverships, with the exception of the Third Avenue Road and its subsidiaries, which are in process
of a separate reorganization.
This combination of reports makes the following
showing for the year ended June 30, 1909:
Receipts from Operation . . . . . . . $14,234,753.87
Operating Expenses . . . . . . . . . . 10,793,585.34
Operating Income .
Deduct Taxes . . . .

$3,441,168.53
1,417,353.44

Income less Taxes . . . .
Add Non-Operating Income

$2,023,815.09
213,959.65

Gross Income . . .
Interest and Rentals

$2,237,774.74
2,532,843.77

Deficit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $295,069.03
If these figures are compared with the $33,458,000
securities on which default has not been entered,
or with the $2,su,040 charges for interest and rentals
now in force, there should be added to the totals
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just stated $1,280,000 General Consolidated Mortgage Bonds of the Second Avenue Railroad carrying an interest charge of $64,000. While the default
of the Metropolitan Street Railway on the Second
Avenue road's rental included default on these
bonds, the interest on them has been continued by
the receiver of the Second Avenue road. There is
a peculiar situation also on the Central Crosstown
road. The receivers are operating that road under
an agreement with its note holders whereby the interest on the $250,000 first mortgage bonds is paid,
along with operating expenses and taxes. There are,
however, $2,250,000 three-year notes which are in
default, along with a rental of rs% on $600,000 of
stock, but these defaults have not been pressed and
the Central Crosstown is allowed to remain in the
Metropolitan system for operation.
It should also be noted that the amount of interest and rentals now in force on leased lines, according to the first tabulations given, which were
obtained from Oren Root, the general manager for
the receivers, does not correspond exactly with the .
amount reported to the Public Service Commission
as having been accrued or paid out as the case
might be. The differences are accounted for, first,
by the fact that certain of the securities on which
rentals and interest are stated as being in force, are
owned by the Metropolitan Street Railway itself, and
secondly, by the fact that the receivers either paid,
or recognized as having accrued during the year
ended June 30, 1909, part interest on the Central
Crosstown notes now defaulted and part of the
rental on the Second Avenue and Central Park,
North and East River roads, inasmuch as the separation of the two lines last named did not come
until after the beginning of the fiscal year, and interest on the Central Crosstown notes was not suspended until last Spring. Nor did the receivers pay
all the interest and rentals which accrued on the
leased lines. The figures in total, upon such interest
and rentals, therefore are: Interest and rentals on
leased lines paid 1908-1909, $1,667,218.87; accrued
1908-1909, $1,890,421.50; now in force, $1,796,040.
Without taking into consideration the securities
of the Third A venue system, the following are those
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upon which default has been made down to the
present time:
Annual

Interest.

Metropolitan Street Railway Company:
General and Collateral
Trust Mort. Bonds . .$12,500,000@ s% $625,000
4% Ref. Mort. Bonds . 16,6o4,ooo 4%
664,16o
Div. Ren. on Cap. Stock 52,ocio,000 7o/o 3,640,000
Met. Cross. Ry. Co.
1st. Mortgage Bonds .
600,000
5%
30,000
Central Crosstown Railroad Company:
go,ooo
Div. Ren. on Cap. Stock
600,000 15%
3-Year Notes . . . . . 2,250,000
5%
n2,500
Fulton Street Railroad Company:
First Mortgage Bonds .
500,000 4%
20,000
Central Park, North & East River R. R. Co. :
Div. Ren. on Cap. Stock I,8oo,ooo 9%
162,000
28th & 29th Streets Crosstown Railroad Co. :
First Mortgage Bonds . 1,500,000
5%
75,000
Second Avenue Railroad Company:
1st. Con. Mortg. Bonds 5,631,000 5%
281,550
Div. Ren. on Cap. Stock 1,862,000 9%
167,580
Debenture Bonds . . .
89,000
4,450
s%
$95,936,000

$5,872,240

The lesson of this analysis of the situation on the
Metropolitan Street Railway does not comprise advice to sell the traction stocks short. The whole
basis of trading in them is too fictitious to admit of
any suggestion on that subject whatever, except as
they may be tipped from day to day on the basis
of a pure gamble. The intention here has been to
show the absolute lack of earning capacity behind
any and all of the securities now in default on the
surface roads in the Metropolitan system, and the
tremendous gulf that must be bridged before the
system can be operated, even in its present state,
without prospect of disintegration. The word to
operators in the market is then: Keep out of tractions altogether unless you want to buy th em as you
would chips in a poker game, which may be cashed
in as long as the game lasts, but are worth nothing as soon as the house is closed up for the night.
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THE FOREIGN SITUATION.
As the holidays approach, financial affairs in the
leading European commercial centers slacken up.
During the week business on the Stock Exchanges
was comparatively small in extent and featureless.
Little attention was given to political affairs and the
only prominent indices of the condition of the money
markets were the open discount rates which everywhere exhibited a hardening tendency.
Commercial conditions in Europe are generally
good. Capital for new industrial enterpri~es is being freely supplied in Germany and France. French
capitalists are purchasing large quantities of British
gold mining and copper stocks. French investors
believe that the American Copper Trust, reported to
have been formed early last year by the late H. H.
Rogers with the co-operation of Standard Oil people, is now under the management of J. P. Morgan,
and that, notwithstanding the severe expres~ions relative to the operations of tru sts contained in the
re cent decision on the Standard Oil charges, the
Copper Trust will continue its manipulation of the
copper markets, and, when conditions are suitable,
will advance the price of the metal to a much more
remunerative figure than the present. In additioru
to apparently reliable information gained fro011
French banking sources, French investors have been,
favorably impressed by the manner in which the
copper markets were handled during the present::
year. Notwithstanding the rapid weekly advance in
surplus supplies in the metal, the large mines continued to work fully manned, metal prices were well
maintained, and all the surplus metal was taken care
of. The good work done by the trust under unfavorable circumstances leads French investors to
believe that great activity will be witnesse:l in copper mining next year, when the demand for copper
is expected to overtake the supply. The French
purchasing of copper shares started a couple months
ago, when large quantities of Rio Tinto shares were
acquired. Copper investments are now broadening
out into the shares of all the large copper mines
traded in on the European Stock Exchanges.
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French and Dutch investors believe that standard
gold mining shares have seen their lowest prices
and they are making very extensive purchases of the
shares of good gold mining corporations. This new
investment trend in mining shares will be well reflected in the mining markets early next year.
Industrial stocks are the most active on the Berlin
and Vienna Bourses. The increased dividends being
paid by the large electrical companies are causing
their shares to rise in value. Steamship Company's
shares are active in anticipation of good earnings
during the next six months.
English trade reports are optimistic. The manufacturing industries in the Midland counties arc
running overtime; excepting the Lancashire cotton mills, which are running short time un account
of the high price of cotton. The Northeast Coast
districts all report brisk business. Business in Scotland and Wales is also steadily improving.
Commodity prices in Europe continue to advance.
The Economist's index number for November, 1909,
was 2333, as compared with 2r76 in March, and 2196
at the end of January. The steady advance in prices
this year is shown by the Economist's index numbers
as follows:
1909
Index
Index
1909
End of January .
2196 End of July
2254
End of February . . . 2190 End of August
2255
End of March
2176 End of September.
2258
End of April .
. 2197 End of October ..
2306
End of May .
. 2225 End of November.
2333
End of June .
. 2240
It will be noted that the November index is more
than 7% greater than that of March, and 6.2% greater than that of January. Bradstreet's index numbers, covering prices in the United States during the
same period, show that prices at the end of November were II% higher than at the beginning of the
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present year. Prices have risen at a greater rate in
the United States than in Europe.
European financial authorities are greatly puzzled
in regard to the money outlook for the new year.
They want to take optimistic views and look forward
to plentiful supplies at low rates. Many corporations are waiting to issue bonds and shares, new
projects are ready to be financed, and a large number of municipal and foreign and colonial loans are
ready to be placed whenever the money markets are
in a position to enable the transactions to be carried
out profitably. Money is always, as a rule, ·plentiful
about the middle of January. Will conditions conform to the rule this year, or will they form an exception? The extraordinary political complications
at present existing will probably continue to affect
the money markets adversely. As far as can be
seen at present, money is not likely to be cheap in
January, and it is possible that discount, will remain about present figures until well into February
or March.
The Economist, London, in editorially commenting upon the money outlook states that "The consequences of the rejection of the budget by the
Lords are not well understood in London; even the
,administration officials themselves, after reading the
Premier's speech, might, in the absence of secret
instructions, feel a little in the dark as to what they
ought, or ought not to do. It will be found, we
think, that large additional and extraordinary demands upon the money market will be made by the
government, and it is idle to pretend to argue, as
some do, that this will not have the effect of making
money dearer in London than it otherwise would
be. For three or four months, London is likely to
be at a disadvantage as compared with other great
centers; for some of the money borrowed, even by
a government, which is disbursed freely, has a tendency to 'stick' and remain off the market."
The Bank of England's statement this week compares as follows:
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This Week ,

Last W eek.

Laat Year.

Circulation . . . £29,083,000 £ 27,305,000 £30.035,000
Public deposits .
9,768,000
7,962,000
7,914,000
Private deposits 40,986,000
37,418,000 42,560,000
Govt. securities. 14,462,000
14,412,000
14,730,000
Other securities. 31,208,000 23,968,000
34,152,000
Reserve . . . . . 22,798,000
24,654,000
19,357,000
Prop. of res. to
liabilities .
44.89%
38.30 %
54.34%
Bullion . . .
34,820,000 30,757,000
33,743,000
Bank rate . .. .
2½ %
4½%
4½ %
The Bank's position is weakening again, as I predicted it would in last week's letter. The directors
anticipated the calls now being made upon its resources fully three months ago, and took steps to
fortify the Bank's reserves. The proportion of reserve to liabilities this week is 44.89%, as compared
with 35.09%-the average proportion during the
past eight years. The Bank, however, is still in a
strong position and able to meet all the calls likely
to be made upon its resources without any further
advancement of its discount rate.
The weekly · statement of the Bank ct France
shows the following changes :
Francs.

Notes in circulation . . .
Inc.
975,000
Treasury deposits . . . . .
Inc. 5,750,000
General deposits .
Dec.
100,000
Gold in hand . . . . . .
Dec. 28,375,000
Silver in hand . . .
Dec.
8oo,ooo
Bills discounted . . . . . .
Inc. 40,975,000
Advances . · . . . . . . . . . .
Inc. 1,100,000The detailed statement compares as follows:
1909.

1908.

Francs.

Francs.

1907.

Francs.

Gold . .
8,502,000,000 3,448,390,000 2,690,938,231
Silver . .
892,350,000
889,629,000
924,4u ,504
Circulat'n
5,139,463,86o 4,934,365,000
48o,581 ,450
G. dep. .
578,056,892
573,450,000
488,976,o66
Bs. disc. . . 846,o66,ooo
654,772,000 1,216,042,612
Tr. ad. . . . 201 ,336,200
165,367,000
258,036,285

THE GENERAL SITUATION.
Money was the overshadowing influence in the
general situation this week although other factors,

500

such as labor agitation, politics, the copper merger
and railroad earnings attracted more or less attention.
The money question in all its ramifications reverts
back in the end to the problem of how much money
will be available in the near future for speculative
· purposes and at what rate will speculators be able
to obtain it. The first thing to be determined in this
connection is how much or how little of our stock
of surplus gold will be allowed to remain in this
country, or, to state it in another way, how soon
and to what points will we be asked to ship gold to
help liquidate the trade balance which is enormously
against us, and which is not being improved to any
appreciable degree by the outward movement of
commodities, particularly as regards food -stuffs.
True, merchandise exports are increasing, but so
also are imports increasing just as fast. The only
thing that saves this phase of the situation from
being an exceedingly dangerous one is the enormous
exports of cotton and the high prices received for
the staple. It must be kept in mind, however, that
during the past eleven months we have lost $80,000,000 in gold which must be considered as applying
to the indebtedness abroad. It being conceded that
when Europe calls for gold we must respond, the
next question is one of European necessity which is
pretty well covered under the head of The Foreign
Situation. A great deal hinges on the wants of Germany and Austria. London and Paris are pretty
well provided for but they must listen to calls from
the continent and other centers. London will not
press us unduly, but, as the World's Banker, she
must keep up reserves until after English political
questions are settled. During most of the week the
foreign exchange market hovered so near the point
where exports to London or Paris were profitable
that it seemed almost certain that they could not be
avoided, but the efforts of our financial interests
resulted in the danger being passed for at least another week. In connection with our foreign trade
relations the uncomfortable thought obtrudes also
that there is a possibility that high prices on our
Stock Exchange may have tempted foreign holders
to part with some of their American holdings. Certainly there have been plenty of opportunities in
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this direction to add to the balance against us. The
ne~t thing to consider is the extent of new capital
demands, which, judging from present indications,
can only be measured by the ability of the various
corporations to secure the services of underwriters.
These things, together with the demands for general
business purposes, the return of crop-moving money
to this center, the return flow of interest and dividend disbursements, and the attitude of the speculative public itself, are the factors which will most
directly affect money rates in the next few weeks.
The importance of the return of crop money is
modified by the knowledge that a more than usually
large percentage of the crops was financed this year
by the interior banks. The return of interest and
dividend money will naturally be divided between
actual purchases of stock and bank deposits which
eventually seeks the loan market and therefore one
channel about offsets the other.
There is one
other factor, more or less transitory in character,
which has already begun to be felt and which had a
great deal to do with the advance in call rates this
week to 6%. That is, the shifting back to the banks
in this center of a number of loans which had been
switched from New York to the interior when there
seemed danger that the associated banks' reserves
would go below 25%. According to the National
Banks' reports to the Comptroller of the Currency,
loans throughout the United States expanded nearly
$20,000,000 from September rst to November 16th,
while New York City reduced them $121,000,000
showing quite clearly the extent of the shifting to
out-of-town institutions. The future extent of this
re-shifting movement will depend largely upon the
demands of general business on the interior banks.
Taking everything into consideration the conclusion is inevitably reached that no "easy" money,
such as was so much in evidence early in this year,
can be reasonably expected, and that it is within the
bounds of possibility that flurries may occur.
General business is brisk. Iron and Steel show
a few signs of weariness in the volume of new
orders but the mills are months behind on old
orders and the momentum will no doubt carry them
along until a fresh spurt of activity is inaugurated.
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The demand for finished goods shows no abatement.
The equipment companies are feeling the effects
of railroad labor troubles to some extent, and report a scarcity of new car orders. The American
Locomotive Company is having labor troubles of
its own which are aggravated by threats of a sympathetic strike to aid the boilermakers, who are still
out.
The copper metal situation, thanks to the progress
of the merger and a better domestic and foreign
demand by consumers, is gradually working around
into its rightful position. The Westinghouse Co.,
which is a large consumer of copper, has received
an order from the New York Central for 50 electric
locomotives of the largest type ever built. The
electrical industry in Germany has received a fresh
impetus and is now in full swing. Voluntary reduction of the output in this country is already having
a beneficial effect upon the price of the metal.
The publication of the Census Bureau's report of
9,362,000 bales of cotton ginned to date has caused
fresh hesitancy on the part of yarn buyers on account of the doubt cast thereby upon the Government estimate of the cotton crop of 10,088,000 bales.
As a n:sult Southern spinners are again talking
about curtailing their output and have arranged a
meeting with selling agents at Charlotte, S. C., on
January 4th. Some of the New England mills have
already shut down until after Christmas.
Silk
manufacturers are also beginning to complain of the
disparity between cost of raw materials and selling
prices, and have inaugurated a curtailing movement.
Labor troubles have been added to by trainmen's
demands on all roads East of the Mississippi River
and some far Eastern roads, and a threat of interference in the switchmen's strike in the Northwest
by the Federation of Labor, but the situation has
been improved by the concessions made by the
Pennsylvania and Lehigh Valley roads and the decision of the telegraphers on the Illinois Central to
submit their differences to Government arbitrators.
There are signs of more unrest among the garment
workers in New York and other Eastern cities.
Politically, very little has developed except the
legislative recommendations by the Interstate Com•
0

503

merce Commission, which would empower them to
investigate reasons prior to and not after an advance in freight rates. The commission's report
of railroad earnings to June 30th shows that per
mile gross earnings were $10,704 against $10,788 in
the previous year; expenses $7,133 vs. $7,544 and net
$3,189 vs. $2,877-the loss in gross being more than
made up by the economies in operation and maintenance.

THE TECHNICAL SITUA'l'ION.
The technical situation has grown weaker in the
last few days. The long marginal interest has increased
and the short interest has been further reduced.
This is probably due to a belief in the proverbial
January rise. The short interest is greatest in the
high-priced rails and is particularly large in Reading.
There is also a rather large shortage in Steel Common. The long interest as well as the investment
demand is greatest in the industrials. Th:s state of
affairs temporarily counteracts natural movements,
but will not be powerful enough to cause any marked
advance in rails or any marked decline in industrials.
A quick advance of two or three points against the
bears would materially reduce the short i'1t ere st but
a decline of equal proportions in the leading industrials would only result in good buying. The bulls
are much better fortified than are the bears.

CONCLUSION.
For the present it appears to be a safe policy to
buy such stocks as Amalgamated Copper, American
Smelting and Refining and Consolidated Gas on the
declines. It was suggested in the daily letter of
December 21 that Consolidated Gas was subject to
some profit-taking and that it would nor be wise
to follow up the advances. This view h11s proved
correct, but on the little r ecessions I find continued
good buying.
If a quick shake-out of moderate proportions, say
two or three points, occurs in the equipment stocks
they should be picked up. Such a flurry would be
the natural forerunner of a campaign in the group.
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Steel Common, Reading, Union Pacific, New York
Central and the other high-priced rails should be
sold on the advances.
In the last weekly letter I offered the opinion that
the ease in money which is usually founcl in January might not materialize this year. I find that a
good many authorities are of the same opinion. The
demand for funds both at home and abruad is unusually pressing.
The charts issued with the letter reierred to
showed that for 13 years we have witnessed a general advance some time between December 15 and
January 15. Of course, blind confidence in such prr.cedents is wholly unwarranted. The logical thing to
do is to inquire why such seasonal advances occur
and we can at once put our finger on the causeeasy money. But if the basic cause is abs ent the result will be absent. In my opinion we should give
careful attention to this phase of the quesLion, now.
Money conditions will be continually scrutinized
and referred to in the forthcoming letters.

sos

DECEMBER 31, 1909.
The holiday week has been enlivene<! by a sensational movement in Rock Island. Otherwise the
market has kept within reasonable bounds and has
followed natural lines. If the Rock Island episode
had not occurred the paragraphers and financial
writers would have been in a pretty bad hole, as
there was no other development or incident worth
talking about. Personally I do not intend to add
much to the Rock Island literature, but a few remarks on the subject may be apropos.
To begin with, the episode amounts to nothing
marketwise. When the quick advance from so to 81
occurred Monday morning there was a moderate decline in prices throughout the general list. The reason for this was that almost every speculator remembers the events of May 9, 1901, and many of
them are in terror of a recurrence of that affair.
They do not stop to analyze the causes. They have
no time for analogy, even if they possess a capacity•
for rapid calculation and discrimination. They want
to get away from danger and they proceed to get.
The limited decline in prices on Monday and the
prompt recovery demonstrates one thing, and that
is, that securities are still in strong hands. If the
technical situation had happened to be rotten when

this flurry hit us there would have been a very sharp
break, extending to probably six or eight points on
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the average. As it was, all offerings were taken
and the market resumed its normal trend at once.
This ill wind has therefore blown us a little goodwe. know more about the location of stocks than we
did before.
So far as the causes which brought about this
convulsion are concerned, I know nothing about it
and I don't think anybody else does. It may have
been an accident, a combination of circumstances, or
it may have been a deliberate bit of manipulation.
Whatever it was, the Stock Exchange has taken
the matter promptly in hand and will carry their investigation to a tinish. Of course, a great many
intolerant critics will blame the Stock Exchange,
and a number of rural legislators will introduce bills
damning speculation, and some self-styled economists who wear spectacles made of plain glass will
multiply words (with the assistance of Roget's Thesaurus) condemning all operations in _securities, but
the fact remains that the New York Stock Exchange
is using every effort to check and kill manipulation
of every character. This has been shown in a dozen
instances in the last year. We might as well blame
a national bank because one of its employees eloped
with part of the bank roll as to blame the Stock
Exchange because one of its members, or a few of
its members, violated the rules and dignity of that
body.
That's enough about that.
is to forget it.

The best thing to do

A number of clients have expressed a desire to
have the daily barometrical figures produced in concrete form for the year 1909. I therefore offer the
tabulations in this letter:
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AVER A GE DAILY PRICES FOR THE MONTH
OF JANUARY, 1909.
2R Ralls.

Date

18 I nd.

41 R. & I.

AdT,

Dec .

100.57
75 .22
87.89
.26
73.07
86.28
1.61
99.50
72.18
85.36
.92
98.55
72.23
98.55
85 .39
.03
100.12
73.73
86.92 1.53
7
100.00
73.16
86.58
.34
" 8
1.02
72.29
85.56
9
98.83
.11
72.23
85.45
98.67
" 11
.31
85.14
98.20
72.09
" 12
.32
98.04
71.60
84.82
" 13
98.73
71.83
85.28
.46
" 14
85.32
.04
98.87
71.78
" 15
99.85
72.45
86.15
.83
" 16
72.16
.35
99.45
85 .80
" 18
99.85
72.43
86.14
.34
" 19
· .06
72.23
99.92
86.08
" 20
100.32
72.96
86.64
.56
" 21
.OS
99.83
73.35
86.59
" 22
.12
99.61
73.33
86.47
" 23
.25
99.79
73.65
86.72
" 25
.32
73.15
86.40
99.65
" 26
.29
100.11
73.26
86.69
" 27
.75
99.31
72.56
85.94
" 28
72.12
.58
98.59
85.36
" 29
.75
71.39
84.61
97.83
" 30
High in Jan .
100.57
75.22
87.89
84.61
L ow in Jan.
97.83
71.39
High in 1909 .
100.57
75.22
87.89
L ow in 1909 .
97.83
84.61
71.39
23 Active Rails show a decline since December 31
of 2.14.
18 Active Industrials show a decline since Decemher 31 of 3.90.
41 Rails and Industrials show a decline since December 31 of 3.02.
Jan.

2
4
5
6
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AVERAGE DAILY PRICES FOR THE MONTH
OF FEBRUARY, 1909.
Date

Feb.

23 Ralls.

18 Ind.

1
2
3
4
5
6
8
9
10

41 R. & I.

AdY,

Dec.

97.90
71.55
84.72
.11
98.66
72.09
85.37
.65
98.81
72.09
85.45
.08
98.86
71.84
85.35
.10
98.87
71.96
85.42
.07
98.57
85.18
.24
71.79
"
99.07
72.65
85.86
.68
98.99
72.53
85.76
.10
72.71
.27
98.35
86.03
"
99.61
73.09
.32
86.3~
" 11
Holiday. Stock Exchange Closed.
" 12
Holiday. Stock Exchange Closed.
" 13
100.65
73.57
87.11
.76
" 15
100.45
73.19
86.82
.29
" 16
100.00
86.37
.45
72.73
" 17
98.23
71.64
84.94
1.43
" 18
98.57
71.08
84.83
.11
" 19
97.87
69.42
8-3.65
1.18
" 20
Holiday. Stock Exchange Closed.
" 22
94.60
66.72
80.66
2.99
" 23
96.33
68.59
82.46 1.80
" 24
95.68
67.76
81.72
.74
" 25
96.74
68.48,
82.61
.89
" 26
97.08
68.99
83.04
.43
" 27
High in Feb ..
100.65
73.57
87.11
Low in Feb . .
94.60
66.72
80.66
High in 1909 . 100.65
75.22
87.89
Low in 1909 .
94.60
66.72
80.66
i3 Active Rails show a decline since January 30
of .75.
18 Active Industrials show a decline since January
30 of 2.40.
41 Rails and Industrials show a decline since January 30 of 1.57.
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AVERAGE DAILY PRICES FOR THE MONTH
OF MARCH, 1909.
Date

Mar.

23 Ralls.

1
2
3
4

s

"
"
"

"
"
_.,"
"

"

.
.
.
.

6 .
8 .
9 .
10 .
11
12 .
13 .
15 .
16.
17 .
18 .
19

" 20

"
"

"
"
"

"

"

"
"

High
Low
High
Low

22 .
23
24 .
25 .
26 .
27.
29 .
30 .
31 .

in
in
in
in

Mar.
Mar.
1909
1909

97.62
97.78
97.18
9'6.62
96.91
96.97
97.35
96.78
97.11
96.89
97.24
96.95
96.78
97.50
98.21
98.12
97.94
97.86
98.94
98.50
99.04
99.26
99.36
100.24
101.20
100.92
101.87
102.52
96.62
102.52
94.60

18 Ind.

70.01
70.50
70.10
69.30
70.05
69.67
69.73
69.08
69.16
69.41
69.72
69.74
69.52
70.28
70.61
70.33
70.15
70.05
71.02
70.64
71.04
71.12
71.46
72.SS
73.12
73.03
73.75
73.90
69.08
75.22
66.72

41 R. & I.

Ad~.

83.82
84.14
83.64
82.96
83.48
83.32
83.54
82.93
83.13
83.15
83.48
83.34
83.15
83.89
84.41
84.22
84.04
83.95
84.98
84.57
85.04
85.19
85.41
86.39
87.16
86.97
87.81
88.21
82.93
88.21
80.66

.78
.32

Dec.

.so
.68

.52

.16
.22

.61
.20
.02
.33

.14
.19
.74
.52

.19
.18
.09
1.03
.41
.47
.15
.22
.98

.77
.19
.84

23 Acti ve Rails sh ow an adva nce since February
'I

I

27 of 4.79.
18 Acti ve Industrials show an ad vance since February 27 of 4.76.
41 Rails a nd Industrials show an a dvance since
February 27 of 4.77.
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AVERAGE DAILY PRICES FOR THE MONTH
OF APRIL, 1909.
Date

23 Ralls.

18 Ind.

41 R. & I.

AdT.

Dee.

.40
88.21
73.90
102.52
1
.98
87.23
73.00
101.47
2
.63
87.86
73.59
102.14
3
.80
88.66
74.31
103.02
5
.39
88.27
74.16
102.38
6
.10
88.37
74.35
102.39
7
.59
88.96
75.03
102.88
8
Holiday. Stock Exchange Closed.
9
Holiday. Stock Exchange Closed.
" 10
89.62
.66
75.73
103.51
" 12
.67
88.95
75.02
102.88
" 13
.12
89.07
75.12
103.02
14
"
.05
89.02
75.11
102.93
" 15
.84
88.18
74.40
101.97
" 16
88.67
.49
74.80
102.54
" 17
.82
89.49
75.63
103.36
" 19
.10
89.59
75.37
103.82
" 20
.20
89.39
75.21
103.58
" '21
89.82
.43
75.63
104.02
" 22
.35
89.47
75.47
103.47
" 23
.32
89.79
75 .78
103.80
" 24
.54
89.25
75.33
103.16
" 26
.19
75.15
89.06
102.97
" 27
.78
75 .77
89.84
103.91
" 28
.15
89.69
75.71
103.68
" 29
90.13
.44
76.14
104.12
" 30
90.13
76.14
104.12
Hig h in Apr.
73.00
66.72
Low in Apr.
101.47
90.13
76.14
104.12
High in 1909
80.66
66.72
94.60
L ow in 1909
23 Active Rails show an advance since March 3\
of 2.25.
18 Active Industrials show an advance since March
31 of 2.39.
41 Rails and Industrials show an advance since
March 31 of 2.32.

Apr.
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AVERAGE DAILY PRICES FOR THE MONTH
OF MAY, 1909.
Date

May

28 Ralls.

1
3
4
5
6

.
.
.
.
.

18 Ind.

fl R. & I.

AdT .

Dec.

104.20
76.08
90.14
.01
104.73
76.43
90.59
.45
104.87
76.68
90.77
.18
104.41
76.73
.20
90.57
104.50
77.36
90.93
.36
7 .
105.09
78.35
91.72
.79
8 .
105.21
78.27
91.74
.02
104.75
77.73
91.24
.so
" 10
105.38
78.05
91.72
.48
" 11
105.64
78.21
91.93
.21
" 12
105.77
78.29
92.03
.10
" 13
.14
105.31
78.46
91.89
" 14
105.29
.07
78.62
91.96
" 15 .
104.86
78.37
91.62
.34
" 17.
105.25
78.73
91.99
.37
" 18.
105.54
78.95
92.25
.26
" 19 .
104.95
78.24
.65
91.60
" 20 .
105.13
78.50
91.82
.22
" 21 .
.51
. 105.57
79.09
92.33
" 22.
H
24 .
. 105.55
79.17
92.36
.03
.19
105.30
79.04
92.17
" 25 .
104.80
78.62
.46
91.71
" 26.
92.17
105.22
""79.11
.46
" 27.
105.41
79.65
92.53
.36
"H 28.
Holiday. Stock Exchange Closed.
29 .
Holiday. Stock Exchange Closed.
" 31 .
92.53
High in May
105.77
79.65
Low in May
104.20
76.08
90.14
High in 1909
105.77
92.53
79.65
Low in 1909
94.60
66.72
80.66
23 Active Rails show an advance since April 30 of
1.29.
18 Active Industrials show an advance since April
30 of 3.51.
41 Rails and Industrials show an advance since
A pril 30 of 2.40.
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A VERA GE DAILY PRICES FOR THE MONTH
OF JUNE, 1909.
Date

June

"
"

..
"

"
"
"
"

"
"
"
"
"

"

"
"
"
"
"

"
High
Low
High
Low

23 Ralle.

1
2
3

4
5
7 .
8.
9 .
10
11
12
14
15
16
17
18
19
21
22
23
24
25
26
28
29 .
30.
in June
in June
in 1909
in 1909

105.97
105.74
106.88
107.69
107.77
107.41
107·.75
107.53
107.81
107.70
107.66
107.51
106.46
106.68
105.55
105.87
105.96
104.34
.104.58
105.88
106.42
106.18
105.96
106.39
106.86
106.51
107.81
104.34
107.81
94.60

18 Ind.

41 R. & I.

80.00
92.99
80.15
92.95
81.00
93.94
80.85
94.27
81.03
94.40
80.72
94.07
80.62
94.19
80.36
93.95
80.48
94.15
80.65
94.18
80.57
94.12
80.77
94.14
79.28
92.87
79.09
92.88
78.03
91.79
78.15
921ll
78.21
92.08
76.66
90.50
76.95
90.77
78.05
91.97
78.62
92.52
78.37
92.28
78.26
92.11
78.37
92.38
.79.46
93.16
79.12
92.81
81.03
94.40
76.66 . 90.50
81.03
94.40
66.72
80.66

AdT,

Dec,

.46
.04
.99
.33
.13
.33
.12
.24
.20
.03
.06
.02
1.27
.01
1.09
.22
.07
1.58
.27
1.20
:55
.24
.17
.27
.78
.35

23 Active Rails show an advance since May 27 of
1.10.
18 Active Industrials show a decline since May 27
of .53.
41 Rails and Industrials show an advance since
May 27 of .28.
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AVERAGE DAILY PRICES FOR THE MONTH
OF JULY, 1909.
Date

23 Rall•.

18 Ind.

'1 R. & I.

Ad\'.

Dec.

1
106.67
79.51
93.09
.28
79.62
93.19
2
106.75
.10
Holiday. Stock Exchange Closed.
" 3
Holiday. Stock Exchange Closed.
5
107.26
93.42
.23
6
79.57
7
107.39
79.60
93.50
.08
106.95
.26
8
79.53
93.24
.26
9
106.76
79.20
92.98
106.93
79.27
93.10
.12
" 10
107.32
79.62
93.47
.37
" 12
107.03
79.13
93.08
.39
" 13
107.15
79.08
93.11
.03
" 14
107.32
79.68
93.50
.39
" 15
107.51
80.17
93.84
.34
" 16
108.01
80.27
94.14
.30
" 17
108.11
80.54
94.32
.18
" 19
108.61
80.89
94.75
.43
" 20
107.90
" 21
80.41
94.16
.59
108.02
80.58
94.30
.14
" 22
108.26
80.73
94.49
.19
" 23
108.28
80.81
94.54
.OS
" 24 ·.
107.71
80.49
94.10
.44
" 26
108.62
80.98
94.80
.70
" 27 .
108.93
81.26
95.09
.29
" 28 .
" 29 .
109.66
81.68
95.67
.58
110.56
82.68
96.62
" 30 .
.95
110.32
83.09
9"6.70
.08
" 31 .
High in July
110.56
83.09
96.70
Low in July
106.76
79.08
92.98
High in 1909
110.56
83.09
96.70
Low in 1909 .
94.60
66.72
80.66
23 Active Rail s show a n adva nce since June 30 of
3.81.
•
18 Active Industrials show an advance since June
30 of 3.97.
41 Rails and I ndustrials sho w an ad va nce since
June 30 of 3.89.
July

514

AVERAGE DAILY PRICES FOR THE MONTH
OF AUGUST, 1909.
Date

23

Rall■.

Aug. 2 .
3 .
4.

18 Ind.

110.55
83.69
110.48
84.08
110.44
84.14
s.
110.07
83.48
6 .
111.38
84.53
7
111.54
84.66
111.71
"H 9
84.48
10
111.76
84.53
H
11
112.67
85.01
112.93
"H 12
84.85
13 .
112.44
84.31
112.97
" 14
84.46
H
16
112.49
83.58
H
17
112.70
83.87
H
18
111.70
82.88
110.22
" 19
82.40
H
20
110.16
82.40
H
21
111.18
83.09
H
23
111.46
83.53
" 24
111.46
83.84
H
25
110.16
83.26
H
26 .
107.74
81.39
" 27 .
108.61
82.19
High in Aug.
112.97
85.01
Low in Aug.
107.74
81.39
High in 1909
112.97
85.01
Low in 1909 .
94.60
66.72
23 Active Rails show a decline
1.71.

41 R. & I.

Ad'I'.

97.12
97.28
97.29
96.77
97.95
98.10
98.09
98.14
98.84
98.89
98.37
98.71
98.03
98.28
97.29
96.31
96.28
97.13
97.49
97.65
96.71
94.56
95.40
98.89
94.56
98.89
80.66

.42
.16
.01

Dec.

.52

1.18
.15
.01

.OS
.70

.OS
.52
.34

.68
.25
.99
.98
.03

.85
.36
.16
.94
2.15
.84

since July 31 of

18 Active Industrials show a decline since July 31
of .90.
41 Rails and Industrials show a decline since July
31 of 1.30.
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AVERAGE DAILY PRICES FOR THE MONTH
OF SEPTEMBER, 1909.
Date

23-Rall•.

18 Ind.

Sept.

41 R. & I ,

Adv.

Dae.

1 .
109.33
82.46
95.89
109.89
82.95
96.42
.53
" 2 .
110.31
83.31
96.81
.39
" 3 .
Holiday. Stock Exchange Closed.
" 4.
6 .
Holiday. Stock Exchange Closed.
7. .
108.43
82.39
95.41
1.40
8 ..
108.07
82.12
95.09
.32
106.53 , 80.79
93.66
1.43
" 9 ..
109.22
82.07
95.64 1.98
" 10 .
108.81
81.34
95.07
.57
" 11 .
107.94
81.17
94.55
.52
" 13 .
109.16
81.97
95.57 1.01
" 14.
110.28
83.37
96.82 1.26
" 15 .
110.77
84.01
97.39
.57
" 16 .
111.21
'84.18
9'7.69
.30
" 17 .
111.14
84.08
97.61
.08
" 18 .
111.42
84.44
97.93
.32
" 20.
111.13
84.40
97.77
.16
" 21 .
110.04
.82
83.85
96.95
" 22.
.19
109.64
83.88
96.76
" 23 .
109.52
83.88
96.70
.06
" 24.
Holiday. Stock Exchange Closed.
" 25 .
109.90
84.15
97.02
.32
" 27 .
111.23
84.85
98.04 1.02
" 28 .
.03
111.37
84.66
98.01
" 29.
.21
111.18
97.80
84.43
" 30 .
High in Sept.
111.42
98.04
84.85
Low in Sept.
106.53
80.79
93.66
85.01
High in 1909
112.97
98.89
Low in 1909 .
94.60
66.72
80.66
23 Active Rails show an advance since Aug. 31
of 1.56.
18 Active Industrials show an advance since Aug.
31 of 1.45.
41 Rails and Industrials show an advance since
Aug. 31 of 1.50.
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AVERAGE DAILY PRICES FOR THE MONTH
OF OCTOBER, 1909.
Date

Oct.

23

Rall ■ •

18 Ind.

1
2
4
5

41R.&I.

AdT,

Dec.

111.25
84.91
98.08
.28
111.19
84.94
98.07
.01
111.26
84.84
"
98.05
.02
110.29
"
83.59
96.94
1.11
110.21
" 6
83.49
96.85
.09
110.66
" 7
83.71
97.18
.33
109.67
" 8
82.87
96.27
.91
" 9
109.61
82.64
96.13
.I4
108.51
81.82
" 11
95.17
.96
Holiday. Stock Exchange Closed.
" 12
108.96
" 13
81.94
95.45
.28
109.83
" 14
82.89
96.36
.91
110.67
" 15
83.62
97.14
.78
110.61
" 16
83.58
97.09
.OS
110.79
" 18
83.58
97.18
.09
110.20
" 19
83.27
% .73
.45
109.86
" 20
83.13
96.49
.24
110.12
" 21
83.18
96.65
.16
108.69
82.18
" 22
95.43
1.22
107.35
" 23
81.02
94.18
1.25
108.29
" 25
82.07
95.18 1.00
107.70
81.58
" 26 .
94.64
.54
108.42
" 27 .
82.26
95.34
.70
108.79
" 28 .
82.88
95.83
.49
110.05
83.85
" 29.
96.95 1.12
109.79
" 30 .
84.34
97.06
.11
High in Oct . . 111.26
84.94
98.08
Low in Oct. .
107.35
81.02
94.18
High in 1909 . . 112.97
85.01
98.89
Low in 1909
94.60
66.72
80.66
23 Active Rails show a decline since September 30
of 1.39.
18 Active Industrials show a decline since September 30 of .09.
41 Rails and Industrials show a decline since September 30, of .74.
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AVERAGE DAILY PRICES FOR THE MONTH
OF NOVEMBER, 1909.
Date

23 Ralls.

18 Ind.

'1 R , &I.

.MT,

Dec.

.39
97.45
84.81
110.09'
1 .
Holiday. Stock Exchange Closed.
2 .
.35
97.80
85 .39
110.22
3 .
.09
97.71
85.41
110.11
4 .
.34
97.37
84.94
109.81
5 .
.38
96.99
84.64
109.34
6 .
.03
96.96
84.78
109.13
8 .
.44
96.52
84.41
108.63
9.
.16
96.36
84.07
108.65
" 10
.23
96.13
83.98
108.28
11
"
.20
9'6.33
84.23
108.43
" 12 .
.45
96.78
84.77
108.79
" 13 .
.02
96.76
84.97
108.55
15
.
"
.20
96.56
84.83
108.29
" 16.
.16
96.72
84.91
108.54
17
.
"
.43
97.15
85.37
108.93
" 18.
.30
97.45
85.77
109.14
" 19 .
.66
96.79
85.21
108.37
" 20 .
.57
96.22
84.57
107.88
" 22 .
.14
96.08
84.29
107.87
" 23 .
.39
95.69'
83.76
. 107.61
" 24.
Stock
Exchange
Closed.
.
Jfoliday.
" 25 .
.84
96.53
84.57
108.49
" 26 .
.79
95.74
83.59
107.90
" 27 .
1.33
94.41
82.01
106.81
" 29 .
.04
94.37
81.98
106.75
" 30 .
97.80
85.77
110.22
High in Nov.
94.37
81.98
106.75
Low in N9v.
98.89
85.77
112.97
High in 1909
80.66
66.72
94.60
Low in 1909 .
23 Active Rails show a decline since October 30
of 3.04.
18 Active Industrials show a decline since October
30 of 2.36.
41 Rails and Industrials show a decline since October 30 of 2.70.

Nov.
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A V ERAGE DAILY PRICES FOR THE MONTH
OF D E CEM BER, 1909.
Date

23 Ralls.

Dec.

1 .
107.15
2 .
106.69
3 .
107.39
4 .
108.03
6 .
107.50
7 .
108.27
" 8 .
108.33
9.
109.14
" 10
108.67
" 11
108.89
109.58
" 13
" 14
109.26
" 15
109.48
" 16
109.62
" 17
109.93
18
110.31
" 20
109.76
" 21
109.47
" 22
109.49
" 23
109.62
" 24
109.76
" 25
H oliday.
" 27
109.55
" 28
109.59
" 29
110.40
" 30 .
110.79
" 31 .
111.36
High in Dec. . 111.36
Low in Dec.
106.69
High in 1909 . 112.97
Low in 1909
94.60

18 Ind.

41 R. & I.

Adv.

Dec,

82.88
95.02
.65
82.59
94.64
.38
83.39
95.39
.75
83.96
95.99
.60
83.26
95.38
.61
83.84
96.06
.68
83.98
96.16
.10
84.21
96.68
.52
84.13
96.40
.28
84.21
96.55
.15
84.75
97.16
.61
84.30
96.78
.38
84.31
96.89
.11
84.35
96.98
.09
84.51
97.22
.24
84.71
97.51
.29
84.73
97.24
.27
84.72
97.09
.15
84.78
97.13
.04
84.52
97.07
.06.
84.76
97.26
.19
Stock Exchange Closed.
84.39
96.97
.29
84.62
97.10
.13
85.46
97.93
.82
85.52
98.15
.22
85.47
98.41
.26
85.52
98.41
82.59
94.64
85.77
98.89
66.72
80.66
23 Active Rails show an advance since November
30 of 4.61.
18 Active Industrials show an advance since November 30 of 3.49.
41 Rails and Industrials show an advance since
November 30 of 4.04.

.

519

THE FOREIGN SITUATION.
The movements in the European money markets
during the week were similar to those of last week.
There was a very small investment demand for
money, the British and German Governments issued
a number of treasury bills, gold continued to gravitate to Germany from the mines, and from the
Banks of England and France, and stock exchange
speculation was of limited extent.
The bitter electioneering campaign that is being
-carried out in England has, so far, had little effect
upon the English money markets. Investors and bankers now admit that the Bank of England directors
:handled the bank's business in a masterly manner during the recent money crisis, and the recent lowering
of the bank's discount rate has assured business
men generally that the outcome of the elections will
not be such as will interfere with British commer•
dal affairs.
The fears relating Jo the collection of customs
revenues in England under the new Budget schedules recently expressed by the Conservative newspapers has subsided. Experience has proved them
to be groundless. The customs authorities report
that there is no friction between them, the importers
.and manufacturers.
The Conservative Party has announced its substitute for the Lloyd-George Budget. .1 he Unionists'
.alternative, as described by Mr. Austin Chamberlain, is as follows: 1. It is proposed to establish a
_general tariff, placing duties on practically all goods
wliich are not deemed to be raw material.
2. Only three rates of duty, giving an average
•of about 10 per cent., will be imposed.
3. Goods deemed raw material will be admitted
-duty free.
4. Goods on which a little labor has been spent
-will be taxed 5 per cent .
5. Goods nearly approaching the finished state
-will be taxed 10 per cent.
6. All completely manufactured articles will be
taxed 15 per cent.
No variations from this scale will be permitted,
unless some very exceptional cases can be proved.
Those who propose this alternative express the
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desire to "Make the foreigner pay." Unfortunately
for them, the campaign literature and the Conservative newsi)apers' articles have enlightened the
people in respect to prominent protection fallacies.
For example, last month the Conservative press reported that there was a state of chaos at the London Customs House. Some merchants, they said,
paid the duties on dutiable goods, while others refused to pay. But the truth is that as soon as the
House of Commons passed resolutions imposing the
duties, merchants took advantage of the opportunity
to advance prices to consumers. This caused merchants to occupy a position from which it is difficult for them to retreat. If they were to refuse
to pay duties and obtain their commodities under
the old customs schedules, or duty free, they would
be compelled to lower their prices to consumers,
and this would be too important an object lesson to
the voters regarding the question as to who pays
protective duties. Consequently, all importers decided from the first to pay the customs charges without protest, and reap the benefits of increased profits
by advancing prices all around.
English investors in stock exchange securities
have been interested in recent discussions relative
to a theory of the geographical distribution of capital that may in future have some influence in enlarging the market for American securities in England. The theory is based upon the insurance principle of averaging rates. Investors are advised to
divide their capital into eight or ten parts, each of
which should be invested in a different part of the
world. The distribution advised is in accordance
with the following rules:
1. It is indispensable that there be an even division among all the stocks held.
2. All sto'cks must . be matched in quality and
width of fluctuation.
(Debentures, for example,
with a 2 per cent, variation, are not an ade,quate
equipoise for a common stock with an 8 per cent.
variation.)
3. Each of the stocks held must be subject to an
entirely different set of influences which causes them
to rise and fall in value.
This theory has been developed from the old European investment practice of splitting up capital
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over entirely different industries, so as to guard
against the effects of similarity of price movements.
But experience has shown that this splitting up of
capital is, generally, quite unavailing. The new
theory of the geographical distribution of capital is,
consequently, advanced to remedy the defects of the
old practice. lt is, of course, only recommended to
those investors who desire to place their capital at
interest for a number of years, and not to those who
wish to profit by market variations within short
intervals.
Although many investors look favoral>ly on this
new theory and will undoubtedly give it a trial, it
is doubtful whether it will work out as successfully
as its promulgators expect.
Statistics relating to the price fluctuations of Government bonds on the London Stock Exchange
show that in recent years their fluctuations admit of
the bonds being classified in two columns, as follows:
Bonds Advanced.
Bonds Declined.
Paraguay
Algeria
Japan
Chili
Tunis
Turkey
Bulgaria
Denmark
Belgium
Servi a
Norway
Germany
Greece
Sweden
Hungary
Mexico
Switzerland
Austria
Roumania
Cape Colony
United States
Brazil
Canada
Russia
Argentina
Egypt
Great Britain
China
Holland
France
Portugal
Spain

Italy
An examination of the history of the above loans
shows that this grouping is not fortuitous. When
the present prices of gilt-ed~ed bonds are compared
with those of 1896 and earlier years, it will be noticed that there has been a steady decline. This indicates that there is a well-defined gene'ral movement worldwide in extent, ·and in the same direction,
among stocks of equal security. Arbitraging in international stocks is based on the recognition of
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this uniformity of movement in stock and bond
prices.
The weekly statement of the Bank of England
shows the following changes: Total reserve decreased £578,000; circulation decreased £224,000;
bullion decreased £803,000; other securities increased
£rn,561,ooo; other deposits increased £9,223,000;
public deposits increased £1,013,000; Government
securities increased £249,000.
is now 36.40%, against 44.90% last week ::ind comweek last year.
The proportion of the bank's reserve to liabilities
pares with a decline from 38.30% to 31i% in this
The checks cleared by the London banks for the
week aggregate £244,000,000, compared with £242,130,000 last week and £217,317,000 last year.
The following table gives the Bank of England
statement in detail, for the week, with comparisons:
Week End
Week End
Week End
Dec. 28, '09. Dec. 30, '08. Jan. I, '08.
Circulation. . £28,858,490 £29,751,030 £29,520,435
Pub. depos.
I0,782,095
7,924,225
7,558,694
Other depos
50,208,782
53,602,640
52,657,228
Gov. secur .
14,712,388
15,832,136
14,730,535
Other secur.
41,769,846
45,086,432
40,807,943
Total res . . . 22,220,638
19,431,372
21,473,227
Coin and bull. 32,629,128
30,732,402
32,543,662
Prop. of res .
36.40%
31i%
3Si%
This statement shows that the bank's reserve has
suffered further impairment. The proportion of reserves to liabilities this week is 36.40 per cent., as
compared with 35.09 per cent.-the average proportion during the past eight years. The factors
that have induced the impairment that !·as been
noticeable during the past three weeks are still operative and the bank's statement next week will, doubtless, show further diminution in reserve.
Authorities on British constitutional law express
the opinion that the demand notes for ordinary income tax, and the new super-tax, cannot be sent
out until Parliament meets again and r,asses the
Budget or a new one. This will result in a large
Government deficit, which must be relieved by issues

523

of treasury bills and, later, by Joans from the Bank
of England. This will oblige the directors of the
Bank of England to take steps to keep up the bank's
gold reserve beyond the amount usually held at the
beginning of the year when money generally becomes plentiful.
European bankers expect large gold demands
from India, Russia, Argentina and Brazil early in
the year, and they look for a continuatior. of high
discount rates for some time. The Statist, London,
editorially states that it considers "The worst of
the money troubles are over. But it would be foolish to conclude, therefore, that we may act as we
please. We are by no means yet out of the wood.
In another four or five weeks money will begin to
come easy all over the world. In every country at
all economically forward, money will begin to flow
back from the interior to the great monetary centres and therefore the demand for gold will ease
off. Here in England, the elections will then be
beginning, and electioneering will probably prevent
money from flowing back to London during the
month of January. The reserve of the Bank of
England, therefore, may continue low for fully two
months."
The weekly statement of the Bank o[ France
shows the following changes: Gold on hand decreased 11,600,000 francs; silver on hand decreased
16,325,000 francs.

THE GENERAL SITUATION.
The high cost of living promises to take its place
in importance alongside the high cost of raw materials, of which cotton spinners and manufacturers of
other goods have been complaining. The former is
the basis for the wage demands of railroad employees, and, while £astern railroad officials say
that if necessities have risen since the last increase
in wages they are willing to make proper conccs. sions, in the same breath they bring forth statistics
to prove that such a rise has not taken place. Much
will depend upon the conservatism of labor leaders
whether the controversy results in a general strike
o n the roads east of the Mississippi. Notwithstand-
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ing the assertions of railroad officials that the strike
of the switchmen in the Northwest is now a strike in
name only, there is great congestion of traffic in that
section as shown by the side-tracks being full of cars
loaded with grain, and the situation promises to be
further complicated by the interference of the Railroad Department of the American Federation of
Labor, the head of which is now in Washington
seeking Federal intervention.
In some instances railroads in the Central West
are hampered in handling a heavily increased traffic
by inefficiency of motive power. The engines, it is
said, are not up to their rated capacity. This is
probably due to the paring down of maintenance of
equipment expenses. The American Locomotive
Co. has recently been favored with orders for $500,000 worth of motive power. This company is now
in shape to handle such business, as its trouble with
the boilermakers has been adjusted.
Rail contracts for 30,000 tons have come to light
during the past few days and the pig iron business
in the East and West shows some signs oi improvement. The demand for plain and fabricated structural steel is composed of small orders, but the aggregate in very gratifying. The steel companies
have enough orders booked ahead to keep them going for several months, provided, of course, the right
to cancel is not exercised.
Copper metal is still in good demand, both for
domestic use and for February and March shipment
to Europe. James Lewis & Son, of Liverpool, report consumptioTI of Copper in Europe for ,n months
as follows:
England
France .
Germany .

1909
61,922
48,506
123,857

1908
72,88o
57,782
128,005

1907
64,310 tons.
53,083 tons.
96,395 tons.

Total .
213,788 tons.
258,667
234,285
The big electric companies in this country report
some large new orders and are confident as to the
future. The projected construction of 1,000 miles of
n.c w electric roads in Texas which is planned to bc-
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gin in the Spring will benefit the market for the
metal.
Money is still the greatest single factor in the
situation. There are no visible signs which point to
any very low rates in the immediate future, either
in this country or in Europe, and we are s1ill under
the shadow of possible gold shipments to Europe.
Cotton exports are falling oft, and exports of wheat
and flour are 23.9ro/o below the II month period of
1go8. The cables tell us that American interests
have renewed their efforts for accommodations in Europe and that new American securities are being
offered freely to syndicates. Canadian and the interior banks continue to draw down deposits to meet
year-end requirements. The Western money markets are all firm. New capital requirements will
serve to prevent any pronounced drop in money
rates. So far the harmonious efforts of our local
banking institutions, together with the assistance of
out of town banks, have resulted in preventing any
abnormal rise in rates. One thing that has helped
tile situation is the closer relationship between New
York and out of town banks. Money is moved
quickly to the point where there is the most demand for it. The movement is also handled with
less effort than in former years. How far this unity
of action would extend in times of actual and general
money stress is problematical. Call rates reached
7o/o on Thursday but the incipient flurry was checked
by offerings from Chicago.

THE TECHNICAL SITUATION.
The technical situation has improved this week.
The quick shakeout on Monday drove the weaker
bulls out and somewhat increased the short interest. The borrowing demand reflects a rather large
shortage in the general list. The well-based tendency to sell such stocks as Reading, Union Pacific,
New York Central and Steel Common results in a
heavier short interest in these stocks than in Amalgamated, Smelters, or the equipments. The stocks
last mentioned are advancing on their merits, which
is all the more convincing. The equipments have
practically no short interest and are also neglected.
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Chart Showing Market Movements for December, 1909.
(Thomas Gibson' s Figures.)
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They may not move much for a while, but will have
their day before the bull market ends.
Taking the list as a whole, the character of the
buying is better than the selling.

CONCLUSION.
We are entering a stock market year in which ·
discrimination is going to be the prime factor making for success. In 1908 there was nothing to it
but to buy anythmg that had any merit at all. In
1909 the sailing was not quite so clear and in 1910
unusual vigilance must be exercised. The advance
in stock prices in 1908 was, on the average, about
29 points in rails and 26 points in industrials. In
1909 the advance was 9.62 points in rails and 9.33
points in industrials. I had no hesitancy in predicting advances in both 1908 and 1909, but I do not
feel at all sure about 1910. Everything depends
on developments. I trust, however, that with the
service improved by new channels of information
and an increased staff of competent men, we will be
able to reap our reasonable profits as usual. I have
gone on record in my published works with the
opinion that there is no reason why speculation,
properly conducted, should ever result in a losill&'
year. When this .statem·ent was made in 1906 it
subjected me to a great deal of criticism, but so
so far I have proved my case-that is a matter of
record. I hope to do so in 1910.
In my opinion the best thing to do just now is
to confine operations to purchases of industrial
stocks. Amalgamated Copper, American Smelting
and Refining and Consolidated Gas look best for
immediate movements. Would buy the equipments
on all soft spots for a longer pull. In the highpriced rails the best bargain is in Pennsylvania. In
the low-priced rails Chicago Great Western looks
attractive. Would sell Reading and Steel Common
on bulges.
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THOMAS GIBSON'S MARKET LETTERS
THIS ADVISORY SERVICE CONSISTS OF:
1.-A daily letter mailed at 3.30 P. M.
2.-A weekly letter covering general business conditions, crop conditions, the technical situation and
offering suggestions for operations during the coming week.
3.-A special letter weekly covering whatever topic
is most vital.
4.-A special letter weekly on crop conditions, during the season.
5.-Analysis of the reports of leading corporations
as they appear.
6.-A daily table of average stock prices (Rails and
Industrials).
7.-Occasional telegrams regarding important
changes.
8.-Privilege of a reasonable number of inquiries
by mail or telegraph.
The subscriber to this service may rest assured that
every question affecting future values and prices of
securities will be thoroughly covered.
These letters deal particularly with securities. Grain
and Cotton are also briefly touched Qn. While I attempt to gain the most dependable opinions on commodities, the advice offered is not based on personal
investigation.

THE PRICE OF THE SERVICE IS AS FOLLOWS:
One month ... $10.00
COMPLETE SERVICE
Six months .. . 40.00
AS DETAILED ABOVE
One year ..... 75.00

I

COMPLETE SERVICE
(EXCEPT DAILY LETTER)

One month .... $5.00
{ Six months ... 20.00
One year .. . . 35.00

THOMAS GIBSON
Corn Exchange Bank Building
NEW YORK

Thomas Gibson-'s
Market Letters for the Year l 907
This volume includes all the weekly letters
and several of the special letters published in
the year 1907. The value of this work lies in
the fact that the great decline of 1907 was predicted months before it occurred, and every
reason for anticipating such a decline is set
forth in the letters.
The educational value of the work cannot be
overestimated. It has demonstrated absolutely
that it is possible to foresee great price changes
through the mediums of logic and the study of
economic factors.
The book contains a number of valuable
statistical tables and offers a broad prediction
of price movements in the year 1908.
Uniform in size with the Pitfalls and the
Cycles of Speculation. Price, bound in cloth,
$1.00. By mail, $1.10.
Complete Library (9 vols.) $5.00.
Published by

THE GIBSON PUBLISHING CO.
15 William Street, New York

Thomas Gibson's
W eeldy Market Letters for l 908
IN TWO VOLUMES
Vol. J- Weekly Market Letters.

Vol. 2- Book of Charts

This volume includes all the weekly letters published in the year 1908, together with a number of
valuable statistical tables. The letters form a history
of the stock market of 1908, not alone a record of
prices and movements, but a practical and philosophic discussion of economic causes and effects
underlying the broader swings, and also offers a
comprehensive forecast of price movements for 1909.
No attempt is made at day to day or week to
week prognostications. The intent and purposes of
these letters have been to adhere to the original
policy which is made clear in the Weekly Letters of
1907. Current events of interest in market circles
are taken up each week and their relation marketwise discussed in the broadest sense.
Ordinary gossip, idle rumors or "inside information" find but little space in these letters, although,
of course, some of this base currency of the Street
cannot be entirely ignored because of its temporary
influence upon prices and sentiment.
The book of charts, which is more ,fully described
on another page, is an almost indispensable companion work to the weekly letters, being a visible aid
to the thorough understanding of the movements discussed and analyzed. Reference is invariably made in
the letters to particular pages in the book of charts.
Price, bound in cloth, uniform in size with Pitfalls
and Cycles of Speculation, $1.00 for each volume, or
$1.50 for the two. By mail, $1.10 and $1.62.
Complete Library (9 vols.) $5.00.
Published by

THE GIBSON PUBLISHING CO.
15 William Street, New York

Thomas Gibson's Weekly Market Letters
1908, vol. II, Book of Charts
In this volume are reproduced the charts issued in
connection with Thomas Gibson's Market Letters for
1908. A few of the various subjects graphically
presented in these charts are:
Railroad Earnings and Their Immediate Effect on
Stock Prices in Years 1893-4, 1903-4 and 1907-8.
Effect of Reductions in Iron and Steel Prices in
Periods of Depression upon the Common Stock of
the United States Steel Corporation.
Stock Prices and Total Cereal Crops of the
United States by Years since 1885.
Market Movements of Stocks in 14 years in which
Labor Troubles Occurred.
Stock Prices and Cotton Crop of the United States.
Average Monthly Stock Movements and Quarterly Dividends of Amalgamated Copper for Years 1900
to 1908; also Average Monthly Prices of Electrolytic
Copper for the same Period.
Average Monthly Stock Market Prices and Dividend Payments for Years 1904-08.
Average Monthly Movements of 20 Active Railway Stocks from January, 1888, to March, 1908;
also Dull Months of that Period.
Bank Clearings of the Entire United States and
Prices of Twenty Principal Railroad Stocks for
Twenty-five Years.
Total Cereal Crop of the United States and
Prices of 20 Principal Railroad Stocks for a Period
of Years.
Comparison of Earnings and Price Movements of
United States Steel Common since 1902.
Stock Prices, Crops, Trade Balances and Bank
Clearings from ~85 to 1908.
Stock Market Movements in Month of June, 1908.
Railroad Earnings and Market Movements of
Stocks for 6 Years Next Following Panic Years of
1873, 1877, 1884, 1893, 1896, 1903.
Market Movements of Industrial Stocks for
Seven Years Next Following Panic Years.
Price, cloth, $1.00. By mail, $1.10.
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15 William Street, New York

Thomas Gibsont s
Special Market Letters for l 908
The subjects discussed have been chosen as bearing directly
upon the prices of securities, and in all cases the views of
men who speak with authority are presented.
Probable Effect of Tariff Revision on Securities, by Byron
W. Holt, chairman Tariff Committee Reform Club of New
York, editor of The Gold Supply and Prosperity: Increasing
Gold Supply and Stock Prices, by Maurice L. Muhleman,
ex-Deputy Assistant Treasurer of the United States; A Talk
About Cotton, by Katherine M. Giles, cotton expert; The
Coal Land Law, a compilation of the confidential opinions on
the constitutionality of the law by leading Senators and Mem•
hers of Congress ; The Importance of Fixed Charges, by
Carl Snyder, author of American Railways as Investments,
New Conceptions in Science, The World Machine, etc.;
The Balance of Trade, by Charles A. Conant, ex-treasurer
of Morton Trust Co., author of A History of Modern
Danks of Issue, etc.; Review of the World's Gold Supply, by Arthur Selwyn-Drown, E.M., M.A., B.Sc., consult•
ing mining engineer ; The Outlook for the Next Six
Months, by Professor J. Pease Norton of Yale University,
author of Statistical Studies in the New York Money Mar•
ket, etc.; Railroad Earnings and the New Accounting, by
George Bevan Mott, editorial staff The Wall Street Summary;
Gold Depreciation and Security Values, by Byron W. Holt;
Call Money Rates and Stock Prices, by John P. Ryan, financial
writer; Convertible Bonds, by Robert W. Speir, manager bond
department of Knauth, Nachod & Kuhne, New York; The Function of Speculation1 by Frank Fayant, writer on financial and economic subjects; Mmes on the New York Curb, by George E. Vigouroux, mining editor of the New York Commercial; Speculation
-Its Place in Economics, Speculation vs. Gambling, The
Moral Aspect of Speculation, Should Speculation be Regulated
by Law-are the captions of an article ably discussed by How•
ard Schenck Mott, associated with Messrs. Malcom & Coombe,
and on the staff of Harper's Weekly; The History of Prices
for 2508 Years, b_y Arthur Selwyn-Brown, E.M., M.A., B.Sc.,
etc. ; Copper, by Frank Fayant.
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The Pitfalls of Speculation
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BY THOMAS GIBSON

In this volume the author, has endeavored
to discuss as simply as is possible, the salient
factors of speculation and investment. The
Table of Contents, following the introduction,
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Manipulation.
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The Cycles of Speculation
BY THOMAS GIBSON

This book enters a little further into the influences bearing on price changes, than does the "Pitfalls of Speculation," described on the preceding
page.
The Table of Contents introduces as bearing
upon the subject:
The Cycles of Speculation.
The Gold Supply and Its Effect on Prices.
Money.
Political Influences.
Crops, etc.
Puts and Calls.
The Question of Dividends.
Basing Railroad Values.
Effect of Business Depression.
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Best Method of Trading.
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The Factor of Safety.
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Bibliography.
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The Increasing Gold Supply
A symposium of special letters on Gold Production and its probable effects on prices and
business by writers well versed on the subject.
A correct understanding of this matter is of
vital importance to every business man, and
particularly to the speculator or investor in
bonds, stocks or commodities. The volume
contains contributions by such eminent authorities as Maurice L. Muhleman, Byron W.
Holt, Arthur Selwyn-Brown, Professor J. Pease
Norton, and W. G. Nichols. Also a chapter
on the gold supply, by Thomas Gibson. The
principal subjects discussed are "Gold Depreciation and . Security Values," "Increasing
Gold 'Supply and Stock Prices," "Gold Supply
Not Too Great," "Review of the World's Gold
Supply," "Gold Depreciation Means Rising
Commodity Prices," "Gold lp.flation and Interest Rates," and a general discussion of the
World's Gold Supply as an economic factor.
Price, bound in cloth, $1.00. By mail, $1.10.
Complete Library (9 vols.) $5.00.
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Following the precedent est;iblished in 1908, a
number of special letters, written by competent and
trustworthy authorities were sent during the year
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The views expressed and deductions drawn in the
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but such divergences add to the value of a work of
this kind·; discussion of any one-sided question is
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and are offered to students of financial and economic
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7½ Billion Dollars Needed by Railroads in 15 Yrs .. .
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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Maurice L. Muhleman
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